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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation examines the idea of community development in the last four 
decades of the twentieth century through the example of the Harlem neighborhood of 
New York City and, in doing so, explains the broader transformation of the American 
city in these decades. Frustration with top-down urban redevelopment and the rise of 
Black Power brought new demands to Harlem, as citizens insisted on the need for 
“community control” over their built environment. In attempting to bring this goal to life, 
Harlemites created new community-based organizations that promised to realize a 
radically inclusive, cooperative ideal of a neighborhood built by and for the benefit of its 
predominantly low-income, African-American residents. For several reasons, including 
continued reliance on the public sector, dominant leaders, changing sociological 
understandings of poverty, and the intransigence of activists, however, such organizations 
came to advance a narrower approach in Harlem in succeeding years. By the 1980s, they 
pursued a moderate vision of Harlem’s future, prioritizing commercial projects instead of 
development that served residents’ many needs, emphasizing economic integration, and 
eschewing goals of broad structural change.  
In examining community design centers, community development corporations, 
self-help housing, and other neighborhood-based strategies, I conclude that local actors 
 iv 
achieved their longstanding aspiration that they could become central to the process of 
development in Harlem and similar places, but built a dramatically different reality than 
the idealistic hope that had fueled demands for community control in the late 1960s. This 
ironic outcome reveals the unexpected, radical roots of urban landscapes that by the end 
of the century were characterized by increasing privatization, economic gentrification, 
and commercial redevelopment. Likewise, it demonstrates that such dramatic changes in 
American cities were not simply imposed on unwitting neighborhoods by outsiders or the 
result of abstract forces, but were in part produced by residents themselves. 
Understanding the mutable nature of community development helps to explain both the 
complicated course of urban development in the aftermath of modernist planning and the 
lasting, often contradictory consequences of the radical demands that emerged from the 
1960s, two areas that historians have only begun to examine in detail.  
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Introduction 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the transformation of Harlem – a single 
neighborhood in a single American city – in the last four decades of the twentieth 
century. It is also the story of the surprising and remarkable transformation of American 
cities more broadly in these forty years. By the 1960s, cities had become for many the 
very symbols of all that was wrong in America. Urban centers, wracked by crime, 
joblessness, and poverty, had entered what many called an “urban crisis.” Television 
screens and newspaper front pages broadcast the decade’s “long hot summers,” 
delivering violent images that often confirmed the decision many had already made to 
leave cities behind. Depending on one’s perspective, the riots, civil disorders, or 
rebellions that altered the landscapes of Harlem in 1964, Detroit and Newark in 1967, and 
hundreds of other communities offered distressing evidence that cities were already a lost 
cause, that government policies had failed to bring prosperity and equality to all 
Americans, or that a bigger upheaval was just around the corner. All agreed that cities 
were in big trouble. “[A]fter our inspections, hearings, and research studies,” the 
members of the National Commission on Urban Problems wrote in 1968, “we found 
conditions much worse, more widespread and more explosive than any of us had 
thought.”1 In the next decade, as America’s biggest city lurched toward bankruptcy, the 
very possibility that urban centers had tipped past the point of return seemed entirely 
                                                
1 “Excerpts from Summary of Urban Panel’s Report,” New York Times, 15 December 1968, 70. 
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possible, even probable, at least from the point of view of the New York Daily News. 
“Ford to City: Drop Dead,” read the paper’s famous headline.2 
Yet by the late 1990s it had become quite clear that American cities had not, in 
fact, “drop[ped] dead.” At the end of the twentieth century, urban centers were, as one 
national broadcaster explained, “hot again.”3 Reporters followed the stories of families 
who moved back to city centers to rehabilitate historic buildings, of artists who turned 
overlooked neighborhoods into desirable real estate, and of new retail centers that rose on 
unexpected streets. Rather than a scapegoat for the country’s problems, cities became the 
very image of cool in the late 1990s and early 2000s, appearing as the stylish, often 
reductively caricatured stars of popular TV sitcoms or the unlikely inspiration for new 
developments that sought to mimic urban lofts and walk-up apartments on the suburban 
fringe. Observers coined a variety of new terms to describe this turn of events: a “back to 
the city movement,” “gentrification,” and an “urban renaissance.” Their optimism 
suggested unambiguously that professions of the city’s end had been premature. 
Harlem provides a particularly clear lens through which to view this 
transformation. As the most famous predominantly African-American neighborhood in 
American history – if not the most famous neighborhood in America – and also the most 
mythologized, Harlem offered a vivid symbol of the many facets of urban change in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. At midcentury, Harlem’s streets had provided the very 
basis for some of the best-known chronicles of the urban crisis. The sociologist and 
Harlem native Kenneth Clark, for example, used the neighborhood as a laboratory to 
                                                
2 “Ford to City: Drop Dead,” New York Daily News, 30 October 1975, 1. 
 
3 Les Christie, “Cities are Hot Again,” CNNMoney, 15 June 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/15/real_ 
estate/return_to_cities (accessed 29 April 2013). 
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“describe and interpret what happens to human beings who are confined to depressed 
areas,” he explained, “whose access to the normal channels of economic mobility and 
opportunity is blocked.” The title of his 1965 masterwork, Dark Ghetto, testified to 
Harlem’s bleak reputation. So too did the widely-seen work of photographer Gordon 
Parks, whose 1968 Life magazine series, “A Harlem Family,” chronicled the hunger, 
poverty, addiction, and cold air that haunted his subjects daily.4 
But Harlem’s streets likewise offered a highly visible example of the economic 
transformation of so-called “inner-city” neighborhoods several decades later. Harlem, 
with refurbished rows of landmark brownstones, new shopping complexes, and a brightly 
glowing digital marquee on the Apollo Theater, provided compelling evidence for those 
who pointed to the rebound of American cities. Once Manhattan’s most infamous 
enclave, Harlem increasingly appeared as a star in the city’s real estate columns. Once 
America’s best-known “ghetto,” by the end of the century Harlem stood as a symbol that 
even the most forsaken of urban neighborhoods could once again become sought-after 
destinations for a middle-class that had largely left such places behind. Indeed, the 
neighborhood’s transformation even received its own moniker, hearkening back to the era 
that put African-American Harlem on the map. This was, commentators frequently 
explained, the neighborhood’s “Second Renaissance.”5 
                                                
4 Kenneth B. Clark, Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power, 2nd ed. (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1989), xxxvi; Gordon Parks, “A Harlem Family,” Life, 8 March 1968. 
 
5 See, for example, Victoria Pope, “Harlem’s Next Renaissance,” U.S. News and World Report, 10 
February 1997, 56; Nina Siegel, “Harlem on the Brink,” New York Times, 26 September 1999, 732; Nina 
Siegel, “For Harlem, More to a Boom Than Shopping Centers,” New York Times, 28 November 1999, ST1; 
Terry Pristin, “New Cinema and New Hope in Harlem,” New York Times, 1 July 2000, B1; Ruth Evans and 
Sue Armstrong, “Harlem’s Second Coming,” BBC News, 23 December 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/1083578.stm (accessed 29 April 2013); Peter Hellman, “House Proud: Making Family History in 
Historic Harlem,” New York Times, 17 January 2002, F1; Monique M. Taylor, “A Second Renaissance in 
Harlem,” Los Angeles Times, 5 May 2002; Peter Hellman, “Coming Up Harlem,” Smithsonian, November 
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If observers often remarked on the apparent revival of neighborhoods like Harlem 
with surprise, however, the story had actually been decades in the making. These forty 
years were marked by profound transformation at the global, national, and local levels. In 
these decades, Harlem became part of a transnational network of capital and ideas that 
turned cities like New York into “global cities.” Across America, a variety of factors 
combined to drive an ascendant middle class “back to the city,” including the availability 
of cheap property, new urban employment centers, and a cultural vogue that celebrated 
urban space. In New York City itself, a new economy that prioritized finance, insurance, 
real estate, and business services over declining industry brought a recovery from the 
fiscal crisis of the 1970s, making New York once again the country’s leading city and an 
attractive magnet for new investment.6  
Yet if these factors combined to make neighborhoods like Harlem newly 
attractive, they are insufficient on their own to explain the neighborhood’s physical, 
social, and economic transformation. A deeper look reveals that Harlemites themselves 
                                                
2002; C.J. Hughes, “A Neighborhood Worth the Big-Ticket Investment,” New York Times, 5 August 2007, 
I9. 
 
6 On New York City as a global city, see Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles: 
America’s Global Cities (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). For accounts that consider 
the effects of globalization in New York alongside the role of national- and local-level actors, see William 
Sites, Remaking New York: Primitive Globalization and the Politics of Urban Community (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2003); Susan Fainstein, The City Builders: Property Development in New 
York and London, 1980-2000, 2nd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001). For several of the 
major works that offer theoretical and historical explanations for the return of middle-class residents to city 
centers, see Neil Smith and Peter Williams, eds., Gentrification of the City (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 
1986); Neil Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City (New York: 
Routledge, 1996); Suleiman Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn: Gentrification and the Search 
for Authenticity in Postwar New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). On New York’s fiscal 
crisis, fiscal turnaround, and changing economy, see Martin Shefter, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The 
Collapse and Revival of New York City (New York: Basic Books, 1985); John Hull Mollenkopf and 
Manuel Castells, eds., Dual City: Restructuring New York (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991); 
John H. Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Joshua Freeman, Working-Class New York: Life and 
Labor Since World War II (New York: New Press, 2000); Jonathan Soffer, Ed Koch and the Rebuilding of 
New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
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played a crucial role in producing this apparent renaissance on their streets. Even amidst 
urban crisis, neighborhoods like Harlem continued to exist as communities with residents 
deeply invested in their persistence. Harlemites inhabited, reimagined, and rebuilt their 
neighborhood despite federal retrenchment, increasing socioeconomic constraints, and 
the neighborhood’s generally decreasing presence on New Yorkers’ cognitive maps. In 
the last four decades of the twentieth century, Harlemites invented new kinds of 
institutions intended to attain the goal of urban revitalization. Residents inspired by 
1960s-era calls for community-level control of the built environment created and shaped 
community design centers, community associations, and community development 
corporations, all for the purpose of giving their neighbors new influence over the 
redevelopment of their neighborhood. These institutions became major forces in 
rebuilding Harlem by the end of the century, but also the medium through which 
residents, officials, and outsiders debated the direction that redevelopment would take.  
In this project, I demonstrate the crucial role that Harlemites played in bringing 
their neighborhood from “urban crisis” to so-called “second renaissance,” how new, 
community-based institutions transformed American cities in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, and, at the broadest scale, what this story can teach us about the 
political and social context of this era. I argue that community-level actors achieved their 
longstanding dream that they could become central to the rebuilding of urban 
neighborhoods, but I likewise argue that the objectives they pursued under the mantle of 
community development changed markedly and often paradoxically over the course of 
these forty years, as Harlemites struggled to define the shape of their community. 
Institutions founded with the purpose of community control stood at the center of larger 
 6 
debates over the possibility of participatory democracy, the role of the state in the 
reconstruction of cities, which income groups should populate a community, what it 
should look like, and who should decide.  
 
The bookends to this story are, on one side, the radical dream that grew out of the 
shift in the Civil Rights Movement toward Black Power – the idea that a racially 
segregated, predominantly low-income community like Harlem represented not a liability 
but the very means through which residents could achieve a cooperative, self-determined 
urban ideal – and, on the other side, the increasingly privatized, commercially-oriented, 
and economically gentrified urban forms often characterized by observers as the 
“neoliberal” city. In the late 1960s, Harlemites frustrated with the top-down nature of 
urban redevelopment occupied a 125th Street block that the state had hoped to redevelop 
with a modern skyscraper. Protesters built modest wooden homes on the site, cooked for 
one another, and staged rallies during their three-month occupation, physically 
embodying the premise that residents could rebuild their community themselves. In the 
late 1990s, the Abyssinian Development Corporation, one of Harlem’s largest and best-
known community-based organizations, began construction of the neighborhood’s newest 
commercial and shopping complex, Harlem Center, in partnership with one of the 
country’s largest real estate developers. The project rose not just as a symbol of the 
increasing ease with which residents could purchase clothing, cosmetics, and office 
supplies in the neighborhood, but also as a sign of the emergence of community-based 
developers as major players in the transformation of Harlem, New York, and American 
cities in general. If the distance between these endpoints seems vast, the extraordinary 
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fact remains that they are the material traces of a single thread that describes urban 
redevelopment in the late twentieth century. Indeed, they rose on the very same site, the 
central block of Harlem’s main street between Lenox and Seventh Avenues. 
The events that connect these visions of a single block in a single American 
neighborhood unfolded in relation to, and often in opposition to, the midcentury 
development strategy popularly called “urban renewal.” As Americans settled back into 
life after the end of World War II, officials and their private sector and institutional 
partners reshaped cities through spatial and policy tools emblematic of the conjoined 
projects of modernism and liberalism. In an effort to keep cities viable in an era of rapid 
suburbanization, the federal government subsidized the large-scale reconstruction of 
urban centers to build housing, commercial enclaves, expanded universities, and new 
cultural centers. Such projects often took familiar forms—tower block housing, austere 
marble pavilions, and prismatic glass skyscrapers. Though urban renewal involved 
complex techniques and diverse outcomes that scholars have increasingly uncovered, the 
age of large-scale redevelopment proved nonetheless remarkable for the sweeping 
commonality of means and ends that marked its deployment across American cities: 
projects typically cleared massive expanses of urban centers, displaced thousands of 
residents, and left behind monumental structures in their stead.7  
                                                
7 The literature on urban renewal is vast and growing. For contemporary accounts that explain the policy 
and tenets underlying large-scale redevelopment and its implementation, see Scott Greer, Urban Renewal 
and American Cities: The Dilemma of Democratic Intervention (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); 
James Q. Wilson, ed., Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1966); Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, eds., Urban Renewal: People, Politics, and Planning 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967). For some of the many historical accounts that consider the 
practice of urban renewal in New York City and other American cities, see Robert A. Caro, The Power 
Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Jon C. Teaford, The 
Rough Road to Renaissance: Urban Revitalization in America, 1940-1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990); Joel Schwartz, The New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and the 
Redevelopment of the Inner City (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1993); Alison Isenberg, 
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While urban renewal sought to sustain cities in an era when their foundations 
increasingly crumbled, the policy often proved to be quite counterproductive in its 
consequences. Renewal forced residents with deep social ties to bid neighbors adieu as 
their communities met the force of the bulldozer. The public housing towers that held 
displaced residents often became vast centers of concentrated poverty. In effect, if not 
intent, redevelopment harmed low-income, minority populations to a disproportionate 
extent. For both uprooted residents and outside observers, the failures of urban renewal 
came to symbolize the failures of the New Deal welfare state. Redevelopment sought to 
bring urban revival, but instead many pointed to it as a precipitating factor in bringing 
America’s urban crisis.8  
By the mid-1960s, urban renewal received widespread condemnation from all 
corners, including libertarian opponents of government intervention, liberals who 
objected to its increasingly apparent social costs, and radical critics who wrapped a 
condemnation of this large-scale, generally top-down strategy in the larger demand for 
self-determination that marked the ascendance of the New Left. In Harlem and in many 
                                                
Downtown America: A History of the Place and the People Who Made It (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004); Lizabeth Cohen, “Buying Into Downtown Revival: The Centrality of Retail in Postwar Urban 
Renewal in American Cities,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 611, no. 1 
(May 2007): 82-95; Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City: The 
Transformation of New York (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2007); Samuel Zipp, Manhattan Projects: 
The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Michael H. Carriere, “Between Being and Becoming: On Architecture, Student Protest, and the Aesthetics 
of Liberalism in Postwar America” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2010); Christopher Klemek, The 
Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011); Francesca Ammon, “Culture of Clearance: Waging War on the 
Landscape in Postwar America” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2012). 
 
8 For treatments that link urban renewal and public housing to America’s urban crisis, see Arnold R. 
Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); John F. Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in 
Philadelphia, 1920-1974 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Howard Gillette, Jr., Between 
Justice and Beauty: Race, Planning, and the Failure of Urban Policy in Washington, D.C. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).  
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other American cities, this radical critique became a central factor in the rise of a more 
militant approach to gaining civil rights. Here and elsewhere, many civil rights leaders 
had once looked to redevelopment as a means of achieving the goals of racial liberalism, 
especially economic and racial desegregation. But a new, younger generation of activists 
saw in the failures of urban renewal yet one more symbol of a power structure in which 
African Americans had little voice in the decisions that most affected them.9 Instead of 
seeing their predominantly low-income neighbors as symbols of pathology or problems 
to be excised through large-scale clearance, they turned the equation of urban crisis on its 
head, arguing that the existing Harlem community provided the very basis from which 
revitalization could occur. Adopting the anti-colonial metaphors common in the Black 
Power movement, Harlem activists offered the aspiration that the segregated environment 
in which they found themselves could become a source of power, a means to seize 
control. They expressed an ambitious vision of Harlem built by and for the benefit of its 
existing population, an ideal intended to both lift the community’s residents and 
demonstrate their self-reliance. I call this driving vision their “revolutionary spatial 
ideal.” 
If Black Power inspired a utopian conception of community control in the shaping 
of the built environment, however, the legacy of such radical demands proved quite 
                                                
9 Three of the best-known critiques of urban renewal, from across the political spectrum, are Jane Jacobs, 
The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961); Herbert J. Gans, The 
Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 
1962); Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer: A Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964). Historical accounts of grassroots movements against urban renewal 
include John Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); John Emmeus 
Davis, Contested Ground: Collective Action and the Urban Neighborhood (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); Mandi Isaacs Jackson, Model City Blues: Urban Space and Organized Resistance in New 
Haven (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008); Carriere, “Between Being and Becoming”; Klemek, 
Transatlantic Collapse of Urban Renewal; Jennifer Hock, “Political Designs: Architecture and Urban 
Renewal in the Civil Rights Era, 1954-1973” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2012). 
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unexpected. Activists’ revolutionary spatial ideal brought forth a dynamic array of new 
institutions that promised to realize their aspirations in physical form. Yet for a variety of 
reasons chronicled in this study, over time these organizations and their successors came 
to pursue a very different vision of revitalization. Dependent on financial partnerships 
with the public sector even as they preached self-determination, subject to the whims of 
strong leaders even as they promised participatory democracy, influenced by changing 
social thought, and challenged by the simple difficulty of enacting visionary change 
against powerful countervailing forces, community-based organizations came to idealize 
the objectives of a mixed-income population and integration into an economic 
“mainstream.” These goals made up what I have called their “moderate spatial vision.” 
The Harlem of the new century did not mark a sudden break from the grassroots 
movements of the 1960s, then, but a gradual shift away from those radical roots. Indeed, 
dramatic changes in Harlem’s residential and commercial landscape, such as the return of 
the middle class and the growing presence of national retail chains, were not imposed on 
an unwitting neighborhood by outsiders or the product of ineffable forces, I argue. 
Rather, the economic upscaling of Harlem and increasing emphasis on creating “free” 
markets for private sector investment, traits often pointed to as symbols of the 
“neoliberal” city, were in part the ironic outcome of demands for community control.10 
                                                
10 “Neoliberalism,” David Harvey writes, “is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices.” See Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore emphasize the importance of understanding neoliberalism in its specific 
political, social, and spatial contexts, what they call “actually existing neoliberalism,” a goal that is 
consistent with my own interest in uncovering the social and political processes through which actors on 
the ground produced the contemporary city. See Brenner and Theodore, “Cities and the Geography of 
‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism,’” Antipode 34, no. 3 (July 2002): 349-79. 
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The connection between these seemingly distinct endpoints testifies to the 
complicated story of city building in the most recent major period in urban history. If 
urban renewal grew from a foundation of relative intellectual consensus, the consistent 
monumentality of architectural modernism, and the guiding force of a largely stable 
policy apparatus, the period chronicled in this study was characterized instead by 
competing urban visions, an eclectic, often highly pragmatic approach to physical form, 
and an equally pragmatic approach to policy through which residents assembled a 
patchwork of funding tools to bring their ideas to life. A social and political history of 
urban change in this era largely confirms the notion of the late twentieth century as an 
“age of fracture,” as historian Daniel Rodgers has described these decades.11 Activist 
designers sought new means of democratizing their professions to enable Harlemites to 
plan their own future. Enterprising residents demonstrated that if the public and private 
sectors would not rebuild abandoned buildings to provide much-needed homes, they 
would do it themselves. Church leaders became developers, while parishioners 
questioned their motives. Instead of a single, prevailing idea of the future of the city, 
Harlemites of different stripes offered multiple ideas about what their community should 
be.  
If struggle defined the spirit of the age, however, in retrospect these decades hold 
together as a cohesive period with community-based organizations at its center. Through 
these organizations, residents negotiated fundamental questions that had followed African 
Americans for nearly a century: about the tensions between self-determination and 
integration, between the idea that Harlem, with its largely low-income population, 
                                                
11 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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already bore the seeds of its revival, and the idea that greater economic diversity and 
entry into a broader economic system were necessary for revitalization.  
  
For the most part, historians have yet to examine the events of these decades in 
detail, yet doing so offers several major insights. First, deep analysis of urban 
development in the late twentieth century demonstrates the fundamental and lasting 
influence of the upheaval that brought the end of modernist planning in the 1960s. Anger 
over the human costs of large-scale redevelopment motivated activists alongside 
frustration over the slow pace of school integration, housing discrimination, and lack of 
economic opportunity. By the end of the decade, neighbors and likeminded architects and 
planners alike stood in front of bulldozers, demonstrated at public meetings, and drafted 
alternate plans, all for the purpose of ending spatial practices that disrupted the lives of 
residents in the country’s majority-minority neighborhoods. For the most part, historians 
have examined these movements only as an endpoint, crediting them with bringing the 
fall of large-scale urban renewal but leaving their constructive effects unexamined; 
explained that hopes for broad transformation faded away in disappointment; or, where 
they have considered succeeding decades, focused on change within the institutional 
structures of planning.12 In examining their influence more broadly, however, I argue that 
                                                
12 On social movements as the end of modern planning, see especially Klemek, Transatlantic Collapse of 
Urban Renewal; Zipp, Manhattan Projects. Other works examine the activism that erupted in urban 
planning in the 1960s, but either maintain a focus on the profession itself or do not carry the story forward 
into succeeding decades. See Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman, Guerrillas in the Bureaucracy: 
The Community Planning Experiment in the United States (New York: Wiley, 1974); Lily M. Hoffman, 
The Politics of Knowledge: Activist Movements in Medicine and Planning (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1989). In her study of activism in the Cooper Square neighborhood of New York City, 
historian Marci Reaven explains how citizen participation became part of the institutional process of 
planning by the mid-1970s, through such means as the city’s community planning boards. See Reaven, 
“Citizen Participation in City Planning: New York City, 1945-1975” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 
2009). Tom Angotti also focuses on community-generated plans within the institutional framework of New 
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these demands both fundamentally shaped the subsequent debates that defined the form 
of the contemporary city and transformed the practice of urban development in ways that 
we have yet to fully understand. By positioning radical social movements as the starting 
point of a new period in urban history, I show their enduring impact over the late 
twentieth century, as new kinds of community-based organizations became major players 
in the transformation of American cities. 
In doing so, I reveal the long, complicated, but profound reverberations of the 
demands for self-determination that arose on a larger terrain in this period. In recent 
years, historians have taken a closer look at Black Power, examining the radical shift in 
the Civil Rights Movement as a new phase in the black freedom struggle. Instead of 
depicting new militancy as the denouement of a larger story of urban decline and urban 
crisis, historians have uncovered the persistent, often-inventive grassroots organizing and 
activism that grew out of Black Power, through which city residents sought to stem urban 
problems at the community level. In so doing, scholars have revealed the long history of 
Black Power, demonstrating its deep roots in the Civil Rights Movement and the diverse 
forms that it took in the realms of politics, economics, and education. Through 
examination of Black Studies programs that emerged in major universities and of 
African-American electoral politics, scholars have only just begun to bring the history of 
Black Power forward into succeeding decades, explaining radicalism not as the tragic end 
                                                
York City’s planning apparatus. See Angotti, New York For Sale: Community Planning Confronts Global 
Real Estate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 
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of a “heroic period” in the Civil Rights Movement, but as an innovative, often effective 
shift that brought new forms of participation into American society.13  
I join this emerging effort through the lens of the built environment. By showing 
the increasing influence of community-based organizations in this era, I uncover a realm 
in which Black Power, calls for community control, and the events of the 1960s changed 
– and continue to change – public life in America. As a sphere that joins politics, society, 
and culture in a highly tangible physical form, urban space offers an especially apt terrain 
for understanding the lasting ramifications of that decade’s social movements. The new 
                                                
13 In their seminal statement on Black Power, Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton wrote, “The 
concept of Black Power…is a call for black people in this country to unite, to recognize their heritage, to 
build a sense of community. It is a call for black people to begin to define their own goals, to lead their own 
organizations and to support those organizations. It is a call to reject the racist institutions and values of this 
society.” See Carmichael and Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1966), 44. On the long history of Black Power and the diverse forms it took in practice, see 
Komozi Woodard, A Nation Within a Nation: Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones) and Black Power Politics 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Robert Self, American Babylon: Race and the 
Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‘Til 
the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 
2006); Hasan Kwame Jeffries, Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power in Alabama’s Black Belt 
(New York: New York University Press, 2009); Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, 
and the Rise of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, California (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010); Peniel E. Joseph, ed., Neighborhood Rebels: Black Power at the Local Level (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). On the long history of the Civil Rights Movement in general, see 
Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of 
American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-63; Thomas J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The 
Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the North (New York: Random House, 2008). For historical work 
that casts the militancy of the late 1960s as the end of a declension narrative, see Hirsch, Making the 
Second Ghetto; Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis; Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The 
Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1995). For accounts that consider the legacy of Black Power and its associated demands for community 
control, see James Edward Smethurst, The Black Arts Movement: Literary Nationalism in the 1960s and 
1970s (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Noliwe M. Rooks, White Money/Black 
Power: The Surprising History of African American Studies and the Crisis of Race in Higher Education 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); Heather Lewis, “Protest, Place, and Pedagogy: New York City’s 
Community Control Movement and Its Aftermath, 1966-1996” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2006); 
J. Phillip Thompson, III, Double Trouble: Black Mayors, Black Communities, and the Call for a Deep 
Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Fabio Rojas, From Black Power to Black Studies: 
How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2007); Devin Fergus, Liberalism, Black Power, and the Making of American Politics, 1965-1980 
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Fredrick C. Harris, The Price of the Ticket: Barack 
Obama and the Rise and Decline of Black Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). I take the 
idea of a “heroic period” of the Civil Rights Movement, framed in earlier histories as a precursor to and in 
opposition to Black Power, from Peniel E. Joseph, “Waiting Till the Midnight Hour: Reconceptualizing the 
Heroic Period of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965,” Souls 2, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 6-17. 
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institutions born out of demands for radical community control helped to establish 
“community development” as a concept so ubiquitous that many cities now claim 
Departments of Community Development, not Departments of City Planning. 
Community developers established a new role for citizen participation in the construction 
of the built environment, I argue, extending the gains of the Civil Rights Movement into 
a crucial and omnipresent realm that encompassed the home, the workplace, and the 
street. But by showing the transformations that occurred under the umbrella of 
community development in the decades that followed the 1960s, I also explain the 
complicated and often ironic afterlife of radical social movements.14 
Indeed, my research reveals the shifting political bodies that occupied the cloak of 
“community development,” whether through formal institutions like community 
development corporations, or informal efforts to rebuild the city through the collective 
labor of urban residents. In doing so, I suggest a different story than the familiar trope of 
sixties-era social movements followed by conservative backlash that until recently has 
dominated the historiography of American urban politics in the late twentieth century.15 
                                                
14 On the question of what difference the social movements of the 1960s made in America, see – in addition 
to many recent works on Black Power listed above - the essays in Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds., The 
World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2003); Michael Kazin, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2011); Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, “The Failure and Success of the New Radicalism,” in The 
Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, eds. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1989); Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil 
Rights Movement & the New Left (New York: Random House, Inc, 1979). 
 
15 Historical works that follow this model include Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of 
Brooklyn Against Liberalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: 
Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987); James Miller, Democracy is in the 
Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Thomas Byrne 
Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 
(New York: Norton, 1991); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 
1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael W. Flamm, Law and 
Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005). On the changing historiography of American conservatism, see Kim Phillips-Fein, 
“Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (2011): 723-43. 
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In Harlem, residents witnessed a transformation from radical, often utopian spatial 
aspirations to a moderate, pragmatic approach to development that prioritized the act of 
building over broad structural transformation. Black Power inspired the vision of 
cooperation, self-determination, and broad democratization that made up activists’ 
revolutionary spatial ideal. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, that hope yielded to a 
spatial vision that assembled a patchwork of residents, funding sources, and political 
allies across the spectrum in rebuilding Harlem. As the goals of community developers 
shifted, Harlemites feared that they would lose the influence they had gained and, as a 
result, lose their neighborhood too. But they found instead a third way between their 
inclusive ideal and its exclusionary antithesis—a gradual diversification of the 
neighborhood as the moderate spatial vision became a “moderate spatial reality,” and 
Harlem-based organizations built new mixed-income housing, new supermarkets, and 
new shopping malls that often met longstanding resident needs as well as those of an 
increasingly income-diverse population.  
This story complicates the accounts and explanations that have thus far stood as 
the record of the city in the post-urban renewal era. By showing the crucial role that 
community-based organizations played in building a city that emphasized greater private 
sector involvement and economic integration – even gentrification – as normative ideals, 
I explain that such changes in urban centers did not arise solely through the action of 
opportunistic speculators or middle-class outsiders who saw places like Harlem as ripe 
real estate opportunities. I examine parallel efforts by which low-income residents 
themselves, through the social movements they joined and organizations they shaped, 
helped to produce the Harlem that we find today. At times the neighborhood that resulted 
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from community-level efforts was an unintended consequence of the alliances that 
Harlemites accepted to bring their ideals to reality. At other times, it was a direct result of 
the changing objectives that they pursued. In demonstrating these diverse outcomes, I 
explain that the story of community development was not a monolithic tale of pluck, 
perseverance, and drive towards a single idea of urban revitalization, but one of change, 
struggle, and, often, contradiction. The city of the early twenty-first century did not 
emerge fully formed, but was the product of a long history with deep, often unexpected 
origins. In Harlem, efforts with radical roots followed a path of transformation that 
registered in the neighborhood’s physical space, from a vision of a low-income utopia to 
a mixed-income reality, from wide-ranging structural change to a new pragmatism, and 
from an ideal of mixed land uses to an approach that prioritized the commercial 
redevelopment of Harlem’s major streets.16 
 
Harlem offers a case that is remarkable both for its exceptional history and for the 
mythology that surrounds it as the best-known predominantly African-American 
community in the United States. Always a center of attention, Harlem has served as the 
ur-type for the changes that have marked majority-minority neighborhoods throughout 
the twentieth century. Harlem’s emergence as the heart of New York City’s African-
                                                
16 For an account of neighborhood change in this period that emphasizes the role of middle-class actors, see 
Osman, Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn. For a history of community-level efforts to rebuild urban 
centers that takes a largely optimistic view, see Alexander Von Hoffman, House by House, Block by Block: 
The Rebirth of America’s Urban Neighborhoods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). For accounts 
that explore the changing nature of community development, focusing especially on economic 
development, see the essays in Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig, eds., The Business of Black Power: 
Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar America (Rochester, NY: 
University of Rochester Press, 2012). For a history of community development in Newark in this period, 
see Julia Rabig, “Broken Deal: Devolution, Development, and Civil Society in Newark, New Jersey, 1960-
1990” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2007). 
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American population early in the century exemplified the transformative effects of the 
Great Migration. So too did the neighborhood’s “renaissance” suggest the political, 
social, and cultural flourishing that demographic shifts could bring. Harlem’s experience 
of the Great Depression highlighted the disproportionate burden that African Americans 
bore amidst economic strife, while the neighborhood’s streets soon played host to new 
demands for civil rights as African-American veterans returned home from World War II. 
Harlem political leaders like Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., rose to national prominence at 
midcentury. Here, Malcolm X matured as an intellectual and as an activist. Harlem, too, 
played a prominent role as a symbol of the deindustrialization, dilapidation, and 
overcrowding that undermined African-American communities in the postwar decades. 
The neighborhood came to exemplify a period of urban disinvestment and urban 
decline.17  
Despite Harlem’s increasing distance from its popular heyday by the early 1960s, 
and, indeed, despite the neighborhood’s diminishing identity as New York City’s largest 
African-American community, Harlem retained its role as the symbolic center of Black 
America in the last decades of the twentieth century. The neighborhood’s high visibility 
in many ways proved a self-fulfilling prophecy, the result of Harlem’s prominent history 
and its proximity to the nation’s media capital. As a result, things often happened first in 
Harlem in the years chronicled in this study and, even when they did not happen first, 
they often received tremendous attention. The neighborhood became home to the nation’s 
                                                
17 Harlem has long provided a source of fascination to historians, whose works include David Levering 
Lewis, When Harlem Was in Vogue (New York: Knopf, 1981); Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, “Or Does it 
Explode?” Black Harlem in the Great Depression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Martha 
Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003); Shane White, Stephen Garton, Stephen Robertson, and Graham White, 
Playing the Numbers: Gambling in Harlem Between the Wars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2010); Jonathan Gill, Harlem: The Four Hundred Year History from Dutch Village to Capital of Black 
America (New York: Grove Press, 2011). 
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first community design center, for example, an effort by activist architects and planners 
to empower residents with the tools to plan their community. Likewise, residents founded 
one of the nation’s first community development corporations in Harlem in the late 
1960s, an entity that aspired to own and shape Harlem’s land. When a new generation of 
community development corporations emerged in the 1980s, Harlem’s received extensive 
coverage in the press and soon became exemplars at the national level. Harlem served as 
a site for innovative social movements, a destination for visits from prominent national 
and international officials, and a favored target for public investment throughout this 
period. Unsurprisingly, then, when middle-class residents began to move back to Harlem 
at an increasing rate and national retailers like the Disney Store and Starbucks looked to 
make the neighborhood home, social scientists, reporters, and observers took notice. 
Harlem became a national symbol of inner-city reinvestment.18 
Harlem’s history in the last four decades of the twentieth century presents a story 
that was undeniably unique as a result of the signal importance of its setting, its cast of 
notable characters, and its early onset. Yet Harlem offers a telling case through which to 
understand development in the aftermath of urban renewal precisely because it often 
served as the leading edge for techniques and practices that would likewise transform, 
and that continue to transform, majority-minority neighborhoods elsewhere in the United 
                                                
18 Many social scientists flocked to Harlem to study neighborhood change in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century. Their efforts include John L. Jackson, Jr., Harlemworld: Doing Race and Class in 
Contemporary Black America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Monique M. Taylor, Harlem 
Between Heaven and Hell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Arlene M. Dávila, Barrio 
Dreams: Puerto Ricans, Latinos, and the Neoliberal City (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); 
David Maurrasse, Listening to Harlem: Gentrification, Community, and Business (New York: Routledge, 
2006); Lance Freeman, There Goes the ‘Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2006); Derek S. Hyra, The New Urban Renewal: The Economic Transformation 
of Harlem and Bronzeville (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The 
Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). On dynamics of 
immigration in Harlem in this era, see Zain Abdullah, Black Mecca: The African Muslims of Harlem (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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States. If Harlem provided particularly visible examples of grassroots social movements, 
community-based organizations, and demographic transformations, those phenomena 
proved notable not because they were exceptional, but because they soon came to 
characterize similar communities in other major cities, including the U Street Corridor in 
Washington, DC, Bronzeville in Chicago, Over-the-Rhine in Cincinnati, Uptown in 
Oakland, and the Mission District in San Francisco. With this history of Harlem, I hope 
to illuminate not only the mechanics of change in one important place, but also reveal the 
social and political forces, competing urban visions, and transformational events that help 
to explain the dynamics of change in parallel neighborhoods across the United States. If 
these places lack the attention that Harlem has long attracted, they share socioeconomic 
commonalities, a cyclical history of disinvestment and reinvestment, and a tradition of 
community-level activism. Understanding Harlem helps to explain the complex stories 
unfolding throughout American inner cities.  
My decision to examine Harlem’s transformation through a social and political 
history of organizations, individuals, and the places they inhabited grew out of a desire to 
concretize a process of change that is often described only in amorphous terms, such as 
“gentrification,” “revival,” and “revitalization,” that fail to capture the social processes, 
individual decisions, and political dynamics that shape a city at the community level. 
Moreover, though grassroots activists often fixed on the built environment as a site and a 
stake for their demands, their role as spatial actors has not received the historical 
attention it deserves. Yet Harlemites, including those with and those without formal 
training in architecture and urban planning, not only took oppositional stances in their 
activism. Over the course of the forty years of my study, radical design professionals, 
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charismatic community leaders, and interested residents often expressed their highest 
ideals about equality and democracy, their “freedom dreams,” in the words of historian 
Robin D.G. Kelley, in the language and material of the built environment.19 These 
ambitious, often competing visions of the future city reward detailed analysis. Thus, I 
combine study of the archival records of community-based organizations and the actors 
who participated in their activities with close attention to the actual spaces they produced 
on paper and in reality. Where the papers of architects, planners, activists, and 
organizations provide an incomplete record, I have benefited from the intense media 
scrutiny that Harlem received during these decades from both the mainstream and 
African-American press, and from the memories of the actors in this story.20 These 
sources enable a rich portrait of Harlem’s physical spaces in their broader social, 
political, and cultural context.  
In charting the role of community-level actors in transforming Harlem, this 
dissertation brings many new players into the history of the late twentieth century. In six 
chapters, I uncover the influence of organizations both short-lived and long-lasting as 
well as the aspirational hopes of both prominent community leaders and little-known but 
imaginative neighborhood activists. I consider Harlem’s story in these four decades 
through three stages.  
                                                
19 Robin D.G. Kelley, Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002). 
 
20 History of the recent past offers both unique opportunities, such as the chance to interview living actors 
and access their personal papers, and distinct drawbacks, such as an archival record that is not yet fully 
represented at institutions. The scale of media coverage in the late twentieth century, however, and the 
increasing documentation of events in digital formats, provides unique resources through which to examine 
these decades. On the craft of recent history, see Claire Bond Potter and Renee C. Romano, eds., Doing 
Recent History: On Privacy, Copyright, Video Games, Institutional Review Boards, Activist Scholarship, 
and History that Talks Back (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012). 
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In the first stage, situated in the 1960s, I examine the development of residents’ 
revolutionary spatial ideal as a response to the history of urban renewal in Harlem. I 
explain how frustration with the effects of large-scale redevelopment sparked new 
demands for community control over development and, soon, a visionary ideal of a 
community built by and for its low-income residents. In the first chapter, I focus on the 
work of the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, or ARCH. A white architect 
named C. Richard Hatch opened ARCH in 1964 to offer architectural services to a 
community that had long been at the mercy of expertise-driven urban renewal. Working 
with neighborhood groups, ARCH helped to shape the alternate planning practice that 
would come to be known as advocacy planning. But even as ARCH rejected the typical 
ends of urban renewal, the organization maintained a dependence on expertise and 
outside funding that mirrored the larger approach of Great Society-era liberalism, a 
model that faced increasing criticism in Harlem with the rise of the Black Power 
movement late in the decade. The theatrical takeover that installed African-American 
architect J. Max Bond, Jr. as the group’s leader in 1967 symbolized broader debates over 
the role of sympathetic intermediaries on one hand, and new demands for direct 
democracy and community control on the other.  
Under Bond and its new Black leadership, ARCH played a central role in 
articulating the implications of Black Power in the space of the city, the subject of the 
second chapter. In attempting to flatten the distance that had separated Harlemites from 
the plans that affected them, ARCH helped to shape a physical vision of a neighborhood 
that was produced by its low-income residents and whose redevelopment would serve 
their needs for community-controlled education, social services, affordable housing, 
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political activism, and cultural experimentation. This, I argue, constituted their 
revolutionary spatial ideal, a vision that ARCH helped to realize in provisional form on 
the State Office Building site that protesters occupied in 1969, and that activists hoped to 
bring to life on blocks throughout Harlem. 
In the second stage of this dissertation, I explain the shift from a revolutionary 
spatial ideal to a moderate spatial vision through a close examination of two attempts to 
realize a collectivist, communitarian Harlem in physical form. In Chapter Three, I 
examine such efforts on Harlem’s main street, 125th Street, by considering the 
neighborhood’s first community development corporations. The Harlem Commonwealth 
Council grew out of ARCH’s efforts in the neighborhood. The Harlem Urban 
Development Corporation emerged as a state-sponsored attempt to address the protests 
that had stopped the State Office Building project. Yet if both organizations initially 
promised democratization of decision-making, community-controlled ownership, and 
community-oriented development, both likewise came to embody the paradoxes that 
attended such efforts. As a result of the ready availability of public sector funding, the 
moderate orientation of powerful leaders, and the intransigence of radicals who refused to 
compromise any principles, both organizations came to advance a much narrower 
conception of the future of Harlem premised on the large-scale, commercial 
redevelopment of 125th Street. Yet their dependence on public funding despite promises 
of self-reliance proved to be a devil’s bargain—with such support in decline by the early 
1980s, these development plans sat unrealized.  
My fourth chapter considers Harlem’s residential neighborhoods during the same 
period.  Many Harlemites saw the widespread property abandonment of the late 1960s 
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and early 1970s as an opportunity to achieve collective ownership of Harlem’s land and, 
through the techniques of self-help rehabilitation, gain much needed housing and 
employment alongside the abstract ideal of control. Yet in relying on buildings that had 
fallen into city ownership, residents also were vulnerable to the city’s tendencies. While 
activists achieved several successes through their sweat equity, abandoned buildings 
nonetheless became a battleground between Harlemites’ idea that low-income residents 
could rebuild their community themselves and officials’ ambition that abandoned 
buildings could serve as the means to bring middle-class residents back to Harlem. In the 
end, the outcome of this standoff produced not the disruptive economic upheaval that 
residents feared, but instead a gradual move toward a mixed-income future for Harlem, 
symbolizing the broader transition from a radical to a moderate spatial ideal.  
Lastly, in the third stage I examine the construction of the moderate spatial vision 
of the 1970s and 1980s as the moderate spatial reality that reshaped Harlem’s landscape 
in the last fifteen years of the century. I take up this theme in the fifth chapter through an 
examination of the church-based community development corporations that emerged in 
Harlem in the mid-1980s. I use their history to demonstrate that the goal of economic 
integration emanated from within neighborhoods like Harlem, not just as an ideal 
imposed from outside. Spurred by fears of both rapid gentrification and internal collapse, 
changing sociological understandings of poverty – especially the emerging literature on 
the urban “underclass” – and the nature of the funding that supported their efforts, new 
organizations like the Abyssinian Development Corporation and the Harlem Churches for 
Community Improvement sought to manage demographic change by building mixed-
income housing in Harlem. They took a politically, socially, and architecturally 
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pragmatic approach to their work, a strategy that succeeded in reconstructing many of 
Harlem’s residential blocks but largely deemphasized the broad structural transformation 
that had once motivated the project of community development.  
Likewise, in considering the commercial redevelopment of 125th Street in the 
1990s in the sixth chapter, I demonstrate the central role that community organizations 
played in building a moderate reality on Harlem’s major boulevards. For many observers 
in and outside Harlem, the construction of the neighborhood’s first shopping malls and 
first large-scale supermarket symbolized a complete departure from ideals of community 
ownership and community-oriented development. Yet I explain that groups with roots in 
the social movements of the 1960s, such as the Harlem Commonwealth Council, and 
their successors, like the Abyssinian Development Corporation, played a fundamental 
role in assembling these new edifices. Community-based organizations shared the 
increasingly prevalent idea that Harlem’s fate depended on its integration into the 
economic “mainstream” and development as a “free” market. Their alliance with private 
sector partners suggested the moderate position that community development had come 
to occupy by the new century, but also spoke to the complex role these projects served. 
Even as some Harlemites feared the incursion of national retailers, many others were, 
indeed, excited to have ready access to the kinds of services that most New Yorkers could 
already claim in their communities. The transformational effects of such large projects 
provided unambiguous physical evidence of the new prominence that community 
developers had at last achieved, though not all benefited equally from their emergence as 
major players in development and politics, in Harlem and beyond. 
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In the last four decades of the twentieth century, predominantly low-income, 
African-American neighborhoods like Harlem, once symbols of decline – if not public 
pariahs – became symbols of rebirth. As I hope to show in this dissertation, residents in 
Harlem played a central role in this transformation, in a period defined by the continued 
reverberations of the Civil Rights Movement, the decline of the public sector in urban 
development, and the return of the middle class to American cities. Looking forward 
from the 1960s, I demonstrate the lasting, often ironic consequences of radical demands 
for community control. Looking back from the new millennium, I uncover the long and 
unexpected history of a place that, like many of its counterparts, came to be characterized 
by increasing privatization, economic integration, and commercial development, and the 
major part that community-based actors played in building it. Community development, I 
argue, proved a profoundly transformational concept in Harlem and other American 
cities, but never a static one. Over time, the future that Harlem-based organizations 
imagined transformed too, from the radical ideal that low-income Harlemites were not 
the cause of urban crisis but its very solution, to a moderate vision that increasingly tied 
Harlem’s fate to the attraction of the middle class and to broader economic integration.  
Yet if this reality marked a departure from community development’s radical 
roots, I do not intend for it to be a story of decline or ascension. Too often, observers 
describe the history of the twentieth-century city using either a framework of tragic 
declension or one of heroic resurrection. As I hope to demonstrate, however, tracing the 
social and political history of the contemporary city reveals that residents brought 
multiple visions and competing aspirations to the project of city building over the course 
of the late twentieth century. They reimagined, debated, and worked toward the 
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construction of their ideal city in this era. In other words, this is a story of continuous 
reinvention, one that suggests that the course of a city is never preordained. Harlem’s 
history, then, serves not only as an object lesson that helps to explain the nature of the 
transformation that many American cities experienced over the last half-century, but also 
one that reveals the role that people ultimately played – and can continue to play – in 
shaping them. 
   
Chapter One  
Reforming Renewal 
 
In late July 1964, Time magazine turned its gaze upon Harlem. A recent protest 
over the death of a fifteen-year-old boy at the hands of police had turned into several days 
and nights of violence and looting. Harlem had become the first site of the civil disorder 
that would turn the summers of the middle and late 1960s into “long hot summers.” Like 
most journalists who travelled uptown over the course of the decade, this one had been 
attracted by bad news. The article read like an autopsy. “Central Harlem is no place like 
home,” the unnamed reporter considered. “It occupies only a 3.5-sq.-mi. wedge of upper 
Manhattan, but 232,000 people are packed into it, 94% of them black. Its worst streets are 
so crowded that if the same density prevailed throughout New York City the entire 
population of the U.S. could be jammed into just three of its five boroughs.” Employing a 
loaded metaphor borrowed from an interviewed Harlemite, the reporter continued, “The 
jungle is, above all, inexorably and everlastingly dreary. There is no fun, no glamour 
here. There is little excitement even in the violence and sin.”1  
The people encountered were unemployed, poorly educated, and hopeless in the 
eyes of this reporter. The buildings fared little better. Central Park’s “fresh breezes and 
greenery” seemed “a planet distant.” Harlem offered instead “tenements where mortar is 
so fatigued with age that hoodlums had merely to peel the bricks from crumbling 
chimneys last week for ammunition to heave at the cops.” Inside, the reporter explained, 
things were even worse. There were “garbage-strewn hallways and rotting, rickety 
                                                
1 “Nation: No Place Like Home,” Time, 31 July 1964; Paul L. Montgomery, “Thousands Riot in Harlem 
Area; Scores Are Hurt,” New York Times, 19 July 1964, 1; R.W. Apple, Jr., “Violence Flares Again in 
Harlem; Restraint Urged,” New York Times, 20 July 1964, 1. 
 29 
staircases,” the account read, “rat-infested rooms and grease-caked stoves where the 
roaches fight one another for space.” In a neighborhood whose bounds ranged roughly 
from the Hudson to the Harlem and East Rivers, and from the northern reaches of Central 
Park to 155th Street, the reporter found “more of a slum than ever and…with no core to 
build on.”2    
Time endorsed a familiar prescription for Harlem’s maladies, calling in the 
bulldozers that had already reshaped vast stretches of the neighborhood. “Critics 
complain that the projects wipe out small businessmen, leave slum dwellers with 
nowhere to go, and perpetuate the ghetto by ‘packaging’ people in huge blocky 
buildings,” the Time reporter explained. “While there is something to their complaint, the 
fact is that the projects are the best hope of luring back the professional people, whose 
escape…has robbed Harlem of its middle-class backbone.”3 Such advice leaned on the 
assumption that the replacement of Harlem’s predominantly low-income residents would 
yield a dramatically improved neighborhood, a perspective with which officials largely 
agreed in this era.  
Harlem’s “urban crisis” was apparent to many by the mid-1960s—in the 
devastation of five days in July 1964, and in the endless statistics cited by those who 
recorded the neighborhood’s pathology. For many, so too was the solution. Yet if 
orthodox approaches to urban renewal – the federal program involving large scale 
clearance and reconstruction of city blocks, frequently to facilitate the return of the 
middle class to urban centers – continued to dominate the response to such problems in 
the mid-1960s, they obscured the emergence of an alternative view among the very 
                                                
2 “Nation: No Place Like Home,” Time, 31 July 1964. 
 
3 Ibid. 
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residents that observers hoped to excise. Harlemites increasingly sought means of 
rebuilding their neighborhood that would permit them to remain in place and, indeed, to 
improve their community. It was often in the sections of Harlem that fared worst 
statistically that neighbors protested most vehemently that they should determine the 
future of their built environment themselves, that they should shape the character of 
development in their midst. In arguing for a more humane form of city-building, one that 
viewed decent, low-income housing as the very objective of redevelopment, residents 
turned the assumptions of modernist planning on their head.   
Yet if residents reimagined the tenets of midcentury modernism and, 
consequently, the interrelated project of midcentury liberalism in the mid-1960s, their 
alternative remained within the parameters of both. Indeed, even as Harlemites offered a 
dramatic reversal of the typical ends of urban renewal, they remained reliant in two major 
ways on the traditional means that enabled large-scale redevelopment. First, residents 
called not for an end to publicly funded urban renewal but for the redirection of both the 
financial resources and policies of the state toward the objectives that neighborhood 
activists demanded. Second, they continued to rely on the tools of urban planning, 
particularly the master plan, the document that had provided the foundation for planning 
in the postwar era and which Harlemites now sought to reimagine in their image. These 
strategies aligned with a broader discourse that emerged in this period, a discourse that 
sought to expand the range of participants in public life without undermining 
longstanding liberal institutions. In the realm of governance, this tendency expressed 
itself in the goals of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, which created new 
avenues for participation without dismantling the state or the role of the experts who 
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maintained it. In the realm of planning, this tendency expressed itself in the project of 
“alternate planning” that Harlem residents pursued, a strategy that fundamentally 
reinforced the importance of planning and planners even as it sought to make the 
discipline more democratic. 
As Harlemites staged a critique of planning orthodoxy, then, they relied on the 
assistance of experts who could help them translate their ideals into the language of 
redevelopment. In Harlem, residents turned to the Architects’ Renewal Committee in 
Harlem, or ARCH, a group of activist architects and planners who sought to open 
avenues for broader participation in the practice of design. Founded in 1964 by C. 
Richard Hatch, a white architect engaged with the broader rights battles of the era and 
frustrated with the top-down method with which most architects had approached the 
question of Harlem, ARCH partnered with residents in neighborhoods like West Harlem 
and the East Harlem Triangle. ARCH staked a role for professionals as intermediaries in 
a process of translation from idea to form. Hatch sought to maintain the patron-designer 
relationship that had long defined the practice of design, but shifted the “client” role to 
those whom plans had often harmed. In thus defining an advocacy role for architects and 
planners, Hatch’s organization symbolized the strategy of reform that design activism 
would take in this era, an approach soon crystallized in the idea of “advocacy planning.”4 
Redevelopment, Hatch argued, could work for low-income residents if communities 
produced their own plans with the help of sympathetic professionals. 
                                                
4 Planner Paul Davidoff provided the seminal theoretical work defining “advocacy planning.” See Paul 
Davidoff, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” Journal of the American Planning Association 31, no. 4 
(November 1965): 331-338. On activism in the profession of planning at this time, also see Robert 
Goodman, After the Planners (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971); Martin L. Needleman and Carolyn 
Emerson Needleman, Guerillas in the Bureaucracy: The Community Planning Experiment in the United 
States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974); Lily M. Hoffman, The Politics of Knowledge: Activist 
Movements in Medicine and Planning (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989). 
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If ARCH offers a revealing lens through which to examine the fundamental 
gradualism of efforts toward participatory democracy in the age of Great Society 
liberalism, however, so too does it offer a lens into the intractable tensions that underlay 
that project. The right to participate in shaping the built environment represented a civil 
rights issue equal to the right to decent education, public accommodations, or 
employment. Indeed, ARCH drew its motivation from the larger context of the Civil 
Rights Movement. Yet the African-American freedom struggle proved as mutable in this 
period as planning itself, and the organization thus occupied a shifting terrain in Harlem. 
Outside the windows of ARCH’s office on Lenox Avenue, staff could watch the 
emergence in these years of increasing demands for self-help among African-American 
Harlemites. Like other contemporary organizations that sought to broaden participation 
through gradual reform, ARCH experienced increasingly paradoxical dilemmas as the 
decade unfolded. With its community partners, ARCH helped shift the dynamic of 
modernist planning from a clearance approach to one that emphasized rehabilitation and 
careful redevelopment for the benefit of residents who refused to be displaced. Yet the 
persistent role of expert advocates and continued presence of outside aid increasingly 
contradicted the demands for self-determination that arose on these streets with the 
emergence of Black Power. ARCH’s attempts to adapt to such changes within the rubric 
of reform demonstrated the dynamism of activist planning in this period. But the 
organization’s refusal to fully cede its intermediary role ultimately proved untenable in a 
place where the project of participation and the project of radical community control 
increasingly aligned. 
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Urban Renewal and the Transformation of Harlem 
  Though New York’s enthusiasm for large-scale urban renewal reshaped much of 
the city’s landscape in the postwar period, Harlem bore the mark of redevelopment on an 
especially vast scale. Here, officials carried out the conjoined midcentury projects of 
modernism and liberalism, building new middle-class apartments and expansive public 
housing developments, and expanding the institutions that ringed the neighborhood, with 
the hope of maintaining New York City’s primary role on the national and international 
stage. If such projects derived from the beneficial intentions of the welfare state, 
however, they often disproportionately harmed Harlem’s predominantly low-income, 
African-American residents on the ground. Though proponents promised meaningful 
reforms in the early 1960s in response to criticism of redevelopment’s excesses, 
Harlemites found that officials could not resist the bulldozer approach that so frequently 
brought residential displacement. New plans for disruptive redevelopment in Harlem met 
a mobilized citizenry, however, who expressed newly strident but also newly constructive 
opposition in the face of plans that threatened to reshape their communities. Residents 
demanded a voice in the planning processes that transformed Harlem. They called not for 
urban renewal’s end but for its redirection toward new ends, to create a community of 
decent homes for Harlem’s existing population.   
New York City became the major laboratory for the practice of slum clearance in 
the postwar period, exceeding all other American cities in both the scale and the scope of 
urban redevelopment. The Housing Act of 1949 provided municipalities with two major 
tools to reconstruct their land. The first, the act’s Title I, enabled the acquisition and 
clearance of private land with considerable public subsidy, and its subsequent 
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development by private investors. The second, Title III, provided for the construction of 
public housing on cleared blocks. New York City pursued both ends enthusiastically 
under the leadership of Robert Moses, who dominated the city’s redevelopment apparatus 
and ensured that New York maintained a steady flow of funding from federal 
benefactors. By 1960, New York had obtained nearly $66 million in grants under Title I, 
almost doubling those of the second largest recipient, Chicago.5 Through Title I, the city 
supported institutional expansion of its universities, provided public facilities like the 
New York Coliseum and Lincoln Center, and constructed nearly 30,000 housing units for 
middle-income and affluent New Yorkers. Likewise, the city constructed 130,000 new 
public housing units in greater New York between 1945 and 1965, rebuilding hundreds of 
acres in the process.6  
Such projects disproportionately impacted residential neighborhoods where low-
income, minority New Yorkers resided. The law required that cleared sites be 
predominantly residential, and the subjective nature of “blight,” the designation used to 
justify eminent domain and the use of public subsidy, ensured that officials could mark 
almost any neighborhood as a slum, facilitating the clearance of prime real estate 
occupied by groups with little political recourse. Moreover, officials typically maintained 
racial and economic segregation in completed projects, reifying existing boundaries and 
                                                
5 See Hilary Ballon, “Robert Moses and Urban Renewal,” in Robert Moses and the Modern City: The 
Transformation of New York, eds. Hilary Ballon and Kenneth T. Jackson (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2006), 94. On Moses and urban renewal in New York, also see Joel Schwartz, The New York 
Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and Redevelopment of the Inner City (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1993); Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974); Samuel Zipp, Manhattan Projects: The Rise and Fall of Urban Renewal in 
Cold War New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Christopher Klemek, The Transatlantic 
Collapse of Urban Renewal: Postwar Urbanism from New York to Berlin (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2011). 
 
6 Schwartz, New York Approach, 175; Ballon and Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City, 244-
304; Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 157-249, 287. 
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further stratifying the city’s population.7 Moses notoriously assisted in ensuring that 
Stuyvesant Town, a massive World War II-era housing development and important 
precedent for postwar renewal, maintained racial segregation, encouraging construction 
of the all-black Riverton project in Harlem as an alternative to integration. And he 
pursued policies that bore uneven burdens in later projects, too. Of the sixteen Title I 
projects built by 1957, seven redefined the cityscape of predominantly nonwhite 
neighborhoods for the benefit of new middle-class residents. Moreover, Moses had 
gained special exemption from rules requiring oversight of residential relocation, a 
privilege that resulted in displaced tenants disproportionately moving to other poor, 
dilapidated neighborhoods, worsening the very conditions that redevelopment purported 
to solve.8  
While such efforts remade the canvas of vast swaths of the city’s five boroughs, 
Harlem’s blocks likely bore the brunt to an extent greater than any other neighborhood. 
East Harlem, generally the neighborhood between Fifth Avenue and the East River, 96th 
Street and the Harlem River, saw the city’s largest campaign to construct public housing 
between the start of World War II and 1965. New York City invested over a quarter of a 
billion dollars to build 15 public housing projects in the neighborhood, housing 62,400 
residents. Such projects reclaimed massive spaces within the grid. The James Weldon 
                                                
7 Scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 18, 152; 
Nicholas Dagen Bloom, Public Housing That Worked: New York in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 170-75. For discussion of these issues in Detroit and Chicago, 
respectively, see Thomas Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and 
Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). On the uses and abuses of 
“blight,” see Wendell E. Pritchett, “The ‘Public Menace’ of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of 
Eminent Domain,” Yale Law and Policy Review 21, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 1-52.  
 
8 Martha Biondi, “Robert Moses, Race, and the Limits of an Activist State,” in Robert Moses and the 
Modern City, eds. Ballon and Jackson, 117-20; Schwartz, New York Approach, 175; Zipp, Manhattan 
Projects, 114-129, 205-7.
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Johnson Houses, opened in 1948, occupied six blocks between Park and Third Avenues, 
extending from 112th to 115th Streets. Their scale was grand but not atypical. By the 
completion of the fifteenth such project, the city had reconstructed 162 acres of East 
Harlem.9 Likewise, Central Harlem saw considerable redevelopment under urban 
renewal, including the Polo Grounds Houses and Colonial Park Houses (now the Ralph 
Rangel Houses), both large public housing complexes along the Harlem River, and the St. 
Nicholas Houses between Seventh and Eighth Avenues and 127th and 131st Streets. Two 
Title I projects housed middle-income African-American tenants—Delano Village, along 
Lenox Avenue between 139th and 141st Streets, and Lenox Terrace at Lenox Avenue and 
135th Street. Their 24 acres had included some of the first speculative townhouses built in 
Harlem in the late nineteenth century, and some of the first homes in Harlem to be sold to 
African Americans in the early twentieth century.10 Nearby, in West Harlem, Columbia 
University and other institutional interests backed the construction of Morningside 
Gardens, a Title I project that opened in 1957, and two adjoining public housing 
developments: General Grant Houses along 125th Street, and Manhattanville Houses a 
couple blocks north.11 
The intentions behind such projects were never purely negative and their impact 
on surrounding Harlem was decidedly complex. Reconstruction of the urban fabric 
derived from several motivations: the hope that reconstruction would restore urban 
                                                
9 Zipp offers the most detailed chronicle of public housing construction in East Harlem. See Zipp, 
Manhattan Projects, 258-260; also see Schwartz, New York Approach, 116. 
 
10 Schwartz, New York Approach, 116; Ballon and Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City, 255-
8. For a discussion of the early history of these blocks, see Sharifa Rhodes-Pitts, Harlem is Nowhere: A 
Journey to the Mecca of Black America (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2011), 7-17. 
 
11 Ballon and Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City, 260-1; Schwartz, New York Approach, 
151-9, 185-9; Michael Carriere, “Between Being and Becoming: On Architecture, Student Protest, and the 
Aesthetics of Liberalism in Postwar America,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2010), 182-211. 
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competitiveness in an age of increasing suburbanization, aspirations to stem physical 
deterioration, and a midcentury liberal faith in the importance of institutions on a national 
and global stage. For example, Columbia University justified the redevelopment of 
Morningside Heights by arguing that its continued prominence depended on distance 
from nearby minority and low-income populations, which leaders perceived as slums. 
Moreover, protagonists of this reconstruction tempered their actions with steps they 
viewed as beneficent, including rehabilitation of nearby homes, increased policing, and 
recreational outreach.12 Likewise, the construction of middle-class housing for African 
Americans in Central Harlem grew from Moses’s practice of racial segregation, but also 
provided some of the finest housing the neighborhood had yet seen. Lenox Terrace, with 
its modern towers and elegantly attired doormen, became the go-to address for many 
prominent Harlemites. Getting to that point was punishing for tenants of the homes that 
had made up the site, however, whose neighborhood deteriorated during the five years of 
delays that preceded construction and, ultimately, their displacement.13  
Likewise, public housing’s legacy is famously mixed: while such housing often 
became the final destination for those displaced from renewal projects elsewhere in the 
city, the motivations of backers, such as those in East Harlem, were typically benign at 
the outset. As historian Samuel Zipp has argued, in this period “public housing was still 
seen by all but the most hostile real estate interests as a forward-looking way to clear 
slums, build decent housing for the poor and working classes, foster community, and 
                                                
12 Schwartz highlights the exclusionary aspects of the reconstruction of Morningside Heights, while Ballon 
and Jackson emphasize their liberal ideals. See Schwartz, New York Approach, 151-9; Ballon and Jackson, 
eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City, 260-1. On the role of renewal in maintaining New York’s 
importance on a global stage, see Zipp, Manhattan Projects. 
 
13 Ballon and Jackson, eds., Robert Moses and the Modern City, 255-8. 
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create a new and modern total living environment for remaking cities.” Yet the initial 
promise behind public housing revealed a “false dream” within only a few years, 
providing tenants with problematic homes and adjacent neighborhoods with new social 
problems, and creating a pool of low-income New Yorkers who either could not qualify 
for the new housing or who spent years waiting for a spot in the projects.14 
Regardless of the intentions underlying renewal, then, the fact remained that by 
the mid-1960s commentators, policy makers, and affected residents largely shared the 
perception that the means of renewal had brought dramatically negative results.15 By 
1965, social scientist Scott Greer could draw one damning conclusion from his 
nationwide study of urban renewal: “At a cost of more than three billion dollars the 
Urban Renewal Agency has succeeded in materially reducing the supply of low-cost 
housing in American cities.”16 Critics assailed the practice of slum clearance, leveling 
heavy condemnations from all sides. In her classic Death and Life of Great American 
Cities of 1961, Jane Jacobs focused on the physical products of renewal. “They seldom 
                                                
14 Zipp, Manhattan Projects, 261, 300. The legacy of public housing is extraordinarily complicated and still 
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aid the city areas around them, as in theory they are supposed to,” she wrote. “These 
amputated areas typically develop galloping gangrene.” Sociologist Herbert Gans offered 
a close study of the Italian Americans in Boston’s West End in 1962, revealing a rich 
social structure in a community that was soon to be cleared for new middle-income 
housing. In his vividly titled 1964 study, The Federal Bulldozer, Martin Anderson, a 
conservative political scientist, criticized urban renewal’s failure to achieve its stated 
goals of creating decent housing and condemned the broad government role the program 
entailed.17 
Such published works offered the most visible attacks against the predominant 
city planning practice of the era, but New Yorkers had already begun to push back 
against modernist redevelopment at the grassroots level well before Jacobs published 
Death and Life of Great American Cities. Jacobs herself defended her Greenwich Village 
neighborhood against street widening plans in 1958, and had joined the East Harlem 
Project in 1957. Led by social workers Ellen Lurie and Preston Wilcox, the East Harlem 
Project attempted to craft an alternative to the alienation often associated with immense 
public housing schemes. Their design for the DeWitt Clinton Houses appropriated the 
scale of the neighborhood’s traditional fabric instead of obliterating it with high-rise 
buildings and vast open space. While that ideal went unrealized, members subsequently 
focused on reworking the common areas at two East Harlem housing developments in the 
early 1960s, creating public spaces that advocates hoped would restore the social life of 
                                                
17 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961): 4; Herbert 
Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York: Free Press, 
1962); Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964). 
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the neighborhood.18 In the Lower East Side, too, tenant organizers and residents in the 
Cooper Square area moved to wrest control of the redevelopment process, forming the 
Cooper Square Committee in response to a 1959 plan to clear a substantial portion of the 
neighborhood. They successfully warded off such plans and guided redevelopment of the 
Cooper Square area over the next several decades.19 
New York’s redevelopment officials responded to this rising tide, promising a 
new approach to the practice of city rebuilding. In 1960, Robert Moses resigned his 
position at the Committee on Slum Clearance, the body most responsible for 
implementing redevelopment projects, and the city replaced the Committee with the 
Housing and Redevelopment Board, an entity responsible for both clearance and 
rehabilitation projects. The men who took over as the city’s top redevelopment officials – 
James Felt as chair of the City Planning Commission, and J. Clarence Davies as head of 
the Housing and Redevelopment Board – offered a more nuanced redevelopment 
strategy. “The backbone of renewal,” Felt said in 1961, “is in conserving and improving 
our existing structures and relating new development to the character and needs of the 
community.” In practice this was to involve a range of methods instead of only clearance, 
including rehabilitation, development on small sites, and selective removal within 
blocks.20 
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Such assurances suggested the distance that the city had travelled in only a few 
short years, but words did not always align with deeds. Indeed, Harlem found itself the 
object of renewed attention in the new decade, and proposals frequently relied on the 
very strategies of large-scale demolition that had come under increasing scrutiny by the 
late 1950s. In the spring of 1961, for example, the city proposed clearing a neighborhood 
that would come to be known as the East Harlem Triangle, a predominantly African 
American neighborhood north of 125th Street and east of Park Avenue, which proponents 
called “one of the most blighted and run-down areas in Harlem.” In these densely 
inhabited blocks, the city planned an industrial park including four million square feet of 
rentable space. Officials called the scheme a “major stimulus to the city’s economy,” but 
the massive project also promised the total devastation of the existing community.21  
Indeed, by the mid-1960s, officials acknowledged a “return to [the] bulldozer,” as 
the New York Times described it. William Ballard, chair of the City Planning 
Commission in early 1964, acknowledged, “We’ve been trying to do urban renewal 
without taking down any buildings, moving any people or hurting anybody.” But the city 
emphasized clearance in the projects it was ready to announce. “Now, in a very limited 
way, we’re going again into the areas that have to be bull-dozed,” Ballard continued. One 
of those areas included the land surrounding the Milbank Recreation Center in Central 
Harlem, delineated by 115th and 118th Streets, and Fifth and Lenox Avenues. However, 
the fairly modest scale of that project paled in comparison to the scope of the 
Morningside General Neighborhood Renewal Plan (GNRP), released publicly in the fall 
of 1964. For these 92 blocks around Columbia University, the city touted a list of goals 
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that largely aligned with the ideals that had characterized renewal since Moses’s reign. 
Officials hoped to reduce density and traffic congestion, provide new open space, 
improve public facilities and the area’s general “physical appearance,” and enable the 
expansion of Columbia and its academic neighbors.22 
Officials promised a variety of strategies to bring about those ends without severe 
human costs, but even here, where the city expected to demolish only 17 percent of the 
project area, or just over 36 acres, the city’s return to clearance bore profoundly uneven 
impacts. Then, as now, Morningside Park ran south to north for 13 blocks, delineating a 
break in Harlem’s landscape marked by dramatic changes in topography, land use, and 
demographics. Along the park’s western flank sat the neighborhood known as 
Morningside Heights, encompassing Columbia, the Cathedral Church of St. John the 
Divine, Union Theological Seminary, and the Jewish Theological Seminary, all high 
upon a bluff looking east over Harlem. Below, West Harlem presented a predominantly 
residential neighborhood, with dense blocks and commerce along 116th Street and its 
broad avenues. Almost three-quarters of the residents who lived amidst the institutions of 
Morningside Heights were white. Nearly 99 percent of the residents in the designated 
area of West Harlem were African-American, and of lower income than their 
counterparts up the hill. Here, officials rendered a bleaker diagnosis and, consequently, a 
harsher cure. In Morningside Heights, they reported, 217 of the 390 surveyed structures 
had “deficiencies.” In West Harlem, however, officials explained that nearly all the 
housing was unworthy of rehabilitation, especially the many old law tenements—built 
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before 1901 and containing what they deemed insufficient light and “inadequate basic 
facilities.” Planners claimed that an astounding 375 of the 393 structures in the West 
Harlem portion of the plan were unsound. They envisioned clearing 16 of the 50 acres in 
Morningside Heights, but more than 20 of the 25.7 acres in West Harlem.23 
The city pledged that the necessary relocation would be a matter of little concern 
for the residents uprooted by the nearly total demolition of their community. “Over the 
next ten years, there will be ample housing facilities to meet the relocation needs of the 
General Neighborhood Renewal Plan,” officials wrote. Their litany of potential housing 
encompassed the full sweep of the five boroughs, noting the hundreds of thousands of 
units that had been completed in the city over the previous decade, and optimistically 
projecting that hundreds of thousands more could be expected during the ensuing ten 
years. The possibility that the 3,500 West Harlem households to be displaced (of 3,800 
total) might wish to remain in the neighborhood where they had already constructed lives 
and livelihoods received only brief acknowledgement, and in measured tones. “Some of 
the housing resources to meet relocation needs for successive stages will become 
available within the renewal area from new or rehabilitated units produced in earlier 
stages,” planners promised.24 
But residents, familiar with the city’s heavy-handed approach to redevelopment in 
Harlem over the past two decades and thus deeply suspicious of any promises, showed 
little confidence in official pronouncements. In August, just before the Morningside 
plan’s official release, neighborhood leaders including Eugene Callender, the minister at 
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West Harlem’s Church of the Master, and Marie Runyon, a tenant activist in Morningside 
Heights, circulated a letter asking, “Do you know how the Morningside General 
Neighborhood Renewal Plan is going to affect you?” Invoking past experience, they 
noted, “One thing…is certain about urban renewal in low income areas: only rarely are 
the buildings that are torn down replaced by living units that fit the pocket books of those 
who were living there.”25  
Indeed, despite claims of reform in the urban renewal order in New York City in 
the early 1960s, residents had learned to be disappointed by the consequences of 
redevelopment. Yet a growing trend of resistance to plans across the city empowered 
West Harlemites. The nature of their early complaints foreshadowed the shape of things 
to come. Their protest against the Morningside GNRP was not premised on opposition to 
redevelopment per se, but specifically to renewal that failed to serve the needs of the 
neighborhood’s existing inhabitants. In other words, residents did not oppose rebuilding, 
but its use against them. “Urban renewal should improve the life of the community,” they 
wrote, “but it can do this only if its primary allegiance is to the individuals who will be 
[a]ffected by it. We who live in the area covered by the Morningside GNRP have not 
been guaranteed that allegiance, and it is therefore essential that we make sure that the 
plan benefits us.”26  
Noting that Morningside Heights institutions had helped shape the city’s plans, 
neighborhood leaders demanded a voice in planning decisions too. The outcome, they 
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hoped, would prevent wanton clearance and provide improved, affordable housing for 
current residents. Runyon’s Morningsiders United organized a ten-week seminar led by 
planner Walter Thabit, who had been instrumental in the effort to transform plans for the 
redevelopment of Cooper Square. Thabit was to instruct attendees on both the recent 
history of renewal and his own experience shaping it. These were skills that even a 
mobilized community could not offer on their own – expertise in the practice of city 
making, a vocabulary that could match that of officials – but that would prove essential as 
Harlemites sought to change the nature of urban redevelopment.27 
 
Technical Problems or Human Problems? 
 That Gertrude Wilson, a columnist at the New York Amsterdam News, regarded an 
October 29, 1964 meeting of the New York Chapter of the American Institute of 
Architects with suspicion was understandable. The meeting, on the theme of “Housing 
Problems in Harlem,” took place in the lavish Ponti Auditorium on the eighth floor of 
what she termed the “plush-lush” Time-Life Building, a midtown skyscraper that marked 
the extension of Rockefeller Center across Sixth Avenue. Sixty blocks from Harlem, it 
was far indeed from the neighborhood participants had gathered to discuss. “The meeting 
was like a broken record playing all over again – rat-holes, garbage, and yoo-hoo-hoo,” 
Wilson wrote. “I would like to know who is kidding whom and why. It is interesting to 
see how many white people can attend a nice comfy, cozy meeting in downtown 
buildings like the Time-Life building to discuss rebuilding Harlem.” These architects, 
Wilson was sure, were after the same prize as the many other professionals who had 
gazed upon Harlem during the past decades. “All the while their collective eye is not on 
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the sparrow, but on the nice lucrative fees to be had in rebuilding such a vast tumble-
down area,” she wrote in Harlem’s major newspaper.28 
 Indeed, architects and planners had not exactly been good to New York’s low-
income residents during the urban renewal period, serving as the shock troops that drafted 
the plans and designed the buildings that redefined the cityscape in neighborhoods like 
Harlem. But C. Richard Hatch, the 30-year-old architect who as a member of the AIA’s 
Housing Committee had organized the October meeting, claimed a different impetus. “It 
is true that most white architects do not comprehend the problems of the Harlem ghetto,” 
Hatch responded to Wilson. “But that was exactly the rationale for the meeting and for 
the choice of speakers.” Before a crowd of as many as 400, Harlem tenant activist Jesse 
Gray told attendees about conditions in Harlem; minister Charles Leber described his 
experience leading the Woodlawn Organization against urban renewal in Chicago; 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) director James Farmer outlined goals for the 
neighborhood; and architect Albert Mayer, who had worked with the East Harlem 
Project, suggested possible solutions that architects and planners could offer.29  
Hatch sought not employment opportunities for his colleagues, but the chance to 
put their skills to the service of Harlem residents. “If the residents of the Morningside, St. 
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Nicholas Park, and Milbank areas (and later the rest of Harlem) are not to be pawns of the 
real estate speculators, government bureaucrats, or private institutions seeking cheap land 
for expansion,” Hatch wrote, “they must organize to produce their own urban renewal 
plans and pressure the city to adopt them.” The line between design expertise and the 
public had become too vast, leading to plans that followed textbook orthodoxy but did 
not meet the needs of actual city residents. Hatch acknowledged the faults of his 
profession, hoping to direct knowledge to new ends. “We in the profession who have 
followed the pattern of urban renewal (or Negro removal, as it is sometimes called) 
across the country know what Harlem residents are up against,” he reminded readers. 
“We know that technical knowledge equal to or superior to that of the government 
agencies is necessary to a successful fight. We hope to be able to provide that 
assistance.”30  
Hatch and the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, or ARCH, the 
organization that grew out of the October meeting and that he led as executive director, 
tapped into broader currents emerging in Harlem and nationally in the mid-1960s. 
Residents subject to disruptive redevelopment plans, such as those who offered early 
opposition to clearance-oriented schemes in Morningside Heights and West Harlem, 
sought the assistance of professionals who could support their activism with design 
expertise. Likewise, architects and planners like Hatch, who voiced a rejection of the top-
down approach of modernist redevelopment from within the profession, sought 
opportunities to lend their expertise in the communities that renewal reshaped, like 
Harlem. Such objectives aligned with a larger effort to provide new avenues for 
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participation in public life in this era, an effort that – in keeping with the aims of Great 
Society liberalism – sought to respond to new demands for grassroots democracy without 
fundamentally overturning existing institutions. Yet if ARCH offered a gradualist 
approach to reform, retaining the conventional relationship of architect and client in its 
work and seeking the continued assistance of state aid, it hoped to turn both to 
dramatically new ends. ARCH joined Harlemites in outlining a new, more humane role 
for urban renewal. Instead of serving the expansion of institutions and seeking the return 
of the middle class, residents instead called for plans that benefited the existing low-
income population of Harlem neighborhoods, plans that treated the present population as 
the beneficiaries of redevelopment, not its victims. 
 Hatch’s vision had its roots in a range of sources, including ongoing debates 
around the nature of planning and the broader struggle over civil rights for African 
Americans. Civil rights provided a personal motivation for Hatch, who was white. He had 
grown up in a conservative Long Island family but maintained far left sympathies, 
representing the American Labor Party in Great Neck and documenting poverty in the 
town, a campaign that was published in the Suffolk County News in the late 1940s. He 
studied architecture at Harvard College and the University of Pennsylvania in the 1950s, 
and in the 1960s became involved with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party through his then-wife. Hatch 
watched tides of young people leave to join the Civil Rights Movement in the South, but 
realized the extent of the problems that persisted in the North—an awareness that focused 
his energies on New York, where he was working as an architect. In 1963 and 1964, 
Hatch became acquainted with Harlem civil rights leaders through Maureen Cusack, who 
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would later become ARCH’s first hire and, later still, Hatch’s second wife. Through 
contact with Farmer, Gray, Marshall England and Roy Innis, both then leaders in Harlem 
CORE, Hatch began to consider alternatives to renewal in its typical form.31 
Architects and planners conscious of the paradoxes of renewal’s liberal 
aspirations had offered their services to specific neighborhoods in Harlem and elsewhere 
on a limited basis since the late 1950s, as described above. But ARCH was likely the first 
effort to institutionalize this function, to provide a physical space accessible to an entire 
neighborhood where residents affected by official plans could access professional 
services otherwise out of reach. This concept would later come to be known as the 
“community design center.” Its role in Harlem revealed itself in the preposition Hatch 
had chosen for the organization’s name. ARCH was not “of” Harlem – its architects and 
planners came from throughout the city – but it was “in” Harlem, accessible to residents, 
at their service, and in their midst.  
In this sense, ARCH reflected the broader public discourse on participation that 
was gaining momentum at this time. President Lyndon Johnson had signed the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964 into law in August, not long before Hatch’s first meeting, 
bringing the Community Action Program to reality as well as its promise to ensure “the 
maximum feasible participation of the poor and members of the groups served” in its 
activities. While it would be several months before the first War on Poverty monies made 
their way to Harlem, ARCH’s mission and early work shared the aspirations of this 
model. At an early meeting, Hatch explained the organization’s intention to restore 
control to Harlem residents. “Ghetto residents must, as a first step toward full 
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participation of our society, be enabled to make the decisions which affect their 
destinies,” he explained. “In our work, they will take the leadership.”32  
Yet in its approach to democratizing planning, ARCH also symbolized the larger 
paradox that attended such efforts in this period. The drafters of the War on Poverty 
sought to move beyond the liberalism of the New Deal era, characterized by the sort of 
federal government-dominated policies that urban renewal exemplified, but President 
Johnson’s Great Society nonetheless remained largely within the parameters of 
midcentury liberalism. While broadening opportunities for participation, policies 
continued to maintain the centrality of federal aid and the prominence of professional 
expertise in public life.33 Likewise, in pursuing alternatives to clearance-oriented 
redevelopment, the leaders of ARCH at once aspired to access a steady stream of public 
funding and to negotiate a new localism in its use, to bring new participants into the 
decision-making process and to retain the central role of experts. While calling for the 
democratization of planning, for example, ARCH maintained a dependence on highly 
trained professionals from the outset, a fact exemplified by its board of directors, which 
included AIA New York Chapter president Norval White, architects Albert Mayer, 
Edward Echevarria, and Edgar Tafel, planner Walter Thabit, and sociologist Herbert 
Gans.34  
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Indeed, Hatch sought to reform planning within the traditional architectural 
relationship of patron and designer, a goal that aligned with the broader efforts of the 
Great Society to provide citizens with new influence without fundamentally undermining 
existing institutions. As Hatch explained to the architects and planners in attendance at 
the April 1965 Harvard Urban Design Conference, his objective was “to turn the 
consumers of architectural goods – the poor – into clients, into proper clients.” While 
shifting the patronage role from the city officials who had typically guided planning 
decisions to residents themselves, architects and planners would retain a primary role as 
intermediaries in the process, as advocates. “Architects eventually have got to see 
themselves – I quite strongly feel – as advocates for the poor,” Hatch said, drawing a 
parallel with other contemporary efforts that saw professionals offer their services to 
predominantly low-income communities. “And students coming out of architecture 
school must be required…to go into the neighborhoods of the poor and work with them 
as lawyers and legal aid societies work with them.” ARCH staff members were to 
translate the wishes of their previously disenfranchised clients into the language of 
architecture and planning. “[W]e will develop their ideas into physical plans and concrete 
proposals for social action,” Hatch said.35  
In describing new modes of engagement as a means of reform within the bounds 
of the design professions, Hatch’s words anticipated those of planner Paul Davidoff’s 
November 1965 article, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning.” Davidoff’s treatise would 
offer the most famous philosophical backing for the field of activist planning, and best 
exemplified the movement’s departure from the prevailing orthodoxy of urban 
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development while retaining the centrality of professional expertise. “[T]he planner 
should do more than explicate the values underlying his prescriptions for courses of 
action,” Davidoff argued, “he should affirm them; he should be an advocate for what he 
deems proper.” Davidoff envisioned a new professional role for planners, inspired by the 
adversarial approach of law. Instead of a single “unitary plan,” as Davidoff called the 
traditional medium of planning, he contended that planners should develop multiple 
plans, each representing the different interests at stake in a given project. These would 
form the basis for negotiation, with planners serving as advocates for their clients. 
“Appropriate policy in a democracy is determined through a process of political debate,” 
Davidoff wrote. “The right course of action is always a matter of choice, never of fact.” 
Though Davidoff’s notion of “plural planning” offered a radical departure from the top-
down mode of modernist planning, however, he voiced such solutions as a means of 
strengthening, not undermining, the profession of planning in an era of potential crisis. 
“The advocacy of alternative plans by interest groups outside of government would 
stimulate city planning in a number of ways,” Davidoff explained. Advocacy would 
provide improved alternatives and increase the quality of work, he argued, and it would 
force opponents to speak through the tools of planning, not simply vocal opposition.36  
The paradox intrinsic to ARCH’s effort to democratize planning while retaining 
an intermediary role for professionals suggested itself in the organization’s first months. 
ARCH’s success depended most of all on gaining the trust and attention of residents in 
the areas marked for renewal, but the organization’s staff was made up of outsiders to 
Harlem. These volunteers formed committees assigned to different Harlem 
neighborhoods. The committee for the Milbank area, for instance, included young 
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architects and planners, both African American and white, Norval White, ARCH’s board 
president, and Frances Fox Piven, the noted social scientist and poverty scholar. “The 
community will not come to us, we must go to it,” Hatch instructed his volunteers. Their 
effectiveness depended crucially on finding like-minded local partners, and even on 
convincing Harlemites that this was a pursuit worth their effort. “[W]e must make them 
aware of the implications of renewal action,” Hatch wrote, “and of the possibilities for 
immediate action.” To increase the organization’s visibility in the community, ARCH 
had begun to plan federally funded preschools, educational materials, such as a filmstrip 
on planning, and an exhibition on neighborhood conditions. “This job is not going to be 
easy,” Hatch warned.37 
 Yet any apprehension at this early stage proved largely premature. In the 
communities affected by the Morningside GNRP, ARCH staff found residents who had 
already begun to organize around the threat of large-scale residential displacement. 
Neighborhood activists, who had sought the assistance of professional experts early on, 
shared the approach that Hatch voiced. In December 1964, Eugene Callender, of West 
Harlem’s Church of the Master, formalized opposition with the creation of the Tri-
Community Organization, an alliance of tenant activists including representatives from 
Morningsiders United, West Harlem, and Manhattan Valley, the neighborhood 
immediately south of West Harlem. Tri-Community’s first action involved organizing the 
low-income tenants of the Bryn Mawr Hotel, a Morningside Heights single-room-
occupancy (SRO) residence that neighboring institutions hoped to take over. For the far 
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larger effort of resisting the clearance of the neighborhoods surrounding Morningside 
Park, Tri-Community turned to ARCH, whom it asked to analyze the intentions of the 
Morningside plan.38 
In ARCH’s critique of the Morningside GNRP, the organization’s first public 
statement, staff captured their novel approach to redevelopment at large, outlining the 
principles that would mark their work in West Harlem and elsewhere. Fundamental to 
ARCH’s denunciation was an extreme distaste with the city’s method of urban renewal, 
but never a rejection of the need for renewal itself. Indeed, ARCH volunteer Ronald 
Kolbe wrote, their aim was “to improve the plan,” to suggest the ways that a 
wrongheaded approach to the area could be righted. “The idea that urban renewal is a 
chance to create a balanced and healthy environment for the present residents is alien to 
this proposal,” Kolbe argued, expressing an ideal for redevelopment even as he criticized 
the city’s neglect of the existing community. The city’s plan encompassed vast disparities 
in the distribution of its negative impact, segmented along class lines. West Harlem 
would see severe displacement, Kolbe wrote, with more than three-quarters of its tenants 
uprooted. Even in wealthier Morningside Heights, where fewer homes were to be 
destroyed, officials intended to displace all tenants of single-room-occupancy hotels, 
typically the poorest and most problem-plagued residents in the city.39 
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Yet ARCH’s analysis contended that officials had drawn the boundaries of the 
redevelopment project too stingily, not too expansively. In other words, if anything the 
renewal area was too small. Planners excluded considerable acreage within the 
boundaries of the plan area, specifically 14 blocks around Columbia. The exemption of 
those 17,000 residents from the redevelopment plan, Kolbe argued, “removes Columbia’s 
actions which affect the community from public scrutiny, and leaves the interests of the 
present residents unprotected.” Relocation assistance from the city left much to be 
desired, indeed, but inclusion in the plan would at least provide some aid to the 4,300 
households who lived in Columbia-owned property in those blocks, who could otherwise 
be evicted without any form of compensation. Equally problematic for ARCH activists 
were the outer boundaries of the plan, which threatened to redraw neighborhoods while 
excluding key areas that could potentially help reduce the burden on displaced residents. 
“The inclusion of West Harlem, supposedly to reduce the barrier effects of Morningside 
Park and to bring it ‘closer’ to Morningside Heights,” Kolbe wrote, “is undermined by 
the specific plans for the area.” In the city’s plans for broad clearance, a four-block 
community center, and a widened Eighth Avenue, ARCH saw “a major reduction of 
residential land” in the neighborhood. “The total effect will be to drastically change the 
character and population of the community, and to constrict Harlem further as its 
boundary is pushed eastward from Morningside to Eighth Avenues,” Kolbe contended. A 
larger renewal area could help to reduce the scope of these problems, ARCH staff argued, 
by including vacant land upon which the city could build new housing before displacing 
any existing tenants.40 
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Above all, ARCH’s critique rested on a fundamentally different view of social 
structure than officials maintained. The city’s strategy grew from an increasingly obsolete 
approach to urbanism, rooted in the same assumptions that had guided redevelopment in 
Harlem over two decades—especially a faith in institutions and in the inherent value of 
the middle-class. Returning the middle-class to New York City had been Robert Moses’s 
first priority, apparent in the expansion of urban universities and cultural institutions 
intended to reassert the city’s world-class status, and in the dozens of developments 
meant to provide affordable housing for the city’s middle-income workers.41 ARCH 
found the same tendency in the Morningside plan. The group’s staff doubted the city’s 
intention to house low-income residents in the 4,500 new housing units that planners 
promised, noting that officials “offer[ed] no assurance that many of those who were 
forced to move will be able to afford the new units.” ARCH forecasted that only a third 
of displaced tenants would find affordable housing anywhere in the city, let alone in their 
reconstructed neighborhood, leaving the vast majority to “compete for the small number 
of vacant, rent-controlled apartments” or to meet “impossibly high rentals in new or 
existing un-controlled apartments.” More distressing still were the prospects for SRO 
tenants, who faced the longest odds and the dimmest prospects. “Dislocation may be an 
immediate remedy for Morningside Heights,” where institutions hoped to eliminate all 
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SROs, ARCH staff explained, “but it will only force these people into other areas where 
they will face the same problems and hostilities all over again.”42 
 ARCH asked why decent low-income housing couldn’t be a solution in itself, 
even the very objective of redevelopment. “[T]he plan fails to recognize the important 
need for this type of housing in the city,” Kolbe wrote of SROs, “as well as the basic 
economic and social reasons for its existence.” Indeed, such housing could be more than 
a last resort, even a means “to restore self-confidence and hope to these people.” But, he 
claimed, the city’s priorities revealed a deeper bias. “In addition to its insensitive attitude 
towards people in SRO’s, the plan betrays an almost cynical lack of concern for the deep 
rooted and serious social problems of the area,” Kolbe wrote. His litany captured the full 
range of deficiencies that ARCH believed were overlooked in the plan: “the housing and 
social welfare needs of the elderly, unfavorable economic circumstances of many 
families, the high incidence of drug addiction, and the lack of adequate child care, 
medical, and educational services.” This was a matter of equity. Not only did the 
Morningside plan reinscribe existing disparities into uptown’s built environment, 
threatening to heighten existing inequality, but the costs were not borne equally. “The 
plan will offer benefits to certain groups such as the institutions and some middle income 
families,” Kolbe argued, “while others, such as residents of West Harlem, those in 
rooming houses throughout the area, and the elderly, will suffer an unusually large share 
of the burdens.”43 
                                                
42 ARCH, “A Review of the Morningside General Neighborhood Renewal Plan,” 1 March 1965, Box 6, 
Folder 7, Collins Collection. 
 
43 Ibid. 
 58 
 Harlemites echoed Kolbe’s criticism, insisting that the city recognize the 
humanity of existing residents, regardless of their income. Within days of the March 
release of ARCH’s critique of the Morningside GNRP, residents of the area made their 
way to City Hall for a hearing at the Board of Estimate, the body that would vote to 
approve the plan. An all-night vigil led by Reverend Callender preceded the hearing, 
where, the Times reported, “a parade of the Negro and Puerto Rican poor protested…on 
the ground that it would destroy their homes and simply drive them into other slums.” 
Residents opposed the plan and its backers by pointing to their value as people, low-
income or not. “How much money will you give for a human life?” asked William 
Stanley, who managed a building in the area and had become involved in tenant 
organizing. “These people…they know what a rat or a roach infested home is. Bad as it 
is, they want to keep it.” Resident Estelle Edwards wondered whether she and her 
neighbors were “always going to be a collection of citizens in a minority always 
categorized by what we haven’t got.” “We want to be first-class citizens, too,” she 
argued.44  
But officials reiterated the very approach to redevelopment that activists attacked, 
demonstrating their fundamental unwillingness to reframe renewal in the new terms that 
residents and ARCH demanded. At the March City Hall hearing, Columbia University 
officials and their institutional neighbors justified the project with the grandiose 
explanations that had been central to urban renewal, suggesting that “if the plan did not 
go forward they would be denied the room for the expansion they desperately needed to 
serve the city and the nation,” the Times reported. In response to the pleas of residents, 
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Columbia provost Jacques Barzun instead voiced concern for the well being of the 
students of his university. His language undoubtedly sounded hollow to Harlemites who 
had publicly objected to the second-class status they repeatedly felt. As the reporter 
paraphrased, Barzun argued that his university “had the responsibility of training the 
leaders that the country would need tomorrow.” His actual quote was less delicate, if 
more revealing. “They must not,” Barzun said, “be subjected to an environment that 
requires the perpetual qui vive of a paratrooper in enemy country.”45  
The battle for the future of West Harlem, though marked by seemingly intractable 
opposition, in fact symbolized the broader transformation that redevelopment was 
undergoing at this time in its approach to the lives of real people. Long a paternalistic, 
top-down policy that viewed a community like West Harlem as a simplified abstraction, 
ARCH and its partners instead offered an approach to urban renewal that valued the 
individuals who lived in places such as West Harlem, and supported their right to remain. 
The tension inherent in this shift from an old order to an emergent alternative, and the 
issues at stake, became vividly apparent when West Harlemites clashed again with 
Barzun, the Columbia administrator who personified the standpoint they refused. Barzun, 
it appeared, did not respect the residents that plans would displace, stereotyping and 
belittling them with poorly chosen words at an April hearing on the city’s proposal. They 
were “transient, footloose, or unhappily disturbed people,” Barzun contended. But the 
members of the West Harlem Community Organization (WHCO), the organization that 
residents founded with the assistance of ARCH, Reverend Callender, and Morningsiders 
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United, proved remarkably canny, in fact, staging an uninvited visit to Barzun’s office in 
early May and notifying a reporter so the encounter would be recorded. “No one, 
especially an educated man like you, has the right to talk about people the way you 
did…You insulted me,” William Stanley opened. “I was not talking about you good 
people,” Barzun deflected, “but about addicts and prostitutes.” “How do you know what 
we are?” Stanley asked. “You were talking about a part of our community. About 
Harlem. About colored people.” “We want to help the addicts. They are a part of our 
community,” added Margaret McNeil, a leader of WHCO. “The university, with all its 
education, should also help the addicts.” Barzun objected. “That is a technical problem,” 
he told McNeil. Stanley disagreed vehemently: “No…that is a human problem.”46 
 
Rehabilitating West Harlem 
What might a city without displacement look like, one where William Stanley’s 
“human problems” were assisted, not excised, through urban renewal? Vocal critique 
could only go so far, activists learned, spurring modest compromises but not materially 
changing the negative impact of city plans on residents. Indeed, the Morningside plan 
made its way through city bureaucracies largely intact throughout early 1965. The minor 
concessions that officials granted, adjustments intended to ease the pace of displacement 
and allow the possibility of some relocation housing in the area, did not dramatically alter 
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the plan’s human costs. Six thousand, five hundred people would still be evicted, 
opponents estimated.47 Faced with intransigence in response to their pleas, activists 
increasingly focused on the translation of resistance into physical form. Alternate 
planning offered an alternative to direct action, premised on the assumption that Paul 
Davidoff would soon voice, that a physical vision could sway opponents in ways that 
rhetoric could not.48 Yet as alternate plans for West Harlem took shape, they were 
remarkable not for any apparent visionary quality, but for their resemblance to the 
existing city. In emphasizing the intrinsic value of West Harlem’s residents, ARCH staff 
likewise emphasized the intrinsic value of its buildings, calling for the wide use of 
rehabilitation as a means of improving the neighborhood. Stabilizing the existing fabric 
of the city in order to decently house low-income residents provided a solution whose 
very physical continuity revealed its distance from the norm of urban renewal. Despite 
this departure, however, ARCH’s spatial strategy reinforced the fundamental gradualism 
of its method, reemphasizing both the centrality of the state and of the professional 
designer in the organization’s effort to rethink redevelopment.  
Indeed, an increased focus on the physical form of redevelopment bolstered the 
role of design expertise in ARCH’s work. “Our services are free,” Hatch wrote to the 
editor of the New York Amsterdam News in July 1965, announcing the opening of 
ARCH’s new office at 306 Lenox Avenue, near the major intersection of Lenox Avenue 
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and 125th Street. “We welcome the opportunity to serve interested neighborhood groups.” 
Their objective was to become the neighborhood’s architecture and planning firm. “Our 
staff and volunteers have broad experience in the use of federal and local programs for 
job training, pre-school education, physical planning, rehabilitation, and other phases of 
architectural design,” he explained.49 ARCH added 21 additional architects and planners 
for the summer, all graduate students supported through a J.M. Kaplan Fund grant and 
engaged in a variety of research projects focused on Harlem’s physical space, including 
problematic building types such as SROs.50 Likewise, ARCH doubled its design staff 
with the addition of Jack Bailey, a white architect and Harvard acquaintance of Hatch, as 
assistant director. Bailey had previously worked at the Boston Redevelopment Authority, 
the agency responsible for one of the most prolific redevelopment programs in the 
country, had earlier been on staff at the New York City Planning Commission, and had 
become disaffected with urban renewal. Bailey offered a perspective honed on the other 
side of the table, a contribution that Hatch recognized would lend ARCH credibility as 
well as expertise as its reputation grew and it became more central in the reconstruction 
of Harlem.51  
Such changes at ARCH underscored the organization’s commitment to reforming 
redevelopment from within the parameters of urban renewal. So too did the very planning 
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document through which activists drafted their vision for West Harlem. To lend 
legitimacy to their project and, indeed, as a clever sleight of hand, ARCH and WHCO, 
their community partners, wrote the alternate plan for what they called the “West Harlem 
Urban Renewal Area” as a Survey and Planning Application, the official form required to 
request federal planning funds for urban redevelopment. They submitted their “counter 
proposal” through official channels as well, with the help of New York City 
Congressman William Fitts Ryan, who arranged a meeting between ARCH, WHCO, and 
the regional director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the 
agency that approved urban renewal funding requests. The Survey and Planning 
Application hewed closely to official guidelines, yet emphasized at every turn a strategy 
of upsetting the Morningside GNRP’s clearance-heavy approach from within.52 
In the alternate plan for West Harlem, planners continued to point to the vast scale 
of dislocation encompassed under the official plan, and the negative consequences 
involved for residents. “To underwrite such a proposal is to sanction the displacement of 
almost 80% of the present population for what is, in effect, the benefit of another and 
more privileged population,” planners wrote. Yet they called for the expansion of the 
redevelopment area, so that the potential benefits of reconstruction would encompass 
more Harlemites. Instead of ending the plan boundaries at Eighth Avenue on its east side, 
or at 119th Street along Morningside Park, ARCH and WHCO extended the eastern flank 
across Eighth Avenue, and the northern border up to 123rd Street, in order to bring more 
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residents under the plan. Instead of reconstructing Eighth Avenue as a barrier between 
Central Harlem and the institutions to its west, planners imagined the boulevard “as a link 
between these communities.”53 
If the alternate plan’s generous boundaries suggested assent with the basic 
premise of renewal, however, its physical strategy offered a telling rebuke to the 
clearance orientation of the city’s plan. Rehabilitation provided the architectural 
watchword of the alternate plan, an idea that recurred at every turn (Figure 1.1). “The 
dwindling supply of low rent housing in Manhattan…and the expanding need for such 
housing,” planners argued, “makes it mandatory that the basic[al]ly sound housing stock 
of West Harlem be retained through a program of conservation and rehabilitation in 
varying degrees with spot clearance and redevelopment only where necessary and 
appropriate.” ARCH had conducted its own survey of housing in this area, finding 
dramatically different results from those described in the city’s plan. Against the notion 
of a neighborhood in dilapidation, planners contended that much of the housing stock was 
actually intact, if not ideal. “A common building type…is the Old Law Tenement, which 
is generally recognized as an obsolete building [t]ype in terms of current space 
standards,” the planners acknowledged. “Most of these buildings are, however, in sound 
structural condition and su[s]ceptible of upgrading to adequate standards.” ARCH staff 
estimated that potentially more than a third of the neighborhood’s buildings required only 
code enforcement, or basic improvement based on city building codes, and as much as 40 
percent could be improved through modest rehabilitation “which will not require 
substantial relocation.” Geographically, this meant concentrating clearance along Eighth 
Avenue, the portion of the neighborhood where ARCH staff identified the most  
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Figure 1.1. Plan for West Harlem Urban Renewal Area, 1966. West Harlem Community 
Organization and Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, “West Harlem Urban 
Renewal Area: Survey and Planning Application,” January 1966, C. Richard Hatch 
Private Collection. 
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dilapidated housing, and otherwise clearing small portions only where absolutely 
necessary. 54 
Rehabilitation marked a physical response to a practical problem, perhaps the 
most obvious strategy in a situation where residents were of low-income and housing was 
imperfect but salvageable. ARCH did not originate the concept, to be sure. The Housing 
Act of 1954 had brought rehabilitation under the umbrella of redevelopment, and the city 
became more open to that approach in the 1960s, as described above. More recently, 
HUD had embarked on a model rehabilitation program on 114th Street between Seventh 
and Eighth Avenues, immediately abutting the area of the West Harlem plan. The 114th 
Street effort captivated journalists, who traced the journey of the low-income tenants as 
they began to move into their new homes in 1965.55 But the scale of rehabilitation 
outlined in the alternate plan for West Harlem, and the exclusive use of this rehabilitated 
housing for low-income tenants, marked a dramatic departure from precedent. Urban 
renewal, after all, remained physically deterministic at its core, tying large-scale 
reconstruction to improved social outcomes. Activists’ calls for the retention of 
“obsolete” housing types, such as the Old Law Tenement, refuted the idea that the 
improvement of a neighborhood required starting with an architectural blank slate, just as 
it rejected the idea that redevelopment required starting with a new population. 
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Yet even as the alternate plan suggested deep frustration with the typical physical 
strategy of official policy, activists fully exploited the potential remedies they could 
obtain from government at all levels. Just as planners called for urban renewal’s 
reorientation toward new ends, they encouraged the use of public funding for the benefit 
of existing residents. They would tap every available public resource, ARCH staff 
explained, “including acquisition by condemnation, resale at reuse value, use of tax 
abatement and exemption combined with the Municipal Loan Program and profit and 
non-profit sponsorship under the Federal 221(d)(3) program.” Their laundry list included 
policies that reduced rent through supplements, by easing tax bills, or through subsidized 
mortgage loans.56 As ARCH staff wrote in their March 1966 Government Programs for 
Community Development, a guidebook whose very title encapsulated this strategy, “[t]he 
Federal, State and City governments all offer aids which can enable local organizations, 
on their own initiative, to make real changes in their neighborhoods.” They broadcast the 
message less subtly in announcing the guide: “This book will help your community 
organization to get government money for neighborhood improvement.” They 
highlighted programs that promised to reduce the cost of housing rehabilitation, subsidize 
construction labor, or minimize new construction costs, in order to make new housing 
affordable to low-income tenants.57 Likewise, the Housing and Urban Development Act 
of 1965, passed in August, caught ARCH’s admiring eye for its focus on rehabilitation 
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and new rent supplements that promised to reduce the costs of private-market affordable 
housing.58 
The gains of the tenants’ rights movement offered an alternative approach to the 
goal of rehabilitation as a means of ensuring the availability of decent housing for low-
income tenants. Tenants’ rights battles had a long history in New York, but 1965 and 
1966 brought several new policy tools at the state and local levels that ARCH leaders 
enthusiastically embraced. The city’s Emergency Repair Program, for example, allocated 
a fund from which officials could draw to make crucial repairs, billing recalcitrant 
landlords for the costs. Article 7-A of the state’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings 
Law facilitated rent strikes, allowing tenants to gain court protection to put rent money 
towards building needs, such as lack of heat, water, or electricity, and dangerous 
structural problems. City Receivership allowed temporary takeover of dilapidated 
buildings when landlords failed in their responsibilities, again to ensure that essential 
repairs were made.59 ARCH’s major contribution to such efforts was a comprehensive 
guidebook, Tenant Action, first published in 1965 and distributed widely in Harlem and 
beyond. The book went into its second printing by March 1966, with 2,500 copies 
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circulated by November. Free publicity in New York Times and New York Amsterdam 
News articles surely helped. Tenant Action “offer[ed] guidelines for minority-group 
families in dealing with uncooperative landlords – or an uncooperative society,” the 
Times wrote.60 
Tenant Action facilitated ARCH’s goal to improve the physical condition of 
existing housing by cataloguing existing policies, listing step-by-step instructions, and 
providing a directory of supportive community associations. But ARCH extended its 
work beyond guidance to become directly involved in such cases, acting on behalf of 
tenants throughout Harlem, even preparing legal claims. Staff testified in court and 
recruited lawyers and volunteers to target housing violations. By June 1966, staff member 
Robert Stover, who had prepared Tenant Action, had filed 15 rent strike cases. By the 
fall, he had assembled ten attorneys and ten architects in a broader effort that 
encompassed 40 actions under Article 7-A and other rent strike legislation. Hatch 
reported that these represented more than half of the cases brought in New York City in 
1966.61  
Such success demonstrated the plausibility of rehabilitating Harlem’s housing, an 
accomplishment that inspired broader ambitions. “[W]e are the only housing organization 
active in this fashion in Central Harlem!” Hatch wrote. With more activist legislation on 
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the horizon, Hatch imagined the “potential for substantial city-wide strike action.” His 
dream embodied a prescient vision that would attain ironic reality in the late 1970s.  “The 
net effect of such a massive, simple, legal rent strike would probably be to drive many 
marginal slumlords to abandon their buildings—and here we are back at the 
Neighborhood Housing Corporations which would be created to take over the 
properties,” Hatch said.62  
Yet as Hatch reported ARCH’s success to the organization’s leaders in 1966, and 
his aspiration that the organization’s efforts marked only the first step in a sweeping 
transformation of Harlem, new concerns tempered his enthusiasm. “We feel we need a 
Negro organizer-housing consultant to oversee this program and seek out clients,” Hatch 
wrote.63 Indeed, this warning spoke to a broader tension that had begun to surface more 
frequently. For example, a December 1965 article noted the criticism of one volunteer, an 
African-American architect “in charge of ARCH’s activities in the neighborhood where 
he was reared.” In his view, the reporter noted, “too few of the volunteers have or seek 
direct knowledge of the ghetto community. Too much time is spent on fact-finding 
reports…and too little getting acquainted with community leaders and organizations.” 
One 1965 project, a proposal for a “long range plan” for Harlem, suggested a possible 
basis for criticism that the organization’s strategy risked aloofness. “ARCH must begin to 
think about a long range plan for Harlem as a whole,” the proposal began. Despite the 
organization’s promise to facilitate channels for meaningful participation through its 
advocacy role, the proposal instead suggested a contrasting approach that originated with 
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the trained professionals of ARCH before moving back into the Harlem community. “It 
would…be appropriate for a group to start working on total long range ideas of what 
Harlem could be like and how it might get there,” staff wrote, “to stimulate the thinking 
of local community groups and broaden their concepts of possibilities.”64 
Indeed, even as ARCH’s approach to alternate planning signaled the persistence 
of the relative gradualism of Great Society-era liberalism, the organization witnessed the 
first stirrings of a move away from that approach. West Harlem residents voted on the 
alternate plan for their neighborhood upon its December 1965 unveiling at a 
“community-wide public hearing,” where, in ARCH’s words, they “unanimously 
approved.” If the support of ARCH’s first clients endured unabated, however, the 
organization’s predominantly white architects and planners would soon face changing 
dynamics in Harlem. The neighborhood became the very seat of new demands for racial 
autonomy, and new frustrations with the “advocacy” models that ARCH, with its 
emphasis on the intermediary role of professional experts, particularly embodied.65  
 
The Emergence of Community Control 
The creation of an alternate plan for West Harlem and its reception among both 
federal lawmakers and bureaucrats testified to the gains ARCH had made in reputation 
and visibility in less than two years. Yet the organization’s vision of the widespread 
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rehabilitation of Harlem’s built environment proved unattainable. “A great deal of our 
energy has gone into this project,” Hatch wrote in November 1966, listing the Survey and 
Planning Application, meetings with the West Harlem community, various studies, and 
the Head Start preschool – perhaps the first in New York City – that ARCH and WHCO 
organized to provide employment and facilitate community organizing. But momentum 
had subsided. “[T]he city has all but dropped the project,” Hatch observed, an outcome 
that marked only a partial victory for the activists who had maintained pressure in the 
hope of improving the neighborhood.66 
Planners still intended to realize their vision of a community reconstructed for 
low-income Harlemites, however. The East Harlem Triangle, the neighborhood that the 
city had designated for total clearance in 1961 to make way for an industrial park, offered 
a new opportunity for ARCH in 1966. Where ARCH had often led the way in West 
Harlem, as staff helped establish the West Harlem Community Organization and then 
guided the alternate planning process, the East Harlem Triangle had seen an active and 
tenacious resistance to urban renewal throughout the early 1960s. By the time leaders 
tapped ARCH’s assistance in June 1966, members of the Community Association of the 
East Harlem Triangle (CAEHT) already had extensive experience manipulating the urban 
renewal bureaucracy and grand aspirations of their own alternate plan, a comprehensive 
vision for the neighborhood that included social services alongside improved housing.67  
The East Harlem Triangle offered a departure from West Harlem not only because 
of its longstanding mobilized community, however. Here, ARCH came in direct contact 
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with the leading edge of the transforming Civil Rights Movement. While plans for West 
Harlem had depended on public largesse and the advocacy role of the professionals in 
ARCH, in the East Harlem Triangle residents sought to balance continued reliance on 
outside assistance with emerging aspirations toward self-help. Such struggles revealed 
the larger battle in progress in this era, between enduring liberal approaches to 
participation and growing demands for radical self-determination. Indeed, as a key site in 
the rise of Black Power, with its demands for racial autonomy in education, politics, and 
the built environment, the Triangle neighborhood became the very crucible in which such 
decisions were forged. The movement for “community control” that burst forth in 
Harlem, New York City, and in major cities across the United States exposed the 
intractable dilemma in the work of organizations like ARCH, however. ARCH’s model, 
premised on the relationship between community members and expert intermediaries, 
marked the very dynamic that radical activists would come to reject amid widespread 
calls for unmediated decision-making by African-American residents.  
No figure represented the deep-rooted activist spirit of the East Harlem Triangle 
as much as Alice Kornegay, whose mischievous greeting at the February 1966 opening of 
the Community Association’s new headquarters encapsulated the modus operandi of the 
Triangle neighborhood’s driving force. To an audience of social workers, clergy, police, 
and, especially, government officials, Kornegay exclaimed, “I have to acknowledge that 
all you city people are here because I’ll have to fight y’all later.” “Let the city be on 
notice,” she continued. “We intend to press for action on the renewal of our community 
and along the lines we want, not what they want for us. The time is past where we are 
willing to let others make our decisions for us.” The renovated loft at 130 East 129th 
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Street, until recently another dilapidated building in the Triangle, now housed the group’s 
staff and programs, which included tenant organizing and welfare officer training for 
residents, a Head Start preschool, and a “planned parenthood center.”68 
Kornegay had loudly demanded equal resources and decent treatment for her 
neighbors for over a decade. Indeed, she, a resident of the Triangle neighborhood since 
the 1940s, knew officials well by 1966. Melvin Schoonover, the white minister at nearby 
Chambers Memorial Baptist Church and Kornegay’s partner in efforts to organize the 
community in the East Harlem Triangle, first learned of her as the central figure in the so-
called “130th Street Mafia,” a group of residents who served as a de facto social service 
organization for their neglected block. Kornegay, he was told, was “a real fireball.” The 
New York Times reported that she was feted at the opening of the Community 
Association’s headquarters as their “sparkplug.” The metaphor was apt, for her first 
major public activism involved the dangerous traffic that surrounded the Triangle, which 
was bound on one side by busy Harlem River Drive, on a second by Park Avenue, and on 
the third by 125th Street. The city had constructed a park on the far side of Harlem River 
Drive in 1953. After several children were injured crossing traffic, Kornegay organized 
petitions for a stoplight, and then a pedestrian bridge, both ignored by officials. In 1957, 
Kornegay led her neighbors onto Harlem River Drive, where they blocked the major 
thoroughfare and off-ramps. Kornegay’s arrest during the second week of protests 
sparked a 300-person picket to the local 25th Precinct. Her persistence yielded a meeting 
with the Manhattan Borough President. “He actually said he didn’t know people lived in 
the Triangle,” Kornegay remembered. “He told us, ‘Your area has never asked for 
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anything before.’ We asked for plenty that day.” The Triangle gained a temporary 
footbridge over Harlem River Drive, and then “Alice’s Bridges,” the permanent red steel 
pedestrian bridges that still connect the neighborhood to the park today.69  
Conditions in the Triangle were grim, a fact that Kornegay, Schoonover, and 
officials all agreed upon, though they offered contrasting responses. Kornegay’s 130th 
Street Mafia had long challenged ineffective landlords, ousted unresponsive building 
superintendents, and taken on their own repairs in dilapidated buildings. The city 
intended to simply bulldoze away the neighborhood’s problems, selecting the Triangle as 
the site for the relocation of industry that residential redevelopment would displace along 
the East River, from 107th to 111th Streets. After the city’s announcement of clearance 
plans for the Triangle in May 1961, Schoonover sought more information about this 
relatively unknown corner of Harlem. He sent seminarians to survey the neighborhood. 
“There was no question that the area contained some of the most deplorable housing 
anywhere in the city,” he remembered. “Overcrowding was almost unbelievable, with as 
many as thirteen people living in two rooms.” Surprisingly, Schoonover’s assistants also 
learned that most residents had no idea that a renewal plan was even in the offing, a 
finding that led Schoonover to gather Triangle residents at his church.70 
In many ways, the problematic state of the East Harlem Triangle exemplified the 
direct and collateral damage inflicted by urban renewal over the previous decade and a 
half. Made aware of the city’s new redevelopment plans for their neighborhood, residents 
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revealed that the very conditions that officials hoped to excise were in many ways a 
consequence of past renewal efforts throughout the city. “People complained of having 
moved as many as seven times because of ‘community improvements,’” Schoonover 
remembered of the meeting he had called. “One man said that the Triangle was 
‘endsville’ as far as he was concerned—where did the city expect him to go, into the East 
River?” Faced with the stark reality of a neighborhood full of redevelopment’s victims, 
Kornegay and four others, including William Stanley, who would later reemerge as 
Barzun’s nemesis in West Harlem, formed a Committee for the Preservation of the East 
Harlem Triangle. Their first effort involved a resident-led, detailed study of their 
neighborhood. With loudspeakers installed upon Stanley’s car, Committee members 
distributed surveys throughout the Triangle. The results confirmed the anecdotal evidence 
that Schoonover cited. Many neighbors struggled with addiction to drugs and alcohol and 
many also had criminal records. According to the survey, sixty percent of children were 
born out of wedlock, and seventy percent of families were separated without divorce. 
Residents faced the personal barriers these findings entailed, but administrative barriers 
too. In the context of urban renewal, these facts meant that few residents could qualify for 
public housing if they were displaced again.71 If the Triangle was a “last resort,” as the 
Times would report in 1964, then where would residents go to make way for an industrial 
park?72 
Anticipating the pleas of West Harlem residents, Kornegay argued that clearance 
brought deep human costs and marked a missed opportunity. She remembered a mother 
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asking, “Why should I have to move somewhere where people don’t understand my 
kids?” Kornegay insisted that her community should represent “a model for the black 
poor everywhere.” “We must have something we can be proud of and want to preserve,” 
she contended, echoing the name of her Committee for the Preservation of the East 
Harlem Triangle.73 Triangle residents attended a June 1961 City Planning Commission 
hearing to explain that they did not oppose renewal per se, but rather its use against them. 
Speakers wanted a plan that would improve the community’s housing alongside any 
industrial development.74 Later that year, at the Board of Estimate hearing where the city 
requested approval of the clearance plan, Kornegay’s group presented an extensive report 
recording their survey findings as well as their stance on redevelopment. Seventy 
residents attended, wearing paper triangles on their collars. “The city has a moral 
responsibility to…help those communities which it arouses to overcome their worst 
fears,” their report stated, “as well as to help them to build a new community that will 
uplift their lives rather than merely scatter them.”75 
Such nascent calls for self-determination came as the city showed new 
willingness to experiment with redevelopment in the aftermath of Robert Moses’s 
departure. But here, as elsewhere in New York City in the early 1960s, officials proved to 
be inconsistent in their support for departures from the norm. Amidst residents’ protests, 
the city seemed to shift away from the clearance approach they had outlined for the 
neighborhood. The Triangle gained the Area Services Program that community leaders 
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had requested to maintain property before redevelopment began, for instance. Yet the city 
dragged its feet in implementing the effort. Likewise, once the program commenced, 
Schoonover wrote, “[a]larm grew that Area Services was really engaged in a program to 
empty out the neighborhood.” Officials moved families out of overcrowded housing, but 
also often out of the Triangle neighborhood entirely. Area Services declined to pressure 
delinquent landlords and failed to maintain services as basic as garbage pickup.76 The city 
moved at a glacial pace in pursuing a study that would serve as the basis for revised 
renewal plans that met residents’ needs. Officials gained federal funding for the study in 
1964, but debated details over the next two years with their selected consultant, 
sociologist (and ARCH board member) Herbert Gans, who eventually withdrew from the 
project.77 Adding to residents’ frustrations, the neighborhood continued to decay while 
officials dithered. “We…are deeply concerned about what can be done to ease the plight 
of on-site tenants between the time of designation and the actual execution of the urban 
renewal plan,” Schoonover wrote to the New York Times in April 1966.78  
Frustrated with the city’s inability to follow through on its promises of support, 
the leaders of the Community Association resolved to produce their own plan for the 
redevelopment of the Triangle. To outline a vision for their 14 blocks, Kornegay and her 
staff turned to ARCH in mid-1966, an effort they funded with money Schoonover had 
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obtained from a mysterious anonymous donor he called Mr. X.79 June Fields, a new staff 
member at ARCH who had most recently been employed in the city’s Department of City 
Planning, worked with a community “planning committee” whose participants suggested 
the diversity of challenges that residents faced. “[S]everal have been residents of the area 
for more than 20 years,” she explained, “four are single individuals; most are from very 
low-income families; some receive aid to dependent children; one was a high school 
dropout; four lived in receivership buildings.”80 They met almost daily with ARCH staff 
throughout the summer and fall, expressing hope that, above all, they could obtain better 
housing. “They believe, with the others at those June meetings,” Fields wrote, “that a 
‘neighborhood’ worth preserving exists in the Triangle, but that time is running out.” The 
committee culled ideas from their neighbors in evening sessions. They even carried 
displays to the neighborhood’s sidewalks, to gain the perspective of those who did not 
voluntarily join the planning effort.81 
Their plan balanced traditional redevelopment strategies with experimental 
methods intended to limit disruption and meet resident needs, a hybrid approach evident 
even in the plan’s forms (Figure 1.2). As in West Harlem, the first stage encompassed 
substantial rehabilitation to provide relocation housing within the community, beginning 
with five buildings at 130th Street and Lexington Avenue. Subsequently, community 
members hoped to build a compact elementary school at the center of the neighborhood  
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Figure 1.2. Preliminary Renewal Program for the East Harlem Triangle, October 1966. 
Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, “Urban Renewal in the East Harlem 
Triangle,” October 1966, C. Richard Hatch Private Collection. 
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and a core of new housing around it. Some strategies borrowed from the toolkit of typical 
urban renewal, closing selected streets within the neighborhood, for example, and lining 
125th Street with an enfilade of modern high-rises, while others departed from precedent. 
The final plan depicted a patchwork quilt of meandering residential buildings among 
existing tenements, and commercial and industrial structures alongside new and 
rehabilitated homes. This mixture of land uses contrasted with the strict segregation 
common to modernist redevelopment, rejecting the concepts that underlay the city’s plan 
for a neighborhood of only industry.82 
Just as the Triangle plan’s juxtaposition of renovated and new housing marked a 
subtle – though significant – departure from the rehabilitation-heavy strategy in West 
Harlem, so too did the plan’s focus on the community’s self-reliance signal an important 
shift from the central role of public support in the earlier effort. The Triangle plan 
included a mix of residential development, employment within the neighborhood through 
new businesses, stores for resident needs, and social services woven into the 
community’s fabric. “The community wants to achieve these goals chiefly through self-
help,” Fields reported. “It is developing a nonprofit membership corporation to 
rehabilitate – and eventually to build – housing; it is trying to develop locally-owned 
businesses both to serve local residents and to produce goods for ‘export.’” Committee 
members imagined courses that would teach their neighbors how to maintain and manage 
housing as an occupation, and homemaking lessons that would help tenants adjust to new 
homes. Neighbors hoped to share ownership of a cooperative supermarket, a practical 
land use that fulfilled a major local need. Community organizations were to provide 
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childcare to working parents, job training, and health services, all to fulfill a mantra that 
suggested movement beyond intermediaries and external support.83 
If hopes for self-help foreshadowed demands that would soon emerge forcefully, 
however, inherent limitations constrained this goal. Indeed, proponents acknowledged, 
capital to fulfill these dreams was a problem in a corner of Harlem whose poverty likely 
exceeded that of any other community uptown. “[S]elf-help is not enough,” the plan 
stated frankly. “The financial resources of this area – as of most ghettos – are 
nonexistent. Considerable help and cooperation from public agencies is needed.” While 
residents hoped self-help would reduce the plan’s public costs, they made clear that they 
still wished for some public housing. Despite the recent disappointments the 
neighborhood had experienced at the hands of sluggish bureaucracies, planners 
explained, they hoped their plan “would go a long way toward persuading the poor 
everywhere that bureaucracy and administrative regulations are flexible enough to be 
used to solve critical neighborhood problems.” Indeed, even as they dreamed of 
community-run housing corporations, the planning committee members sold their plan as 
a chance to build a model neighborhood for renewal, “a testing ground for the City’s 
intentions in the ghetto.”84  
No aspect of the plan symbolized the persistent tension between dreams of self-
determination and continued dependence on outside partners more than the state office 
building envisioned for 125th Street. In late May 1966, Urban League director Whitney 
Young had proposed locating the planned World Trade Center in Harlem, an ambition 
whose hopes echoed those that had long followed urban renewal. “The trickle of 
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antipoverty funds into the ghetto cannot change anything without more visible, tangible 
signs of willingness to upgrade the ghetto and make it truly a part of the city,” Young 
argued. “What better way than to locate these huge new developments in ghetto areas?” 
Young, long active in the Civil Rights Movement and an adherent to the strategy of racial 
liberalism, imagined that the World Trade Center would blaze a trail for racial 
integration, employment, and physical rehabilitation. Harlem religious and civic leaders, 
including Eugene Callender, voted unanimously in favor of Young’s suggestion.85 Within 
days, Wyatt Tee Walker, Governor Nelson Rockefeller’s urban advisor, had begun to 
encourage a separate state facility for Harlem.86 After a summer of deliberation and 
constant pressure from Harlem representatives, Rockefeller announced in September that 
the state would locate a 23-story office building in Harlem, to be designed by Percy Ifill, 
a prominent African American architect, Harlem resident, and ARCH board member at 
this time.87 The Times reported overwhelming support for the building from those on 
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Harlem streets the day after the announcement. “Maybe it’ll make this a better place to 
live,” one shopper suggested.88 
Moderate leaders publicly backed the skyscraper, but so too did the professional 
and community activists who had most vociferously opposed large-scale urban renewal, a 
fact that signaled their complex relationship with the public sector in this era. East 
Harlem Triangle planning committee members endorsed Rockefeller’s announcement, as 
did the members of ARCH, who recognized that the project was not perfect but still saw 
it as beneficial. “[I]t’s a sop to Harlem,” Hatch granted, agreeing with Borough President 
Percy Sutton that the project was perhaps a token to the neighborhood. But he 
nonetheless saw it as a boon to Harlem’s “job base…our major problem,” that would 
“help attract good stores, with reasonable prices,” as the Times paraphrased. Officials 
were considering several Harlem sites by October, one of them in the Triangle.89 
Residents involved in the planning process hoped that the building might rise in their 
neighborhood. “The new building would be of great potential benefit to residents, 
providing jobs and making it possible to support a high quality commercial section,” they 
wrote in their plan, echoing Hatch. “Community members would like to see the building 
here.” But their enthusiasm bore an undercurrent of anxiety, as they insisted that the city 
had to ensure that any benefits did not draw wealthier residents who would push the 
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Triangle community elsewhere. The building had to be part of a broader plan, one “that 
will protect the residents of the Triangle,” they explained. “Redevelopment will make no 
sense here if it substitutes a different economic class for the poor…who are most in need 
of a rebuilt neighborhood,” committee members wrote.90 The State Office Building 
marked a slippery slope. Too much of a good thing, residents feared, and they would lose 
control. The risk entailed not just the loss of affordable homes through displacement, but 
also the lost dream of the ideal community that their renewal plan articulated.  
Underlying such hopes and fears were the broader ideological battles sweeping 
Harlem, between persistent liberal approaches to civil rights, seen in the continued 
reliance on outside support even in alternate planning schemes, and a growing radical 
movement centered on the idea of Black Power, evident in rising calls for self-help and 
self-determination. The East Harlem Triangle found itself at the nexus of this debate at 
the very moment that community members were completing the plan for their 
neighborhood. Officials were on the verge of opening Intermediate School 201 (I.S. 201) 
in September, at 127th Street between Madison and Park Avenues. They considered the 
school a “showcase,” the Times reported, a model for the new fifth through eighth grade 
city schools that featured curricular innovations, smaller classes, and a “hand-picked 
staff.” Architecturally, too, the school boasted of innovation—its form unabashedly high 
modernist, a red brick box elevated upon pilotis over a vast plaza. Windowless except for 
occasional brick screens offering views out but not in, the school claimed novel features 
such as moveable walls and air conditioning. It had already won honors from the New 
York Chapter of the American Institute of Architects. But parents in the school district, 
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most of which encompassed the Triangle community, were less enthusiastic about their 
new neighbor, promising boycotts before the doors even opened.91   
Parents who opposed the school were frustrated by the distance between the ideals 
that officials promised and the reality that the project attained. Initially, the city had 
touted the intermediate schools as models of the liberal goal of racial integration, but 
little in the initial planning of I.S. 201 in the early 1960s suggested that administrators 
were pursuing that objective with conviction. Parents and community leaders protested 
when officials chose the Madison Avenue site, contending that the school’s location 
directly in the middle of an African-American and Puerto Rican neighborhood 
fundamentally undermined aspirations toward integration. Officials denied such charges, 
blanketing the Northwest Bronx and Queens with 10,000 flyers in 1965, explaining the 
school’s virtues in the hopes of attracting white students from elsewhere in the city. The 
New York Times stated that only ten white families expressed interest in the school as a 
result of the city’s campaign, however. Time magazine said that none had done so.92  
Such failures inspired parents and community leaders to seek alternative means 
through which to ensure that their children would be best served by a school that, despite 
promises of innovation, appeared to be more of the same. Indeed, neighborhood debates 
over I.S. 201 on the eve of the school’s opening charted the ideological transformation 
underway in the Civil Rights Movement, from the integration model of civil rights 
liberalism to more radical ideals of racial self-determination. “Either they let us bring 
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white children in to integrate 201 or they let the community run the school,” said Helen 
Testamark, a local parent, in early September. Isaiah Robinson, a leader of the activist 
Harlem Parents Committee, suggested that segregation might actually be the best choice 
if it meant that the community could make decisions itself.93 Soon, integration was no 
longer a goal sought by picketers. Parents instead demanded veto power over school 
staff, then dismissal of the school’s white principal.94  
In this way, I.S. 201 and the adjacent community of the East Harlem Triangle 
became key sites in which Black Power, and its associated ideal of community control, 
moved into the debate over racial justice in America. A September 23, 1966 protest 
especially symbolized the radical position of autonomy emerging amidst increasingly 
loud conflicts over decision-making at the new school. “‘Black Power’ Moves Into 
Harlem School Battle,” the Amsterdam News proclaimed across the top of its front page, 
announcing the arrival to the picket line of Stokely Carmichael, chair of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Parents had already begun to articulate the meaning 
of community control in their own terms, but Carmichael, the embodiment of the new 
militancy that marked civil rights tactics, gave their calls immense weight. “Negroes have 
a right to run the schools in their areas,” Carmichael announced. “White people do. They 
run the schools in the suburbs where they live and it should be the same in Harlem.” The 
crowd greeted Carmichael enthusiastically. “Freedom, Black Power! We’ve got to win 
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our fight!” they chanted. Carmichael’s arrival marked the culmination of a banner day, 
which also saw Alice Kornegay arrested from the picket line by 8:15 that morning. Black 
Power discourse had swirled in Harlem for years, but I.S. 201 marked a critical moment, 
one that turned philosophical premises into practical strategies.95  
Education brought community control to Harlem’s doorstep, but the debate over 
I.S. 201 also crucially played out in architectural terms. Preston Wilcox, a close friend of 
Kornegay who had worked on the East Harlem Project in the 1950s, declined the 
executive director position at the Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle, 
and taught at Columbia University’s School of Social Work, became a leading 
intellectual force behind community control during the I.S. 201 battle (Figure 1.3).96 His  
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Figure 1.3. Preston Wilcox, 1973. AframSouth, Inc., “The Afram Legacy,” 
http://www.aframsouth.net/legacy.htm (accessed 20 December 2012). 
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belief in his neighbors in the East Harlem Triangle grew out of a larger faith in the 
abilities of African Americans to run their own institutions. “If one believes that a 
segregated white school can be a ‘good’ school,” Wilcox explained, “then one must 
believe that a segregated Negro and Puerto Rican school, like I.S. 201, can be a ‘good’ 
school also.”97 Wilcox viewed the heralded architecture of I.S. 201 as a “palliative for 
anger,” however, a gesture used to distract community members from such aspirations 
and a means of imposing outside control on the surrounding neighborhood. “I.S. 201 
stands as a monument to absentee-decision-making, colonialism, and a personal affront,” 
Wilcox wrote. “It symbolizes the worst in community planning and public education.”98  
Specifically, Wilcox saw the school’s aloof form, “loftily perched on stilts,” as a 
symbolic move against local leaders who sought to undermine professional hierarchies – 
“the professional caste system” – so that residents could shape community decisions 
themselves. “It epitomizes middle-class paternalism, white control and lower-class 
compliance and lethargy,” Wilcox continued. His critique tied the forms of the school to 
its sociopolitical context: “Passers-by ask the question of I.S. 201…Is it a jail?” Above 
all, Wilcox condemned the school because its architecture embodied the failure of a 
liberal approach to community improvement premised on outside approval and the 
authority of expertise. Wilcox addressed the Board of Education, but his conclusion could 
encompass the full sweep of outsiders, sympathetic and not, involved in shaping Harlem. 
“The longing of blacks for positive definitions by the Board has come to an end; blacks 
are now prepared to exercise and implement their own definitions,” Wilcox wrote. “The 
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die has been cast in architectural form. The architecture has soothed the guilt of the 
Board; it has failed to handle the legitimate anger of the ghetto.”99 
Wilcox’s conflation of architectural form and political function at I.S. 201 
undoubtedly grew from his intimate awareness of the failures of this particular project, 
but likewise suggested more broadly that the means and ends of liberalism, and their 
formal expression in modernism, could not hold in a new era.100 Community control 
rejected the roles of professional intermediaries, however sympathetic they may have 
been, for its fundamental principle relied, as Wilcox suggested, on the breakdown of such 
hierarchies. But many of the gains that activists had made in the built environment up to 
this point had depended on those intermediaries—on the professional services of ARCH, 
and on the official means of urban renewal. Race added further complications, for 
community control incontrovertibly relied on the notion of racial self-determination, a 
hurdle that predominately white ARCH members could not easily clear. Soon after the 
I.S. 201 crisis reached its climax, Hatch suggested both his awareness of this limitation 
and his intention to respect rising demands for autonomy. “Because of our whiteness and 
our desire to increase the power of indigenous organizations and leadership we have 
made no attempt to organize in the community,” he reported to board members in 
November 1966. But faced with a rapidly changing context, where did that leave the role 
of ARCH?101 
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Seeking a Middle Ground 
 By all appearances, ARCH remained deeply engaged with its existing partners, 
even increasingly successful, amidst rising demands for Black Power. With an alternate 
plan in hand, the Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle gained unexpected 
support from city officials, who assented to their proposal to conduct the long delayed 
study of the Triangle neighborhood themselves. In the spring of 1967, the city awarded 
the organization a 164,000-dollar grant for the effort. This was, the New York Times 
reported, “the first time that the city had retained a community organization to determine 
how its own neighborhood should be renewed.” The Community Association used this 
newfound funding to hire ARCH, to help them complete physical planning.102  
Indeed, despite the emergence of demands for community control, ARCH staff 
declined to fully cede the role they had evolved in Harlem. Instead, leaders attempted to 
absorb calls for racial autonomy into their method, seeking a middle ground in a 
transformation marked by extremes. Hatch sought to diversify the organization’s 
leadership and joined in efforts to introduce new institutional models that would support 
local movements for self-determination in Harlem’s built environment. ARCH’s founder 
and leader found himself in a peculiar position, however, both sympathetic to new 
demands for community autonomy and irrefutably the symbol of an organization that 
sought to expand participation without undermining existing institutions or the role of 
design expertise. If Hatch recognized the need to evolve from the intermediary position 
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that ARCH maintained, the question remained how much evolution would satisfy 
emergent radical strands in Harlem. 
Consistent with its continued alignment with the broader aspirations of the Great 
Society in this era, ARCH received its first grant from the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity in April 1967. Hatch, however, took this as a chance to bring new racial and 
ideological diversity into ARCH’s leadership. Hatch invited Kenneth Simmons, an 
African-American architect from San Francisco, to join ARCH. Simmons, who was to 
run a demonstration project for “Professional Training and Planning Services for Low-
Income Community Development,” had previously worked in a community action 
program as part of the War on Poverty, and in early 1967 pursued the development of an 
ARCH-like community design center in San Francisco, called Planners and Architects for 
Neighborhood Regeneration.103 Simmons hailed from an affluent Oklahoma family – his 
father, Jake Simmons, Jr., had reached unsurpassed heights for an African-American 
oilman – and had attended Harvard College with Hatch. But the arrival of Simmons 
brought a new perspective to ARCH. In San Francisco he was, as ARCH staff 
announced, “a CORE militant.”104 He espoused a distinctly nationalist vision, one rooted 
in the space of the city. “The black people of America – concentrated into communities 
which are therefore, by definition, black communities – have come to realize that we are 
not part of the mythical homogenous mass,” Simmons wrote. “We are a group apart and 
obviously we are an interest group. We have our survival as a common interest.” The 
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solution to the problems that African Americans faced in American cities, he explained, 
lay in community control of the built environment. “We must also control our land; 
control our geographic community,” Simmons argued.105 
Receptive to the objective that Simmons articulated, and in search of further 
methods of altering its work to meet emerging ideas, ARCH leaders pursued a second 
strategy in the spring of 1967, embarking on the foundation of Harlem’s first community 
development corporation. In Harlem and other predominantly African-American 
communities, residents’ lack of control of land often aligned with lack of control of the 
broader economy that occupied that land. In other words, few Harlemites owned either 
the businesses where they shopped or the real property they inhabited. “Why should 
white people be running all the stores in our community?” Malcolm X had asked in 
1964.106 In 1967, the problem remained equally severe but community control offered a 
possible way out, a philosophical ideal that in terms of the built environment suggested 
the need for new institutions that would enable communities to both own their land and 
determine how that land should be developed. Community development corporations, or 
CDCs, served as one such model. Though each CDC varied in its specific strategies, such 
entities typically aspired to build community-owned enterprises that would provide 
employment and economic resources for community members, thus supporting 
subsequent development. With the rise of Black Power, CDCs proliferated across 
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American cities in the late 1960s, a movement that ARCH and its community partners 
joined early on.107  
CDCs, proponents hoped, would serve the same function for planning and 
development that locally controlled school boards could serve for education. The Harlem 
effort involved several components, including skills training and economic research. Its 
centerpiece was the Harlem Corporation, later called the Harlem Commonwealth 
Council. The Harlem Corporation, ARCH and its partners explained, was to “[help] 
Harlem to become increasingly self-sufficient and self-determining through the efforts of 
its residents.” Employing a metaphor common to the Black Power era and conveying the 
neighborhood’s present lack of economic autonomy, backers hoped “to consider 
strategies to end Harlem’s ‘colonial’ status and its poverty.” The effort brought together 
several of the major figures in the local rise of Black Power, including Preston Wilcox 
and Isaiah Robinson, both active in the battle over I.S. 201, and Roy Innis, who had 
helped to radicalize CORE, with Stanislaus Wellisz, Roger Alcaly, and Thomas 
Vietorisz, development economists from Columbia University and the New School. 
Harlem’s residents were disproportionately poor, backers explained, but their density 
meant that a remarkable amount of potential capital existed in the neighborhood, possibly 
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more than 450 million dollars after taxes. “Properly channeled, this purchasing and 
investment power could transform the community,” proponents argued.108  
Indeed, the proposed tenets of the Harlem Corporation marked a radical departure 
from prevailing development tendencies, a new model that promised a level of self-
sufficiency that activists had not seen in either West Harlem or the East Harlem Triangle. 
Instead of exploiting the federal redevelopment process, proponents hoped to generate 
their own economic engine for development. Proponents were confident that they could 
obtain an initial $300,000 from within Harlem in order to procure a federal loan. “[T]o 
assure that the interests of the poor will be reflected, no more than $200,000 will be 
raised in large chunks,” they wrote. “The final $100,000 will be raised from as broad a 
group in Harlem as possible in the form of small, perhaps $5, voting shares.” Harlemites 
would be able to each own one share of the corporation, an investment in its success as 
well as its governance, forming “a mass-based citizen organization with substantial 
economic power,” backers explained. Their money would go towards “new businesses 
and industries,” intended to provide jobs while expanding the capital from which the 
corporation could draw for subsequent investment.109 “[T]he Corporation’s investment 
fund will grow steadily, enabling it to move out into new fields including housing, 
vocational education and health services,” they claimed.110 Community shareholders 
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offered an intriguing alternative to public aid, suggesting a means to effect self-help over 
the long term.111  
Yet despite such lofty long-term aspirations, the paradox remained that in the 
present the project relied fundamentally on the persistent role of intermediaries like 
ARCH and academic advisors, and the initial generosity of federal government 
assistance. Though backers hoped to self-finance their effort, they could not resist the 
pull of readily available funding through the federal War on Poverty. The Office of 
Economic Opportunity awarded 400,000 dollars to help launch the project. But OEO’s 
enthusiasm for the effort suggested the risks that came with continued reliance on outside 
interests despite calls for self-determination. In agreeing to provide the grant, for 
example, federal officials considered the Harlem CDC’s potential as a model for local 
elected leaders hoping to stem radical social movements in other urban centers. “Mayors 
seeking positive alternatives to turmoil should be able to create a new rapport and 
working relationship with civil rights groups and militant anti-establishment types,” 
officials suggested.112 Likewise, while Wilcox, Robinson, and a panel of other local 
leaders were to “guide the professional research teams,” their role remained officially 
subordinate to the project’s academic advisors, who would administer the funding. This 
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arrangement seemed directly contradictory with the goals of autonomy that had 
motivated the creation of the Harlem Corporation.113  
Indeed, with so many potentially competing interests involved, could such efforts 
provide the community control that Harlemites sought? This stood as the fundamental 
question that pervaded the model of engagement that ARCH continued to embody. Even 
as leaders of the organization tried to maneuver it around the explosive issues 
surrounding Black Power and community control, they maintained a hold on the very 
tenets that newly vocal Harlem activists increasingly fixed upon in their criticism, 
especially the involvement of outside experts and the persistent, potentially undermining 
role of outside funding. These principles undeniably grew from deep commitments on the 
part of ARCH’s leaders to the project of broadened participation. Likewise, their method 
of advocacy and reform through official channels marked a clever, often effective 
strategy of changing the process of redevelopment without abandoning the resources 
required for large-scale physical transformation. The vision that ARCH and its 
community partners voiced, of redevelopment that benefited those most in need, offered a 
humane alternative to the clearance-oriented methods that had devastated Harlem and 
predominantly low-income neighborhoods across New York City.  
As the goal of community control emerged as a force, then, the differences 
between Black Power advocates and organizations like ARCH were typically ideological, 
not practical. If radical activists agreed with figures like Hatch that Harlem could be both 
a thriving community and one that belonged to its low-income residents, they disagreed 
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on the means of getting there. Newly empowered African-American leaders hoped to 
radically flatten the process through which decisions in Harlem were made, giving direct 
control to the neighborhood’s residents. Hatch sought a more gradual transformation, 
supporting increasing degrees of local control in ARCH’s work but not quite abandoning 
the model he had pioneered. But, as the middle months of 1967 demonstrated, the most 
radical voices were no longer willing to wait. In June of that year, Hatch appointed 
Simmons as the co-director of the organization, a move marking a middle way consistent 
with the interracial leadership of the economic development project. But Hatch and 
Bailey soon reached out to J. Max Bond, Jr., an African-American architect and former 
Harvard classmate, suggesting that he return from Ghana to become the organization’s 
sole director.114  
Hatch felt that the time had come for such change. “[A] sense of guilt at the 
disservice which the architectural and planning professions have done to the poor 
underlie[s] the new profession of advocacy—and it must be sensitive to the need for 
black leadership,” he argued several months later. Indeed, Hatch found “hopeful signs” in 
“the black ghettos themselves…where calls for self-help and self-determination are 
increasingly heeded by a new breed of black men.”115 With the emergence of Black 
Power, Hatch had begun to feel out of place. He increasingly sensed suspicion from 
community members who once welcomed ARCH. But while Hatch hoped for a peaceful 
transition, Simmons had grown impatient with the pace of change. So in late summer, he 
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staged a rowdy demonstration – a “palace coup,” Hatch called it – on the steps outside 
the organization’s front door, at 306 Lenox Avenue. Assembling protesters for the 
spectacle and attracting a crowd, Simmons installed Bond as the first African-American 
director of ARCH. Hatch was out at the organization he had founded.116 
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Chapter Two 
Black Utopia 
 
 By June 1967, writer and Harlem resident Albert Murray had grown weary of the 
relentlessly negative depictions of his adopted home. “Mass media images of 
contemporary Harlem reveal only a part of the actual texture of the lives of the people 
who inhabit that vast, richly varied, infinitely complex and endlessly fascinating area of 
uptown Manhattan,” Murray wrote. Whether captured through sociological studies or 
through the lens of a camera, such dreary images neglected the neighborhood Murray had 
come to love. “Many photographers seem to use equipment designed especially for 
assignments in places such as Harlem,” he wrote, “especially designed to highlight the 
bleakness of blackness while obscuring everything else.” Along Harlem’s boulevards, on 
its sidewalks, and upon the stoops that graced its historic homes, Murray found a culture 
whose members disproved popular stereotypes. “The life-style of Harlem Negroes of all 
levels already goes with the very best esthetic features not only of Harlem but of New 
York at large,” said Murray. “They do not at all act like the culturally deprived people of 
the statistical surveys, but like cosmopolites. Many may be indigent but few are ever 
square.” Voicing an appreciation of Harlem taken on its own terms, Murray depicted an 
idyll in opposition to the dystopia described by many outsiders looking in. “[W]eather 
permitting, the sidewalks, the brownstone doorways and steps of most of the streets of 
Harlem always hum and buzz with people in familiar contact with other people,” he 
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remarked. If not perfection, Murray noted, “what Harlemites do with what they have is 
often marvelous all the same.”1 
 Murray’s appreciation came from the pen of an observer a generation older than 
the radicals who had taken over many of Harlem’s institutions by late 1967 and from a 
more moderate point of view. But his resistance to the idea of Harlem as a hopeless slum 
and his faith in the people who populated its streets nonetheless echoed broader currents 
emerging in the neighborhood in the late 1960s. As organizations like the Architects’ 
Renewal Committee in Harlem (ARCH) transformed from white- to African-American 
leadership amidst the rising influence of Black Power discourse, they brought not only a 
new militancy to their strategy but also a visionary new conception of the ideal 
community that Harlem could become. Fundamentally, their dream for Harlem’s future 
rested on the neighborhood’s existing residents, those Murray characterized as often 
“indigent” but rarely “square.” Where ARCH had emerged in 1964 as a force advocating 
the practical goal of preventing the residential displacement of the longstanding, largely 
low-income residents who made Harlem their home, under African-American architect J. 
Max Bond, Jr. the organization advanced a more ambitious vision based in the potential 
that ARCH and others found in those residents. In the wake of calls for widespread 
community control, activists shifted their conception of the ideal city from one that 
simply housed its longtime residents into a broader, more utopian vision of an alternative 
urban future, a vision I call a “revolutionary spatial ideal.” 
This ideal marked continued – and escalating – frustration with two central 
projects of postwar liberalism—racial integration and urban renewal. Racial segregation 
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had circumscribed the social and geographic parameters of Harlem over the previous 
half-century, quite literally defining a “city within a city,” but the rise of Black Power 
brought new opposition to the strategy of integration as a means of achieving civil rights. 
Impatience with the slow pace of integration and the mixed results of its outcomes 
prompted radical calls to embrace the identity of Harlem as a predominantly African-
American, low-income space. Adherents to the concept of community control 
emphasized Harlem’s segregated identity as a distinct source of power, even a point of 
pride. “[I]ntegration, as traditionally articulated, would abolish the black community,” 
Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton explained in their manifesto Black Power. 
“The racial and cultural personality of the black community must be preserved.”2  
In that community, activists increasingly found the raw material out of which a 
black utopia could be born as a rebuke to the typical ends of urban renewal. While 
activists maintained their reliance on the resources and means of urban renewal – 
including the tool of the master plan and the financial support of the state – the vision 
they advanced marked a dramatic departure from the forms that had typically defined 
redevelopment. Instead of the predominantly commercial, middle-class oriented interests 
that past plans had often emphasized, ARCH and its collaborators sought to 
accommodate the manifold demands of low-income Harlemites, for community-
controlled education, affordable housing, social services, and facilities that celebrated 
African-American culture, placing such needs at the center of the community’s public 
life. Their schemes offered novel forms unlike the monolithic structures that tended to 
predominate under urban renewal, mixed the land uses that urban renewal sought to 
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segregate, and emphasized the traditional street grid that defined Harlem. Above all, like 
Murray and like artists and writers involved in the contemporaneous search for a “black 
aesthetic,” ARCH staff and their community partners embraced the quotidian vitality of 
Harlem, celebrating the neighborhood’s urban fabric and the vernacular culture they 
found there. Their vision advanced the radical idea that Harlem’s poverty, its literal and 
figurative isolation from much of New York, served not as a liability but as the means 
through which Harlemites could achieve empowerment, self-reliance, self-awareness, and 
self-determination. 
To achieve this ideal, the members of ARCH sought radical democratization of 
the planning process. While activist planners and architects had served as expert 
intermediaries in the organization’s first years, the goal of community control prompted 
redoubled efforts to eliminate any divide between the subjects of planning and the plan 
itself. In pursuit of an unmediated translation of the needs of Harlemites into built forms, 
ARCH came to support a more direct, confrontational style of community engagement 
and a new focus on minority representation in the design professions. Members idealized 
widespread participation as a means of ensuring a future for Harlem fashioned 
collectively by its residents acting on their own behalf. If this goal seemed the most 
utopian of all those contained in ARCH’s revolutionary spatial ideal, it also appeared 
entirely within reach in the last months of the decade. In 1969, officials moved to 
construct the long-planned State Office Building on 125th Street, intended to be the most 
consequential redevelopment effort along Harlem’s iconic spine and, as Harlem’s tallest 
building, a very literal symbol of the continued power of outside interests in the 
neighborhood. Activists joined by ARCH vied instead to realize their own idealistic 
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vision, at the very center of Harlem, on the block on which the state’s building was to 
rise. 
 
Democratizing Design 
When architect J. Max Bond, Jr. (Figure 2.1) became director of ARCH in the 
summer of 1967, his arrival marked not only the organization’s symbolic transition from 
white to African-American leadership, but also its decisive shift to a radical approach to 
its work on behalf of Harlem’s residents. Though Bond perhaps wore his allegiance to the 
ideals of racial self-determination less militantly than did Kenneth Simmons, the ARCH 
staff member who had led the “coup” that brought Bond’s ascension, he nonetheless 
believed fervently in the power contained in segregated neighborhoods like Harlem. “The 
ghettos of America reflect the real as opposed to pretended values of that country, and 
their continued existence gives the lie to all manner of pious statements,” Bond wrote in 
early 1967, while an instructor at the University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, 
Ghana. “The ghetto, this fact of American town planning (and let no one call it an 
accident) invariably strikes back at the nation and, as evidenced by the recent upheavals, 
may yet prove to be its undoing.”3 Bond maintained the goal of turning urban renewal to 
the advantage of those usually negatively affected by it, but departed from the 
intermediary approach that activist planners, like those in ARCH, had practiced in the 
mid-1960s under the banner of “advocacy planning.” As Black Power’s influence 
increased in Harlem, ARCH instead came to evince two tendencies: a deemphasis of the  
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Figure 2.1. J. Max Bond, Jr. (at left) with architects Donald Ryder and Nathan Smith. 
Source: Bond Ryder Associates AIA, c. 1969, Box 1, Folder 20, Bond Papers. 
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role of the professional expert as a mediating force in the design process on the one hand, 
and a reemphasis of the importance of minority representation among design 
professionals on the other. Though seemingly at odds, both approaches arose from a 
desire to define routes through which Harlemites could directly translate their needs into 
the forms of their neighborhood.  
Bond’s own biography helps to explain how a member of one of the twentieth 
century’s most distinguished families came to lead the radical architectural vanguard in 
Harlem in the late 1960s. Born in Louisville in 1935, Bond moved frequently as his 
father, J. Max Bond, Sr., manned academic posts at Dillard University and Tuskegee 
Institute, and an American educational post for the U.S. Government in Haiti. Bond’s 
father would become president of the University of Liberia, but his achievement was 
hardly unique in the family. Bond’s mother, Ruth Clement Bond, was also an academic 
and played an instrumental role in modernizing the art form of the quilt through her work 
in the Tennessee Valley Authority. Max, Sr.’s brother, Horace Mann Bond, held the 
presidency of Lincoln University in Philadelphia, and his brother-in-law, Rufus Clement, 
served for two decades as president of Atlanta University. Horace Mann Bond’s son, 
Julian Bond, would become a major civil rights leader, and remained close to his first 
cousin, Max, Jr.4  
Despite his exceptional family, Bond’s experience as an undergraduate and 
architecture graduate student at Harvard in the 1950s was at times difficult, in large part 
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due to his status as one of the few African Americans at the university. Other students 
burned a cross before the freshman dorm where he and eight other African-American 
freshmen lived in 1952, a humorless prank that suggested the problematic racial context 
that pervaded even the Ivy League. An architecture professor instructed him to choose a 
different profession—architecture was not for African Americans, he said. Yet Bond also 
maintained the presidency of the Harvard Society for Minority Rights, the college’s 
NAACP affiliate. He moved to France to begin his career in architecture, received a 
series of interviews at prominent New York firms upon his return, and then a series of 
rejections upon showing up. Few African Americans had found entry into the design 
professions, and few firms would make room even for a designer as highly trained as 
Bond. In 1963, inspired by a liberated Ghana, Bond joined Kwame Nkrumah’s 
government as an architect – a “palace architect” in Bond’s words – who designed state 
buildings and an addition to Nkrumah’s estate.5 
In moving to Ghana, Bond joined a vibrant expatriate community that shaped 
both his worldview and that of many of his peers. Nkrumah had declared Ghana’s 
independence from British rule in 1957. As the first African state to escape colonial 
status, Ghana attracted an international audience from the moment of its independence. 
Nkrumah’s guests at the ceremonies celebrating Ghana’s freedom included Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Harlem congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., for example, as well as 
Horace Mann Bond, Max’s uncle. But the Americans who settled in Ghana typically 
skewed towards the more radical end of the political spectrum, compelled to cross the 
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Atlantic by choice or often by necessity. Harlem writer and activist Julian Mayfield and 
scholar and activist W.E.B. DuBois moved to Ghana when their search for radical 
alternatives to racial liberalism brought increasing state repression. Ghana offered exile to 
those on the far left, but many others expatriated by choice with the same frustrations in 
mind. When Max Bond and Jean Carey Bond, his wife, moved to Ghana, they became 
part of a group of intellectuals and artists – including writer Maya Angelou – pursuing 
the promise of a newly liberated state run by black leaders.6 
 Ghana offered a symbolic ideal that appealed to increasing nationalism and 
internationalism among many African Americans in the urban north, who increasingly 
linked their situation to that of colonized people in African states. “The economic 
relationship of America’s black communities to the larger society also reflects their 
colonial status,” Carmichael and Hamilton wrote. “Historically, colonies have existed for 
the sole purpose of enriching, in one form or another, the ‘colonizer.’”7 Colonization 
implied the subjectification of citizens, but the struggle for decolonization offered the 
hope and promise that a nation’s people could claim the right to self-determination and 
self-rule. Ghana provided a living example. Within the boundaries of liberated Ghana, 
expatriates found a state promising collectivism and openness to socialist ideas. Nkrumah 
described his nation as the center of an international movement toward the liberation of 
black people, a Pan-African idea that appealed to African Americans frustrated with the 
slow progress and failed promise of racial integration. If segregation marked the outcome 
of disadvantage and discrimination, advocates reasoned, so too could it seed a seizure of 
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power akin to that of Ghana. Bond’s observation from Ghana that “the 
ghetto…invariably strikes back at the nation” echoed Carmichael and Hamilton’s own 
invocation of “dynamite in the ghettos.” Increasingly, it seemed, desegregation offered 
not a solution to the problems of predominantly African-American neighborhoods, but a 
possible threat to the potential for self-determination that radical activists located in the 
“liberation” of such communities. Before joining ARCH in 1967, for example, Kenneth 
Simmons considered, “If, in fact, we are a colony, we must start to think like a colony 
seeking to throw off the yoke of colonial oppression....We must come to control our own 
destinies; we must gain our independence.”8  
By the time Bond arrived in Harlem to lead ARCH, then, he had matured as a 
designer – “As an architect, I sort of grew up in Ghana,” he later recalled – but also 
politically.9 Under Bond, ARCH immediately changed the nature of its critique, 
absorbing the language of Black Power into its daily work. Bond launched a new 
monthly publication, Harlem News, which encompassed a broad range of issues related to 
race – not only urban planning – and espoused a viewpoint focused on community 
control. Early issues featured articles on the lack of job opportunities for black 
contractors, continued battles over decentralization of education, and frustration over a 
strike by predominantly white teachers in October 1967. Dave Spencer, a leader in the 
I.S. 201 protests for community control of schools (described in Chapter One), wrote, 
“More and more, we people of Harlem are showing others that we are a let-us-do-it-
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ourselves community. To be able to do things for oneself, one’s family, one’s neighbor, 
one’s community is to find and have power. If it be a black community, then it be black 
power.” Roy Innis titled an article on the Harlem Commonwealth Council, the 
community development corporation that ARCH had helped to found, with the headline 
“Black $$$ Power.” “One of the great needs of black people is for control of their own 
institutions,” he wrote. Bond offered the liberatory perspective he had gained in Ghana, 
critiquing the “continued colonialism” he found in proposed incentives to seed business 
investment in Harlem and similar neighborhoods. “It seems to us that the key issue in 
housing, in the economic development of our communities, in planning our 
neighborhoods and in educating our children is not simply what decisions are made but 
who makes them,” he wrote.10  
Bond’s quote suggested a position consistent with the community orientation 
ARCH staff had maintained throughout the organization’s first three years, yet with 
significant differences revealing the vast distance that activists had travelled. For Bond’s 
concern was not with outsiders making decisions for the neighborhood of Harlem, but 
outsiders making decisions for our neighborhood. The possessive pronoun pointed 
toward a paradigm shift in the perceived role of those who made up ARCH. The 
organization’s early orientation toward advocacy positioned staff members as 
sympathetic intermediaries in the design process, determined to assist Harlemites in 
crafting alternate plans with which they could oppose disruptive policies. But as the 
organization transitioned to predominately African-American membership, staff 
identified with Harlem not as supportive outsiders, but as members of the community. 
Consequently, they increasingly emphasized their role not as intermediaries, but as 
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activists seeking to create direct pathways through which Harlemites could gain self-
determination.  
In part this shift marked a response to demands emanating from the very residents 
whom ARCH had assisted. For instance, Ruth Atkins, a member of the Community 
Association of the East Harlem Triangle, ARCH’s longtime partner, called for diminution 
of expertise in the neighborhood. “Professionals must learn to give the poor the chance to 
contribute,” she argued. “The situation can be compared to a tree growing in a lot. If a 
building stands next to the tree, it will rob the tree of light and stunt its growth. If that 
building is moved or torn down, the tree will have a chance to regrow.”11 Equally, 
ARCH’s desire to collapse the distance between the subjects of planning and the plan 
itself grew from a sometimes anarchistic and always experimental desire emanating from 
within the design professions themselves. Activist architects and planners, like their 
colleagues in the New Left as a whole, sought to enable radical forms of participatory 
democracy.12 In declaring the necessity to “go beyond representative democracy to 
participatory democracy,” for example, one ARCH supporter suggested both the urgency 
to enable broad participation in the project of planning and the paucity of clear answers 
on how to do so. His “views carry advocacy…to the point where planning becomes a 
matter of total direct citizen participation,” a Christian Science Monitor reporter 
explained about Alan Kravitz, a planning professor who defended ARCH at the annual 
American Society of Planning Officials convention in 1968. “He offered no details on the 
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how and why of such a system,” the reporter wrote. “He did say that his method would 
lead to ‘a decentralization of authority and a breakdown of the political hierarchy.’”13 
If the means to this end were not always clear, Bond proved willing to experiment 
nonetheless. Soon after Bond’s arrival, ARCH pursued a dramatic change in leadership 
consistent with the goal of collapsing the distance between professional expertise and the 
community the organization served. Since at least late 1966, ARCH’s board had included 
architects Norval White, Lowell Brody, and Edward Echeverria, urban planners Paul 
Davidoff and Walter Thabit, landscape architect Karl Linn, engineer Ewell Finley, and 
social scientist Frances Fox Piven. All except Finley were white, and all were 
credentialed “experts” in their respective fields. But new members joined in January 
1968, doubling the board’s size and providing what ARCH claimed was “not only a 
strong position within the community but giv[ing] the community a controlling influence 
on ARCH’s policies and programs.”14  
New board members Leo Rolle, Kenneth Marshall, John Killens, John Henrik 
Clarke, Preston Wilcox, Kenneth Simmons, Roy Innis, and Isaiah Robinson, all African 
American, each claimed longstanding ties to the ascendant ideology of Black Power and 
to Harlem-based community organizations. None were professional designers, and all had 
prominent reputations as Harlem-based activists. Wilcox and Robinson both played 
central roles in the battle for community control of New York City schools that had 
begun at Harlem’s I.S. 201, and Wilcox served as one of community control’s most 
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active theorists. Rolle led the United Block Association, a technical resource for block 
associations in Harlem. Marshall helped pioneer early community action programs and 
served as vice president at sociologist Kenneth Clark’s Harlem-based Metropolitan 
Applied Research Center. Killens was a writer and civil rights activist who cofounded the 
innovative Harlem Writers Guild. Clarke, also a writer and professor, campaigned for the 
adoption of Black Studies curricula. All except Clarke and Killens served on the board of 
the Harlem Commonwealth Council as well, demonstrating both the continued close ties 
between ARCH and the community development corporation it had helped to found, and 
the ideology they shared.15  
Innis’s presence on ARCH’s board particularly symbolized the increasing 
prominence of a radical, nationalistic, and community-based point of view among the 
organization’s leadership. His rise closely tracked the emergence of community control 
and Black Power both in Harlem and nationally. Floyd McKissick became leader of the 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in 1966, replacing the moderate James Farmer and 
marking the emergence of a nationalist orientation in the organization, but Innis had 
waged the battle of ideas that led to the transition. Innis, whom the New York Times 
described as a “militant black nationalist,” rose from director of Harlem CORE to 
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associate national director of CORE in December 1967 to national director in June 1968, 
touting the same principles of black economic development that underlay the Harlem 
Commonwealth Council (HCC).16 Indeed, Innis served at this time as HCC’s founding 
director, a position through which he managed a major organizational upheaval that 
reversed the administrative hierarchy of the development project in favor of a structure 
more conducive to community control. Columbia and New School faculty members had 
administered the federal grant that initially funded the organization, passing along a small 
portion of the overall funding to the Harlem activists who developed HCC. But, as 
officials from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity explained, Innis had “refused 
to be subordinate to the grantee and…proclaimed himself the head of the demonstration 
grant.”17  
Innis’s seizure of control at the helm of HCC mirrored strategy within ARCH, as 
staff began to adopt decidedly militant tactics in opposing unwelcome plans, a decisive 
turn that often placed confrontation over expertise and broadened participation. “[U]ntil 
Harlem stands together, the City – or some other outside force – will always make the 
policy decisions,” Bond explained.18 This strategy reflected the fever pitch of the era, in 
which conflicts over civil rights and the Vietnam War attained greater intensity, 
sometimes shifting into violence. Activists increasingly expressed their critique of policy 
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along starkly drawn racial lines, emphasizing the broader injustice they sensed in the 
uneven application of government power. Bond’s speech to “Architects and Planners 
Against the War in Viet Nam” in May 1968, for example, evinced both the 
internationalist perspective he had maintained and the vehemence he brought to his task. 
“The crisis in Viet Nam, the crisis in our cities are really one crisis, the crisis of Black 
and white,” he said. “America is a racist country.” War seemed to affect non-whites most 
destructively, Bond argued, as did redevelopment. “In our pacification program at home, 
we do much the same thing. Urban renewal has meant Negro removal, and still does.”19  
Though staff continued to assist with the planning projects in which ARCH had 
long been involved, in their effort to oppose unwanted and seemingly unjust plans they 
moved towards a greater engagement with direct action. For example, a city proposal to 
build a sewage plant in West Harlem, where 125th Street met the Hudson River, elicited 
confrontational opposition from the Harlemites to be affected by the mega-project. 
Twenty-eight residents testified at an April 4, 1968 Board of Estimate hearing on the $70 
million plant. Edward Taylor, who spoke on behalf of ARCH, alluded to the violence of 
recent “Long Hot Summers” in Harlem, Newark, Detroit, and elsewhere. “You want a 
riot this summer, you build the plant!” he proclaimed, a threat that surely took on new 
urgency as word spread that evening that an assassin had killed Martin Luther King, Jr., 
and civil unrest broke out across American cities.20 The Harlem News offered an editorial 
whose threat remained veiled but no less potent. “We as black people in Harlem want and 
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will not settle for less than the RIGHT of SELF-DETERMINATION in Harlem,” staff 
wrote. “We have the right as citizens of this community to say what will be and what will 
NOT be placed in our midst and we will exert this right. Harlem does not want the plant, 
Harlem does not need the plant, and Harlem will not have the plant. On this and this 
alone we rest our case.”21  
Likewise, ARCH enthusiastically supported the West Harlem community as 
longstanding tension with Columbia University turned violent in April 1968. Columbia 
had planned since the early 1960s to build a gymnasium for its own use in Harlem’s 
Morningside Park. ARCH had resisted the project since at least 1966, when staff 
considered filing suit against it, but Columbia’s move toward construction in late 1967 
brought the start of more spirited protests.22 The West Harlem Community Organization, 
ARCH’s partner in West Harlem since 1965, burned a Columbia trustee in effigy at the 
university’s front gate in November, setting the tone for resistance that would become 
increasingly tense into the spring (Figure 2.2). In February 1968, police arrested twelve 
residents of West Harlem and nearby neighborhoods as they sat before bulldozers set to 
clear the site for what ARCH and others termed “Gym Crow.” One protester climbed into 
the maw of a backhoe (Figure 2.3). ARCH chronicled the subsequent April student and 
community takeover of Columbia’s campus in great detail, dedicating four pages in  
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Figure 2.2. Harlem residents picket along Broadway to protest Columbia University’s 
plans to build a gymnasium in Morningside Park. Source: ARCH and WHCO, West 
Harlem Morningside: A Community Proposal. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. A Harlem resident sits in the mouth of a backhoe in an attempt to prevent 
clearance of the Columbia gymnasium site, February 1968. Source: ARCH and 
WHCO, West Harlem Morningside: A Community Proposal. 
 119 
Harlem News to the conflict that would become one of the iconic events of the social 
movements of 1968, and in which the planned gymnasium played a central role. “The 
Battle of Morningside Park,” an unnamed Harlem News author titled the events, writing, 
“Harlem citizens man the supply lines to Hamilton [Hall] and its 120 Black Berets. The 
sense of tactics, organization, logistics and strategy is superb!” Photos depicted protests 
on 125th Street, leaders addressing gathered crowds, and police striking students. Most 
were captured from the lens of Tyrone Georgiou, an ARCH staffer who closely followed 
events as they unfolded. Linking the gymnasium project to the broader redevelopment 
plans for West Harlem to which ARCH had long been opposed, one writer nudged 
readers to raise their voices too, asking, “Why are you taking all of this lying down?”23 
Such tactics expanded the range of participants involved in planning the 
neighborhood, providing direct involvement for Harlemites who feared the consequences 
of large-scale redevelopment. Roger Starr, executive director of New York’s Citizens’ 
Housing and Planning Council, a prominent non-profit focused on urban policy, and later 
a housing administrator in New York City, criticized ARCH’s role in the protests 
surrounding the Columbia gym. Starr claimed that ARCH had taken a planning issue and 
made it into a political issue, using the plan as a lever to gain influence for Harlemites. 
“ARCH…interpreted the gym as a symbol of Columbia’s indifference to Harlem. ARCH 
used it not to defeat a bad planning idea,” Starr chastised, “but as a means of affecting 
community organization.”24 But that, of course, was precisely the point, as ARCH shifted 
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from offering planning services to encouraging confrontations intended to empower 
Harlemites to stop projects they did not want. In sometimes militant, often histrionic 
direct action, Bond found a strategy that seemed to gain results when measured 
approaches achieved little. To initially voice its opposition to the sewage plant, for 
example, ARCH had organized a press conference that few reporters attended. “Max 
Bond comments that this is just one example of the well-known fact that polite public 
outcries never seem to do any good,” Progressive Architecture reported. “Bond feels a 
physical demonstration of some sort will be necessary before the city and the press will 
pay any attention to the Harlem citizens’ reasoning about the sewage plant, just as there 
was on the gym.”25  
If ARCH’s increasing involvement with direct action marked a decided 
deemphasis of professional expertise in the organization’s work, however, staff likewise 
pursued a strategy that stressed the role of trained designers—but with a new focus on 
minority representation. The two tendencies, seemingly in tension, grew out of the same 
impulse to increase the voices involved in the design process. In part, activist designers 
tied the disparate burdens of redevelopment to the paucity of minority designers involved 
in the process. Bond hoped that greater opportunities for African-American and other 
minority architects and planners would generate more enlightened plans. He issued a 
broad call to other minority professionals, for example, touting the accomplishments of 
ARCH – “an organization of Black architects, city planners and lawyers” – in order to 
compile a list of like-minded designers. “We are trying to make a nationwide list of every 
Black (and Puerto Rican, and Mexican American) architect and city planner who would 
possibly be interested in either working for an organization of this type or starting one in 
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the city in which he resides,” Bond said. He acknowledged the inherent difficulty of this 
task in a country where there were not many minority planners and architects to begin 
with, but remained hopeful that their involvement could alter the nature of power in the 
redevelopment process. “Even if only a few of the architects express interest in the 
program,” Bond wrote, “these few can help to give the minority groups in America who 
have been trampled on so long, a strong, effective instrument with which to control their 
destiny.”26 
But Bond also looked to address the issue of racial representation in the design 
professions at its roots. Education had long been a preoccupation of ARCH, and, indeed, 
a design-oriented training program for Harlem residents had been discussed as a possible 
initiative since ARCH’s inception, but it was only under Bond that such a program 
became a reality. “Architecture in the Neighborhoods,” as ARCH titled the initiative that 
began in the summer of 1968 under the direction of architect Arthur Symes, sought to 
address “the dearth of Black and Puerto Rican talent in the fields of Architecture and City 
Planning.” ARCH counted “only 14 black architects in the states of New York and New 
Jersey combined,” a sum whose scarcity seemed all the more alarming in the capital city 
of American architecture.27 Symes issued calls through churches and schools and posted 
announcements requesting applicants 18 to 25 years old, especially those who had not 
completed high school. Twenty-five students entered an intensive course including 
design instruction by minority architects and planners, counseling, and remedial 
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education oriented towards GED attainment.28 Students studied drafting and drawing, 
learned architectural terminology, and created a range of projects in two- and three-
dimensions focused on planes, texture, and structure (Figure 2.4). In the fall, staff placed 
students in full-time jobs that reflected their interests, with leading architecture firms 
such as Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, and that provided meaningful design work—on 
drafting tables, not as couriers. Students who graduated were encouraged to attend 
architecture schools, with scholarship assistance from the program.29 
While ARCH’s early ideas for a training program had emphasized job skills and 
advanced education, under Bond the effort took on a more political dimension, stressing 
the impact that design competency could have in predominantly minority communities 
like Harlem.30 Instructors favored projects that would be relevant to the lives of students 
and that pertained to the spaces they inhabited. For instance, students initially pursued 
hypothetical assignments focusing on the design of a vacation cottage and on the 
rehabilitation of an urban brownstone. Staff found that the cottage was too foreign to “the 
students’ social and economic backgrounds,” however. “[A] first design problem should 
be one that is closer to their real experience,” staff reported. “For these students a 
brownstone is such a structure and therefore, a more meaningful experience.”31 ARCH 
staff apprenticed students in the city’s largest commercial firms, but intended that 
participants would bring their skills back home. “Specific emphasis will be given to  
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Figure 2.4. A participant in “Architecture in the Neighborhoods” completes one of the 
program’s design exercises. Source: Symes and Banks, Architecture in the 
Neighborhoods. 
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developing skills which can be used not only in traditional planning or architecture 
studios,” they reported, “but also by advocacy planning groups (such as ARCH), by 
community groups, or in the implementation of governmental programs in urban areas.”32 
Kenneth Knuckles, a member of the first class of “Architecture in the Neighborhoods,” 
had dropped out of high school and worked as a teller at Con Edison before being pointed 
to the program by a relative. “There’s more creativity to this than counting money, that’s 
for sure,” he told a New York Times reporter. “I have a chance now.” Symes emphasized 
this goal of empowerment through design. “Architecture and planning are just too 
important to be omitted from the lives of people who happen to be poor,” Symes said.33 
As the first class of “Architecture in the Neighborhoods” settled into their 
apprenticeships, ARCH leadership opened a second front in their battle to expand the 
influence of minority voices among the professional decision makers who shaped the 
city. The City Planning Commission, the body responsible for approving all major 
planning and redevelopment decisions in New York, had claimed not a single minority 
commissioner since its founding in the 1930s. Yet the commission held outsize influence 
over Harlem and other predominantly minority neighborhoods where the city tended to 
focus its major planning activities. In ARCH’s first public statement decrying the 
commission’s makeup, Bond noted that the membership of the Board of Education 
corresponded with the diverse citizenry it served, yet Harlemites were not reflected in the 
planning body that determined how much funding went to low-income housing 
development and that supervised all citywide plans. Citing a recent instance in which the 
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Planning Commission approved housing subsidies for those Bond characterized as “high 
income” but not for “more needy groups,” Bond argued, as the Harlem News 
paraphrased, that “the opportunity to introduce a different point of view must not be 
lost.”34 
Over the following months, ARCH-led protests grew vehement. Bond and Nathan 
Smith, who served as assistant director of ARCH, left the organization at the end of 1968 
to found their own, Harlem-based architectural firm. Under Symes, now ARCH’s 
executive director, the organization encouraged supporters to send telegrams to city 
officials recommending African-American and Puerto Rican candidates for vacant 
Commission slots, gathered organizations including CORE and the Harlem 
Commonwealth Council to join their protest, and met with Lindsay administration 
officials, including Commission chairman Donald Elliott, to plead their case.35 When 
Mayor Lindsay appointed white, male commissioners to two open positions in March and 
July 1969, ARCH turned to direct action.36 In August, Symes and fellow activists arrived 
at City Hall to appoint their own city planning commissioners. Barred from the building’s 
steps, the sixty demonstrators chanted, “Planning power to the people” as Symes 
declared, “We’ve got to have some representation.” The assembled group swore in two 
African Americans and one Puerto Rican as the people’s commissioners: ARCH board 
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member Marshall England; architect Harry Quintana, director of the Real Great 
Society/Urban Planning Studio, an activist planning group in East Harlem and ARCH 
ally; and Vernon Ben Robinson, a former leader of the Community Association of the 
East Harlem Triangle. The three attended the open commission meeting a couple days 
later, where a member of the audience exposed the all-white commission’s lack of 
representation. Speaking to commissioners in Spanish, he then returned to English, 
declaring, “You can’t understand me, but he can!” Quintana, the subject of the protester’s 
praise, addressed the commissioners. “If I catch any of you Commissioners up in East 
Harlem, I’ll go all the way with you,” he declared. “It’s a warning and a threat.”37   
Though the emotional potency of Quintana’s words seemed at odds with the 
question of who composed an elite city board, they suggested the huge potential that 
ARCH recognized in such an appointment. “The Planning Commission’s decisions are 
vitally important to minority communities,” the Harlem News had explained, describing 
the Commission’s influence over public housing, school construction, and the Model 
Cities program. “Thus it is crucial that the Mayor of this City understand that he can no 
longer appoint outsiders to positions from which they can determine how black and 
Puerto Rican people are going to live.”38 Indeed, Mayor Lindsay acceded to protesters’ 
demands just a couple weeks after the City Hall demonstration, appointing an African-
American lawyer and Harlem resident named Ivan Michael to a vacant seat (Figure 2.5).  
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Figure 2.5. Mayor John Lindsay appoints Harlem lawyer Ivan Michael to the City 
Planning Commission in August 1969, making Michael the first ever non-white member 
of the commission. Source: “Michael Sounds Off,” New York Amsterdam News, 4 
October 1969, 1. 
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Michael almost immediately proved the worth of his perspective, voicing opposition to 
the typical order of urban redevelopment and demanding that plans include the 
community’s voice. “One of the things I am certain that the black and Puerto Rican 
community does not want,” Michael declared, “is more urban renewal.”39 
Michael’s concern was with representation, with the resonance between those 
who made decisions about the shape of New York and those impacted by such decisions. 
“[B]lack people make up a large part of this city and we shouldn’t have to rely upon 
pressure to have a truly representative body,” he said.40 Intrinsic to his statement, and to 
the work of ARCH after Bond’s arrival, was the idea that a designer’s race or ethnicity 
mattered, that people of color – whether trained professionals or amateur activists – were 
particularly attuned to the needs of neighborhoods like Harlem, and that they could thus 
uniquely plan their future. As Symes explained in the case of “Architecture in the 
Neighborhoods,” the goal of diversifying participation in the design process grew from 
the assumption that doing so would produce a different sort of city. The effort “should be 
considered a pilot program – the beginning not the end – of a nationwide endeavor to 
train black and Puerto Rican young people so that they may take the lead in deciding how 
they and the people in their communities are going to live,” Symes wrote in 1969.41 
Where white architects assisting black residents of Harlem had inevitably served as 
intermediaries in a process of translation from concept to form, now ARCH staff – with 
racial discourse inflecting every aspect of their work in the late 1960s – claimed the 
possibility of a more direct, even unmediated translation. The project of participatory 
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democracy remained decidedly utopian, but to proponents like Bond, Symes, and their 
collaborators, utopia seemed worth a try. “There is no great danger in seeing whether 
other ways of determining architecture might work,” Bond said. “The people cannot do a 
worse job than architects have done. How could the people possibly be more parochial 
and less sensitive to real human needs and concerns?”42 The question remained what such 
a city might look like. 
 
The Search for New Forms 
Faith in the possibility of a radically democratized mode of participation implied 
faith in the possibility of a radically different city than redevelopment had typically 
wrought. In attempting to discern the meaning and limits of this vision, ARCH 
participated in the broader project of defining the cultural implications of Black Power in 
the 1960s. While artists, poets, writers, and playwrights involved with the 
contemporaneous Black Arts Movement argued for the existence and necessity of a 
“black aesthetic,” Max Bond and the members of ARCH extended this discourse into the 
realm of the built environment. Their articulation of what exactly their ideal city might 
look like remained provisional, but words and plans suggested a place cooperatively 
shaped by and for low-income Harlemites, the foundations of which rested in the culture 
of the community’s everyday life. In seeking the revolutionary goal of community 
control, ARCH and its partners suggested an accompanying revolutionary spatial ideal. 
The pursuit of such a vision echoed the culminating chapter of Carmichael and 
Hamilton’s Black Power. The need for new political, social, and economic institutions 
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necessitated “the search for new forms,” they had insisted.43 This charge seemed 
especially apt in the space of the city. 
Though by no means the only place in which activists sought to determine the 
spatial implications of community control, Harlem formed a particularly vital realm for 
such pursuits. In part this role grew from the community’s iconic status as the capital of 
black culture in America, but also from the presence of ARCH, which filtered the broader 
concerns of black power discourse through its specific interest in design and planning, 
and from Bond, who proved a passionate advocate for the possibility of an alternative 
urban ideal. Indeed, Bond’s articulation of this ideal drew directly from his experience of 
the uniquely African-American space of Harlem. Fundamentally, Bond believed that 
form – as much as power – could derive from the fact of segregation, and that race 
mattered tremendously in determining the shape of the city. “The idea of a Black 
expression in architecture is…something that is scoffed at, for which there is little 
respect,” he noted. “This, in the face of the many distinctive contributions that Afro-
Americans have made to music, literature and world culture.” If critics attributed Gothic 
form to the culture of its makers, or the appearance of Japanese architecture to the 
nationality of its designers, Bond wondered, why should cities designed by African 
Americans not also evince fundamental differences? “It seems reasonable…to expect that 
were Black Americans in a position to express their particular condition and values 
through understanding architects and planners, distinctive buildings and plans would 
result,” he argued.44 
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Bond’s claim mirrored broader debates in Harlem at this time, especially among 
those active within the Black Arts Movement. The Black Arts Movement, described in 
critic Larry Neal’s 1968 manifesto as “the aesthetic and spiritual sister of the Black 
Power concept,” brought the nationalist goals of the era into the realm of the written, 
visual, and performing arts. The range of protagonists in the movement – including Amiri 
Baraka, Nikki Giovanni, and Ishmael Reed most famously – pursued an array of goals as 
diverse as their respective media and geographic locales. But a broader search for a 
“black aesthetic” marked one strain common in much of the work of participants. As 
Neal explained, “A main tenet of Black Power is the necessity for Black people to define 
the world in their own terms. The Black artist has made the same point in the context of 
aesthetics.” Neal contended that the black and white worlds were intrinsically different, 
“in fact and in spirit.” Frustrated with the prospects for African Americans within what 
he perceived as an often-contradictory white-dominated world, Neal argued for the 
necessity of abandoning Western cultural models. “Implicit in this re-evaluation is the 
need to develop a ‘black aesthetic,’” he argued. Addison Gayle, Jr., also a major critical 
interpreter of the Black Arts Movement, explained in terms similar to those voiced by 
Bond, “that unique experiences produce unique cultural artifacts, and that art is a product 
of such cultural experiences.”45 
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The possibility of a black aesthetic rested in a fundamental conception of the 
“community” as the genius loci of creativity. “The Black Arts Movement is radically 
opposed to any concept of the artist that alienates him from his community,” Neal 
declared at the opening of his manifesto.46 His proclamation reflected a tendency 
ubiquitous throughout the work of the Black Arts Movement—a focus on authenticity 
that participants discerned in the vernacular culture of economically impoverished 
African-American communities. In a manner not unlike the deemphasis of professional 
expertise inherent in ARCH’s search for a radical form of participatory democracy, 
proponents of the Black Arts Movement rejected both the idea that the cultural vanguard 
would be made up of highly-trained intellectuals and the expectation that the raw material 
of cultural production would derive from or lead to “high” forms. Instead, proponents 
drew their inspiration from popular culture and daily life in communities like Harlem, 
where a predominantly African-American and low-income population defined the 
neighborhood’s identity for both insiders and outsiders. For cultural producers in the age 
of Black Power, as with those who took Black Power into political realms, the identity of 
segregated communities like Harlem – with a diminishing middle class but a substantial 
population of poor residents – served as a source of inspiration, not a weakness.47  
Similarly, in articulating his spatial vision, Bond looked to informal urban 
settlements, whose vernacular culture and seeming self-determination he idealized. Bond 
romanticized the thriving public realms he identified with such models, describing spaces 
shaped collectively by “the people,” without the mediation of professional experts. “In 
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considering what a ‘people-planned’ city would be,” Bond said, “I think we have to relate 
to the current fad among architects for studying Greek towns, anything built by the 
people. In every case we find not only a coherent expression, but one full of individual 
variety, full of richness, full of life.” If ancient civilizations offered one example, 
however, Bond noted similar qualities in contemporary settings, often those defined by 
abundant economic poverty. “[W]hat we are trying to capture is not Brasilia but that 
Shantytown next to Brasilia; not Tema (Ghana’s new city), but Ashiaman, the 
shantytown next to it,” Bond explained, raising juxtapositions all the more interesting for 
their comparison of highly planned modernist new towns with the unplanned settlements 
on their margins. “They are shantytowns only because they do not have the public 
services and facilities that Brasilia or Tema have, but they do possess the spirit and life of 
an urban place that Brasilia and Tema lack. They are in fact the people’s creation, full of 
the vibrancy and color that go with life.” Bond condemned Tema for its contrasting 
emphasis on private ownership and individualism. Why had planners not embraced 
cooperative housing and the mutual aid and “community pride” he associated with it, 
Bond wondered, instead of “locking each family in its own little box”?48 
Though Bond knew Tema well from his time in Ghana, in fact he did not need to 
look to Africa to find a cooperatively-shaped utopian ideal. Indeed, Bond found similarly 
idyllic qualities outside ARCH’s door, on the streets of Harlem. “Physically, Harlem is 
terrific,” Bond explained. In a description that echoed both the portrait painted by Albert 
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Murray and the orientation of the Black Arts Movement, Bond celebrated Harlem’s 
streets as the stage on which Harlemites protected each other, played, and participated in 
the neighborhood’s civic culture. “You can send your children out to play and the 
neighborhood will take care of them,” he said. If Bond’s description recalled Jane 
Jacobs’s “ballet of the good city sidewalk,” it more so suggested the uniquely racialized 
space in which participants performed, as well as the political potential latent within. 
“The streets are informal, they’re real. They’re the place where your friends are, but 
where the enemy (the police) is too,” Bond continued. “Black people enjoy the streets; 
they like to go for walks. Everyone is at home outdoors.” Harlem’s streets revealed its 
contemporary life as well as its recent history, Bond noted. “Many corners are symbolic 
places – 125th Street and Seventh Avenue where Malcolm X used to speak, Michau[x]’s 
bookshop used to be – in the struggle for equality, for liberation.”49 
Bond’s vision sought to retain the architectural diversity and social activity he 
celebrated in gazing upon Harlem’s blocks. This marked a significant turn from the tenets 
of modernist planning, which had depended on the notion of the tabula rasa, joining the 
physical potential of the clean slate to the symbolic possibilities of wholesale 
reconstruction. The modernist city, embodied in the large-scale projects of urban renewal, 
prioritized the segregation of land uses, the division of the city into districts, and the use 
of monumental forms. If redevelopment was not wholly anti-urban, it nonetheless largely 
devalued the city as it had grown over time.50 Bond, on the other hand, celebrated the 
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messiness of urban life, the eclecticism of land use he discovered in Harlem, and the 
resultant urban vitality he identified as a consequence of that diversity, qualities he hoped 
to capture in his revolutionary spatial ideal. “I imagine that the Black city would be like a 
very rich fabric,” Bond explained. “It would not be a fabric with a superimposed pattern 
but one with multicolor threads running through it. A great mix of housing, social 
facilities, and working places, rather than a series of distinct zones, each separate, each 
pure, each Puritanical.” Bond positioned this vision against the monumentality of urban 
renewal. “A Lincoln Center, pompous and dull and completely aloof from the 
surrounding blocks, simply could not happen in a Black city,” Bond argued.51 As Bond 
explained in a later interview with writer Ishmael Reed, this dichotomy reflected two 
tendencies, one grounded in popular culture, one in an elite vision that Bond rejected. He 
referred back to the performances of Miles Davis in the late 1950s. “[T]heir stuff is so 
urban it really conveys the sense of the urban environment, and without the pretense [his 
emphasis],” Bond said, “and that’s the fundamental difference between what the black art 
forms are doing and the establishment culture—they really deal with what the people 
are.”52  
Bond’s vision, and that of ARCH, acknowledged the need for physical 
reconstruction in Harlem, but offered an approach opposed to the typical strategies of 
urban renewal even as it maintained faith in the role of the master plan. ARCH completed 
plans for both West Harlem and the East Harlem Triangle in 1968, the two communities 
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with which the organization had long been involved. The former served as a conceptual 
vision for the neighborhood in the aftermath of the Columbia gymnasium battle, the latter 
as an official document submitted in response to the city’s contract with the Community 
Association of the East Harlem Triangle for a planning study. The plan for West Harlem 
took a dramatically different approach from – even, in a sense, rejecting – ARCH’s 
earlier, rehabilitation-oriented 1965 plan. “For hundreds of years, Black and poor people 
in America have settled for secondhand possessions while the more affluent sector had 
the better things in life,” ARCH staff wrote. “Let us not be fooled by Establishment types 
who try to cop out on their responsibility by only offering ‘rehabilitation’ because it is 
still secondhand housing.” The West Harlem plan restricted rehab to the neighborhood’s 
most distinctive homes, its brownstones and post-1920s apartment buildings, and called 
for the wide use of federal subsidies to reconstruct West Harlem’s blocks (Figure 2.6). In 
the East Harlem Triangle, planners imagined the nearly wholesale reconstruction of the 
neighborhood’s homes, limiting rehab to only a few small rows.53 Instead of a stopgap, 
planners called for quality regardless of class, an insistence that Harlemites deserved 
equal treatment no matter their income.  
Indeed, both plans redoubled ARCH’s focus on the low-income residents of 
Harlem, emphasizing not just the need to prevent displacement but the possibility of 
building a neighborhood on a low-income foundation. “With few exceptions, West 
Harlem must be rebuilt entirely, but this time for the present residents,” staff wrote.54 In 
the East Harlem Triangle, planners described a population increasingly desperate for  
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Figure 2.6. ARCH and WHCO plan for West Harlem, showing extensive use of new 
construction (gray and black) and limited use of rehabilitation (light gray), 1968. 
Source: ARCH and WHCO, West Harlem Morningside: A Community Proposal. 
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improvement. “The people in the Triangle know something is wrong,” they wrote. “They 
simply are not ‘bettering themselves.’” Their daily barriers extended to nearly every 
realm of life. “Men and women cannot find decent jobs providing a living wage scale. 
Children are growing up diseased in mind and body for want of better social 
services…Housing just can’t seem to get built for the poor. Something is wrong and the 
people in the Triangle know it.” But optimism for the future of the East Harlem Triangle 
lay with the low-income residents who had opposed the plan to demolish their 
neighborhood and eventually won the right to plan its future. “The Triangle Association 
believes there is a breath of hope remaining; that breath of hope is themselves,” the plan 
read, referring to the Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle. “They know 
they must somehow deliver what all poor people need. Nothing less would suffice.” 
While the plan considered the possibility of eventually attracting middle-income residents 
to the neighborhood, planners first insisted on the necessity of “a human[e] and decent 
life style” for current residents. Indeed, as members of the Triangle Association pursued 
residential construction in the following years, they focused entirely on the development 
of low-income housing.55  
Quite literally, the needs of current residents stood as the centerpiece of the 
revolutionary spatial ideal for Harlem. The plan for the East Harlem Triangle emphasized 
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the attributes that Bond had espoused in his description of the city as “a very rich fabric,” 
especially the diverse land uses that had long characterized the small neighborhood. Plans 
maintained a mixture of industry and residence in the Triangle, for example, delineating 
an industrial zone along its western flank, an area intended to provide employment for 
residents proximate to their homes (Figure 2.7). Instead of hiding residents’ unique and 
often acute social service requirements, the plan’s authors located an innovative center 
called the “Triangle Commons” directly in what they described as “the heart” of the 
rebuilt neighborhood. This center was to provide a home for the full range of services that 
residents needed, including welfare assistance, employment assistance, legal services, 
recreation, addiction treatment, day care, and special education. “An integral part of the 
whole concept plan is the programming of specific services to meet specific needs of the 
Triangle community,” planners explained.56  
Likewise, planners sought to retain and reproduce the vernacular character that 
Bond had so admired on the streets of Harlem. Where structures in ARCH’s initial 1966 
plan for the East Harlem Triangle had often borrowed the monolithic forms characteristic 
of urban renewal, under Bond’s direction the new plan eschewed the “aloof” monumental 
structures he denounced. Buildings took a smaller form and largely maintained the 
neighborhood’s existing grid (Figure 2.8). In new public spaces, planners offered hopeful 
visions that the civic life of the neighborhood would thrive. One illustration depicted the 
Triangle Commons as a lively center in the neighborhood, a modern plaza surrounding a 
low glass building, with children playing and adults socializing (Figure 2.9).57 In 
Morningside Park, on the demolished clearing that was to have become the Columbia 
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gymnasium, ARCH and the West Harlem Community Organization envisioned a stage 
set (Figure 2.10) for the cultural and political currents of Black Power. A multi-use 
amphitheater was to “feature performances by Motown artists, the Negro Ensemble 
Company, the New Heritage Repertory Theatre, and local musical, singing, and acting 
groups of all ages,” staff wrote. Plans included space to accommodate “avant garde 
theater,” an “African museum,” the production and exhibition of “black culture and 
crafts,” and even a “soul food garden,” an effort that Harlem residents had begun in the 
aftermath of the gym battle. The plan’s authors imagined a plaza (Figure 2.11) in which 
all of Harlem’s residents would find space to act out their civic roles—including children, 
couples, political radicals (“Support Black Panthers,” a sign read), and even a 
neighborhood inebriate.58 
Above all, idealized visions of Harlem’s future preserved the streetside dynamism 
that observers emphasized as the neighborhood’s defining feature. ARCH employed a 
single illustration (Figure 2.12) to depict both 125th Street and Eighth Avenue, a 
rendering that stood as an ideal type representing the neighborhood’s famous boulevards. 
The streetscape’s unique qualities revealed themselves immediately. A divided road 
offered two lanes for buses, taxis, and local traffic. All other vehicles were to be diverted 
to secondary streets. “Read Muhammad Speaks,” the bus urged, touting the official organ 
of the Nation of Islam. Signifiers of Black Power fashion abounded: passersby raised fists 
in greeting and wore natural hairstyles. One man sported a dashiki. Yet more evident was 
the very normalcy of the scene. Though new buildings faced the avenue alongside 
historic predecessors, they aligned to define an active public realm. A lush canopy of  
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Figure 2.7. Conceptual plan prepared by ARCH and the Community Association of the 
East Harlem Triangle, showing mixture of land uses within the East Harlem Triangle 
neighborhood and community and social services at its center, 1968. 125th Street forms 
the southern boundary of this plan, and Madison Avenue defines the western boundary. 
Source: ARCH, East Harlem Triangle Plan. 
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Figure 2.8. Site plan for the East Harlem Triangle, showing maintenance of the 
neighborhood’s traditional street grid, 1968. Source: ARCH, East Harlem Triangle 
Plan. 
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Figure 2.9. Rendering showing “Triangle Commons,” the community and social service 
center to be located at the center of the East Harlem Triangle neighborhood, 1968. 
Source: Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, East Harlem Triangle Plan. 
 
 144 
 
Figure 2.10. ARCH and West Harlem Community Organization plan for the cleared site 
in Morningside Park where Columbia University had planned to build a gymnasium, 
1968. Source: ARCH and WHCO, West Harlem Morningside: A Community Proposal. 
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Figure 2.11. Rendering showing residents on the plaza intended for the cleared 
gymnasium site in Morningside Park, 1968. Source: ARCH and WHCO, West Harlem 
Morningside: A Community Proposal. 
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Figure 2.12. ARCH rendering of 125th Street from the East Harlem Triangle plan. ARCH 
used the same drawing to represent Eighth Avenue in the West Harlem plan. Source: 
Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, East Harlem Triangle Plan. 
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trees framed the sidewalk, the bearer of the street life celebrated by both Bond and the 
proponents of the Black Arts Movement, and vividly depicted here.59  
Planners tied that quotidian activity to the diverse uses that defined Harlem’s 
boulevards. “The strip of residential-commercial uses along Eighth Avenue has a vitality 
that should be retained in any rebuilding scheme,” they argued in the West Harlem plan. 
They feared the transformation of Harlem’s major axes into bland single-use business 
districts. “All the other crosstown streets are anonymous. What has happened to 8th Street 
is a good example of what we don’t want,” Max Bond said, referring to 125th Street. 
ARCH’s aim, he argued, was to retain the “main street quality” of Harlem’s iconic 
thoroughfare, to prevent the duplication here of what one observer sympathetic to ARCH 
called “Sixth Avenue stoneland,” filled with “maximum-land-utilization office 
blockbusters.” The plan for the East Harlem Triangle abandoned the canyon of identical 
skyscrapers that the earlier plan for the neighborhood had imagined for 125th Street, 
offering instead a mixture of commercial and residential uses in high-, mid-, and low-rise 
buildings along the boulevard. The State Office Building, the skyscraper that planners 
and local residents had once hoped would anchor their transformation of Harlem’s major 
axis, was now nowhere to be seen as residents instead placed their faith in their own self-
reliance.60 But the State Office Building was in fact just over the horizon, and workers 
were soon to begin its construction on the north side of 125th Street between Lenox and 
Seventh Avenues, at Harlem’s center. Imagining a revolutionary spatial ideal on paper 
proved relatively easy. Activists intended to demonstrate they could also realize Bond’s 
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“Black city” in bricks and mortar, even in a world where outsiders still often dominated 
decision-making in Harlem. 
 
Reclamation Site #1 
In June 1967, the members of ARCH watched from their second floor office as 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller stood on a platform across Lenox Avenue to commence the 
demolition that would clear the block for construction of the State Office Building. 
Expressing characteristic assurance, he told a crowd full of dignitaries – including Jackie 
Robinson, Senators Jacob Javits and Bobby Kennedy, and civil rights leaders A. Philip 
Randolph, Whitney Young, and Roy Wilkins – of the lofty goals he held for the 
skyscraper. “Here will stand the State’s 23-story vote of confidence in the future of the 
community,” he announced. “Here will stand a magnet to draw new businesses and new 
enterprises to this area—other offices, new restaurants, new shops and the like.” This was 
not to be just any renewal project, he promised, but one as transformative as the midtown 
commercial campus that bore his family name, Rockefeller Center. Rockefeller 
concluded his remarks, took the controls of the demolition crane, launched the torpedo, 
and hit the wrong building. The spectators watching from inside the occupied building 
were shocked, but unharmed. The patrician governor, used to getting his way, struck the 
right building on the second try. But the wayward wrecking ball was only the first signal 
to Rockefeller that the previously clear path to redevelopment would be filled with new 
obstacles in the era of Black Power. During 1968 and 1969, the crucial years in which 
ARCH underwent its metamorphosis, the site on 125th Street between Lenox and Seventh 
Avenues would transform from an inhabited mix of apartments and small businesses, into 
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a cleared lot, into the very culmination of the struggle for the community control of 
Harlem. On the neighborhood’s central block, where officials intended to build the 
monumental State Office Building, activists strove instead to turn their revolutionary 
spatial ideal into a revolutionary spatial reality in the last months of the 1960s.61 
While the walls supporting urban renewal had begun to show substantial cracks 
well before Bond’s tenure at the helm of ARCH, the redevelopment apparatus remained 
quite powerful in the last years of the decade. When moderate leaders in Harlem gained 
assurances that the state would build a new office building in the neighborhood in 1966 
(detailed in Chapter One), ARCH had looked on with measured approval and the hope 
that the project would provide needed jobs and improve local retail.62 But two years later, 
Rockefeller’s bold promises of transformation through large-scale intervention disturbed 
many with a different viewpoint on Harlem’s future. Their objections grew not from lack 
of faith that the powerful governor’s promises would come true, but from confidence and 
fear that the likely realization of his vision would undermine their own ideal for Harlem 
as a whole, and for its iconic 125th Street. 125th Street marked “Harlem’s ‘soul center,’” 
Progressive Architecture reported, paraphrasing ARCH, “with a style that belongs 
distinctly to the people of Harlem.”63 But the State Office Building plan, which included 
the modernist skyscraper itself, designed by the African-American-led architecture firm 
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Ifill, Johnson, and Hanchard, a state motor vehicle facility, and a vaguely defined cultural 
building (Figure 2.13), threatened to change 125th Street fundamentally. “In Harlem, 
there are many proposals for redevelopment,” Bond warned the audience in his May 1968 
speech to the Architects and Planners Against the War in Viet Nam. “Invariably, these 
proposals will tend to make 125th Street into a business district which serves the whole of 
New York and will boost land costs.”64 
Long-term fears about the transformation of 125th Street aligned with immediate 
realities visible to all who witnessed the demolition of the construction site. As a 
redevelopment project, the proposal occupied relatively little space, only a single city 
block in the vast neighborhood. But demolition wiped clean the central space on 
Harlem’s main street, and one that had especially defined Harlem’s history as a center of 
racial radicalism. Called both African Square and Harlem Square, the corner of Seventh 
Avenue and 125th Street had served as one of Harlem’s great pulpits, an intersection that 
offered a soapbox for orators like Malcolm X and Kwame Nkrumah, who publicly 
claimed the civil rights that Harlemites had often lacked. Lewis Michaux’s National 
Memorial African Bookstore, also called the “House of Common Sense and Home of 
Proper Propaganda,” had anchored the corner since the early 1930s, when the ardent 
Garveyite and political radical began to build the collection that numbered over 100,000 
volumes by the time its demolition began. Michaux’s bookstore – Harlem’s most famous 
– served as a center of progressive thought in the neighborhood, a space where visitors 
could buy a book but receive an education for free. “I believe that when the Negro  
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Figure 2.13. Architectural model of the State Office Building (left; architects: Ifill, 
Johnson, and Hanchard) and adjoining buildings (architect: Philip Johnson). Source: Ada 
Louise Huxtable, “Hard Questions for Harlem,” New York Times, 11 February 1968, 
D24. 
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knocks this time and nobody opens the door, he’s just going to knock it right in,” 
Michaux told one City College class that stopped by to meet “the Professor” in 1966.65  
African Square and Michaux’s bookstore symbolized the most revolutionary 
possibilities that Harlemites envisioned for their neighborhood. Their presence marked an 
intellectual beacon in Harlem. Members of the Black Arts Movement, for example, 
celebrated the corner as the center of the thought that had inspired their search for 
alternatives to dominant cultural modes. “The older black nationalists always talked on 
their ladders across the street in front of the Hotel Theresa,” Amiri Baraka remembered, 
describing the hotel on the southwest corner of the intersection. “Larger forums were held 
in front of Mr. Michaux's bookstore, called, affectionately, the House of Proper 
Propaganda. Malcolm had spoken in front of the store often and there was a sign in front 
of the store ringed by Pan-African leaders from everywhere in the black world.”66 Larry 
Neal melded his memories of the corner with his larger sense of Harlem’s celebrated 
people and places and African-American culture at large, rolling together jazz musicians 
like Duke Ellington and Charlie Parker, Communists like Benjamin Davis, and 
nationalists like W.E.B. DuBois. “It was Freedom Square, Garvey Square, Little Africa, 
Mecca, the University of Timbuctoo, the voice of Nat Turner,” Neal wrote. “Du Bois 
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…Malcolm X, Mr. Michaux, James Lawson, Richard Wright, Kwame Nkrumah, and 
Ellison’s Ras.”67  
The corner of 125th Street and Seventh Avenue marked the center of the public 
sphere that Bond, too, had idealized. Its clearance suggested not just inconvenient 
displacement for the residents and merchants who occupied the block, but a form of 
cultural violence as well. At the very moment that radical Harlem had seized the mantle 
of Black Power, the state’s promises to bring prosperity through the liberal project of 
redevelopment threatened to undermine dreams of a neighborhood controlled by African 
Americans. First the State Office Building would rise, ARCH and its allies contended, 
and then the rest of Harlem would slip into the hands of outsiders, typically cast as 
wealthy whites. “Already demolition is under way for the construction of a state office 
building on 125th Street,” an ARCH brochure warned in the summer of 1968. “The law 
does not guarantee that Harlem’s present residents will live or work in the redeveloped 
Harlem.” The neighborhood’s “wide streets” and convenient location were “being eyed 
by developers who need new building sites for white luxury and middle-income 
apartments,” staff wrote, describing a dystopia directly in opposition to the possibility of 
a space dedicated to Harlem’s low-income residents.68 The state promised revitalization, 
one protest flyer read, “But this is not so. Instead, they are physically removing Black 
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people—scattering us, making it impossible for us to effectively vote, making it 
impossible for the poor to get homes.”69  
Such fears sounded alarmist, but were not unfounded. The Amsterdam News 
reported a string of projects announced for 125th Street after the start of demolition for the 
State Office Building. In August 1968, for example, a white developer proposed to build 
a 33-story office, hotel, department store, and mall on 125th Street at the edge of the East 
Harlem Triangle, a project that directly contradicted the plan that Triangle residents had 
developed for their neighborhood. “Again, downtown is trying to dictate to uptown,” 
Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle executive director (and later 
nominee as people’s planning commissioner) Vernon Ben Robinson said. Robinson saw 
only “colonialists who seek to prostitute our resources, occupy our land and live off 
nothing but misery.”70 Bond likewise invoked the colonial metaphor in a news 
conference he held two days later, describing Harlem as a place that outsiders both 
plundered and used as a dumping ground. “[T]here seems to be a gradual process of 
nibbling away at the edges of black communities—which are usually very desirable 
land,” Bond said. “Junkyards don’t get to choose what they get,” he continued, “and 
that’s what’s happening here.”71  
Radical Harlemites had their own opinions about what Harlem needed on its 
central block, but felt entirely excluded from a process that state officials and their 
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moderate partners had dominated from the beginning. As with the plans for West Harlem 
and the East Harlem Triangle, activists suggested redevelopment that would meet the 
immediate needs of current residents, not new middle-class workers that the state hoped 
to attract. “Why not build something meaningful on the site, something beneficial to the 
community,” asked Arthur Symes, ARCH’s director by early 1969.72 Many opponents 
voiced the goal of a high school on the block. Somewhat remarkably, Central Harlem 
claimed no general public high school for the 17,000 students that proponents estimated 
lived in the neighborhood. A high school, activists hoped, would not only improve 
education but provide an opportunity to realize the community control of schools that 
radicals had long demanded in Harlem. Which did residents really want, supporters 
wondered, “A building that will house the offices of the state of New York, or a 
community controlled high school that will provide meaningful education for the young 
people”? The 2,500 jobs that officials promised for the office building would provide 
only “crumbs” to Harlemites, opponents argued, and the cultural center seemed just 
another imposition of outside culture at a time when Harlemites increasingly took pride 
in their own. “How are we to be inspired when they force someone else’s culture, 
someone else’s standard of beauty on us,” critics asked, echoing the language of those 
active in the search for a “black aesthetic.”73  
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Debate over the State Office Building exposed ideological and generational 
fissures that often coincided. The politically moderate members of the Rockefeller-
appointed site selection committee that chose the location of the project included many of 
Harlem’s leading men and women of business and religion: the presidents of Carver 
Savings and Loan and Freedom National Bank, for example, the pastors of major 
churches, and the publisher of the Amsterdam News.74 State Office Building protesters 
made up a much more youthful crowd. The loudest voices opposed to the project 
belonged to the young residents who had enthusiastically embraced the nationalism 
coursing through Harlem, and who adopted the militancy and even violence that had 
increasingly become prevalent as an anti-redevelopment technique. A memorial service 
commemorating the fourth anniversary of the death of Malcolm X in February 1969 
marked a fitting inflection point as opposition increased in intensity. Around 600 students 
gathered at Cooper Junior High School at 120th Street and Fifth Avenue, the Times 
reported, to watch a film about the assassinated leader, “a skit on the divide-and-conquer 
tactics ascribed to the power structure,” and African dancers. As the program concluded, 
at least thirty students marched the seven blocks to the construction site, yelling “state 
building, no; high school, yes.” The students lingered at the site, continuing their protest, 
before moving west to the building where John Silvera and Wyatt Tee Walker, 
Rockefeller’s aides in Harlem, kept their office. “[T]hey smashed and kicked their way 
through a locked door,” the Times explained, before ripping draperies from windows, 
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overturning a photocopier and desks, and dumping out drawers, all while continuing to 
chant their anti-State Office Building mantra.75  
The rowdy high school protest set the tone for much of the spring to follow. 
Harlem State Senator Basil Paterson became a vocal opponent of the project when the 
state legislature funded the office building but not the adjacent cultural center in April 
1969. Paterson warned the governor that Harlemites might justifiably see the stripped-
down project as a provocation, but indeed protests had already escalated regardless of the 
funding situation. As a projected July construction date loomed and the site sat empty, the 
Times noted, “the opposition became more intense.” Picketers frequented the site, and 
Rockefeller’s staff faced a hostile crowd at a late June meeting, “overwhelming” in its 
opposition to the impending construction.76 Late on June 30th, the night before 
construction crews were to at last enter the site and begin building the long-planned 
skyscraper, 200 African-American demonstrators came down to 125th Street with wire 
cutters in hand. Under the cover of darkness, they severed the construction fence that 
blocked access to a site that had once served as a center of Harlem’s public life. They 
moved past the barricade before raising barriers of their own, beginning an occupation 
that they intended to halt the State Office Building project.77 
Occupants renamed the block “Reclamation Site #1,” a moniker that designated 
both the fundamental objective of community control that the seizure signified, and the 
larger project that the occupation was to commence. The name, protesters allied as the 
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“Community Coalition” proclaimed, marked their “conviction that this is just the first of 
many such battles.” Their objective, as they stated in their official position statement, was 
to stop the State Office Building at all costs but also to shape the site to their ideal vision 
of Harlem. “Under no circumstances will a state office building be allowed to sit on 125th 
Street in the middle of our community,” they proclaimed. As they explained, the building 
rewarded a few Harlemites “at the expense of the general welfare of Harlem people.” It 
would bring the transformation of the neighborhood that opponents had long feared, 
“clear[ing] the present residents out of the area and into other slums…to ‘redevelop’ 
Harlem with commercial-industrial buildings and middle to upper income housing,” they 
argued. The state’s project undermined long sought planning goals, contradicting both the 
means by which radical activists insisted that their community take form, and the ends 
that they envisioned as the outcome. The project was “an inappropriate, unwanted and 
treacherous intrusion on the rights of Harlem residents to plan for redevelopment that will 
truly suit our needs,” the Community Coalition wrote. As with earlier efforts, they 
emphasized the inherent value of present inhabitants as the foundation for development, 
not the middle-class residents that officials and the Harlem establishment sought to 
attract. “We intend to see to it that the primary concern in all redevelopment designs for 
Harlem is for the Human Beings who live here now,” they claimed.78  
The ensuing weeks saw the site begin to reflect the self-determination that 
protestors espoused as their ultimate objective. Governor Rockefeller indefinitely 
postponed the State Office Building project late on the second day of the occupation, 
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bowing to what he termed “community concern” as well as the city’s fear that protests 
would turn violent if the project continued. The governor promised that the site would 
become a recreational area for the summer, but occupants objected. They had already 
“begun clearing the land and planning for its temporary use,” they reported. The 
inhabited site was to display their ideal of radical participatory democracy and its 
resultant forms. “We intend to demonstrate to many so-called ‘community leaders’ and 
the State and City of New York what it means to serve the basic needs of Black people,” 
they countered.79 Within days, the Community Coalition had raised five tents on the site, 
one as a “field kitchen,” and replaced the American flag that flew at the intersection of 
125th Street and Seventh Avenue with a nationalist red, black, and green flag, a standard 
that also flew at multiple places along the site’s fence (Figure 2.14). “Red for the blood 
we have shed, black for our blackness and green for our land, which we are demanding,” 
an occupant proclaimed to passersby by loudspeaker. Guards patrolled the outer 
perimeter of the site, “equipped with walkie-talkies,” a reporter noted, to keep out 
“strangers.”80  
The block “has been transformed from a brick-strewn lot into a tent and shanty 
‘liberation’ town,” a reporter noted, an apt comparison as the site began to resemble the 
“unplanned” settlements that Bond had romanticized in voicing his spatial ideal. 
Reclamation Site #1 became a community without designated architects or planners, one  
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Figure 2.14. Reclamation Site #1, with red, black, and green flag flying in foreground. 
Source: ARCH, Harlem News, October 1969. Photograph by Doug Harris. 
 
 
Figure 2.15. Reclamation Site #1, showing the tents and wooden structures that occupants 
used for shelter. Source: “State Office Site Suggestions Grow,” New York Amsterdam 
News, 23 August 1969, 1. 
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in which all members filled those roles. Several protestors inhabited the hulk of an old 
bus that had remained on the site. Others added a large green and white striped tent and 
simple wooden structures that provided shelter to occupants (Figure 2.15). “[T]he 
occupiers are digging in,” a New York Post reporter chronicled on the one month 
anniversary of the occupation. “At the gate of the fenced in area is an information booth 
with a sign above it requesting food, funds and support. And decorating the 15 foot fence 
surrounding the site are signs put up by the demonstrators[.] One of them reads: ‘What do 
you want here?’”81 Residents of the site planned a health clinic and a day care, inviting 
community members to see for themselves and take part. “If you come visit us, you will 
see that our temporary clinic will soon be finished,” they said. “If you come to help us, 
you will see that it will be finished much faster.”82 Their efforts recalled those of civil 
rights activists in Washington, DC the previous spring, who settled the National Mall for 
six weeks as part of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s posthumous Poor People’s Campaign. 
Almost three thousand activists had built and inhabited plywood structures in what they 
called “Resurrection City.” Reclamation Site #1 marked a much smaller effort – media 
estimated from under fifty up to several hundred people on the site at a time – but 
nonetheless earned a parallel nickname from at least one reporter: “Resurrection City, 
Harlem.”83  
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Also like Bond’s shantytown ideal, Reclamation Site #1 functioned as a 
cooperative enterprise. “All work on Reclamation Site #1 is done voluntarily,” members 
of the Community Coalition explained. “We are being fed, clothed, sheltered, protected, 
and generally supported by thousands of people in the community.”84 Members of the 
Coalition insisted on anonymity and shared responsibilities on site. “It’s about working 
together,” one Community Coalition newsletter announced.85 Mealtime provided a telling 
example of their collectivism (Figure 2.16). “The people occupying the site may be poor, 
but they’re proud,” a reporter wrote. “Each day a hale and hearty meal is cooked over an 
outdoor, charcoal pit fire…The meal cost nothing to those who wished to enter and 
partake.” Journalist Charlayne Hunter described a woman in “African-style dress” 
peeling potatoes for stew alongside two of the site’s security guards, who debated the 
merits of removing all of the peel or leaving some on for flavor. “Naw, man, you got to 
leave some soul,” one guard told the other, a cooking tip that embraced the language of 
racial pride that pervaded even the dinner hour. While they prepared food, others nearby 
assembled more wooden structures. An African drum circle often played on the site, and 
various events took place for site residents and members of the Harlem community 
throughout the summer, including festivals, Saturday rallies, and informal seminars on 
political topics (Figure 2.17). At night, the occupants of Reclamation Site #1 gathered 
around bonfires to enjoy readings and musical performances. Amiri Baraka brought his  
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Figure 2.16. Occupants of Reclamation Site #1 cook and build together. Source: ARCH, 
Harlem News, October 1969. Photograph by Doug Harris. 
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Figure 2.17. Rally at Reclamation Site #1. Source: ARCH, Harlem News, October 1969. 
Photograph by Doug Harris. 
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Spirit House Movers to the site from Newark. Jazz drummer Milford Graves and singer 
Leon Thomas performed for the occupants of Reclamation Site #1, as did Clarence Reed 
and Jacques Wakefield, both poets affiliated with the Black Arts Movement.86 
Moderate observers often disparaged the occupiers, suggesting that they were 
youth unrepresentative of a Harlem mainstream that supported the State Office Building. 
William Hudgins, president of the black-owned Freedom National Bank, characterized 
the protesters as a “small handful of noisy rabble.” The typically establishment-oriented 
New York Amsterdam News, whose publisher supported the State Office Building, 
acknowledged that the occupiers had succeeded in raising the question whether 
Harlemites should have been consulted on the plans in the first place. But the paper called 
Reclamation Site #1 an “eyesore” and cast suspicion on the occupiers’ policy of 
anonymity, suggesting that the protesters had an ulterior motive other than selflessness. 
“What have they to hide,” the paper asked. “It gives us pause to wonder.”87  
The occupants of Reclamation Site #1, however, were not alone in their 
opposition to the project and support for a community-determined plan. Famed Harlem 
tenant leader and politician Jesse Gray supported their campaign. Reverend Moran 
Weston, the influential rector of St. Philip’s Church in Harlem, called from the pulpit for 
the state to sell the land to Harlemites. At the first Afro-American Day parade, held in 
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September, Reclamation Site #1 received a hearty endorsement from the congressional 
delegation that led the caravan. Harlem representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. raised 
his fist in salute to the occupiers who offered the same greeting. Representative Shirley 
Chisholm blew site residents a kiss. A Manhattan Tribune reporter found largely 
supportive views among seven men and women he surveyed. “If it brings jobs and money 
into the community,” one respondent said of the office building, “then I’m for it.” But 
others wondered whether such jobs would go to Harlemites, and many focused on the 
issue of representation. “The government is trying to construct a building in the 
community without consulting the community or meeting its needs,” Edward Brown, a 
recent college graduate, said. Una Kumani agreed. “The state has a lot of nerve trying to 
construct an office building on 125th Street without consulting the community,” he told 
the paper.88 
Where opponents of the State Office Building disagreed was on the issue of what 
should go on the site instead. The Community Coalition did not intend their settlement to 
be permanent, even if they sought to build a subsistent community in the meantime, but 
the question remained what should some day fill Harlem’s central block. “It’s not up to 
us to determine what goes on here any more than it is up to Wyatt Walker or any other 
individual or group,” they said, referring to the Governor’s aide in Harlem. Some Harlem 
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residents endorsed the high school, while others suggested housing, cultural facilities, 
industry, or Black-owned businesses.89  
Proposals concurred, however, in their emphasis on the needs that Harlemites 
perceived for their neighborhood, and their desire to locate those needs at the center of 
the community. Site occupants encouraged Harlem residents to advance their own ideas 
for the site in a process that inverted the top-down approach of the State Office Building 
and urban renewal in general. “We need you! We need your ideas!” Community 
Coalition members appealed to their neighbors, offering a battery of possibilities. “A 
health center? Educational center? Low-income housing? A combination of these? What 
would you like to see on this land?”90 
The residents of Reclamation Site #1 offered a means of decision-making 
different from any that had prevailed before in Harlem, a process that sought to 
concretize the notion of participatory democracy that had suffused discourse in Harlem 
during the Black Power era. At the request of protesters, ARCH presented three 
conceptual schemes for the site at an open hearing on the block in early August: one 
emphasizing low-income housing, one focused on education, and a third that combined 
office space and retail. All departed dramatically from the State Office Building in their 
focus on multiple land uses and on community needs and desires in Harlem’s core. The 
housing scheme (Figure 2.18), for example, included office space, a “Black cultural 
center,” and an outdoor plaza for festivals alongside almost 1000 low-income housing 
units. The high school proposal (Figure 2.19) included an auditorium for public meetings  
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Figure 2.18. Scheme A for Reclamation Site #1, ARCH with assistance from the Real 
Great Society/Urban Planning Studio, 1969. Source: ARCH, “Position Paper on 
Reclamation Site #1,” 8 August 1969, Box 7, Folder 7, Bond Papers. 
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Figure 2.19. Scheme B for Reclamation Site #1, ARCH with assistance from the Real 
Great Society/Urban Planning Studio, 1969. Source: ARCH, “Position Paper on 
Reclamation Site #1,” 8 August 1969, Box 7, Folder 7, Bond Papers. 
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Figure 2.20. Scheme C for Reclamation Site #1, ARCH with assistance from the Real 
Great Society/Urban Planning Studio, 1969. Source: ARCH, “Position Paper on 
Reclamation Site #1,” 8 August 1969, Box 7, Folder 7, Bond Papers. 
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and 200 units of housing. The “office and trade center complex” (Figure 2.20), as ARCH 
titled the third scheme, added educational facilities, social services, a “gallery for Black 
arts,” and a theater to the most commercial of the concepts.91  
Each restored the traditional streetscape that demolition had excised, retaining the 
sidewalk edge that defined 125th Street’s public life. ARCH pointed to the retail strip in 
each plan as an inversion of the high modernism of the State Office Building. “This 
feature reinforces pedestrian activity along the street, while large public plazas occupy 
space away from this prime commercial area,” they explained. “In contrast, compare 
these proposals to the State Office Building proposal where 600 linear feet of prime 
commercial frontage…is wasted on a pretentious lobby and plaza.” Even the forms of the 
three schemes suggested a reversal of the state’s plan. Instead of the monolithic slab and 
wide plaza of the skyscraper, ARCH’s plans adopted an eclectic and often experimental 
approach, including towers alongside low-rise buildings, variegated building forms, and 
public spaces at different levels. The housing scheme, for example, included townhouses 
on an elevated deck, each with its own front yard, and open floors in the housing towers 
“left open for play.”92 
Occupiers displayed ARCH’s renderings on site, inviting residents to visit and 
vote for their preference throughout August. They explained the difference between their 
inclusive ideal and the state’s plans in racialized terms. One option reflected the vision of 
African-American residents, they explained, the other the imposition of white outsiders. 
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“If you had a choice of colors, which would you choose?” Their advertisement (Figure 
2.21) beckoned Harlemites to participate in the month-long poll. “Well…You’ve got a 
choice to make NOW! Black or White?” More than 6,000 residents voted, the 
Community Coalition reported. Their choices largely endorsed the textured, multi-use, 
and community-oriented revolutionary spatial ideal that activists had voiced for Harlem. 
Just over 1,100 participants selected low-income housing as their first choice for the site; 
equally as many chose an educational facility. Half of the participants envisioned 
multiple facilities on the block, choosing a diverse array that included education, housing, 
a medical center, day care, a cultural center, and retail. Just twenty-six voiced their desire 
for the building that opponents had come to refer to colorfully as the S.O.B. “[T]he 
majority of Harlem residents, the poor, the over-worked, the over-looked, do know and 
understand what they need,” a Community Coalition spokesman announced at the 
conclusion of the poll, “and that need is for housing, an education facility and a day care 
center.”93 
The fate of the 125th Street block between Lenox and Seventh Avenues took on 
epic dimensions as the new decade approached. The direction of this site, ARCH insisted, 
would determine the future of Harlem’s main street and, consequently, of the entire 
community. “Building on this site will establish the tone and policy for development of 
the whole of 125th St.,” they wrote. At stake was the very preservation of Harlem’s role 
as a center of thought and as a lively, inclusive public realm. “125th St. has a history as a 
political arena and an organizing force in the Harlem community. Any new buildings  
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Figure 2.21. Flyer advertising “People’s Poll” held at Reclamation Site #1 in August 
1969 to determine Harlem residents’ preferences for development of the site. Source: 
Folder “Harlem—State Office Building,” Schomburg Clippings File. 
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should build on this history.”94 For those with a radical vision for Harlem’s future, 
Reclamation Site #1 marked both a site and a stake in their struggle toward self-
determination. The shantytown utopia that activists developed there offered a physical 
culmination of the flattened, radically democratized process of development that ARCH 
envisioned in the last years of the 1960s. If imperfect as permanent shelter, the wooden 
structures and tents that constituted the settlement opened up space to voice alternatives 
for Harlem’s central block. The “People’s Poll,” as ARCH referred to the on-site 
referendum, suggested the possibility of bringing planning to its most populist form. 
Harlem residents elected to fulfill their most acute needs in the very heart of their 
neighborhood, underscoring their desire that Harlem’s spaces and structures reflect its 
predominantly African-American, low-income population.95 By September 1969, as 
protestors continued their occupation of the open land that made up Reclamation Site #1, 
they could claim a vision for Harlem’s future, the tools that they hoped would realize it, 
and physical evidence that their radical ideal could come true. Extending their seeming 
success from Harlem’s central block to reclamation sites throughout the entire 
neighborhood was their task for the new decade. 
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Chapter Three 
“Own a Piece of the Block” 
 
 September 23, 1969 was a particularly long day on the most contested block in 
Central Harlem. Members of Harlem’s Community Coalition and their allies had resisted 
the construction of the new State Office Building for almost three months, through the 
simple act of inhabiting the city block they renamed Reclamation Site #1. But just a 
couple days after the start of fall, Governor Nelson Rockefeller sent city police to take 
back the land. At dawn, a reporter posted at the site’s gate notified occupants that 
authorities would soon appear. A few hours later, police and officials arrived, asking site 
residents to move out. “Construction work on this location will be starting shortly,” a 
representative of the state Department of General Services called out, “If you leave 
voluntarily no charges will be placed against you.” “We will be free,” a squatter 
responded over a loudspeaker. “Some will die and some others born to carry on the 
struggle. It will not stop here.” Nine refused to move, and police carried them into 
waiting paddy wagons. Another three dozen crossed the street with black, red, and green 
flags in hand, watching the last moments of the community they had created at the 
intersection of Seventh Avenue and 125th Street.  
 Bulldozers arrived soon, and police thwarted one protester’s last effort to stop 
them with his body. The construction equipment rolled through the most permanent 
structures squatters had created, the shacks that dotted the site. Then workers cleared 
protesters’ tents, wiping the vast block clean of its provisional homes. A crowd gathered 
to watch, jeering at police and construction workers for several hours, and questioning 
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the motivations of African-American officers who were serving the governor’s orders. 
One young protester issued a poignant call that promised the persistence of the ideals that 
had driven the occupation. “This is your land, brothers and sisters,” he said. “Freedom is 
not dead.” But many observers were listless, as the acreage they had reclaimed 
transformed so quickly back into a construction site. Crowds gathered throughout the 
day, watching as parading members of the Community Coalition clashed with police, 
sparking new arrests. At night, a much larger assembly flanked the site, and several 
hundred observers saw police subdue rock- and bottle-throwing protesters with 
nightsticks, sending several to Harlem Hospital.  The threat of violence had subsided by 
midnight, but smaller crowds remained, watching police, and watching the site.1 
The occupation of Reclamation Site #1 marked the apogee of the drive for radical 
community control of Harlem’s built environment, and the plans that activists imagined 
for that site marked a new confidence in their ability to chart the course of future 
development. Activists called for a revolutionary spatial ideal, a vision of Harlem built by 
and for the community’s predominantly low-income residents. In this new spatial order, 
ARCH and its allies imagined, residents would be subject to neither the authoritarian 
decision-making of government officials nor the speculative fervor of private investors 
who, they feared, would sweep in upon noticing any sign of rebirth on 125th Street. The 
construction of the skyscraper State Office Building would blaze a path for outsiders to 
take over the neighborhood, opponents argued, rendering meaningless any gains claimed 
in the campaign for Black Power. “[T]he man wants Harlem for himself since it is one of 
the most natural Manhattan areas for redevelopment,” Omar Ahmed, a site occupier, said. 
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“The state office building was intended as a white outpost at first before the takeover by 
white power, white strength, and white money.”2 The Architects’ Renewal Committee in 
Harlem (ARCH) captured the threat more concisely. “The city and state will make costly 
expenditures in the name of black people while corporations reap the profits,” staff 
argued, contending that public promises that the project would benefit Harlemites 
cloaked devious intentions.3  
Yet the state’s rapid eviction of site occupants after their three-month stand 
suggested the difficulties that lay ahead as activists struggled to turn their ideals into 
reality. Like many aspirations born out of the radical movements of the late 1960s, 
community control captivated adherents but proved quite thorny as believers sought to 
realize its tenets in physical form. “Let’s have the land first and then talk business,” 
ARCH demanded of Reclamation Site #1.4 But such goals were more easily envisioned 
than actualized. High hopes sparked the formation of new neighborhood-based 
organizations in Harlem promising to effect “community development,” institutions that 
identified self-reliance and self-determination as their ultimate goals. But in time, such 
organizations continued to depend fundamentally, and ironically, upon the largesse of 
public actors at the state and federal levels, across the political spectrum. If these 
partnerships brought promises that Harlemites would henceforth shape the future of their 
land, they raised equally serious questions about whether community development would 
ever achieve the liberated, often utopian vision to which radical activists had aspired.  
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Indeed, community development organizations revealed deep contradictions in an 
era marked by the transition from New Deal Liberalism to Nixonian New Federalism. 
These years brought a flood of support for community developers, as remaining liberal 
political leaders attempted to reform urban renewal without overthrowing it, and 
ascendant conservative leaders found alignment between demands for local control and 
their own efforts to devolve urban policy to the local level. Such generous public funding 
enabled these new organizations to become central to the reconstruction of Harlem’s built 
environment. But so too did it consolidate power among a select few moderate 
community leaders, who took advantage of financial independence from Harlemites, the 
intransigence of radicals unwilling to compromise the principles on which they staked 
their claims, and the intrinsic ambiguity of community control itself to advance a 
paternalistic approach to the project of community development.5 Their reliance on the 
public sector would prove to be something of a devil’s bargain, however. Plans – whether 
bold or prosaic – depended fundamentally on the persistence of such support beyond the 
1970s, a condition that became increasingly problematic amidst the political and 
economic austerity of the next decade.  
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Struggles to define community development at the local level in this era catalyzed 
a shift from the socially, politically, and spatially transformative hopes of the 1960s to a 
greatly tempered vision of the future in communities like Harlem. Without the self-
reliance that activists had called for and with moderate leaders dominating decision-
making, community-based organizations planning development along Harlem’s main 
street turned away from the communitarian ideals they had once claimed. Projects that 
had promised to realize the inclusive, cooperative, and mixed-use aspirations of the 
occupiers of Reclamation Site #1 increasingly took on a commercial cast and privatized, 
profit-centered orientation. Instead of a revolutionary spatial ideal, I argue, this shift 
marked the ascent of a “moderate spatial vision.” Leaders’ pursuit of this vision in the 
1970s would heighten fundamental tensions: between self-reliance and dependence on 
outside aid, between autocracy and participatory democracy, and between the individual 
and the collective. As they reshaped the development landscape in Harlem, new 
community-based organizations reproduced old inequalities, giving some residents a say 
in development without achieving the broad base to which community control radicals 
had aspired. 
Two organizations, the Harlem Commonwealth Council (HCC) and Harlem 
Urban Development Corporation (HUDC), raised these issues most prominently on 125th 
Street in the 1970s. Both entities followed from the movement for community control 
that ARCH had helped bring about, but their directions marked the different paths 
available in the aftermath of the State Office Building site occupation. HUDC, created as 
a subsidiary of the New York State Urban Development Corporation, represented the 
State’s attempt to mollify protesters with pledges to redevelop Harlem according to 
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community desires. But HUDC also marked the last best hope of the urban renewal order 
in Harlem. Promising a broad base that included Harlem’s diverse political factions, the 
organization eventually cast its lot with moderate, middle-class interests who saw HUDC 
as an opportunity to maintain the status quo from which they benefited. HCC, on the 
other hand, retained many of the radical board members who had helped to found the 
organization in 1967 but aligned with Nixon’s policy agenda, channeling millions of 
federal dollars into Harlem’s real property and remaining industries with the promise that 
profits would go to Harlem’s citizens. Yet while HUDC and HCC initially tracked 
separate paths, their eventual convergence symbolized the contradictory manner in which 
the ideal of community development transformed.  By the end of the 1970s, HCC held 
substantial tracts of property throughout Harlem but had failed to pass its equity along to 
the community at large, and HUDC’s promises of community-oriented development 
adjacent to the State Office Building remained long unfulfilled. As the 1980s loomed, the 
highest hopes of community control radicals in Harlem, as in other American urban 
centers, appeared largely dashed. While they had aspired to find an alternative to both 
publicly-funded urban redevelopment and profit-oriented private development, that 
possibility had seemingly eluded their grasp. Instead, Harlem’s first major community 
development organizations harnessed fleeting public funds to delineate a largely 
privatized, elite-dominated future for 125th Street. 
 
Seeking Consensus 
The swiftness with which Governor Nelson Rockefeller turned Reclamation Site 
#1 back to rubble signaled the strength that officials maintained at the close of the 1960s. 
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Yet if Rockefeller’s crackdown served as a ruthless defense of the urban redevelopment 
status quo, in fact leaders understood that their pursuit was taking place in a rapidly 
changing ideological context. Rockefeller pioneered new innovations in urban renewal 
even as protests grew in strength and number in Harlem, New York City, and throughout 
America. As he championed the new State Office Building in 1968, Rockefeller 
shepherded the legislative passage of the New York State Urban Development 
Corporation (UDC). The UDC took redevelopment to a new scale, with the ability to 
build anywhere in the state and to supersede the powers of local municipalities. Yet 
officials at UDC also sought a middle ground intended to satisfy both the radical critics 
of urban renewal who had occupied the State Office Building site and the moderates who 
still clung to the liberal view that large-scale public intervention would spur urban 
revitalization. Rockefeller’s new UDC and its leader, urban redevelopment czar Edward 
J. Logue, sought to broker calm in Harlem in the aftermath of the occupation of 
Reclamation Site #1. But their attempts to forge a broad consensus within Harlem’s 
diverse communities ultimately foundered on the same ideological fissures that had 
brought the State Office Building controversy in the first place, as radicals refused to 
compromise their demands, and thus found themselves increasingly sidelined.  
UDC marked a watershed in the history of urban redevelopment, an ambitious 
and sweeping agency with unprecedented power. Like redevelopment authorities at the 
municipal level, UDC could take land by eminent domain and amass parcels to build 
housing, commercial projects, industrial parks, or civic centers. But UDC also boasted 
superpowers that cities could never claim, such as the right to build without heeding local 
land use regulations, including zoning, codes, and even local plans. Moreover, UDC 
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could issue its own bonds, a fact that enabled the agency to finance its own work and 
build innovative housing projects throughout New York.6 Edward J. Logue, Rockefeller’s 
choice to lead UDC, claimed bona fides that paralleled the agency’s position at the 
vanguard of urban renewal. As the head of redevelopment in New Haven and then 
Boston, Logue had built his reputation by leading the reconstruction of two of the model 
cities of urban renewal, employing clearance and modernist design to reshape 
neighborhoods and city centers. Logue’s presence at the helm of UDC signaled the 
visibility and prominence of Rockefeller’s program, one he expected to set the tone for 
redevelopment at a never-before-seen scale.7 
Logue’s reputation preceded him. Indeed, ARCH had protested vehemently in 
1966 when rumors suggested that New York City mayor John Lindsay might choose 
Logue as the city’s new redevelopment executive. “[T]here is some evidence…that his 
coming to New York could mean a return both to the high-handed policies of Robert 
Moses and to the kind of slum clearance and rehabilitation that spells Negro and Puerto 
Rican removal,” ARCH board member Herbert Gans warned.8 But unlike the unyielding 
Moses, Logue had maintained a flexible approach throughout his career in response to the 
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changing context in which he practiced.9 UDC’s mandate marked the culmination of this 
adaptability. With its muscle, the corporation set out to reshape New York’s cities in a 
manner that avoided the displacement and disparate racial impact often associated with 
urban renewal: by establishing new towns on uninhabited land, building mixed-income 
tenancy into its housing developments, and aspiring to decrease racial segregation 
through integrated suburban housing construction.10  
Logue’s interest in mediating the State Office Building controversy thus arose out 
of both his responsibility to Governor Rockefeller and his willingness to adjust to broader 
social and political transformations that might otherwise pose barriers to his 
redevelopment agenda. Once squatters moved onto the State Office Building site in the 
summer of 1969, Logue admitted to Alton Marshall, a Rockefeller aide, that he was “in 
no sense intimately familiar” with the issue but wanted to help. Responding to protests 
that in part grew from the state’s elimination of any non-office land use on the site, 
Logue offered, “we can put a black-white architectural team to designing a community 
facility, whether it be a school, a recreational center, or a cultural center.” Or, he 
continued, they could build “housing with built-in community facilities, again with a 
black-white architectural team.”11 By September, Logue’s language began to more 
explicitly mirror that of site occupants. “The first matter is what is the present desire of 
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11 Memo to Alton Marshall from Ed Logue, 10 July 1969, Box 303, Folder 689, Logue Papers; Bill 
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the Harlem community with respect to the program for the balance of the site,” he told 
Marshall. “[W]e would of course seek to work out a Harlem community ownership.”12 
Logue’s aspirations rested on the fundamental – and still very raw – issue of who 
exactly constituted Harlem’s “community.”  The State Office Building had exposed 
already existing rifts, divisions that often found racial moderates on one side and more 
radical community control advocates on the other. Supporters of the building had 
coalesced as the Responsible Coalition in Support of the Harlem Civic Center, a group 
that included members of Harlem’s middle-class establishment and religious strongholds. 
Harlem business leaders, the Negro Labor Council, and the Ministerial Interfaith 
Association, a group of approximately 150 religious leaders from many of Harlem’s 
longstanding congregations, made up the core of supporters. Percy Sutton, then the 
borough president of Manhattan, and Charles Rangel, an upstart on the verge of 
challenging Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s congressional seat, sided with supporters as well, 
while Powell and Harlem political broker Basil Paterson gave political clout to those who 
had seized Reclamation Site #1. Many of those who continued to oppose the construction 
of the State Office Building marked the radical vanguard in Harlem, claiming direct ties 
to the community control movement, and many also maintained direct connections with 
ARCH. David Spencer, an education activist with a leadership post at I.S. 201, Eugene 
Callendar, who had worked with ARCH in West Harlem, and ARCH board member 
Marshall England – as well as ARCH leadership – remained public supporters of the 
youthful Community Coalition and opponents of the state building.13 
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Both sides claimed a mandate in support of their respective positions. Community 
Coalition leaders maintained that a majority of 6,000 surveyed passers-by had supported 
their stand at Reclamation Site #1, while the Ministerial Interfaith Association hoped that 
100,000 petitions would sustain their cause.14 But Logue remained optimistic that with 
his broad redevelopment powers he could build a consensus between divided parties in 
the ongoing conflict. “I believe that among the many diverse interests and groups a 
steering committee can be formed which would represent elected and appointed 
community officials and community leaders representing a wide variety of the groups,” 
he said.15 Logue met personally with State Office Building supporters including Rangel, 
L. Joseph Overton of the Negro Labor Council, and James Gunther, leader of the 
Ministerial Interfaith Association throughout the fall of 1969, but also with Jesse Gray, 
the famed Harlem tenant leader and State Office Building opponent, Livingston Wingate, 
an Urban League leader and opposition mainstay, and Eugene Callendar. Notably, Logue 
and his staff engaged directly with members of the Community Coalition, ARCH, and 
Roy Innis, the community control trailblazer who had presided over the transformation of 
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CORE. Logue even sought out copies of the plans ARCH had drafted for Reclamation 
Site #1, the benchmark of radicals’ vision for a new Harlem.16 
These opposing forces, Logue hoped, would become the representative 
foundation upon which UDC could pursue a much wider role in Harlem. Logue 
envisioned a “Committee of 15” that would help plan not just the redevelopment of the 
State Office Building site but also develop a new plan that encompassed the whole of 
Harlem. He planned to institutionalize the committee’s role in a subsidiary corporation, 
creating a new development entity in Harlem with semi-independent authority—a 
decentralized node that retained the unusual powers of its parent body. Logue hoped this 
group would include the diverse interests he had engaged since September, such as 
Overton, Gunther, Callendar, Wingate, and Rangel, as well as Arthur Symes, ARCH’s 
executive director, and others representing ARCH and the Community Coalition. UDC 
staff remained realistic about uniting forces that had staked diametrically opposed 
positions throughout 1969, but clung to the hope that they could at least garner a critical 
mass. “You can stress the desire for unanimity on this issue but the realistic prospect is 
that perhaps it is one of those things that can only go ahead with a majority consensus,” 
one staff member advised Logue. “If this is so, you can indicate a willingness to do 
business on that basis.”17 
Logue’s optimism rested on the belief that reform of the urban renewal process 
would be sufficient to engage those most frustrated by it. During the last months of 1969, 
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Logue unveiled a series of concessions informed by the meetings he had conducted with 
different Harlem stakeholders. He pledged increased UDC-sponsored housing 
construction in Harlem and greater involvement with reconstruction of the 
neighborhood’s schools and community facilities. The subsidiary corporation, he 
promised, “would work with UDC and the Harlem community in planning and 
implementing an overall program and in supervising specific projects.” Residents would 
nominate the members of the committee that was to guide this subsidiary, Logue 
promised, and might even be able to buy shares in the non-profit corporation. Moreover, 
the state vowed to yield all land not dedicated to the State Office Building to the kinds of 
resident-oriented land uses that radical groups had demanded, including housing and a 
community center. Logue even tapped Bond Ryder Associates, the firm that Max Bond 
had founded upon leaving ARCH in 1969, to plan the site, a move that indicated his 
willingness to make room for the new spatial visions that community control had ushered 
in.18 
Likewise, Logue promised a new purpose for the structure that had sparked 
community protests in the first place. The State Office Building would instead become a 
State Service Center, housing agencies that served Harlem, such as consumer protection 
and job recruiting, and offering space to community organizations. Recounting a meeting 
with Basil Paterson, Logue noted, “His judgment was that the more things that the 
community wanted incorporated into the building under construction, the more credibility 
and potential support such a building would have.” Yet even as Logue offered to 
transform the controversial tower to align with radicals’ land use demands, and even as 
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he facilitated the involvement of a broader constituency than officials had ever engaged, 
he refused to abandon the monolithic structure itself. For Logue, the modernist building 
signified the last vestiges of a redevelopment order that was bending but had not yet 
broken.19 
Community control radicals, on the other hand, opposed Logue’s concessions for 
precisely that reason, as the towering skyscraper’s persistence in plans suggested that the 
struggle for “reclamation” had not yet succeeded. In seeking reform, Logue had 
overestimated the degree to which State Office Building opponents were willing to accept 
compromise. Activists had said as much in their first meetings with Logue and 
maintained that stance throughout their negotiations. The “[g]roup indicated that it would 
not participate in any arrangement with UDC until issue of State Office Building is 
resolved,” Carl McCall, a consultant to UDC, reported of an early November meeting. 
“Requested Logue to recommend to Governor that construction halt immediately.” When 
they met as the Committee of 15 soon after, opponents listened to Logue’s offers but 
stood their ground. “This was [the] last attempt to meet with a group representing 
opposite views on this issue,” McCall reported.20   
Community control radicals insisted that only a neighborhood referendum could 
settle the stalemate that had been reached, a participatory happening that would truly 
democratize a process that Logue had largely brokered. Activists vowed to abide by the 
results of a public vote, but Logue responded cautiously to an invitation that threatened to 
undermine the structure of governance he maintained. When Livingston Wingate 
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announced a Community Convention for mid-December with the purpose of staging such 
a referendum, the UDC demonstrated its trepidation by sending staff members but not 
Logue himself.21 There, ARCH voiced an angry denunciation of UDC’s plan. “The 
change in the name from State Office Building to Harlem Service Center is supposed to 
be a face-saving device for the community. Who needs it?” They continued, “If we allow 
the State Office Building to go up, we may as well forget all the rhetoric about 
community ‘participation’ in planning and accept the fact that we have been had.” 
Instead, ARCH offered a proposal under which UDC would allow community members 
to replan the entire site and stop construction on the State Office Building immediately.22 
ARCH’s position won the day resoundingly, as 55 participants voted for the State Office 
Building and 178 against. Moreover, 167 attendees supported ARCH’s plan and only 20 
chose UDC’s, but the session did little to break the impasse or to sway state officials. 
Carl McCall reported the opposition’s success but seemed unconcerned about plans to 
next stage a Harlem-wide vote. “Construction on the building will probably continue and 
I do not see any organized effort to prevent that,” he told Logue.23  
McCall’s nonchalance suggested the precarious position that community control 
radicals occupied. While Logue had offered every concession but one, the Community 
Coalition remained unwilling to concede even that decision. Doing so would mean 
undermining the very principle of self-determination upon which the three-month 
occupation of the site had taken place, and abandoning the utopian vision for Harlem that 
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radicals had crafted. The editors of the Amsterdam News appeared perplexed by the 
Community Coalition’s intransigence. “Governor Rockefeller has stated that there is 
enough flexibility in the project to include all the facilities as recommended at this past 
weekend’s rather raucous convention,” editors pointed out. “To us this should be 
satisfying to the many adults and young who opposed the building. Or is it that they must 
have their cake and eat it too?”24 Indeed, such refusal was bound up in the very tenets of 
radical community control. “In retrospect we can see that one of the historical problems 
of black people on American soil is that we have demanded too little too late,” 
representatives of ARCH announced at the Community Convention. “Reclamation Site 
#1 should belong to the Harlem community and there should be no question about it.”25  
Unwilling to compromise their idealism, however, ARCH and its allies found 
themselves increasingly isolated from a process that would continue with or without 
them. Logue had options in the divided community, and while he would go far in 
adapting the organization he led, he would not preside over the complete upheaval of the 
top-down method he had pioneered, if not perfected. With hopes for a broad coalition at 
an impasse, the establishment faction that had always supported the State Office Building 
opportunistically looked to become the community representatives who would negotiate 
the role of UDC’s Harlem subsidiary. “[L]et me implore you to ignore all pleas for a 
referendum or other delaying tactics,” one member of the Responsible Coalition urged 
Governor Rockefeller.26 On the eve of the Community Convention, Logue met with 
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Gunther’s Ministerial Interfaith Association to discuss the purpose of a UDC subsidiary 
in Harlem, and by March 1970, the Ministerial Interfaith Association – as well as allies 
including then-Assemblyman Charles Rangel and Thomas Sinclair of the Harlem 
Chamber of Commerce – had begun direct negotiations with UDC. Their interest in 
fortifying their favored position at least matched their interest in improving Harlem. 
“State Government should not allow the noisemakers in the community to thwart 
progress emanating from this agreement in the interest of politics,” several members 
urged.27 UDC staff advised including less moderate voices, including representatives 
from ARCH, but leaders tracked toward the middle, drawing from among Harlem 
officials, the Ministerial Interfaith Association, local Model Cities committees, and local 
businesses. Consequently, the 31-member negotiating committee formed in May 1970 
included Leo Rolle, an ARCH board member selected for his leadership of the United 
Block Association, and Alice Kornegay, selected for her role in Model Cities, but 
otherwise was dominated by the establishment figures with whom Gunther had worked 
all along.28 
By the dawn of the establishment of a new entity promising community 
development in Harlem, then, Logue had assured the persistence of the state as a major 
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force in the neighborhood. However, he had failed to achieve the diverse coalition he had 
sought as an alternative to both the establishment-dominated mode in which 
redevelopment had been practiced and the fully devolved mode that community control 
radicals had demanded. UDC staff worried about the figures with whom they had cast 
their lot. “Without Wingate, Callender [sic], Marshall England, Jesse Gray, ARCH, the 
Community Coalition…the group prepared to sign the [Memorandum of Understanding] 
is not broadly based enough,” Dan Miller, a Logue aide, warned.29  
Those radical figures voiced their agreement, as they watched a process unfold 
that increasingly excluded them from shaping Harlem’s future. Marshall England, the 
president of local community action agency HARYOU and an ARCH board member, 
asked Rockefeller “to cease organizing activity toward a subsidiary corporation in 
Harlem until a more democratic process is established and more broad-based Harlem 
representation is reached.”30 Roy Innis disparaged the effort more bluntly. “He said he 
had heard something about it, but dismissed the ‘Pork Chop preachers’ as ineffectual,” 
Miller reported.31 But due in large part to the intransigence of radicals who had refused to 
cede any ground, the “pork chop preachers” found themselves at the center of the 
subsidiary that would become the Harlem Urban Development Corporation. As it took 
form over the next year, they consolidated their position. Logue could claim Harlem 
representation for the new entity he had established but not the diverse coalition of 
viewpoints he had sought. Radicals in the struggle to bring community control into 
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institutional form were left to consider what other means might enable them to gain 
power over Harlem’s land. 
 
“Own a Piece of the Block” 
Members of the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem stood before the 
Community Convention in December 1969 to describe their vision for Harlem’s main 
street. “[T]he controlled development of 125th Street could bring benefits to the 
community. Each project that is developed should be part of a larger process whereby 
black people generate manpower, information, capital, land and skills which are needed 
to gain control over their lives,” they argued. But if community control stalwarts voiced 
confidence that redevelopment could help solve the neighborhood’s problems of 
unemployment, housing, and inequality, they pinned such hopes on a dramatic departure 
from the way in which development had taken shape in the past. “The basic strategy 
should be ownership of the land and the use of 125th Street as a source of economic 
development within the community.”32 Community control activists rejected UDC’s offers 
to facilitate community planning within the rubric of urban renewal, but remained 
optimistic that they could reshape 125th Street themselves. Self-help offered 
independence as well as control, and at least the hope that any Harlemite wishing to take 
part in the neighborhood’s reconstruction could do so.  
Creating an institutional structure to make such ideas practicable proved complex, 
but the community development corporation (CDC) offered one possible path. 
Community development corporations emerged across American cities in the late 1960s. 
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In Harlem, the members of ARCH, Roy Innis, Preston Wilcox, and other leading lights of 
the Black Power movement had created the Harlem Commonwealth Council in 1967, as 
detailed in the first chapter, but similar organizations sprouted in the Brooklyn 
neighborhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and nationwide. As many 
as seventy-five such organizations existed in cities by 1971, and similar corporations 
came together in many rural areas similarly beset by poverty. Their activities varied 
dramatically: some invested in local businesses or aided entrepreneurs, while others 
constructed new housing or provided social services, loans, and technical assistance. 
Community development corporations largely aligned, however, in preaching the 
compelling, if imprecise notion that, as one observer described, “equality is as much a 
matter of economic power as it is of political rights,” and “that in economics, as in 
politics, there is strength in numbers.”33  
Indeed, CDCs grew from hopes that cooperation between the predominantly low-
income residents of communities like Harlem could provide an economic engine for 
greater self-determination. Communities already bore the resources needed for 
revitalization, HCC and similar CDCs argued, if only an institution could gather, 
organize, and direct such resources. Yet despite such dreams of self-reliance, which grew 
from roots in radical movements for community control, the early history of CDCs 
instead revealed a fundamental contradiction in their work: amidst continued promises of 
community self-help, these organizations came to depend instead on funds that flowed 
readily from the federal government in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the New 
Federalism of the Nixon era, CDCs discovered new opportunity, not new constraints. 
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CDCs calling for local control over development found government officials glad to cede 
responsibility. Such funding redefined the nature of urban development, creating a direct 
path between the federal state and new community-based organizations. This new 
relationship enabled CDCs to become major economic forces in their communities and, 
soon, dream at a bigger scale. However, so too would the moderation of community 
development eventually usher in new questions about the accountability of CDCs to the 
residents they promised to serve.  
From the outset, poverty both motivated the formation of organizations like the 
Harlem Commonwealth Council and provided the economic basis for their strategy. If 
Harlemites individually boasted few resources, HCC’s founders nonetheless contended 
that their combined assets could profoundly reshape the neighborhood. “[T]he 
community and…especially the poor, must support the plan and its goals with its 
dollars,” they wrote in their founding document. Residents’ power rested in their role as 
modest shareholders. Founders estimated that 300,000 dollars would allow HCC to 
procure an initial loan, one-third of which they intended to raise in tiny denominations. 
“The final $100,000 will be raised from as broad a group in Harlem as possible in the 
form of small, perhaps $5, voting shares,” they explained. “The [e]ffect would be the 
creation of a mass-based citizen organization with substantial economic power.” Profits 
would return to Harlem, not to the leaders of HCC but into its subsequent ventures. As a 
result, HCC could become largely independent and self-reliant, allowing its activities to 
expand into realms beyond economic development. “[T]he Corporation’s investment 
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fund will grow steadily,” founders promised, “enabling it to move out into new fields 
including housing, vocational education and health services.”34  
Such an approach struck many residents and observers as novel, but in fact 
community development corporations could claim a deep pedigree in black self-help 
efforts, including those already closely associated with Harlem. Marcus Garvey had 
founded his Universal Negro Improvement Association in the mid-1910s just ten blocks 
north of 125th Street, and similarly focused his efforts on business creation throughout 
Harlem and beyond. Anticipating the very approach that HCC would later promote, he 
financed his grandest project, the ocean-going Black Star Line – a visionary if ill-fated 
passenger and cargo line – by offering five-dollar shares to his Harlem neighbors and 
promising them a portion of profits.35  Garvey organized within an even wider orbit of 
self-help, extending back to Booker T. Washington’s turn-of-the-century call for black 
economic self-reliance and encompassing the entire sweep of African-American 
economic pursuits in the early twentieth century, including race-specific businesses 
focused on personal beauty, daily news, insurance, and death. Such enterprises, while 
limited in both scope and scale, offered the promise of a self-sufficient alternate economy 
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that, decades later, organizations like the Harlem Commonwealth Council would look to 
achieve.36 
Like these predecessors, HCC emerged preaching a gospel combining equal parts 
market orientation and cooperative mutual aid. At times, HCC leaders espoused 
undoubtedly capitalist aspirations. “There will be no begging the establishment—the 
Corporation will compete on the market with its own resources,” the founders had 
vowed.37 Yet the organization promised to temper the capitalistic pursuit of profits with a 
communitarian ethos that was to benefit Harlem at large. While economic development 
remained HCC’s primary goal, gains were intended to enrich the Harlem community, not 
the individuals who occupied leadership positions in the organization. “The network of 
businesses that we are building will vastly improve the basic economic structure of our 
community by creating more financial multipliers, more jobs and better services,” leaders 
argued.38 Roy Innis, HCC’s first director, captured the organization’s refusal to chart a 
dogmatic path. “Blacks must innovate, must create a new ideology,” Innis argued. “It 
may include elements of capitalism, elements of socialism, or elements of neither: that is 
immaterial. What matters is that it will be created to fit our needs.”39 
The series of small ventures that HCC embarked upon in its first years spoke to 
these coinciding goals. Leaders hoped that through enterprise, the organization could 
                                                
36 On African-American commercial endeavors in Chicago during the 1920s, see Lizabeth Cohen, Making 
a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
147-54. 
 
37 “A Demonstration Economic Development Program for Harlem,” 4 April 1967, 4, Hatch Collection. 
 
38 HCC/LDC Progress Report,” 1970, Box 58, Folder “Harlem Commonwealth Council 1969-77,” 
Subseries 1, Series 10, Senator Jacob K. Javits Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, 
Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY (hereafter Javits Collection). 
 
39 Roy Innis, “Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract,” in Black Economic Development, eds. 
William F. Haddad and G. Douglas Pugh (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), 52-3. 
 198 
both fill urgent community needs and feed profits back into subsequent ventures. HCC 
initially operated a small foundry on West 126th Street and a Singer sewing store in the 
landmark Lenox Terrace housing development, but by the beginning of 1971 had 
acquired a pharmacy on 125th Street—renamed Commonwealth Pharmacy, launched a 
travel agency called Commonwealth Tours, and opened a wholesale office furniture and 
equipment store, called Commonwealth Office Equipment and Furniture Company. 
Commonwealth Data Services, incorporated in January 1971, trained keypunch operators 
and prepared accounting data for computer processing. Other, eventually unrealized plans 
included a gas station, a record and audio store, and a supermarket. Each business in this 
seemingly quixotic array served a sector that HCC deemed underserved but crucial. 
“[T]here is a large institutional market which is not being serviced by existing businesses 
at present,” leaders wrote of the office supply business. Similarly, they justified the 
pharmacy as the fulfillment of a vital community demand. “For years the Harlem 
Community has had critical need of a pharmacy that provides twenty-four hour service,” 
they argued. “There are few pharmacies in Harlem to start—cutting down the hours open 
for business increases the problem of obtaining needed medications.”40  
The name that most of these ventures shared – “commonwealth” – represented 
more than a connection to the parent Harlem Commonwealth Council. It also signified 
the idea that success in business would derive from and enrich the entire Harlem 
community, providing a basis for broader control of the neighborhood’s well-being. As 
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HCC amassed subsidiaries, leaders reiterated their plan to offer ownership shares to the 
Harlem community, resisting decades of history in which outsiders controlled most of 
Harlem’s economy. “Once we have reversed the ownership trend,” explained Donald 
Simmons, HCC’s second director, “we will have the confidence of the Harlem 
community to continue its growth as a commonwealth.” HCC’s leaders explained that 
Harlemites would gain significant stakes in the organization’s business ventures and, 
eventually, the governance of the organization itself through representation on its board 
of directors. A foothold in the local economy, Simmons argued, would lead to the 
widespread influence that residents had lacked. “The economic ownership by the people 
will serve as the lever to effect changes in Harlem’s political and educational 
institutions,” Simmons explained. “Eventually, Harlem’s people will be responsible for 
Harlem’s police protection, health services, and education.”41 
Yet despite ambitious promises of self-sufficiency, CDCs like the Harlem 
Commonwealth Council charted a more complicated reality nearly from the moment of 
their creation. Though founders vowed that there would be no “begging the 
establishment,” in fact the organization launched with support from federal government 
partners. Despite plans to fund its initial activities through a loan leveraged with the 
modest donations of community members, for example, HCC’s initial seed money 
instead came through a 1967 grant from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity 
(OEO). Simmons, HCC’s director by mid-1968, expressed unease with the central role 
that federal funding had already come to play in the organization’s first months. He 
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wished to shed OEO funding within the year, he told a Rockefeller Foundation staff 
member. “[H]e did not mind receiving Federal assistance but does not want to remain 
dependent upon Washington,” the staffer explained. Yet the organization pursued and 
received a second OEO grant just a few months later, in early 1969.42  
Why did the Harlem Commonwealth Council so quickly abandon its founding 
cooperative ethos for a model that depended largely on the support of public sector 
funding? Two major factors help to explain this transformation. First, the fundamental 
ideological indistinctness of CDCs – as Innis described, neither capitalist nor socialist – 
brought a decided flexibility to their work. Despite roots in radical movements for 
community control, HCC and similar organizations proved more concerned with their 
intended ends – new business ventures to fuel Harlem’s economic prosperity – than with 
the means of getting there. This expediency grew out of the broader ambiguity of the 
concept of “black capitalism,” an umbrella term that contemporary commentators 
frequently invoked to describe the entrepreneurial outgrowths of the Black Power 
movement, including CDCs. Innis resisted this label. “In the new focus on economic 
control, there has been much talk about something called ‘black capitalism.’ Many of our 
people have been deluded into endless debates centered around this term,” Innis 
explained. “There is no such animal.”43 Yet in doing so, he likewise acknowledged the 
wide variety of approaches that the term encompassed, including everything from radical 
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demands for reparations to partnerships between multinational companies and African-
American communities.44 In a realm of definitional imprecision, in which the very 
meaning of the community development corporation remained up for grabs, it proved 
easy for CDC leaders to shift their approach at will without seeming to abandon the 
equally ambiguous objective of community control. 
Secondly, and relatedly, the ready availability and unconstrained nature of federal 
funding in this era enabled CDCs to stray from their original goal of self-financing. In 
their eagerness to get off the ground, CDCs, like other community-based organizations in 
the late 1960s, looked to the federal War on Poverty as a ready resource willing to 
support new experiments at the local level. Generous grants from OEO allowed HCC to 
avoid the slow, gradual work of gathering resources from the predominantly low-income 
residents of Harlem. Yet if HCC benefited from the last days of the Great Society – its 
1969 grant came just a couple weeks before the inauguration of President Richard Nixon 
– it found that Nixon’s “New Federalism” hardly staunched the flow of funds to CDCs. 
Indeed, CDCs found an eager ally in the new president. As Nixon sought a diminished 
role for the federal government in urban policy, CDCs offered an appealing alternative in 
their opposition to the liberal project of urban renewal and in their calls for self-help and 
localism. Through continued, generous support for CDCs, Nixon could appear responsive 
to African Americans while largely abdicating a direct federal role in addressing urban 
poverty.45 
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CDC proponents viewed the Nixon administration’s support for their brand of 
black capitalism not as a problematic devolution of authority or an attempt at cooptation, 
but as a policy that coincided with and enabled their demands for self-determination and 
community control. They were pleased to gain the autonomy implicit in Nixon’s effort to 
chart a path directly from federal coffers to those of incipient organizations. Such 
seemingly odd bedfellows were common in the complicated political environment of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, in which ideals of the libertarian right and radical left often 
coincided.46 HCC’s first leader, Roy Innis, exemplified this alignment. Innis, who had 
overseen CORE’s shift toward Black Power, found immediate appeal in Nixon’s promise 
to shape a new federal role in cities. Indeed, candidate Nixon had met secretly with Innis 
in 1968 and supported Innis’s attempt to pass the Community Self-Determination Bill 
through Congress. With the Community Self-Determination Bill, proponents hoped to 
empower and multiply organizations like HCC through national financial and 
administrative support and new powers, such as the ability to distribute contracts to other 
community-based organizations.47   
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Innis’s pursuit of such legislation ultimately proved unsuccessful, but other 
mechanisms remained in place to ensure that CDCs like HCC could fuel their activities 
with generous federal support throughout Nixon’s presidency, into Gerald Ford’s 
administration, and under the Democratic administration of Jimmy Carter.  Senators 
Robert F. Kennedy and Jacob Javits had sponsored a 1966 amendment to the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, Title I-D of which established the Special Impact Program, or 
SIP.  Lawmakers intended SIP to channel block grants to community development 
corporations in geographically targeted areas with especially high poverty and 
unemployment, an idea born out of Kennedy’s interest in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of 
Brooklyn. Kennedy had visited Bedford-Stuyvesant in early 1966 to announce a plan 
focused on addressing the neighborhood’s poverty, and his visit and subsequent 
sponsorship led to the initiation of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, one 
of the country’s first community development corporations. The Special Impact Program 
provided funding for the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation and other CDCs, 
becoming the major financial support for such institutions once it made its administrative 
home in the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1969.48  
HCC’s emergence on the national scene, and particularly its elevation through the 
assistance of the Special Impact Program, followed closely behind the appointment of the 
organization’s third director, James Dowdy (Figure 3.1). Dowdy, a Harlem native, had 
not graduated high school and had no formal training in business. A plumber by trade, he  
                                                
48 On the Special Impact Program, see Faux, CDCs: New Hope for the Inner City, 85; Alice O’Connor, 
“Swimming Against the Tide: A Brief History of Federal Policy in Poor Communities,” in Urban Problems 
and Community Development, eds. Ronald F. Ferguson and William T. Dickens (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 105-08. On Kennedy’s work in Bedford-Stuyvesant, see Kimberley 
Johnson, “Community Development Corporations, Participation, and Accountability: The Harlem Urban 
Development Corporation and the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 594 (July 2004): 109-24. 
 204 
 
Figure 3.1. James Dowdy, 1970. “HCC/LDC Progress Report,” 1970, Box 58, Folder 
“Harlem Commonwealth Council 1969-77,” Subseries 1, Series 10, Senator Jacob K. 
Javits Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, Stony Brook 
University.  
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had impressed HCC leaders while working as a contractor on a project for the 
organization, and gained an invitation to join the organization’s board of directors as a 
local business representative. Dowdy’s fellow directors invited him to become the 
corporation’s interim leader upon Donald Simmons’s departure in early 1970 and, soon, 
its permanent chief executive officer. Like his predecessors, Dowdy voiced the objective 
that HCC would build a new economy in Harlem on a foundation of widespread 
collective ownership. “To achieve this goal we must move in the direction of community 
control,” he explained in early 1971. Yet Dowdy’s leadership marked a notable break in 
HCC’s history. His predecessors claimed strong ties to the radical vanguard in Harlem: 
Innis as a leading Black Power proponent, and Simmons as the brother of Kenneth 
Simmons, the figure who had led the radicalization of ARCH. But the self-made Dowdy, 
whom leaders tapped specifically because of the fresh perspective he brought to the CDC, 
claimed no direct ties to either Harlem’s radical movements or to the cooperative ideals 
that motivated HCC’s foundation. If Simmons expressed reservations about HCC’s 
reliance on federal funding even as he continued to draw from it, Dowdy raised no 
similar objections. Politically moderate, charismatic, and ambitious, he eagerly pursued 
partnerships with advocates in Washington.49 
Indeed, under Dowdy’s leadership HCC became one of the country’s leading 
recipients of federal aid through the Special Impact Program. HCC had financed its early 
business ventures with SIP grants of 600,000 dollars in 1969 and 800,000 dollars in 1970, 
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both substantial infusions but hardly remarkable compared to the much larger awards 
received elsewhere. But the organization received 2.3 million dollars in 1971 and 2 
million dollars in 1973, both the second largest grants for their respective years, and 3.5 
million dollars in 1974, the largest grant given under the Special Impact Program that 
year. By mid-1978, only two community development corporations had received more 
SIP funding than HCC, one a Chicago CDC that edged out their Harlem compatriot by a 
few hundred thousand dollars, the other the powerhouse Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation, which remained the best-funded CDC in the nation long after the death of 
Robert F. Kennedy.50   
HCC received more than ten percent of the nearly 175 million dollars that the 
Special Impact Program had distributed to urban CDCs by the late 1970s, and Dowdy 
openly acknowledged the fundamental role that federal support played in enabling HCC’s 
work. If Robert Kennedy famously functioned as the patron saint of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, Jacob Javits in many ways played the same role for 
the Harlem Commonwealth Council. Both New York senators supported HCC’s earliest 
funding requests, but Javits, a liberal Republican and New York’s senior senator, became 
the organization’s strongest voice in Washington, ensuring that HCC had ready access to 
a pool of SIP funding throughout the 1970s.51 Dowdy honored Javits at HCC’s first 
awards dinner in late 1973, alongside Harlem leaders and James Buckley, the junior 
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Senator from the state. “Your presence would mean a lot to me,” Dowdy told Javits, 
whose office heaped praise on HCC’s leader. “[Dowdy] is very generous and, I think, 
sincere in his praise for you and attributes HCC’s success largely to your support,” a 
Javits aide wrote the Senator. “I think that HCC, even more than Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Restoration…can be considered the showpiece of government-sponsored community 
development.” Javits delivered equally enthusiastic remarks upon receiving HCC’s 
award. “I am happy to say that I and my staff have worked closely with HCC and have 
provided all assistance possible in bringing these funds to Harlem,” Javits said. “Jim 
Dowdy has provided exactly the kind of business expertise and quality leadership that 
was required.” In HCC, and in Dowdy, the Senator found the very embodiment of the 
urban policy he espoused, which focused on economic enterprise as the means to the 
broader goal of community development in places like Harlem. And in the Special 
Impact Program, and in Javits, Dowdy found the resources to build his organization into 
the most powerful economic force in Harlem. “I would like to express a personal ‘thank 
you’ for all of the good things that have happened to me as a result of your backing,” he 
wrote Javits in 1973. “I hope that in the future I will be able to stand as a testimonial of 
your efforts in our community.52 
The flood of money that Dowdy accessed through his partnership with the federal 
government enabled HCC to shift its goals to a bigger scale. The December 5, 1970 New 
York Amsterdam News, headlined “The Story of Two Harlem Buildings,” offered 
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material evidence of this decisive transition. The first building mentioned, the famous 
State Office Building, had at last begun to rise after years of tension. The other – 
similarly modern, just a block away, and also housing government offices (in this case, 
municipal) – was on the verge of completion. No protesters had attempted to stop what 
would soon become 125th Street’s first new office building in years. “Unlike its sister or 
brother office building, this City Office Building was not touched by the controversy 
which befell the state office building,” the article pointed out. This was, the author 
suggested, because of the rumors that had swirled throughout construction stating that the 
Harlem Commonwealth Council would obtain a substantial share of ownership, rumors 
that would soon prove true.53 
HCC’s move to purchase half, and later all, of the structure that it would rename 
the Commonwealth Office Building marked a new focus on Harlem’s property that 
would define the organization’s work over the next three decades.54 “This is the first and 
only piece of real estate owned by the community, and there are going to be many more,” 
Dowdy vowed at the building’s inauguration in May 1971. Indeed, a few months later he 
unveiled a more extensive plan for a “Land Bank Program” dedicated to pouring HCC’s 
future resources into Harlem’s land. “In most, if not all, of our Special Impact Target 
Areas lies some of the most valuable real estate in the Nation,” he pointed out. But such 
land was increasingly under siege, Dowdy argued, by redevelopment on 
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one hand, and by speculation on the other. Land banking through the apparatus of a 
community development corporation like HCC offered the possibility that residents could 
control their scarcest resource instead. He proposed putting Harlem’s land in public trust, 
and leaving land use to a public process. “[W]hether land is to be devoted to residential, 
commercial, or industrial uses or is to be left open for park land will be decided by 
trustees in accord with a general plan, adopted and amended by the community at 
elections held for that purpose,” Dowdy wrote. Where once urban redevelopment had 
spelled the displacement of Harlemites or at least their exclusion from the profits therein, 
land banking, Dowdy argued, would ensure that any approved development benefited 
community owners. “[T]he people of the community can, for the first time, gain access to 
the profits from the physical redevelopment of their community.“55  
   Land offered a new frontier for community development corporations, perhaps, 
but one with both practical and symbolic significance. By the time HCC moved into land 
banking as its primary activity, the organization’s earliest ventures had shown mixed 
results. If these small enterprises demonstrated HCC’s aspiration that Harlemites could 
own more than “race businesses” or the crumbs that white investors left behind, their 
monetary and employment benefits remained inherently limited. HCC looked to sell the 
Commonwealth Pharmacy by the end of 1972; Medicaid reimbursements were slow and 
expenses too high. Likewise the Sewing Center, affected by Singer’s decision not to 
renew their contract with HCC, soon closed. “[T]he effectiveness of small scale ventures 
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are perhaps more symbolic than real,” leaders acknowledged in 1972.56 But real estate 
development offered substantial financial benefits, a fact HCC had already seen from the 
steady stream of income that city tenants of the Commonwealth Office Building provided 
through their long-term leases.57 HCC leaders received encouragement, too, from the 
relative ease with which they moved into larger investments. In mid-1972, they acquired 
the Shultz Company, a manufacturer of supermarket equipment and displays, employer 
of 100, and one of Harlem’s largest remaining industries.58 Soon, they were proposing to 
acquire land along Seventh Avenue between 125th and 127th Streets and on 125th Street 
between Eighth and St. Nicholas Avenues, substantial parcels in the heart of Harlem’s 
commercial center.59  
“Own a Piece of the Block,” HCC’s newspaper advertisements began to announce 
in 1972—a promise that the most optimistic hopes of the State Office Building site 
occupiers might soon come true.60 By the time HCC shifted its focus to Harlem’s land, it 
and similar community development corporations nationwide had helped to redefine the 
relationship undergirding development in American cities. Where urban renewal had 
                                                
56 HCC, “Fourth Quarter Narrative Submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity,” June 1972, Box 7, 
Folder “Harlem Commonwealth Council – 1972,” Subseries 5, Series 4, Javits Collection; Center for 
Community Economic Development, “Census of Special Impact Program CDCs,” 1975, Box 8, Folder 
“CCED – Census of SIP CDCs,” CSA/FG. 
 
57 Charlayne Hunter, “New Office Building in Harlem, First in Years, Opening Friday,” New York Times, 
16 May 1971, 1; Stein, “Harlem Commonwealth Council: Business as a Strategy for Community 
Development,” 7-8. 
 
58 “Largest Manufacturing Firm Bought for $1m,” New York Amsterdam News, 12 August 1972, A3; 
Commonwealth Holding Company, “An Analysis of the Acquisition of the Shultz Company, Inc.,” June 
1972, Box 7, Folder “Harlem Commonwealth Council – 1972,” Subseries 5, Series 4, Javits Collection. 
 
59 HCC, “Fourth Quarter Narrative Submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity,” June 1972, Box 7, 
Folder “Harlem Commonwealth Council – 1972,” Subseries 5, Series 4, Javits Collection. 
 
60 See, for example, “Harlem Commonwealth Council Local Development Corp.” (advertisement), New 
York Amsterdam News, 3 June 1972, A3. 
 211 
relied on a network of federal, state, and municipal government officials as well as 
private real estate investors, the funding pipeline that supported HCC ran directly from 
Washington to the community organization’s doorstep. This dependence on outside 
support even as organizations continued to promise self-reliance did not strike leaders as 
paradoxical. They maintained their pledge that community members would soon own the 
corporation themselves, that “this company…will be thrown open to Harlem residents,” 
as the Amsterdam News put it in 1971.61 But five years after HCC’s launch, as the 
corporation began to buy up property along 125th Street, this founding principle still 
remained only a promise.  
 
“How Much Power to the People?” 
Community control activists hoped to fundamentally democratize development in 
Harlem, but the early history of the neighborhood’s community development institutions 
illustrated the difficulty of such transformation. If the public sector’s role in Harlem had 
changed by the early 1970s, it remained crucially involved in the project of 
redevelopment. Likewise, as residents soon discovered, if new faces guided emerging 
development institutions, their commitment to the project of participatory democracy 
proved decidedly ambiguous. Dependence on outside aid did not necessarily mean that 
community development institutions would stray from goals of empowerment and self-
determination, of course, but as the leaders of HUDC and HCC forged close relationships 
with the state and federal governments, respectively, their work gained increasing 
distance from founding principles.  
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Instead of the revolutionary spatial ideal that radicals had espoused as the basis of 
community control, a vision of a richly textured community cooperatively shaped by and 
for the benefit of its existing residents, leaders of community development institutions 
advanced their own, moderate spatial vision for Harlem. Their ideal emphasized the 
commercial development of 125th Street and a paternalistic approach to community 
control, premised on the assumption that dominant leaders knew best what would benefit 
their Harlem neighbors. This outcome resulted in part from pressure by outside funders, 
but more so from the independence that outside funding enabled, leaving leaders of local 
organizations to chart their own course without reliance upon the community members 
they promised to serve.  
Vernon Ben Robinson, who had worked closely with ARCH in the 1960s, 
summed up the budding doubts of likeminded activists in his critical 1971 study of the 
Urban Development Corporation’s work in Harlem. “How Much Power to the People?” 
he asked.62 While HCC and HUDC remained separate organizations with separate 
agendas – HUDC still guided by the establishment Ministerial Interfaith Association, 
HCC still claiming a board including many community control proponents – Robinson’s 
question increasingly pertained to the work of both. As HCC turned millions of dollars 
into real property and HUDC got down to the task of planning 125th Street’s center, 
serious questions surfaced about whether, in fact, most Harlemites would ever have the 
chance to own a piece of the block. 
For the Harlem Urban Development Corporation, finally launched in mid-1971, 
this dilemma played out most visibly on the block that included the rising State Office 
Building. Max Bond’s firm, Bond Ryder Associates, had completed their plan for the site 
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in the spring of 1970 at the request of Logue (Figure 3.2). Bond explained his complex 
program as the “Harlem Town Centre,” a “‘central place’ in Harlem reflecting the needs, 
interests, and talents of the local population.” In the half-block site surrounding the State 
Office Building, a small portion of vast Harlem, architects found room for up to 500 units 
of housing; the central piece of a neighborhood-wide educational complex intended to 
give Harlemites the decentralized system many had long demanded; theaters, studios, 
galleries, rehearsal space, meeting rooms, a library, and restaurant constituting a cultural 
center; commercial space including a communications center; space for small businesses;  
a medical center; a gymnasium and swimming pool; and even a “Harlem Political 
Forum” that retained the historical role this corner had played as a center of debate and 
discourse. Their plan intended to leave loose ends and to define provisional ideas. It was 
meant “as a step towards the development of a program to be done in conjunction with a 
group representative of Harlem,” the designers wrote. But at the same time, Bond 
emphasized that his plan did not intend to take an ideological middle road. “We are not 
offering a rigid proposal, nor is it our intention to suggest a political compromise,” he 
argued.63  
Indeed, Bond’s plan suggested the possibility of at last realizing a revolutionary 
spatial ideal at the center of 125th Street. Its diverse array of land uses echoed the 
schemes squatters had unveiled at Reclamation Site #1, as well as the more recent public 
pronouncements that ARCH had voiced in calling for a community of many functions 
built by and for its low-income residents. Mixed use reflected the spirit of community 
control, especially the notion that Harlem’s main street belonged to all of its citizens, not  
                                                
63 Bond Ryder Associates, “Preliminary Program Analysis: Harlem Centre,” c. March 1970, 1-20, Box 242, 
Folder 148, Logue Papers. 
 214 
 
Figure 3.2. Bond Ryder Associates, Plan for East Side of State Office Building Site (view 
of model). Bond Ryder Associates, Architects, for the New York State Urban 
Development Corporation, “Preliminary Program Analysis: Harlem Centre,” c. March 
1970, Box 242, Folder 148, Edward Joseph Logue Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, 
Yale University Library. 
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only those with the most resources at hand. ARCH and its allies reserved special 
condemnation for the potential that 125th Street would serve only speculative interests 
through commercial development. “Black commercial interests would have to be 
balanced against the other needs of the community,” ARCH leaders had declared about 
125th Street in 1969, “and large scale developments would include residential as well as 
educational and cultural components.” They reiterated this point in 1971. “The strategic 
location of 125th Street makes it vulnerable to pressure for commercial development,” 
staff wrote. “However, like 14th Street, 86th Street, and others, its use cannot and should 
not be entirely commercial.”64  
Early debates within HUDC indicated support for the principle of community-
oriented development that occupiers had called for and that Logue had backed. When the 
state Commissioner of General Services suggested in December 1971 that his 
department, responsible for constructing the State Office Building, was increasingly less 
committed to the idea of a State Service Center with dedicated space for community 
groups, HUDC’s newly appointed president, Jack Wood, responded angrily. 
“[C]ommitments were made redefining the use of the State Office Building as a Harlem 
State Service Center with space available for a variety of community service 
organizations as well as agencies of state government,” he wrote. “A decision now to 
revise understandings reached with the community…could, in my judgment, trigger a 
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reaction so violently in opposition as to seriously destroy the good faith and commitment 
of the Governor’s administration.”65 
The moderate board members at the center of HUDC, however, who viewed 
themselves as the true representatives of Harlem’s interests, proved unconcerned with 
maintaining Logue’s earlier attempts to bridge the community’s ideological divide. Just a 
couple weeks after his stand on behalf of the State Service Center, Wood reported back to 
UDC leaders to announce that the HUDC Board of Directors did not share his view. 
“Apparently at their last meeting the Directors made it clear that they were not in favor of 
using the State Office Building for anything but public agencies,” UDC staffer Daniel 
Miller reported. Their reasons were both imprecise and tentative. “[I]f they did they 
would then be in the position of having to explain to the many who did not get space why 
a few were given preferential treatment,” Miller said.66 As Wood increasingly retreated in 
the course of discussions with HUDC’s board, he resorted to justifications that revealed 
the board’s focus on expedience, not principle. “Much of this confusion can be traced 
back to that period in the development of the State Office Building when the elements of 
both space design and general community relations were substantially different from the 
present,” he argued, suggesting that perhaps the stakes were not so high after all. Indeed, 
he continued, it had all started with activists’ demands for control of the site, which had 
reduced the overall square footage, which reduced the income the state could make from 
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the project. Community offices in the State Office Building would only diminish rent 
further, a concern that seemingly moved the HUDC board more than the issues of equity 
that had motivated the crisis.67 
On the land east of the State Office Building a similar story unfolded, as officials 
initially backed a plan largely consistent with Bond’s vision and then retreated from it 
amidst HUDC board deliberations. “The project can combine housing and commercial 
space with a broad range of Community facilities,” the working Memorandum of 
Understanding between UDC and the negotiating committee stated in April 1971.68 “We 
are challenged to devise a plan of maximum economic and social benefit to the 
community,” Wood told the board of directors early the next year. “[W]e are afforded a 
one-time opportunity to develop certain much-needed facilities,” Wood continued, 
describing a flexible proposal that he described as “a Harlem Center for Culture and 
Commerce.” He felt that Bond’s plan included physically too much, but emphasized 
“making certain that we will end up with a combination which provides the maximum 
possible social and economic benefit to Harlem.” As such, his vision combined housing, 
a hotel, an auditorium, convention space, “cultural facilities and exhibit space, 
restaurants, shops, boutiques, small businesses, offices” and parking on the nearly three 
acre site.69 Yet only weeks later, HUDC board members reoriented the wide-ranging mix 
of uses that Wood had outlined, vastly simplifying the plan and prioritizing commercial 
functions over the diverse program that Bond and his allies espoused. By the time Logue 
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announced the HUDC board’s progress to Governor Rockefeller in February 1972, the 
project had narrowed to a hotel and convention center. “[O]ther civic, cultural, and 
residential facilities” had been demoted to secondary importance, “space permitting.”70 
Moderate board members dramatically altered the direction of plans for Harlem’s 
center, but so too did Logue press his own shifting agenda on HUDC’s staff. While he 
had initially promoted development that met the competing demands of Harlem’s diverse 
political communities, Logue’s commitment diminished as he grew impatient with a 
process that unfolded slowly. Consistent with his reputation as one of urban renewal’s 
most successful executors, Logue became most concerned with making sure something 
would be built on the site during Rockefeller’s tenure, no matter its symbolism. As the 
three acres to the east of the State Office Building lay fallow after several years, Logue 
grew frustrated with Wood’s attempts to balance an establishmentarian board and the 
radical currents that he still perceived lurking in Harlem.  
The cultural center intended for the State Office Building site became the crucible 
in which this debate played out. Wood emphasized that the cultural center played more 
than a programmatic role in the still unfolding debate over Harlem development. “We 
have learned…that Harlem in general would be likely to take a dim view of the eastern 
portion [of] development if cultural facilities were excluded,” Wood argued. “There 
simply will have to be something in this complex that the people in the community can 
relate to as non-business, non-commercial.”71  
                                                
70 Letter to Rockefeller from Logue, 23 February 1972, Box 303, Folder 691, Logue Papers. Subsequent 
correspondence by the governor’s staff referred to the proposal only as a “hotel/convention center.” Letter 
to Rockefeller from Robert R. Douglass, 6 May 1972, Box 303, Folder 691, Logue Papers. 
 
71 Letter to Dan Miller from Jack Wood, 31 March 1972, Box 303, Folder 691, Logue Papers. 
 219 
The cultural center connected the project back to Harlem’s historic role as a 
cultural capital but also to the neighborhood’s more recent cultural awakening, a 
movement in which many of those opposed to the State Office Building had played a 
major role. Wood realized the symbolism associated with such a center by progressive 
voices like W. Joseph Black, a Harlem architect with ties to ARCH who maintained a 
career long engagement with the design of cultural facilities in the neighborhood. “[T]he 
ravages of urban decay and slum clearance by the wrecker’s ball, the social upheavals 
and economic plights that contributed to environmental ruin…in addition to the lack of 
funding from both public and private sources to support cultural endeavors, all account 
for the near death of cultural life in Harlem,” Black wrote, linking the neighborhood’s 
cultural decline with urban renewal, among other factors. But movements for community 
control and demands for self-reliance had reversed the trend. “The revival of cultural life 
came with the determination of the community to control its own destiny,” he argued. 
The development of the State Office Building site provided a vital opportunity to support 
burgeoning trends such as the Black Arts Movement, ensuring that the site took more 
than the commercial cast it increasingly displayed. “[M]uch more should be done to 
support cultural development programs as an essential part of major community 
improvement projects,” Black contended.72 The cultural center, Bond had argued, would 
“give vital expression to the heritage and continuing life style of the Black people—an 
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institution which will take its cues from the Black community and, at the same time, give 
to all who come within its sphere of influence.”73 
Logue’s concern with implementation, however, demonstrated the drawback of 
the dependent position in which HUDC found itself. Because the State would bankroll 
any vision that HUDC’s leaders put forth, the parent organization retained the final word 
over its subsidiary. While Logue had earlier supported the concepts of Bond and others, 
he grew irritated as deliberations produced no physical results. After Logue met with 
HUDC staff in early May 1972, participants agreed the conclave had been a “disaster.” 
Logue put his muscle behind the elements he felt would be most expedient. “Logue is 
very interested in putting up the hotel, the office space, and the convention hall but wants 
to dismiss the cultural center as not feasible because he feels it would not pay for itself,” 
a staff member wrote. “A heated discussion ensued about our responsibility to the 
community to at least investigate the possibility of a cultural center.”74 But Logue’s word 
left staff scrambling for funding through HUDC’s politician board members, foundations, 
or private donors.75 While the idea of a cultural center would recur periodically over the 
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next several years, Logue’s ultimate refusal to provide aid ensured its absence as a viable 
component in any subsequent plans.76  
The Urban Development Corporation’s authority caused HUDC board members 
to bristle, raising demands that they should be independent from their state benefactor. 
“Directors argued that the time had come to change what presently exists and go forward 
with a plan which would enable HUDC to operate on its own,” their secretary recorded in 
September 1972. “It was generally felt that the Board as it now stands is a rubber stamp 
with no real power.”77 But board members seemed to miss the irony of their demand for 
self-determination, for such protests mirrored precisely those of the radicals they had 
rejected in offering their alliance to Logue, and recalled the still resonant question 
Vernon Ben Robinson had asked: “How Much Power to the People?” Upon formation of 
the subsidiary, Penn Kimball, a public relations staffer at the UDC, had raised alarms 
about how the arrangement would be perceived by observers. “To knowledgeable 
outsiders it is likely to seem to be an Old Guard—Old Politics arrangement,” he wrote. 
The vision that took shape on the State Office Building site largely validated his 
concerns. “The dominance of the self-appointed Harlem-UDC Negotiating Committee is 
all too transparent,” he warned.78  
Indeed, to a great extent the increasingly commercial nature of plans for Harlem’s 
central block grew from the outsize influence of one viewpoint within the leadership of 
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HUDC. Though board members complained that they lacked autonomy from their parent 
organization, Kimball’s warning of the establishment faction’s domination proved 
increasingly prescient. Harlem’s different ideological factions offered competing spatial 
visions for the neighborhood, and few, if any, of the moderate voices that dominated the 
board room would speak up for the communitarian ideals that radicals had advanced.  
The establishment figures who controlled HUDC’s board pushed their own, 
narrower vision for the State Office Building site not only due to outside pressure, then, 
but especially because they stood to gain from a profit-oriented approach to the 
development of 125th Street. As plans unfolded, the behavior of board members raised 
persistent, sometimes comically absurd red flags suggesting this underlying motivation. 
Potential conflicts of interest cropped up early. For example, labor official L. Joseph 
Overton, a State Office Building supporter with development interests elsewhere in 
Harlem, who served on the Harlem-UDC Negotiating Committee but not the final HUDC 
board, had warned in 1971 that “if his project didn’t get off the ground the Subsidiary 
would never get off the ground.”79 But self-interest typically surfaced under less 
threatening circumstances. In May 1973, HUDC’s board received its first proposals for 
development of the State Office Building site, unanimously selecting one submitted by 
Center City Communications, an entity that included Percy Sutton, Carl McCall, and 
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Clarence Jones, the publisher of the Amsterdam News.80 By June, however, board 
members wished to reverse their decision. Other proposals had come in, and despite their 
resolution in favor of Center City, they wished to reconsider. After much debate, 
especially between a flustered Wood and board members who hoped to reopen the 
process, the board resolved to do so. Jeff Greenup, counsel to the board, raised a 
question: “would it be a conflict of interest for members of the Board to be participants in 
proposals submitted for consideration?”81  
 Greenup foreshadowed what would become an increasingly bizarre situation, one 
that raised serious questions about whose interests HUDC’s leaders were really serving. 
The proposal that had caused directors to reverse their earlier unanimous decision came 
from a group that included George Miller, an assemblyman and board member; Jeff 
Greenup, HUDC’s counsel; his brother, Henry Greenup; and Arnold Johnson, an HUDC 
board member and the chairman of the very committee charged with reviewing 
proposals.82 Wood, who often found himself at the mercy of his capricious board but here 
reached a new level of frustration, appealed to Logue for assistance. He had been shocked 
by the request to reopen consideration and further shocked that the board’s debate had 
focused on whether Johnson should continue to sit as the chair of the review committee, 
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not the much more obvious question of whether board members should personally profit 
from the efforts of HUDC. “People should not be faulted for wanting to do business with 
HUDC,” he told Logue, “they simply must be told that that preference forecloses their 
eligibility to sit as a member of the board.”83 But debate at the next board meeting instead 
centered on parsing UDC’s conflict of interest policy, a debate to which Greenup 
audaciously contributed a written opinion as counsel, contending that “there is nothing in 
our By-Laws or in fact in the New York State Urban Development Act that prevents 
Directors from participating as long as their interest is openly declared.” Directors aimed 
their frustration not at Greenup but at Wood, who had forwarded Logue’s request that 
Greenup resign as counsel. While Greenup agreed to withdraw from the development 
team, directors continued to stand by their position that they should be able to actively 
participate in HUDC’s projects. Alice Kornegay viewed Greenup’s dismissal as a 
symptom of UDC’s power over HUDC, not as a symptom of HUDC’s increasingly 
apparent self-interest. “UDC had no right to dictate to Harlem,” the minutes recorded.84 
 Wood questioned whether HUDC could ever fulfill its mission as long as it 
defined community development as commercial development that enriched the 
organization’s leaders. “HUDC, in my judgment, can never hope to be effective in 
Harlem if it carries the image of a corporation which allows its Directors to actively and 
publicly participate in and benefit from the business of the Corporation,” he told Logue.85 
Such motivation appeared to be pervasive in the organization, however, even as its 
directors purported to embody Harlem’s wider interests through their role as HUDC’s 
                                                
83 Memo to Ed Logue from Jack Wood, 14 June 1973, Box 302, Folder 663, Logue Papers. 
 
84 HUDC, “Meeting of the Board of Directors,” 12 July 1973, Box 7, Folder 10, Hill Papers. 
 
85 Memo to Ed Logue from Jack Wood, 14 June 1973, Box 302, Folder 663, Logue Papers. 
 225 
official community representatives. Even James Gunther, who had helped to found 
HUDC and remained a key member of its board, sought the organization’s aid for an 
effort that claimed high aspirations – “our group is attempting to foster the revitalization 
of Harlem,” he wrote to Wood – but also served Gunther’s own interests. Gunther 
proposed to build 40,000 square feet of retail and office development as well as new 
churches on land that his Transfiguration Lutheran Church owned on the block 
immediately to the east of the State Office Building site. Two other HUDC directors, 
Nathaniel Gibbon of the United Mutual Life Insurance Company and Richard Greene of 
the Carver Federal Savings and Loan, co-signed a similar request that read as if it were 
written by a perfect stranger to HUDC. “Our coalition of civic and business organizations 
in the Harlem community is very interested in the fact that the Harlem Urban 
Development Corporation is investigating the development opportunities in our 
community,” they wrote, using the third person to refer to the organization in which they 
served. “[W]e ask that HUDC assist us in the most generous manner possible.” Though 
Wood declined to provide such aid, his exasperation surely mounted.86 
*   *   * 
 Though the Harlem Commonwealth Council’s leaders demonstrated less brazen 
self-interest in their evolving approach to community development, they too raised 
parallel questions about representation and accountability as their investment program 
increased in scale and ambition. The organization’s shift toward land banking had 
marked something of a leap of faith, but in the mid-1970s, HCC took major steps towards 
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achieving its goal of extensive property ownership on and near Harlem’s main street, 
especially along key blocks in its central portion. By the fall of 1973, HCC had obtained 
the parcel that leaders had eyed on Seventh Avenue between 126th and 127th Streets, as 
well as two additional properties along 125th Street, between Seventh and Eighth 
Avenues and adjacent to the Apollo Theater. The following year, the organization 
acquired the Braddock Hotel, adjoining the parcels they already owned on 125th Street, 
and a substantial portion of the land between 125th Street, Eighth Avenue, and St. 
Nicholas Avenue. HCC staff estimated that the organization owned more than half of that 
block, which they called “the prime blockfront on 125th Street,” and planned to purchase 
additional parcels to ensure nearly complete control of its extent.87  
With its entrance into Harlem’s real estate market, HCC’s attention shifted from 
Harlem’s small businesses to the development of its land. While Dowdy had initially 
explained land banking as a cooperatively determined community trust, however, the 
organization’s expansion into real estate instead brought increasing reliance on its own 
leadership and on a growing partnership with HUDC. In 1972, HUDC had solicited 
HCC’s involvement in the development of the State Office Building site as well as in an 
effort to prepare a comprehensive redevelopment plan for 125th Street.88 Subsequent 
efforts to draft a development agenda for 125th Street joined what Dowdy described as 
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“the respective interests” of HCC, HUDC, the Uptown Office of City Planning, and the 
New York City Economic Development Administration.89  
HCC came to profess a vision for 125th Street that echoed that of its counterpart. 
Like HUDC, HCC emphasized the commercial redevelopment of Harlem’s prime land. 
The CDC’s major project by mid-decade encompassed the 125th Street block between 
Eighth and St. Nicholas Avenues, where leaders anticipated a large, 70,000 square foot 
development with retail, commercial space, parking, and a market for relocated street 
vendors. This effort formed only a small portion of the much broader commercial 
transformation that HCC imagined. The organization projected that it would help plan 
and develop an additional 300,000 square feet of office space in the neighborhood by the 
late 1970s. “The 125th Street Corridor is the best location for a major retail and 
commercial concentration,” Dowdy wrote. “It is our opinion…that major developments 
along modern lines would revitalize the retail center of the Harlem trade area by not only 
including new facilities, but enhancing the business and market atmosphere for existing 
retail and commercial facilities.”90 
The organization’s business investments, too, shifted towards HCC’s increasing 
commercial real estate development activities, creating a structure whereby all of the 
CDC’s ventures intertwined. In 1973, HCC purchased a fifty-year-old construction 
supply business, Ben’s Lumber Yard, which occupied property on 124th Street and in the 
Bronx.91 Likewise, HCC incorporated a building security and maintenance company as 
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well as a construction company, both intended to assist in the realization of future 
projects. Perhaps the organization’s abandonment of the “commonwealth” title that had 
graced past ventures was merely coincidental, but the names of these new businesses – 
Telec-Tron Security and Nigel Contracting and Construction – marked a striking 
departure from the organization’s early efforts to emphasize the commonweal.92 
To a great extent, the increasing prevalence of commercial development as the 
focus of HCC’s activities – and the increasing authority of its leadership – grew directly 
from the contradiction at the organization’s core. In deciding to rely on public funding 
instead of the pooled resources of local residents, CDCs like HCC severed a fundamental 
connection tying their interests to those of the constituencies they promised to serve. In 
an atmosphere of relative freedom enabled by a federal government that was glad to take 
a hands-off approach to urban policy, the proclivities of strong leaders were free to 
emerge at the helm of their organizations. This was the double-edged sword of policy 
devolution, which enabled experiments in community development but offered little 
oversight of the forms they took. In HCC’s case, Dowdy, more moderate than his 
predecessors and himself the product of a Horatio Alger story, tied community control to 
a capitalistic vision in which power grew from successful participation in the activities of 
the market.  
While profits had been a major objective of economic development-oriented 
CDCs from the start, organizations had maintained an equal focus on the secondary 
impacts of their investments. Thus, HCC had initially chosen to launch business ventures 
that addressed service deficits in Harlem’s retail landscape. But as Dowdy reshaped HCC 
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in his own image, the pursuit of profits became a self-justifying objective, an end in itself. 
The organization’s obligation, he explained, was to pursue any venture that would yield a 
lucrative return. “If five years from now it comes out to be paint or tar for roofs,” he told 
an interviewer, “that is what we will be going after.” But in the short term, Dowdy found 
a ripe opportunity in Harlem’s real estate, and especially that of 125th Street. “[W]e 
believe that Harlem is going to be an up and coming community again,” he explained. 
“We intend to see to it that this time around that Blacks play a major role in the 
development of that corridor and get a lion’s share of what’s developed.”93   
This strategy marked a decidedly paternalistic approach to the project of 
community development. Organizations that had once espoused ideals of cooperative 
ownership and collective decision-making instead came to function much like benevolent 
private enterprises, with an array of impressive ventures and growing portfolios, but with 
little more than leaders’ assurances as a guarantee that benefits would reach all corners of 
the communities they promised to serve. HCC was hardly alone in this transformation. In 
the uncharted terrain of black capitalism, many community development institutions 
changed direction at the behest of strong leaders. In Cleveland, for example, the Hough 
Area Development Corporation, another early CDC, similarly transformed with the 
ascendance of a new director who brought a market orientation to his task. 
Contemporaneous with HCC, the Cleveland CDC shifted from a socially oriented, 
communitarian mandate to an approach that emphasized consolidated ownership and the 
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pursuit of lucrative commercial development projects.94 While such organizations 
continued to voice an ethos of generosity, the potential pitfalls of this approach were 
clear.  As one observer noted in a contemporaneous study of CDCs, “the reason for the 
existence of the CDC becomes one of profit rather than one directly beneficial to the 
target area residents, and the way the CDC operates is much the same as in all other 
corporations.”95  
Periodic munificent gestures both evinced the concern that leaders continued to 
maintain for their neighbors and the paternalism that pervaded their work. HCC planned 
to construct 170 units of senior citizen housing on the property it had acquired on 
Seventh Avenue, for example, and it purchased the 125th Street YWCA in order to offer 
its space to community organizations. “Without our acquisition…a serious vacuum 
would have been created since the initial purchasers of the facility were not of the 
community and had planned to use it for a ‘self-serving’ purpose,” Dowdy wrote.96 When 
a fast-approaching deadline threatened state funding for the construction of a new 
hospital in Harlem in early 1975, HCC provided supporters with the 650,000 dollars 
needed to take title of the land and secure aid, in exchange for the right to build housing 
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adjacent to the project.97 But HCC did not maintain a democratic process shaping such 
decisions, nor did it make socially oriented projects a focus of its activities. Indeed, 
leaders had phased out HCC’s Department of Social Services in 1973. “[O]ur primary 
goal was to do economic development, not so much the social development,” Dowdy 
later explained, suggesting that such work was better left to other Harlem organizations 
that made it their principal task.98 
An HCC advertisement in the Amsterdam News in September 1974 attempted a 
preemptive response to concerns that the organization’s top-heavy structure would soon 
evoke, but instead highlighted the disparities that resulted from its approach. “What’s the 
Harlem Commonwealth Council doing for me?” a bold headline read, before a litany of 
numbers quantifying the organization’s achievements. If HCC intended to paint a picture 
of generosity, most evident was the significant scale of their holdings compared to the 
fairly modest employment they provided in a community of several hundred thousand. 
HCC held more than 20 million dollars in assets; the organization’s real estate holdings 
alone exceeded 11 million dollars. HCC-owned businesses yielded over five million 
dollars in sales. HCC paid 1.5 million dollars in salaries, provided a quarter-of-a-million 
dollars in benefits to its employees, and pumped 140,000 dollars into area minority-
owned businesses. Yet its ventures employed a modest 262 people, only 28 of whom 
                                                
97 HCC, “Progress Report,” 1975, Box 58, Folder “Harlem Commonwealth Council 1977,” Subseries 1, 
Series 10, Javits Collection; “Commonwealth Council Aids Logan Hospital,” New York Amsterdam News, 
8 February 1975, A5; Memo to Project Committee from James Dowdy, 11 November 1974, Box 27, Folder 
9, Black Economic Research Center Records, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York 
Public Library (hereafter BERC Records); Letter to William O. Allen from Dowdy, 12 December 1974, 
Box 27, Folder 9, BERC Records. The hospital and associated housing were never ultimately built. 
 
98 Letter to Ronald Gault from James Dowdy, 18 December 1973, PA730-0054, FFA; “Interview with 
James H. Dowdy,” Alternatives, July-August 1976, 3. 
 232 
maintained management positions. “We’re helping you get your share!” the 
advertisement promised, but that conclusion was not so clear.99  
Indeed, HCC both pushed its profit-centered approach to community development 
to the extreme and demonstrated the risks of this strategy with its 1974 purchase of the 
New Windward Hotel, a modern, air-conditioned, four-story, 145-room, conveniently 
located, conference center-equipped accommodation in faraway St. Thomas, Virgin 
Islands. Leaders intended the hotel to complement HCC’s travel agency, Commonwealth 
Tours, and provide a means of capturing the tourist dollars of minority travelers. “We 
believe there is a need for this kind of service, and if the St. Thomas venture is a success, 
we’ll make every effort to duplicate it in other vacation attractions,” HCC’s vice 
president said.100 Leaders acknowledged that the hotel was “a long way from Harlem in 
terms of distance,” but, they maintained, it was “very near in terms of the overall goals of 
HCC.” Such purchases made sense, Dowdy later insisted, whether or not they were 
within the Harlem community. “[W]e are interested in producing enough profits, so that 
other organizations will not have to depend solely on the Federal government or anybody 
else,” he said in 1976. “In order to do that we are going to have to start investing our 
dollars in those things that are going to bring back those profits, and I’m going to tell 
you, it should not be limited to investments in Harlem, that’s another trick bag…I think 
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that as long as the parent corporation has all the profits, all the benefits come back to the 
people of Harlem, that’s all we have to worry about.”101 If Dowdy made such assurances 
of HCC’s benevolence with the New Windward Hotel in mind, however, the argument 
proved unconvincing. After only a couple years, HCC was already in the midst of ridding 
itself of the distant and unprofitable venture. The domestic economy had worsened and 
“the council wants to direct its energy and time to the Harlem community,” the 
Amsterdam News paraphrased from an interview with Dowdy.102 
HCC’s longstanding and oft-repeated promises of community ownership were 
intended to allay concerns that the increasingly business-oriented CDC was putting 
profits over people. When HCC’s subsidiary, the Commonwealth Holding Company, 
became a publicly owned company, HCC’s leaders frequently pledged, Harlemites would 
gain direct influence over the Harlem Commonwealth Council, elect its board members, 
and guide its activities. “By September 1971,” an HCC ad stated in 1970, “[HCC] plans 
to sell shares in the holding company to community residents at a maximum of $5.00 per 
share…each shareholder will have a voice in controlling the various businesses through 
the members [of] the Board of Directors.”103 At the unveiling of the Commonwealth 
Office Building in May 1971, Dowdy took the jubilant occasion as an opportunity to 
promise again that HCC would soon offer ownership shares.104 Several years later, a 
study of the organization reported that “HCC’s hope is that divestiture might be initiated 
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during 1974.”105 With such hopes still unfulfilled, HCC’s 1975 annual report addressed 
“Our Potential Stockholders.” “The ‘Potential Stockholders’ of Harlem will soon be 
invited to participate through the ownership of shares in all of the Council’s holdings,” 
wrote Dowdy and Isaiah Robinson, the chairman of HCC’s board, again reiterating the 
long-delayed, but fundamental promise.106 
But 1975 came and went, and still HCC had not offered shares in the holding 
company to the Harlem community. The reasons given were manifold. HCC leaders 
genuinely feared that a public offering would lead to takeover by non-Harlem residents, 
undermining the principle of community ownership. To that end, they investigated a 
number of possibilities that would both fulfill the promise of shareholding and ensure that 
they could manage shareholders. Dowdy proposed giving directors first option to buy up 
to ten percent of shares. Harlem residents would be able to purchase a majority of forty 
percent of the remaining shares, with outsiders allowed to purchase the rest of that 
allocation. HCC would hold onto fifty percent of its shares. Leaders also feared the 
economic situation of the mid-1970s. “We understand that today’s climate in the stock 
market is such that public offerings are generally not recommended and are very likely to 
fail,” Dowdy wrote in 1975.107  
But leaders also worried that a stock sale would undermine the almost unilateral 
control they had been able to maintain over HCC, and here the danger of the 
organization’s paternalistic approach to community development became clear. Dowdy 
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deserved tremendous praise for the ambitious redirection of HCC that he had managed 
and for the corporation’s substantial growth in the first years of his tenure. In 1978, the 
community development corporation’s holding company would make its debut on Black 
Enterprise magazine’s list of the top 100 black-controlled businesses in the United States, 
at number nineteen.108 Yet Dowdy also served a practically omnipotent role in HCC, with 
his fingerprints on nearly all of the corporation’s decisions. “[T]he present organization is 
spread very thin. The president…is involved in nearly everything,” a researcher noted in 
1974.109 Dowdy agreed in a 1976 interview. “Working is a part of me. HCC is a part of 
me. I am HCC. It is not a salary, it is not a 9-5 type of thing,” he said. “You cannot 
expect all the employees to be that way, it is me.”110 Opening the company to new 
investors would introduce new interests to its governance, and potentially divergent 
viewpoints. “If stock were widely held, even the most sound business plan would be 
subject to the whim of conflicting stockholder factions to the ultimate detriment of the 
overall program,” leaders argued, though such input was precisely the point of 
community ownership.111  
Unsurprisingly, then, HCC’s reluctance to go public aroused suspicions that its 
leadership was simply consolidating power, and that Dowdy was refusing to share his 
authority. Though the organization maintained a slate of board members that included 
many of its radical founders as well as representatives from community organizations, 
Dowdy’s dominant position fit a broader criticism that observers had begun to voice in 
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response to community development corporations.112 “[W]hereas whites once oppressed 
the ghetto alone, now the whites have the cooperation of an elite band of black managers 
and professionals,” wrote critic Harry Berndt in considering a group of CDCs including 
HCC. “These black capitalists aspire to be the new rulers of the ghetto.”113 If this 
criticism seemed inordinately harsh, even more sympathetic observers worried that 
HCC’s delays would provoke an outcry among Harlem residents. “[C]ontinued 
discussion of the stock sale accompanied by routine deferral of the event could 
undermine HCC’s credibility and interfere with the progress of the sales,” wrote Barry 
Stein, of the Center for Community Economic Development.114  
Indeed, the banner headline on the front page of the January 29, 1977 Amsterdam 
News confirmed Stein’s worst fears. “Harlem Commonwealth Council Fails to Sell 
Shares to Residents,” the newspaper announced to readers in Harlem and beyond. 
Reporter Clinton Cox offered a crisp introduction. “Since 1968 Harlem residents have 
been promised by the Harlem Commonwealth Council that they too ‘can own a piece of 
the block,’” Cox wrote. “But despite HCC’s growth from an initial worth of $250,000 to 
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its present worth of over $23-million, the average Harlem resident is no closer to owning 
stock today than he or she was eight years ago.” Cox surveyed the organization’s many 
promises and the acquisitions it had made along the way—the Acme Foundry, Shultz 
Company, the land it amassed in Harlem. He mentioned the organization’s plans to 
develop a commercial center on 125th Street, and their soon-to-be-completed purchase of 
Harlem’s largest factory, the Washburn Wire Company. “There would seem to be no 
insurmountable problems to working out a feasible stock selling plan, just as there 
seemed to be none in the past.” But Barbara Norris, HCC’s vice president, offered little 
hope that such an offering would come soon. “I really don’t know when it will happen,” 
she told Cox. The reporter closed with a question that captured years of community 
expectation, and perhaps his own too. “What has held up the sale of stock to community 
residents since that first promise was made in 1968? And will the average Harlemite ever 
‘own a piece of the block?’”115 
Dowdy’s rebuttal, in HCC’s newsletter, bore his own frustration but also a more 
troubling undercurrent that evinced the very problem of concentrated power that Cox 
sought to raise. For while Dowdy expressed the stance HCC had long maintained, that 
leaders already had residents’ best interests in mind, he seemed to take Cox’s article very 
personally as well. “One was left to imagine what was really going on,” Dowdy claimed. 
“It was, the article suggested, another Harlem scandal involving the misuse of 
government money for the enrichment [or] benefit of a select few at the expense of the 
community.” Dowdy staged an angry defense, but curiously focused on claims that Cox 
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had actually never made. “Mr. Cox also alleged that members of the…Board of Directors 
receive big fees for serving on the board. Nothing could be further from the truth,” he 
said. But Cox had never mentioned board members or their compensation. “The Cox 
story attempted to smear an organization,” Dowdy wrote, though Cox had only recorded 
the promises that HCC itself had made, and acknowledged the success of its various 
ventures. “It attempted to persuade black people that the 18-member HCC board was 
crooked and not representative of the Harlem community,” Dowdy argued, but Cox had 
never mentioned corruption or representativeness at all. The vehemence of Dowdy’s 
anger in the face of claims that were much more mild suggested someone who felt 
threatened. And if that defensiveness was not itself evidence that Dowdy had become 
more concerned with self-preservation than with ensuring broad accountability and 
participation, the hyperbolic threat with which he closed did suggest as much. “I don’t 
criticize the Amsterdam News for holding black organizations to their mandate,” he 
wrote. “But I do criticize them for recklessly endangering the life and work of an 
organization without the slightest regard for the facts and with no apparent regard for 
what it would mean to the Harlem community if the Harlem Commonwealth Council had 
to close its doors.” Ask too many questions, Dowdy seemed to suggest, and HCC would 
disappear.116  
 
Fiscal Crisis 
HCC board chairman Isaiah E. Robinson, Jr. offered a calmer response to the 
Amsterdam News piece, in which he pointed to the fundamental contradiction that the 
organization faced as the public offering drama played out. “How does a corporation, in 
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good faith, offer stock to poor people in a corporation whose every action is subject to the 
approval of a federal agency with the power to terminate its funding and assume control 
of all property purchased with federal funds?” Robinson asked.117 Even as the leaders of 
HCC and HUDC consolidated their hold on their respective organizations, the paradox 
remained that their success depended crucially on the continued support of state and 
federal partners. Community development institutions thus found themselves in 
something of a devil’s bargain by the mid- to late-1970s. As a result of the public funding 
they depended upon, the powerful leaders at the helms of HCC and HUDC had largely 
succeeded in making their organizations central to Harlem’s development. Likewise, they 
had succeeded in advancing their moderate spatial vision of large-scale, profit-oriented, 
commercial projects along 125th Street. But because they had not pursued the broad 
community ownership – both symbolic and financial – that had motivated their 
foundation, these organizations increasingly foundered as the new decade approached 
and government partners withdrew their support. 
This was a dilemma that the Harlem Urban Development Corporation would face 
first. Leaders had cast their lot as Ed Logue’s reliable allies in forming the subsidiary to 
the New York State Urban Development Corporation, but this very interdependence left 
HUDC vulnerable. UDC’s broad powers and borrowing authority enabled an aggressive 
building campaign across the state, but met a range of countervailing forces by 1973. 
Logue’s ambition to build low-income housing in Westchester County had raised angry 
political opposition, pressure that culminated in legislative amendments that curtailed the 
agency’s power to supersede local zoning regulations. At the federal level, the housing 
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moratorium that President Nixon imposed in January 1973 denied UDC a major source of 
direct subsidy and threatened the tax-exempt status of the bonds that underwrote its work, 
a characteristic that had formerly made UDC bonds an appealing investment. Governor 
Nelson Rockefeller’s resignation to become Vice President of the United States further 
undermined confidence in UDC, the agency that he had created and supported through 
his extensive familial ties to the banking and real estate industries. Before Rockefeller 
even resigned in October 1973, Moody’s lowered UDC’s bond rating. After the 
inauguration of his successor, banks increasingly refused to underwrite UDC bonds. 
Increased competition in the bond markets further increased UDC’s costs of borrowing, 
as investors chose more stable options and shunned UDC. By the 1974 election, UDC 
faced mounting debt and fewer options to address it. Upon the election of Governor Hugh 
Carey in January 1975, with a bond default looming, Logue’s position became 
precarious. Carey installed a Logue opponent as chairman of UDC on February 5, and the 
next day requested Logue’s resignation. If Logue’s departure spelled the end of his tenure 
at the helm of the nation’s most powerful urban redevelopment entity, it did not 
immediately solve the problem of the agency’s financial crunch—by the end of the 
month, UDC would default on debt exceeding 100 million dollars.118  
UDC’s decline and eventual default helped spark the broader fiscal crisis that 
swept New York City and State throughout 1974 and 1975, an event that both grew out 
of and exacerbated the nationwide recession of the period.119 While the social and 
economic impacts of the crisis were felt acutely in Harlem, for HUDC the consequences 
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played out most conspicuously on the block containing the State Office Building. HUDC 
had requested new proposals for the development of the site in early 1974, but the project 
stalled during UDC’s fateful twelve months. By October, Donald Cogsville, HUDC’s 
general manager, realized that New York State would not be a dependable financial 
partner on the project. Though he asked state officials to donate the land and pay for the 
cultural center that Logue would again nix, he looked to the federal Economic 
Development Administration to provide the almost 18 million dollars in grants and loans 
that construction of a hotel, convention center, and entertainment complex would require. 
Despite attempts to procure such funding even in the aftermath of Logue’s departure, 
however, the project languished.120  
HCC’s reliance on federal – rather than state – funding sources left the 
organization better off, if less certain than it had been in the past. Major bureaucratic 
changes at the federal level in the mid-1970s fostered new anxiety among leaders. The 
Community Services Act of 1974 substantially changed the provisions of the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, abolishing the Office of Economic Opportunity and creating 
the Community Services Administration in its stead.121 HCC leaders were not sure what 
the dissolution of the agency that had long supported them would mean. “At the end of its 
current fiscal year, the organization anticipates a difficult round of negotiations with the 
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Community Services Administration,” the Ford Foundation wrote of HCC in May 
1975.122 Indeed, the new fiscal year brought bad news, as President Ford vetoed 
legislation that would have provided the funds HCC depended on for equity 
investments.123 Dowdy painted a bleak portrait of the policy landscape at the close of 
1975. “1975…gave us a hint as to what is in store for our community if we don’t ‘get it 
together,’” he wrote. “From Ford, Rockefeller, and Reagan to Beame, Carey, and a host 
of Liberal Democrats, one constantly hears the call for the retreat of our government, at 
all levels, from social activism. There is no greater danger to Harlem and to Black and 
poor people all over the country.”124  
But against Dowdy’s expectations, 1975 proved to be an exception rather than a 
new normal, and with the election of President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, HCC 
continued to be one of the nation’s best-funded community development corporations in 
the last years of the 1970s. With federal funding restored, the Special Impact Program 
gave HCC the nation’s largest grant, 7 million dollars, in 1976, and awarded several 
million dollars more in 1977, 1978, and 1979.125 The New York Times hailed the 
organization’s purchase of the Washburn Wire Company. The factory, “one of 
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Manhattan’s largest industrial employers, was about to go out of business last year,” the 
Times wrote. “But the company is alive and well now because it was bought by the 
Harlem Commonwealth Council.”126 HCC’s success sparked bigger dreams, and the two 
major 125th Street sites that had supported the visions of HUDC and HCC sprang back to 
life. The organizations joined together in 1977 and 1978 to propose commercially-
oriented projects grander than any they had previously envisioned—Harlem’s first 
shopping mall for the land HCC had amassed between Eighth and St. Nicholas Avenues, 
and an International Trade Center on the site to the east of the State Office Building. The 
latter project was to include the hotel and conference center that HUDC had long desired, 
as well as an office tower dedicated to fostering trade relations between the United States 
and countries in Africa and the Caribbean. Both were to redefine the streetscape of 125th 
Street, by projecting modern new facades on two of the street’s central blocks and 
making Harlem a center of retail and commerce.127 
Yet if these projects marked the optimistic hope that the Harlem Commonwealth 
Council would grow and the Harlem Urban Development Corporation would flourish 
anew in the new decade, they also symbolized the growing prevalence of the very 
excesses that radical community control activists had sought to escape in the late 1960s. 
With public sector funding enabling dominant leaders, organizations founded in the name 
of broadly democratic community development instead advanced projects that unfolded 
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at the highest levels of power. Far from the input of most Harlem residents, U.S. 
Representative Charles Rangel stewarded the International Trade Center through the halls 
of Washington and into the hands of President Jimmy Carter (Figure 3.3). “This is a 
priority project for the White House,” Carter’s staff wrote, referring to the International 
Trade Center as “Congressman Rangel’s proposed international trade center.”128 The 
shopping mall, too, depended on the support of political allies in the nation’s capital. “It 
is now up to President Carter – and the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
– whether the proposed 125th Street Shopping Mall…gets the funds to spur its 
construction,” the Amsterdam News reported in 1979.129 If the manner of decision-making 
and funding planned for each echoed the top-down, insider-dominated process that 
underwrote the State Office Building, only now under the auspices of powerful 
community-based organizations, even the projects’ forms resembled the approach to the 
city that urban renewal had taken. The International Trade Center was to be a skyscraper 
even taller than the State Office Building that it mirrored symmetrically on the block, a  
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Figure 3.3. Congressman Charles Rangel with model of Harlem International Trade 
Center. “Harlem Third World International Trade Center Complex,” no. 1 (1979), Box 
8, Folder 30, Nelam L. Hill Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. 
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Figure 3.4. Elevation view showing State Office Building (left) and International Trade 
Center (right). HUDC, “The International Trade Center,” Box 8, Folder 30, Nelam L. Hill 
Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Harlem International Trade Center model (ITC on right, State Office Building 
on left). “Harlem Third World International Trade Center Complex,” no. 1 (1979), Box 8, 
Folder 30, Nelam L. Hill Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. 
 247 
 
Figure 3.6. Harlem Commonwealth Council, 125th Street Shopping Mall (exterior and 
interior renderings). Designer, Bond Ryder Associates. HCC, “125th Street Multi-Use 
Commercial Center: A Proposal,” Oct. 1976, Box 58, Folder “Harlem Commonwealth 
Council 1969-77,” Subseries 1, Series 10, Javits Collection, Special Collections and 
University Archives, Stony Brook University.  
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monumental celebration of commerce and trade without the complex diversity and 
inclusion that radical activists had envisioned for Reclamation Site #1 (Figures 3.4, 3.5). 
The shopping mall had its own irony. Here, architect Max Bond, who had helped to 
imagine the revolutionary spatial ideal that inspired Reclamation Site #1, instead 
designed according to the moderate spatial vision of his patrons. Renderings showed an 
austere modernist structure whose social life existed within its four walls, not on the 
sidewalks of 125th Street, rejecting the very celebration of traditional street life that Bond 
had voiced as the leader of ARCH (Figure 3.6).130  
But the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem was not around to criticize 
such schemes. Bringing the ideals of the 1960s into reality proved difficult for many 
organizations—this was not a story exclusive to HUDC and HCC. In the case of ARCH, 
its work took an increasingly professionalized direction in the years after the State Office 
Building site occupation. Where once leaders had made dramatic public statements 
through direct action on 125th Street, in Morningside Park, and at City Hall, by 1973 
ARCH staff referred to the organization as “a non-profit, community planning and 
architecture firm” and advertised its activities as “services.” At Morningside Park, for 
instance, the organization subcontracted with a landscape architecture firm to organize a 
community planning process and then develop a design for the park that activists had 
once occupied. But ARCH, too, found its options curtailed when the Office of Economic 
Opportunity stopped funding its work in 1973, and it, too, found itself at the mercy of the 
dominant leader who had charted the organization’s redirection. It is not clear if Leroy 
McRae, then the executive director of ARCH, fled as the organization ran out of money 
                                                
130 “Harlem Third World International Trade Center Complex,” no. 1 (1979), Box 8, Folder 30, Hill Papers; 
HCC, “125th Street Multi-Use Commercial Center: A Proposal,” Oct. 1976, Box 58, Folder “Harlem 
Commonwealth Council 1969-77,” Subseries 1, Series 10, Javits Collection. 
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or fled with the organization’s money, but by late 1973, ARCH had stopped paying the 
landscape architecture subcontractor to whom it owed money, by early 1974, ARCH was 
writing desperate letters seeking funds, and by late 1974, ARCH found its tax status in 
doubt and its tax bills mounting. The organization, a dependable counterpoint to the 
establishmentarian tendencies that had returned in the work of HUDC and HCC, soon 
ceased to exist.131  
If by the late-1970s, community development corporations like HCC had been 
relatively unharmed by the fiscal issues that affected HUDC and ARCH, however, their 
optimism would soon fade. Dowdy sent a letter to acquaintances on the eve of the 1980 
election that suggested his anxiety as Carter sought reelection against Ronald Reagan. “I 
am sure that you appreciate the great importance of the 1980 Presidential election,” he 
began. “The fate of the urban centers in America are at stake.” Carter had been imperfect, 
Dowdy acknowledged, but he had supported HCC’s work in Harlem. “While Ronald 
Reagan was praying twice daily for New York to go bankrupt, President Carter made it 
possible for us to survive,” said Dowdy. “We certainly owe him our support.”132 But upon 
Reagan’s election, Dowdy anticipated a rough road ahead. “We at the Harlem 
                                                
131 “Morningside Park ‘Take Part’ Workshop,” April 1973, Box 7, Folder 2, Collins Collection; Untitled 
(begins “The Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem, Inc.”), c. early 1973, Box 8, Folder 34, Hill 
Papers; Letter to Jim Coleman from Leroy McRae, 14 March 1973, Box 6, Folder 3, Collins Collection; 
Letter to Alvin R. Arnett from Mary A. Dowery, 7 February 1974, Box 24, Folder “Architect’s Renewal 
Committee in Harlem (ARCH) – 1974,” Subseries 3, Series 4, Javits Collection; Letter to Javitz [sic] from 
Dowery, 11 February 1974, Box 24, Folder “Welfare Reform – Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem 
(ARCH) – 1974,” Subseries 3, Series 4, Javits Collection; Arthur Symes, interview with author, 30 July 
2010; Memo to Coalition for Morningside Park and ARCH from ARCH, 8 November 1973, Box 6, Folder 
3, Collins Collection; “HUD money,” 19 November 1973, Box 6, Folder 3, Collins Collection; Letter to 
Javitz [sic] from Dowery, 1 March 1974, Box 24, Folder “Architect’s Renewal Committee in Harlem 
(ARCH) – 1974,” Subseries 3, Series 4, Javits Collection; Memo to RBF Files from Marilyn W. Levy, 15 
November 1974, Box 106, Folder 716, Record Group 3.1, Rockefeller Brothers Fund Archives, Rockefeller 
Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY (hereafter RBF Archives); Memo to RBF Files from Levy, 25 
November 1974, Box 106, Folder 716, RBF Archives. 
 
132 Letter to Neighbor from James Dowdy, 29 October 1980, Box 27, Folder 12, BERC Records. 
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Commonwealth Council have begun the process of making contingency plans,” he 
announced in April 1981.133 Indeed, in September, Reagan eliminated the Community 
Services Administration, a retrenchment that hit New York City hardest.134 Before the 
year was out, the Washburn Wire Factory had shuttered its doors for good, leaving its 
massive buildings abandoned in East Harlem only five years after HCC had rescued 
them.135 The shopping mall and International Trade Center would remain on drawing 
boards for the next decade, and Jim Dowdy and Donald Cogsville, who had replaced Jack 
Wood as president of HUDC in 1976, would attract increasing scrutiny of their imperious 
and autocratic management styles. When Dowdy resigned in 1991, after more than two 
decades as HCC’s chief executive, he did so amid a hail of criticism of his personal gain 
as HCC sank into debt.136 Looking back on the 1980s, HCC leaders noted, “the roof 
                                                
133 James Dowdy, “Dollars and Sense,” Alternatives, April 1981, 2. 
 
134 “Proposed Item for Directors Status Report to White House/OMB,” c. Sept. 1981, Records of the 
Community Services Administration, Records Relating to Grants, 1981, Box 4, Folder “Major CAA 
Grants,” National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD; “The Community Services 
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past. See Simon Anekwe, “Despite Ron Reagan HCC is Alive and Well,” New York Amsterdam News, 24 
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135 Anthony DePalma, “East Harlem TV Deal Unraveling: Proposal to Convert Washburn Factory Snarled 
in Litigation,” New York Times, 15 June 1986, R6. 
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profoundly affect the standard of professional integrity and accountability I have sought to maintain 
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caved in!” “We are certain that you are aware of the devastating financial crisis of the 
past twelve years and the toll suffered by the city government,” they told newly elected 
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 1993. “Well, that devastation had a much 
more tragic impact in Harlem, and more particularly on HCC where many programs were 
curtailed, many jobs were lost, as well as some of our prize assets.”137  
The institutions that had set out to realize community control fell far short of the 
radical goals that activists had voiced in the late 1960s. Perhaps such a fate would have 
been inevitable in any case, for the distance between ideals and reality was vast, indeed, 
and the hope that Harlemites could own, manage, and develop their land according to 
their collective wishes set an especially high bar. But in advancing their own, moderate 
spatial vision for 125th Street, the leaders of the Harlem Urban Development Corporation 
and the Harlem Commonwealth Council often reproduced the very phenomena that the 
occupiers of the State Office Building site had sought to transform: dependence on 
outside aid, top-down governance, concentrated power, and a reliance on big, commercial 
                                                
Cogsville himself came under heavy scrutiny from community members for his autocratic style, 
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projects as a redevelopment strategy. If such excesses now occurred within a new wave 
of community-based organizations instead of through the old urban renewal order, that 
fact offered little consolation to critics. Radical proponents of community control had 
envisioned a community-financed, democratic, inclusive ideal as an alternative to both 
state- and market-driven approaches to development in Harlem. However, by the late 
1970s activists’ frustrations remained unchanged as new rulers came to dominate the 
planning of 125th Street. Looking back in the 1990s, Preston Wilcox, the most radical 
member of HCC’s board and long one of the leading voices in the battle for community 
control in Harlem, expressed his disillusionment with the organization he had cofounded. 
But Wilcox’s words could have been referring to any number of community development 
organizations in Harlem in the 1970s. A “NIGHTMARE…has shrouded the original 
dream,” said Wilcox.138 Harlem residents were left with two empty lots in the center of 
125th Street, ambitious – and unfunded – plans for the commercial redevelopment of their 
main street, and the need to look to other strategies to secure their land. 
                                                
138 Schatz and Dugas, “The Hollow Dream,” Newsday, 27; Letter to Isaiah Robinson from Preston Wilcox, 
11 January 1996, Box 8, Folder 4, Wilcox Papers.  
  
Chapter Four 
The Urban Homestead in the Age of Fiscal Crisis 
 
In “Love and War,” the August 1973 number of the Supergirl comic book, the 
title heroine finds herself in the middle of a gang war between the Flaming Serpents and 
the Hustlers. The Flaming Serpents aim to reclaim their turf from the Hustlers, but the 
Hustlers have gone straight. “I know you once led the greatest street gang of them all,” 
Supergirl tells Rick, leader of the Hustlers. “What ‘Once’? I still do!” Rick replies. “Only 
now—the Hustlers are working for our people—doing good! Instead of wrecking!” 
Moments later, transformed back into her alter ego Linda Danvers, Supergirl sees the 
change for herself when Rick takes her to an abandoned tenement with hardhat-wearing 
gang members repointing brick, patching concrete, and framing new walls. “The city 
condemned it! We said, ‘No—don’t knock it down! Let the Hustlers rebuild it,’” Rick 
tells our heroine. An admiring neighborhood elder stops to kiss Rick on the cheek. 
“Rick—you are good! You take my boy from the streets and teach him a trade!” “What a 
change for a street gang,” Linda marvels. Yet Supergirl’s attempts to broker lasting peace 
instead spur violent conflict. At the Hustlers’ work site, the Flaming Serpents take up 
sledgehammers, intent on razing the tenement. As the gangs enter into an all-out brawl, 
Supergirl works quickly to shore up the imperiled building. Turning on the gangs, she 
wraps the rivals up in the foam insulation that will one day make the building habitable 
again. Freeing her captives, she demands reconciliation. The leaders agree. Rick offers, 
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“You want to do a little building with us?” Steve, leader of the Flaming Serpents, takes 
up his challenge. “Okay! We Serpents will show you what building really is!”1 
If Art Saaf and Vince Colletta’s polychrome panels made palpable a tale 
seemingly too good to be true – full of violence, supernatural strength, and ultimately 
redemption – the fact remained that far north of the Midtown offices of DC Comics, just 
such a story was actually unfolding. Without the assistance of Supergirl, the reformed 
criminals and addicts of the Renigades Youth Gang confronted the impending ruin of 
their East Harlem neighborhood in 1973. Their homes were falling to pieces, not with the 
force of the bulldozers that had reshaped the city in the name of urban renewal, but at the 
hands of the property owners who increasingly left Harlem’s buildings behind. “What do 
you do when your landlord, who has the legal responsibility for maintaining and 
managing your apartment, has abandoned your building and cannot be located to make 
repairs? What do you do when the City, which has the moral responsibility to assist 
tenants when landlords walk out, claims it cannot help??” the Renigades asked. “Do we 
all surrender our homes and our lives to the advancement of abandonment, the plague of 
rats, and the final demolition of our community into vacant lifeless parking lots??”2  
As the tide of abandonment, which would continue to rise throughout the decade, 
washed over Harlem, the Renigades saw what was quickly becoming a crisis as, instead, 
an opportunity. “You can own your own home, and finally be rid of the rats, the 
landlords, the leaks, and the City,” they promised.3 Renigades members had themselves 
                                                
1 “The Gang Lords!” Supergirl, August 1973, 1-14. 
 
2 “Renigades Housing Movement,” January 1974, Box 20, Folder 21, Ronald Lawson: Tenant Movement in 
New York City Research Files, Tamiment Library and Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York 
University (hereafter Lawson Files). 
 
3 Ibid. 
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walked unannounced into the city’s Housing and Development Authority only a few 
months before, convincing officials to sell them one of the many forsaken buildings on 
their streets.4 Now that they were busy renovating the six-story tenement at 251 East 
119th Street, with the guidance of construction professionals but with their own sweat and 
labor as equity, they had become early evangelists for a cause that offered hope to low-
income residents witnessing the collapse of their neighborhoods.  
This chapter considers the spatial practices of those who, like the fictional 
Hustlers and the real Renigades, faced the crisis of housing abandonment that marked 
New York City’s neighborhoods in the 1970s. Due to a range of factors, including the 
city’s inability to serve as an effective landlord of the thousands of properties it had 
obtained, the federal government’s diminished role in funding housing development, and 
the sheer scale of abandonment, thousands of tenants found few places to turn to maintain 
their still viable, but neglected buildings. But abandonment marked a dream as well as a 
nightmare. In what all agreed was indeed a crisis, many also found an opening. Whether 
fashioning themselves as “urban homesteaders” or “neighborhood developers,” residents 
throughout Harlem saw in thousands of abandoned tenements and townhouses a resource 
that could provide much-needed affordable housing, a chance to learn construction skills 
that could garner future employment, and a means of achieving the community control 
that had fueled urban renewal protests but still remained elusive. Though fantastical 
enough to be a comic book plotline, the promise of self-help spawned the hope that 
Harlemites could at last claim the collectivist utopia that radical activists had long 
envisioned—their revolutionary spatial ideal.  
                                                
4 “Youth Gang Turns to Housing Reconstruction,” Consumer-Farmer Cooperator, Jan. 1974, 4. 
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Self-help emerged both from declining government support and the belief that 
neighborhood revitalization could better proceed without the intervention of the state, yet 
activists paradoxically depended on the loans and assistance that government would 
eventually provide. In crafting an alternative to the private market that had failed Harlem, 
then, homesteaders shaped a local and national policy infrastructure that supported their 
demands for improvement through rehabilitation, not replacement, of Harlem’s existing 
urban fabric. Their early successes undermined conventional wisdom about the means of 
neighborhood revitalization, the meaning of abandonment, and the value of certain 
building types—the tenement versus the townhouse, for example, or the cooperatively-
owned multiple dwelling unit versus the single family home. Yet if this political and 
architectural landscape offered a compelling, egalitarian alternative to the much better 
known middle-class rehabilitation of urban neighborhoods of this era, low-income 
homesteaders’ gains remained circumscribed.5 Harlem activists and officials agreed about 
the necessity of reusing still viable buildings, but ultimately disagreed about who should 
live in them. The city’s decision to begin the sale by lottery of Harlem’s most sought-
after abandoned homes – its brownstones – in the early 1980s signaled officials’ desire to 
attract new middle-class settlers to the neighborhood. In the city’s refusal to fully hand 
over Harlem’s stock of abandoned buildings to its enterprising low-income residents, 
activists saw their opportunity for control slipping away.  
I argue, however, that New York’s abandonment crisis marked a hinge, not a 
rupture, in Harlem’s history of urban development. In Harlem, as in America, the 1970s 
were a decade of transition from the radical hopes of the late 1960s. Yet shifts proved 
                                                
5 On middle-class residential rehabilitation, see Suleiman Osman, The Invention of Brownstone Brooklyn: 
Gentrification and the Search for Authenticity in Postwar New York (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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more gradual than abrupt in the residential neighborhoods north of Central Park, and the 
outcome more moderate than reactionary.6 Two visions of the city collided around the 
issue of what to do with the thousands of buildings that were rapidly becoming city 
property. On one side lay the hope that sweat equity and cooperative ownership could 
provide a path toward abundant affordable housing, the foundation for long-sought 
neighborhood control of Harlem’s built environment. On the other lay the faith that 
officials placed in the middle-class settlers who were returning to New York’s 
neighborhoods. Though observers feared that the sale of city-owned brownstones to 
outsiders would bring rapid racial and class upheaval in the neighborhood they loved, the 
reality proved more complicated. Abandonment suggested the possibility of realizing the 
predominantly African-American, largely low-income, and collectively owned 
community that activists had imagined since the late 1960s, a hope that increasingly 
dimmed in the 1980s. Yet in its wake followed an outcome that hinted at a third way 
between that ideal and its exclusionary other—a moderate spatial vision of gradual 
economic diversification amidst increasingly individuated ideals of autonomy.  
 
Crisis and Opportunity 
The promise of self-help rested in the hope that the revitalization of New York’s 
hollowing neighborhoods could grow out of their very devastation. Empty homes in 
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neighborhoods already suffering from inadequate housing suggested that neither the 
private nor public housing sectors were working properly to house New Yorkers. Self-
help marked a radical alternative to both, however, an ideal that turned the housing crisis 
on its head.  If people could rehabilitate abandoned homes themselves, advocates 
reasoned, at once they could fulfill two critical needs: to provide sufficient, decent, and 
affordable housing, and to equip unemployed workers with useful skills and the job 
opportunities to use them. Moreover, they could achieve a third, more abstract goal—
community control, the hope that low-income Harlemites could themselves determine the 
shape of their built environment. Abandonment gave rise to new spatial techniques in 
Harlem as it grew in scale. If the government and landlords would not provide decent 
housing, perhaps residents could do it themselves. 
Abandonment had been a growing problem in New York for years, but it 
exploded to an epic scale in the 1970s as the city came to be flooded with in rem 
buildings, or those that became public property due to their owners’ non-payment of 
taxes. Landlords had deserted 7,000 buildings by 1968; in the previous three years alone, 
owners abandoned 100,000 housing units. Yet landlord desertion accelerated in the 
following decade. Figures were inevitably imprecise as inventory – let alone management 
– proved a daunting task, but in the 1970s the rate of abandonment reached at least 
21,000 units a year and perhaps as many as 40,000 units annually in the first eight years 
of the decade. By April 1978, the city controlled 8,000 buildings with 90,000 tenants, and 
estimated that by July 1979 it could be the keeper of 20,000 buildings with a quarter-
million tenants. In Harlem, the city became the major holder of residential property. 
Officials estimated that the city owned more than 65 percent of Harlem’s property by the 
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early 1980s. Even excepting public housing, the city owned over 35 percent of Harlem’s 
houses and apartment buildings through tax foreclosure—almost 20,000 units.7 
A perfect storm of local, national, and international events converged to motivate 
landlords to abandon properties. Fundamental demographic shifts across American cities 
played a large role in these decisions, as did a deindustrializing economy that brought 
increasing unemployment to urban centers. Middle-class residents departed urban homes 
at an accelerating rate in the postwar decades, while an increasing proportion of low-
income tenants carried less rent-paying capacity even as they expended larger proportions 
of their income on housing. Some officials blamed New York’s rent control laws, 
claiming they made it more difficult for landlords to maintain profits, and often landlords 
simply walked away when tenants initiated rent strikes in response to diminished 
management. Rising maintenance and operations costs played a major role in widening 
the gap between what tenants could afford and what landlords hoped to receive, as did 
skyrocketing fuel prices amidst the 1973 world oil crisis. Additionally, many buildings 
were simply old, with almost two-thirds of New York’s housing over fifty years of age by 
1978. Buildings naturally deteriorated at increasing rates as they aged, incurring costs 
that made residential properties increasingly poor investments. Policy changes only 
exacerbated these trends. The federal government instituted a housing moratorium in 
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1973, providing fewer resources to help low-income tenants with rent payment or rehab. 
And the city changed in rem laws in 1976, taking control of property after one year of 
unpaid taxes instead of three. It soon found itself inundated with apartments, many of 
which landlords had “milked” by squeezing out as much rent as possible while neglecting 
upkeep, before leaving them behind.8 
Yet as the Renigades themselves had described, a crisis borne of the negligence 
and self-interest of absentee landlords held immense potential for those left behind. “You 
can rebuild your block, your homes, and your lives,” the Renigades promised.9 If such 
ideals proved rhetorically seductive, they were also grounded in efforts emerging across 
New York City in the 1970s. Though self-help seemed the most obvious response when 
public support for low-income housing was unforthcoming and private landlords proved 
unwilling to help, the self-help techniques that came to be known as “sweat equity” or 
“urban homesteading” did not emerge fully formed. On East 102nd and East 103rd Streets 
in East Harlem, Monsignor Robert Fox, a Catholic priest with a position in the New York 
Archdiocese, had led residents in the restoration of their blocks in the aftermath of 1967 
civil disorder in the area. Their efforts began first with street clean-up and colorful 
exterior repainting, but soon extended to building projects on the block. Behind the 
adjoining tenements, tenants installed a swimming pool and built a basketball court, and 
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one tenement basement served as a shared community space for residents. In 1969 and 
1970, residents of these blocks convinced an absentee property owner to sell them three 
abandoned tenements and began the rehabilitation of one, at 175 East 102nd Street. The 
city had planned to demolish the apartment building. By the time neighbors acquired it, 
prospectors had stripped it of its copper pipes and appliances, and broken many of its 
windows. But in the still sound structure, residents cleaned out debris and replaced floors, 
supporting beams, and walls. With funding that Fox arranged through small bank loans 
and donations, residents purchased and installed a new heating boiler. The city proved 
less imaginative than the incipient renovators, tying up the project in debates about 
whether homespun solutions met restrictive building codes. But despite red tape, tenants 
were able to move into the building in 1973.10 
A movement of squatters that bloomed across New York City in the spring of 
1970 provided even more radical precedents. Squatting marked both a pragmatic 
response to the paradox of abandonment in neighborhoods that lacked decent affordable 
housing as well as a political act embodied in the claiming of space. As activists had 
demonstrated in taking over the site of the State Office Building in the summer of 1969, 
control could be gained by simple occupation when other means failed. When squatters 
began to “liberate” unoccupied homes across New York City, and often on the periphery 
of Harlem, they quite literally pulled off the tin sheets that covered windows and doors so 
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apartments could once again return to use.11 Inside, they found apartments full of dust 
and debris but frequently in adequate structural condition. Returning such buildings to 
life addressed both the quotidian and the abstract needs of some of the city’s most 
dispossessed.  
Squatters typically occupied buildings that the city and institutions had held 
vacant for years while awaiting urban redevelopment projects, and thus constituted a late 
phase of grassroots opposition to urban renewal. In returning such buildings to habitation, 
squatters offered an alternative development model that depended on neither the public 
nor private sector. The first and most prominent squat, in the West Side Urban Renewal 
Area in April 1970, suggested the upper limits such efforts could reach. A group called 
Operation Move-In led the occupation of six buildings on the project’s Site 30, on 
Columbus Avenue between 90th and 91st Streets. Site 30 was to be cleared and 
redeveloped as middle-income housing, part of a larger project that had already 
contributed to the economic upscaling of the neighborhood. In an effort to resist the 
displacement of the neighborhood’s many poor residents, Operation Move-In introduced 
180 low-income, largely Spanish-speaking families to the apartment buildings remaining 
on the site.12 “We, the poor community, demand control over our lives,” the tenants of 
Operation Move-In argued. “The home is the first mirror of our lives. We are going to 
plan an Urban Renewal that will reflect the destiny of our people.”13 By the summer of 
1971, squatters had begun to transform the already cleared lots on their block into a park, 
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with gardens, barbecues, and a baseball diamond. Operation Move-In ran a health clinic 
on a nearby block of Amsterdam Avenue, and a housing clinic and day care on Site 30. 
The Dot Coffee House, constructed and operated by squatters, hosted evening events, 
fiestas, singing, and dancing. A New York Post reporter marveled at the change these 
blocks represented. “Abandoned buildings usually become havens for addicts and 
drifters, but the three tenements on Columbus Avenue have given birth to a remarkable 
community,” he wrote. Tenants embraced the self-sufficiency they displayed. “[T]his is 
the first time we showed the city that poor people can help themselves,” one squatter 
proclaimed. “We might not have diplomas, but we are very skillful people. We became 
plumbers, plasterers and painters and we’ve made our own homes here.”14  
Inside their new homes, squatters worked to renovate apartments that had 
deteriorated through years of disuse. Juanita Kimble’s experience typified the process of 
squatting. Kimble, a single mother of nine, had fallen into a dismal situation when the 
rent in her Harlem apartment increased beyond her means in early 1970. Since Kimble 
received welfare assistance to supplement her income as a nurse’s aid, the Department of 
Social Services moved the ten Kimbles into two rooms in an exorbitantly expensive 
welfare motel. Juanita Kimble subsequently quit work to search for an apartment, and her 
children stopped attending school while they were crowded five to a room in an 
unfamiliar neighborhood. Friends knew of a Columbia University-owned apartment 
building at 130 Morningside Drive, however, and its empty units. One apartment had 
eight rooms and had sat vacant for two years. The Kimbles needed the space, and 
Columbia had shown no urgency to develop the land, so in May 1970 friends moved 
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Juanita Kimble and her children into the building. The apartment was big but in poor 
shape. The floor was piled with old newspapers, dust covered its surfaces, and sinks and 
even bathroom pipes were missing. Supporters fixed the plumbing and replaced fixtures, 
while Kimble and her family cleaned and restored the kitchen to working order. Friends 
lent appliances and fixed broken windows and doors. High school classmates of Kimble’s 
children replastered the apartment. Kimble tried to pay rent each month, but Columbia 
would not accept her money—doing so would have validated her tenancy. But a year 
later, Kimble and her family nonetheless remained in the apartment. Neighborhood 
activists celebrated with a “paint-in,” an event intended to both finish uncompleted 
repairs and rebuke the unwilling landlord. “Roll over Columbia with paint power,” an 
announcement read.15  
If such efforts achieved a measure of success in returning homes to use, however, 
their tenants’ residence remained nonetheless illegal. Squatters faced constant pressure 
from the city, which hoped to stem further squatting and to reclaim occupied buildings. 
Officials arrested squatters who attempted to expand Operation Move-In’s territory in 
November 1970 and relocated the Site 30 squatters in 1971, promising that low-income 
housing would take their place once development commenced (but later recanted that 
vow).16 Within two years, the momentum of the squatters’ movement cooled.17 Yet while 
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the community that squatters had constructed disappeared quickly with the advance of 
bulldozers, they had nonetheless shaped a radical vision of self-help, one including the 
promise that vacant buildings could fulfill housing needs, the possibility that tenants 
could become their own redevelopers, and the hope that self-building would provide 
direct control over the built environment.  
Even as squatters’ brief momentum dissipated, the practice that would become 
known as “homesteading” emerged as a legal alternative that embraced the same goals. 
Homesteading reentered the popular lexicon in the early 1970s, reviving a term with rich 
romantic associations in American history. The Homestead Act of 1862 had allowed 
citizens in good standing to claim 160 acres of western land. After settling the land for 
five years, homesteaders legally obtained title.18 In time, vast stretches of prairie became 
settlements, towns, and cities. Settlers gained sustenance from the crops they grew on the 
acreage, and built homes. When homesteading reemerged in the mid-twentieth century, 
the term indicated a similar use of abandoned land, this time in American cities. At least 
in the popular imagination, the term suggested the promise of unused real property. As 
residential vacancy proliferated in urban cores, proponents alluded to the western ideal as 
a strategy encompassing pluck and self-reliance. Cities across the eastern seaboard 
adopted homesteading programs in the early 1970s, with the hope of attracting new 
residents to neighborhoods with substantial abandonment. Philadelphia adopted the first 
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such policy in mid-1973, offering homes for one dollar to new owners who would 
renovate them, and Wilmington, Delaware and Baltimore soon followed.19 
Such programs favored the middle class by design, intending to bring wealthier 
residents back into city centers to boost tax revenues and pursue residential rehabilitation. 
Indeed, as frontier imagery made its way into urban discourse in general, it 
overwhelmingly represented the vantage point of the middle class. Brownstone 
renovators described the neighborhoods they settled as “frontiers,” and themselves as 
“pioneers.” As with the settlement of the west, the terms implied a willful elision of the 
presence of predecessors – Native Americans in the case of the American West or low-
income residents in the case of the city – or their conquest. Brownstoners celebrated the 
economic transformation of neighborhoods they brought about and characterized their 
often minority and poor neighbors as violent undesirables. The reimagination of South 
Brooklyn, the Upper West Side, or other gentrifying neighborhoods as wild territories 
necessarily assumed the objective of displacement and economic upscaling. With 
settlement, the metaphor implied, the poor people would be gone.20  
An alternate vision of homesteading emerged in the wreckage of the squatters 
movement, however, positioning low-income residents with few means as the intrepid 
pioneers who sought to turn abandoned buildings back into viable homes. Marie Runyon, 
a squatting supporter and leader in the efforts against Columbia’s expansion in 
Morningside Heights and West Harlem (detailed in Chapter One), adopted the romantic 
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allusion early on. When the university commenced demolition of the squatted buildings 
adjacent to 130 Morningside Avenue in September 1971 – with squatters still inside – 
Runyon’s protest invoked America’s frontier past. “Defenders of the Pharmacy Site, 
Morningside Heights’ most ancient housing battleground, will take to their rocking 
chairs…to protect the homestead,” Runyon announced, like “Americas’ homesteaders 
who guarded their homes with rocking chair and shot gun.”21 In appropriating frontier 
imagery to describe a process intended to create a community of decent, affordable 
housing where buildings were sitting empty, low-income self-help advocates turned the 
coded language of neighborhood change on its head. Rather than playing the role of 
savages to be extinguished from the plains of the inner city, low-income residents saw 
abandoned buildings as an opportunity to claim much-needed housing through their own 
labor.  
Harlem formed one important node in this emerging citywide low-income 
homesteading movement. Groups coalesced rapidly in the early 1970s, representing both 
the interests of single buildings and the collective interests of like-minded groups. The 
Renigades were one of many small grassroots organizations to promote self-help 
rehabilitation, and were typical of homesteaders in general, who were overwhelmingly 
young – a majority were under 30 years old – and generally claimed income below the 
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poverty line.22 The former squatters of Operation Move-In were among the Renigades’ 
contemporaries. They had taken ownership of an abandoned building just south of 
Harlem at 948 Columbus Avenue in October 1973, a transaction arranged by sympathetic 
voices within the city administration.23 In 1974, members of the Mosque of the Islamic 
Brotherhood began a rehab project in two long-abandoned adjacent Central Harlem 
tenements, at 55 St. Nicholas Avenue and 132 West 113th Street (Figure 4.1).24 The next 
year, in the spring of 1975, seven low-income Harlem families formed an organization 
they called United Harlem Growth. The families all lived in abandoned housing, public 
housing, or apartments soon to come out of rent control, and saw in homesteading a 
chance to own stable, affordable homes. By 1976, United Harlem Growth – led by David 
Robinson, Jackie Robinson’s son, and with an expanded membership of fifteen families – 
had purchased five city-owned abandoned brownstones on 136th Street between Seventh 
and Eighth Avenues with plans to renovate them into low-income cooperative housing.25 
In a parallel effort, tenants in single buildings across the neighborhood increasingly  
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Figure 4.1. Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood sweat equity project, exterior before 
rehabilitation, c. 1974. Charles Laven, “Self-Help in Neighborhood Development,” in 
The Scope of Social Architecture, ed. C. Richard Hatch, 1984. Photograph by Beverly 
Hall. 
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pursued conversion to cooperative status, to gain control of apartments that negligent 
landlords had effectively abandoned and to pool rents towards needed repairs.26 
Organizations with close ties in and near Harlem formed to unite these disparate 
but likeminded efforts. In 1974, the leaders of the Cathedral Church of St. John the 
Divine, located just across Morningside Park from Harlem, formed the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board, or UHAB (Figure 4.2), in response to criticism from 
nearby squatters who questioned the church’s commitment to its neighbors. The new 
organization provided technical assistance to participants in the incipient movement; for 
instance, UHAB helped the Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood locate the buildings that 
members set out to rehabilitate.27 Similarly, a collection of community-based 
organizations came together in 1974 to form the Association of Neighborhood Housing 
Developers (ANHD), a resource intended to pool both collective experience and technical 
assistance. Members of ANHD included groups from the Bronx, the Lower East Side, 
and Brooklyn, as well as West Harlem Group Assistance, UHAB, and the West Harlem  
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Figure 4.2. Pioneer motif frequently employed by UHAB. UHAB, “1974 Annual 
Report,” January 1975, Box 8, Folder “Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, Donald 
Turner [sic], 117,” Lawson Files. Courtesy UHAB. 
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Community Organization, the longstanding community force that had played a central 
role in the urban renewal protests described in Chapter One.28  
Such efforts emerged as part of a broader network of points across the city, loci 
where proponents proceeded with the conviction that through their own sweat they could 
provide decent housing for low-income citizens. Philip St. Georges, a homesteading 
advocate who claimed partial responsibility for inventing the term “sweat equity,” 
became the Zelig of self-help housing, working at times with Msgr. Fox, the city, the 
Renigades, and UHAB. He explained the potential of abandoned buildings, which for 
many appeared as only a problem to be excised. “While many abandoned buildings may 
be structurally sound, and capable of being rehabilitated, they represent an overwhelming 
public nuisance in the eyes of City policy makers. They are a liability. And increasingly, 
they are simply demolished,” St. Georges wrote in 1973. “However, for many groups of 
low-income tenants who suddenly see an opportunity to own their own homes, take 
control over their own lives, and improve the condition of their neighborhood, these 
vacant and abandoned structures are anything but a liability. They are a true resource. 
And indeed, they may be the last resource.”29  
Projects that aspired towards St. Georges’s ideal were by necessity highly 
pragmatic affairs. Like squatters, homesteaders who had negotiated the legal acquisition 
of city-owned buildings were concerned with making them fit for habitation at minimal 
cost. Expediency and resourcefulness marked such efforts, especially the reuse of 
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forsaken structures and materials that could be rejuvenated through minimal 
transformation (Figure 4.3). Frequently this meant replacing boilers, repainting, or – in 
gut rehabilitation projects – refitting aging buildings as inexpensively as possible. 
Though sympathetic architects helped prepare the plans needed to obtain permits, 
homesteaders completed as much construction as was feasible on their own. UHAB 
encouraged rehabbers to pursue demolition, for instance, by providing guidebooks for 
this and other construction tasks. The organization clearly recognized the hazards of such 
endeavors. “The possible dangers in demolition are almost too numerous to list,” one 
guidebook warned. But nonetheless, structural beam replacement, roof removal, and wall 
demolition all existed in the realm of the possible for intrepid homesteaders (Figure 4.4). 
If dangerous, such work paid well in the currency of sweat equity. UHAB estimated that 
tenant-led demolition could save 500 of the 800 dollars residents would pay a general 
contractor for the same labor. Likewise, residents proved clever in procuring building 
materials. When possible, they reused materials from their own buildings. Studs, for 
instance, could be cleaned up and employed in reconfigured walls (Figure 4.5). Others 
reused materials and fixtures from buildings elsewhere in the city. One homesteading 
group “purchased all necessary tubs, sinks, toilets, louver doors, lighting fixtures, wall-
size mirrors, carpets, and furnishings…from a contractor remodeling New York’s Hotel 
Croydon,” UHAB noted. A homesteader physically unable to participate in the labor-
intensive construction effort instead reconditioned appliances purchased on the cheap as 
his sweat equity contribution. The unnamed apartment building surely boasted the most 
impressive interior architectural details in the neighborhood. UHAB recounted, “Closets 
were dimensioned and painstakingly built around louvered doors, and bathroom layouts  
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Figure 4.3. UHAB homesteading “instructions.” UHAB, Third Annual Progress Report 
(New York: Cathedral House, April 1977). Courtesy UHAB. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Sweat equity project under construction (Hell’s Kitchen, Manhattan). UHAB, 
The Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, 1974-1984: A Retrospective Report and 
Review (New York: UHAB, 1985). Photograph by Marcia Bricker Halperin. 
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Figure 4.5. Unidentified sweat equity project under construction. UHAB, The Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board, 1974-1984: A Retrospective Report and Review. 
Photograph by Frederic Ohringer. 
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were modified to accommodate the oversized, old-fashioned, but elegant…tubs and 
sinks.”30 
Tenant-laborers were not occupied with the restoration of crown moldings and 
mantelpieces, yet stabilizing, reconstructing, and reinhabiting an abandoned building 
nonetheless constituted the most essential form of preservation. In embarking on such 
rehabilitation of existing buildings with minimal resources, low-income homesteaders 
formed part of a broader “neighborhood movement” underway in New York and other 
American cities at this time. While this notion encompassed interests as diverse as 
middle-class brownstoners and low-income tenants, each shared enthusiasm for the 
promise of self-help as a means of restoring the fabric of the communities they occupied. 
Yet their motivation stemmed from fundamentally different sources, and aspired towards 
dramatically different ends. Brownstoners celebrated “authenticity,” a quality they found 
in the architectural details of their 19th century homes. They removed finishes and 
additions that obscured the original appearance of their townhouses, or rebuilt missing 
decoration. They investigated the histories of their homes, and hoped by restoration to 
grasp a lost past embedded in a building’s walls.31 Low-income homesteaders, on the 
other hand, feared the loss of affordable housing to abandonment, and pursued 
rehabilitation with the intention of saving a diminishing resource before it was too late. If 
brownstoners rescued Victorian-era architectural details in order to achieve a nostalgic 
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ideal in restoration, low-income homesteaders rescued salvaged materials and dilapidated 
apartment buildings in order to conserve much-needed shelter.  
The groups taking on self-help on Harlem’s blocks voiced hope that renovating a 
single building in this manner might reverberate across the entire community. The 
Renigades stated the case most enthusiastically, promising, “WE CAN REBUILD OUR 
COMMUNITY OURSELVES!!!!!” and “We can make our community home once 
again.” By early 1977, the gang had received the certificate of occupancy for the 23-unit 
cooperative they built at 251 East 119th Street and, under the more ambitious name of the 
Renigades Housing Movement, had begun three subsequent projects at 312 and 316 East 
119th Street and 425 East 118th Street. Leaders envisioned their effort extending to the 
entire block, including “a senior citizens center, several mini parks, vegetable gardens, 
and renovated brownstones, trees, bushes and flowers on the sidewalks as part of the 
beautification.”32 The Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood, too, envisioned their initial 
project to build apartments, a day care center, a health food store, and the mosque 
expanding into the surrounding blocks of lower Harlem (Figure 4.6). “These buildings 
represent the first phase of a redevelopment plan created by the Mosque for this area of 
Harlem,” wrote Imam K. Ahmad Tawfiq, leader of the congregation. “It envisions 
rehabilitating over 150 units of abandoned housing,” more than ten times the impact of 
the initial fourteen-unit rehabilitation.33 The families of United Harlem Growth selected 
their block of 136th Street with the hope that rehabbing five brownstones would start a  
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Figure 4.6. Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood sweat equity project, under construction, 
c. 1975. Laven, “Self-Help in Neighborhood Development.” Photograph by Beverly 
Hall. 
 
Figure 4.7. Members of the Renigades of Harlem on their jobsite. UHAB, The Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board, 1974-1984: A Retrospective Report and Review. 
Courtesy UHAB. 
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chain reaction. “It is a neighborhood block, one in which our plans for rehabilitation 
would have a maximum impact,” they wrote.34 
Such efforts promised the possibility of not only a sheltering roof but also much-
needed jobs, both through the individual homesteading effort and the hope that skills 
learned on-site would transfer to employment in the construction industry. In 1974, with 
the Association of Neighborhood Housing Developers and two other neighborhood 
groups, the Renigades proposed a program that combined urban homesteading with job 
training. In one year, they envisioned, ninety people could learn construction skills while 
rehabilitating abandoned buildings in East Harlem, the Lower East Side, and 
Brownsville, Brooklyn.35 United Harlem Growth, too, envisioned such potential in their 
homesteading effort. Estimating that half of area residents claimed job skills that had 
become obsolete in the deindustrializing economy, they planned for 37 community 
members to apprentice with construction workers, accountants, and construction 
managers as they rebuilt the 136th Street brownstones.36 Though idealistic, homesteading 
as a route to employment seemed like a genuine possibility as groups made headway on 
their respective efforts. For example, five Renigades worked as paid trainees alongside 
construction professionals on their rehab project, while also contributing additional labor 
outside of working hours that made up their sweat equity contribution (Figure 4.7).37 
Fifteen men learned electrical, plumbing, and construction skills while working on the 
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Mosque’s homesteading project, through training paid for under the federal 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).38  
Anecdotes offered compelling evidence that the seemingly utopian promise of 
self-help could come true. Carmelo Soria, known as Zorro, had been addicted to heroin 
for thirteen years when he crossed paths with the Renigades. “He didn’t have a job and 
couldn’t get one, didn’t go to school, and just hung out,” Philip St. Georges recounted. 
“He had no hope; he had no direction.” Zorro frequently passed out on the corner of 119th 
Street and Second Avenue, where the Renigades rebuilt their tenement. “One day he 
looked up and saw the Renigades cleaning garbage out of a vacant building which he 
frequently used as a shooting gallery,” St. Georges said. Zorro joined the Renigades, 
learned plumbing, earned an income, and built a home.39 The historical record does not 
reveal if St. Georges was embellishing in support of his cause, but redemption narratives 
recurred frequently as a motive force for self-help projects. For instance, Marie Runyon 
started the Harlem Restoration Project in 1977 to renovate abandoned buildings with the 
labor of former inmates, an effort that set out initially to employ 50 ex-offenders in the 
rehabilitation of 150 apartments on Seventh Avenue.40 In East Harlem, Dorothy 
Stoneman began the Youth Action Program in 1979. Unemployed young people, often 
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high school dropouts, renovated abandoned buildings to provide housing for the homeless 
while learning job skills that many took into the construction industry.41 At least on a 
small scale, these programs addressed hopes that sweat equity could alleviate pervasive 
joblessness and housing shortages, while also providing for the less tangible needs of 
residents in and around Harlem for influence over the space they occupied. 
Above all, low-income homesteaders emphasized the objective of control rather 
than profit in pursuing self-help rehabilitation, a goal embodied in their focus on the use 
value of their homes rather than their exchange value. This ambition was especially 
evident in the near ubiquity of cooperative housing arrangements as a goal of 
rehabilitation, for low-income cooperative housing offered little or no potential for 
financial benefit, but did provide tenants with decision-making authority. In creating such 
homes, low-income homesteaders pursued what self-building advocate John F.C. Turner 
at the time called “housing as a verb” – the notion of housing as “process or activity” – 
instead of “housing as a noun,” meaning as a “commodity or product.” Housing as a verb, 
Turner argued, constituted one of the activities that “can act as vehicles for personal 
fulfillment.” As a colleague writing in Turner’s classic Freedom to Build explained, 
“Owner-building…represents participation – the basic human desire to exercise control 
over the making of one’s environment.”42 Turner’s theoretical work on the link between 
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self-building and control had real-world impact uptown. He helped organize the efforts 
that became the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board, and his student Donald Terner 
served as the organization’s first director. Like his mentor, Donald Terner celebrated the 
autonomy he found in such informal settlements as squatter communities, a quality he 
contrasted with the lack of control that tenants faced in the typical landlord-tenant 
relationship common in predominantly-minority urban communities. “[F]illing the 
vacuum created by the absence of public controls is a vital and optimistic sense of direct, 
independent manipulation of the immediate living environment,” Terner wrote of 
informal settlements.43 With abandonment creating such an absence of oversight and 
Harlemites largely left to fend for themselves, homesteading seemed a chance to shape 
the environment in previously unattainable ways. 
Indeed, self-help enabled an extremely personal engagement with the act of 
rehabilitation. Such engagement was intrinsic to a process that involved residents 
building their own homes along the lines described above, and could be seen in the 
unique opportunity homesteaders had to reflect themselves in the spaces they would 
occupy. At the homesteading project of the Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood, for 
example, the participants incorporated their furniture into the design of apartments, added 
amenities they desired such as oak flooring and exposed brick, and expressed their 
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cultural and religious identity in the rehabilitated buildings. Intricate tile work decorated 
several interior spaces in the completed project, and Moorish arches surrounded the 
apartment doors (Figure 4.8).44 Such improvements were not merely superficial. 
Homesteading was difficult work, but tenants identified with the process of rehabilitating 
buildings that were to become their homes. One homesteader recalled the trials of his 
project as well as the devotion that participants nonetheless maintained. “I remember 
working in a snowstorm…carrying cinder blocks from the street to the cellar, sliding 
along the sidewalk and down the cellar steps. I remember being upstairs with this little 
piece of paper, ‘How to Change a Beam’—somebody’s reading while we have the beam 
in midair, waiting for instructions,” he said. “But I can’t remember a time when 
everybody was down, when everyone thought it was hopeless.”45  
In the modesty of learning a trade and making it physical in the collaborative 
reconstruction of one’s future home, homesteaders expressed feelings of control at the 
most intimate level. In describing the construction of a window, Charyl Edmonds, the 
former leader of Operation Move-In and a homesteader at 948 Columbus Avenue, 
revealed the connection between the building process and her own subjectivity. “You 
need an upper and lower sash, a pulley and chain, wood for the sides, top, and bottom, a 
sill, molding behind and in front of the frame,” Edmonds said. “I measured and sawed 
and hammered and screwed, and when I was done, I had six windows that actually 
opened and closed—crookedly, to be sure, but they opened and closed. I felt  
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Figure 4.8. Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood sweat equity project, interior after 
rehabilitation, c. 1979. Laven, “Self-Help in Neighborhood Development.” Photograph 
by Beverly Hall. 
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invincible.”46 Similarly, when Philip St. Georges questioned the Renigades’ slow pace, 
Tom Foskolos, a leader of the rehab effort, retorted, “Don’t you understand that we are 
trying to accomplish something much greater than simply putting a building back 
together again?” Foskolos explained what he meant in showing off the finished building 
to the New York Times in 1975. “It’s a dream come true, and it means people in the ghetto 
can control their own lives, build for the future.”47 Self-help offered the possibility, 
however idealistic, that Harlemites could gain much sought-after community control 
through the collective labor of rehabilitation, the seemingly prosaic but ultimately 
transformative task of bringing an abandoned building back to life. If the opportunity to 
reclaim the neighborhood building by building came from desperate circumstances, it 
remained nonetheless empowering for those who chose to rebuild any way they could 
manage. 
 
Gains 
Self-help marked an attempt to salvage neighborhoods that both the state and the 
private sector had seemingly forsaken, as well as an opportunistic attempt to create a new 
mode of development in their absence. Yet grassroots efforts to establish self-help 
housing in abandoned buildings remained fundamentally – and ironically – reliant on the 
public sector, forging a policy infrastructure that enabled unprecedented growth of their 
efforts by the late 1970s. While the city supported self-help minimally and largely on an 
ad hoc basis early in the decade, officials at both the municipal and federal levels came to 
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formalize their assistance as the abandonment problem became more acute. With the city 
grasping to keep up with the management of thousands of occupied and unoccupied 
buildings newly in its possession, the dramatically devolved solutions under the banner of 
homesteading appealed to both activists and policymakers. Self-help suggested a radical 
degree of autonomy, but it was the support of officials that gave proponents hope that 
their approach could become widespread enough to both counterbalance abandonment 
and achieve their idealistic vision of abundant affordable housing controlled by 
Harlemites. 
Early homesteading encountered opposition more often than assistance, as 
grassroots efforts to stem abandonment ran against a bureaucracy that largely lacked the 
imagination to support such endeavors. Msgr. Fox’s initial effort to lead the renovation of 
175 East 102nd Street, for instance, nearly succumbed to a long list of violations, some 
reasonable but many others constituting little more than red tape. Officials chastised 
tenants for employing the volunteer services of an architect from Westchester County 
instead of a licensed New York City architect, and for likewise employing a plumber 
from New Jersey, not one holding a New York license. Inspectors objected that the 
wiring of the rehabilitated tenement could not support air conditioning units, but tenants 
did not have air conditioners. Tenants sought a modest loan to cover debts they incurred 
in the course of construction, but their request became delayed as the city cited these 
violations and sorted out a scandal in the Municipal Loan Program. Yet officials 
threatened to foreclose on the nearly renovated building because tenants had not paid real 
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estate taxes while waiting for the loan to clear, a threat that puzzled residents who had 
restored an abandoned building to a habitable status without help from the city.48 
Support for self-help came from advocates within the bureaucracy, however, 
whose willingness to experiment with new approaches to abandonment drew from efforts 
pioneered by enterprising tenants in declining buildings. Attempts to convert rental 
buildings into low-income cooperatives in the 1960s interested officials in the Lindsay 
administration, who tapped a housing lawyer, Robert Schur, to investigate the viability of 
such conversions as a strategy for addressing abandonment. Schur’s report motivated the 
city’s creation of the Office of Special Improvements (OSI) in the Housing and 
Development Administration, an office that Schur came to lead in early 1970 with the 
help of eight interns. OSI supported the creation of subsequent low-income cooperatives 
as well as tenant efforts to refurbish their homes through moderate rehabilitation. Schur 
provided city loans for such projects, which eventually brought Msgr. Fox to OSI’s door. 
Philip St. Georges became one of Schur’s interns in 1972, and while officials tended to 
point out all that was wrong with Fox’s project, St. Georges became an advocate for the 
tenants within the Housing and Development Administration. St. Georges, an early 
evangelist for sweat equity rehabilitation, helped negotiate compromises that the tenants 
of 175 East 102nd Street could afford to resolve, allowing the rehabbers to receive their 
loan and enabling their eventual occupancy in 1973.49  
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St. Georges sought to streamline sweat equity rehabilitation, a cause that the then 
twenty-one-year-old intern hoped to improve after the experience of Fox and his 
collaborators. “To a man, the other ‘housing professionals’ had images of boiler 
explosions, building collapses, shoddy workmanship, and inept or lazy tenant self-
helpers,” St. Georges wrote of the officials he encountered in City Hall.50 With Schur’s 
support, he organized a loosely arrayed Sweat Equity Program that helped rehabbers find 
abandoned buildings, introduced officials into projects early enough to minimize 
construction violations, and assisted with loans that supported up-front costs and other 
expenses incurred along the course of rehabilitation. St. Georges encouraged the 
Operation Move-In squatters to become the program’s first demonstration project. They 
took official ownership of 948 Columbus Avenue in the fall of 1973, and the Renigades 
approached St. Georges soon after, seeking to rehabilitate their own tenement. Over the 
next three years, the city would award loans to eight more projects, constituting 13 total 
buildings and 151 housing units.51 Schur would similarly cobble together a bolstered 
Receivership Program to facilitate tenant management of properties on the verge of 
landlord abandonment, modifying the program so community organizations could 
manage and improve such buildings. These efforts remained highly informal despite their 
official titles, as Schur and his band of like-minded interns reassembled preexisting 
programs in new configurations in order to keep up with emerging grassroots 
rehabilitation efforts.52  
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Like the window Cheryl Edmonds constructed at 948 Columbus Avenue, 
supporting policy was thus characterized by pragmatism and a high degree of 
improvisation. Sympathetic officials created paths that allowed tenants to assemble a 
patchwork quilt of measures old and new. As St. Georges noted, homesteaders 
“‘piggyback[ed] every gimmick in the world.” A supportive reporter explained the 
process like so: “Begin with the sale of a building for $1. Add municipal loans at below 
market interest rates for long terms. Grant full exemption from payment of real estate 
taxes for eight to ten years. Utilize as much sweat equity as possible. Dovetail these 
savings with job training and an adequate technical assistance program.”53 Some self-help 
proponents tapped the low interest financing available through the city’s Municipal Loan 
Program and its successor, the Participation Loan Program. United Harlem Growth 
borrowed from the federal Section 312 Loan Program, the first sweat equity project to do 
so. For their second phase of projects, the Renigades obtained a mortgage funded by the 
city from the federal Community Development Block Grant program, initiated in 1974. 
Many projects paid tenant laborers through the federal Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act (CETA). The Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood and United Harlem 
Growth partnered to obtain such assistance, which allowed tenants to earn income while 
they learned construction skills. Private lenders sometimes supplemented public loans. 
The Mosque received small loans from two foundations—Community Funding, Inc., 
funded by Columbia University and Barnard College, and the Consumer-Farmer 
Foundation, a generous supporter of sweat equity that grew out of a pioneering New 
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York-based milk cooperative. The modest amounts they lent often funded the start-up 
costs that allowed projects to get underway.54  
Such creativity proved necessary in an era when the overall level of political and 
financial support was consistent only in its irregularity. Self-help proponents lost their 
best ally within government when mayor Abraham Beame, elected in 1973, fired Robert 
Schur. But Schur then led the creation of the Association of Neighborhood Housing 
Developers, and Philip St. Georges joined the efforts that became the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board.55 Both organizations pushed the city to affirm its 
commitment to homesteading even as officials demonstrated aversion to funding new 
projects. ANHD urged officials to expand programs that supported management by 
tenants and community organizations to include buildings taken in rem, not only those 
facing impending abandonment but still under landlord control. As many as a quarter of 
the buildings on most blocks in Harlem, the South Bronx, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville, 
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Brooklyn were empty, the Association pointed out, and community groups could restore 
them to a habitable state. In 1975, officials agreed to bring city-owned abandoned 
buildings under the Community Management Program that Schur had established. This 
created an income stream for participating community groups, who received payment 
from the city for taking on management and rehab, as well as a new pathway to creating 
improved, cooperatively-owned affordable housing.56 Meanwhile, UHAB lobbied the 
city to support sweat equity. The city “ridiculed it a year ago,” Donald Terner said in 
mid-1975, but New York and the director of its Housing and Development 
Administration, Roger Starr, had been “pressured into it” by advocacy groups. UHAB 
urged the city to use newly-available Community Development Block Grant funds to 
provide loans for such rehabilitation, a concession that Terner gained early in 1975, and 
which later led to the creation of the Participation Loan Program in 1976. The 
Participation Loan Program, which joined city and private bank funding, provided 30-
year term, one-percent interest rate loans that funded construction of the Mosque of the 
Islamic Brotherhood’s project, among others.57 
Terner’s optimism proved short-lived, however, for the city’s severe fiscal crisis, 
which peaked in the latter half of 1975, ushered in an austerity budget under which 
Beame drastically cut the city’s spending—and particularly programs that affected the 
poor. While ongoing projects continued, the diminished budget undermined efforts to 
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expand the scope of self-help rehabilitation.58 Advocacy organizations felt such cuts 
acutely. As Terner assessed UHAB’s progress toward its original goal of supporting the 
homesteading of 200 buildings and 3,000 apartments in its first two years, he reflected on 
the limitations imposed by reliance on public sector support. UHAB had seen success – 
35 buildings with 426 apartments were undergoing sweat equity rehabilitation by August 
1975 – but he lacked confidence that proponents could make up the deficit in the 
remaining eleven months. “The main obstacle…has been our necessity to borrow money 
from the city,” Terner said. “And the city…is more a borrower than a lender these days,” 
a Times reporter paraphrased.59 ANHD sounded justifiably gloomy in assessing the 
period between mid-1975 and the end of 1976. “[T]he city government provided very 
little in the way of tangible support or encouragement for the preservation of housing or 
neighborhoods,” leaders wrote.60  
Yet if the fiscal crisis shook homesteaders’ confidence in the city as an ally, the 
federal government proved increasingly responsive to self-help in the same period. 
President Jimmy Carter held a keen personal interest in self-help as a neighborhood 
revitalization strategy, a tendency that emerged both from the greater emphasis on 
neighborhood power in this period as well as Carter’s own interest in voluntarism.61 
Carter’s election motivated one city official to tout the Mosque of the Islamic 
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Brotherhood’s project as a model that could address nationwide problems. “With the 
support of a new administration in Washington, every city in America could begin to 
combat the decline of adequate housing and the staggering increase in urban 
unemployment,” Lucille Rose, Commissioner of the Department of Employment, said in 
November 1976 at a press conference held in front of the Mosque’s buildings.62 If Rose’s 
call went unheeded, area homesteading advocates did make new headway under Carter. 
UHAB promoted its successes to the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), an appeal that garnered a generous, federally funded low-income 
homesteading demonstration project in New York beginning in 1977. HUD committed to 
supply CETA job training funds and federal low-interest Section 312 loans for projects in 
the Lower East Side, the South Bronx, and Central Harlem, a plan in part based on 
HUD’s experience loaning Section 312 funds to United Harlem Growth. Though Harlem 
did not remain a targeted area in the final program, the UHAB-coordinated effort 
eventually encompassed twelve tenements with over 100 apartments in New York City, 
and grew to include Hartford, Cleveland, Chicago, Boston, and Springfield, 
Massachusetts.63 Carter famously elevated New York’s grassroots revitalization efforts to 
the national stage with his visit to the South Bronx in October 1977, during which he 
toured 1186 Washington Avenue, the 28-unit sweat equity rehabilitation project of a 
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group called the People’s Development Corporation. Community organizations gained 
unprecedented financial support in the wake of Carter’s tour.64 
These gains came as the fiscal crisis ushered in a tidal wave of abandoned 
buildings. The economic climate of the mid-1970s caused greater economic fragility for 
both tenants and landlords, as low-income residents claimed even fewer assets with 
which to pay rent, and rising inflation and fuel costs worsened landlords’ already tenuous 
position. Banks, long reluctant to lend in predominantly low-income neighborhoods, 
became even less reliable as new state laws increased the investment activities in which 
they could participate. As a result, mortgages in New York City diminished as desirable 
ventures.65 As mentioned above, the city responded to consequently rising abandonment 
with passage of a new in rem law in 1976. Local Law 45 allowed the city to foreclose on 
property for non-payment of taxes after one year, instead of three. Officials hoped the law 
would demonstrate to the state and federal government that the city was addressing its 
financial woes, arguing that the threat of rapid foreclosure would motivate property 
owners to pay their taxes and that properties that were nonetheless abandoned would 
reach the city while they were still in a physically viable state.  But Local Law 45 instead 
spurred a flood of abandoned buildings into the city’s possession, as landlords cut their 
losses and the city took ownership at an unprecedented speed. The city owned 8,000 
buildings with 90,000 tenants by April 1978. By January 1979, the New York Times 
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estimated, the city had become landlord of 9,500 buildings, more than half partially or 
fully occupied. City estimates claimed ownership of 11,700 buildings with 166,000 units 
by April 1979, with 4,100 of those properties housing occupants in 35,000 units. 
Harlem’s streets held a substantial share of those abandoned, occupied buildings—at least 
40 percent by the next year. The onrush of city-owned properties created new difficulties, 
to be sure. “City-Owned Houses Come Complete With Pandora’s Box,” Michael 
Goodwin of the Times titled a 1979 article, detailing the city’s responsibility as a 
landlord: to keep up with heat and repairs in abandoned buildings, to fix the code 
violations in many properties, and to collect rent from reluctant tenants.  The city was not 
equipped to maintain so many properties at this scale.66  
Yet advocates for the conversion of abandoned buildings into affordable housing 
saw the in rem flood as a welcome chance to build the inclusive, community-controlled 
neighborhood they had long envisioned. The Metropolitan Council on Housing, a 
longstanding New York tenants’ rights organization, portrayed the crisis as “an 
opportunity for tenants to move in the direction of housing for people, not profits—in 
other words housing in the public domain.”67 Likewise, an array of community 
organizations and advocates came together as the Task Force on City-Owned Property to 
encourage the city’s newly inaugurated mayor, Edward Koch, to pass city-owned 
buildings along to self-help organizations. Members included many of the stalwarts of the 
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homesteading movement, including the Association of Neighborhood Housing 
Developers, UHAB, the Renigades Housing Movement, the West Harlem Community 
Organization, as well as two Harlem-based politicians, State Senator Carl McCall and 
Councilman Fred Samuel. The Task Force cited the portfolio of abandoned buildings as 
“an opportunity for creative housing and neighborhood development action.” Members 
called for the formation of a “new sector for low income residential management and 
ownership,” with “locally and democratically controlled planning, management and 
development as its cornerstone.” The non-profits that had shaped grassroots responses to 
abandonment over the previous decade would back the effort. The programs they had 
developed, including tenant and community management and homesteading-based 
rehabilitation, were to serve as its mechanisms at a newly expanded scale. In conjunction 
with the expansion of these programs, Task Force members demanded an end to public 
property auctions as a means of disposing of city-owned buildings. Such disposal 
methods, which returned abandoned buildings back to private owners, failed at an 
alarmingly high rate. One April 1977 study by the city Office of Management and Budget 
found that a quarter of auctioned buildings never paid taxes, and 94 percent were again in 
arrears after four years. Rather than making abandoned buildings viable, auctions 
overwhelmingly kept tenants at the mercy of negligent landlords.68 
The city took title to the first wave of in rem foreclosures under the new law soon 
after the Task Force issued its report, and quickly became, as one reporter claimed, “the 
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world’s largest slum landlord.”69 While Koch set out to restore the city’s financial footing 
in the first months of his tenure in Gracie Mansion, the abandonment problem began to 
cripple the agency that was responsible for city-owned buildings, the Department of Real 
Property. In this context, officials were willing to experiment, and they proved receptive 
to the calls for innovation issued by the neighborhood housing movement. In mid-1978, 
the city shifted the management of in rem buildings from the Department of Real 
Property to the newly created Department of Housing Preservation and Development, a 
move that indicated official endorsement of the view that abandoned buildings 
represented a housing resource, not a fiscal resource. Under the new agency, the city 
created the Division of Alternative Management Programs (DAMP), a unit that 
implemented many of the reforms sought by the Task Force on City-Owned Property. 
DAMP replicated much of the patchwork nature of the homesteading movement in 
general, agglomerating a range of strategies intended to free the city of the buildings it 
reluctantly owned. DAMP expanded the Community Management Program, introduced a 
new cooperative ownership program called Tenant Interim Lease, and created programs 
to allow limited management by the New York City Housing Authority and by private 
managers. As leader of this new division, officials tapped Philip St. Georges, who 
returned to the city from UHAB. In November 1978, officials issued the moratorium on 
property auctions that activists had requested, granting their wish that the city reassess a 
policy that undermined hopes for a collective housing movement.70   
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These programs expanded beyond the scope of sweat equity but built upon its 
intentions, offering new avenues for low-income tenants to claim control over their 
homes and, consequently, over Harlem. The enlarged Community Management Program 
enabled groups like the West Harlem Community Organization (WHCO) to take 
ownership of buildings they had managed for the city. In 1980, WHCO purchased four 
city-owned buildings on 116th Street for 250 dollars each, marking the first such 
transaction from the city to a community group. Tenants who had assisted WHCO with 
the buildings’ renovation in turn purchased their apartments from the organization, 
creating four new cooperatives.71 Tenant Interim Lease quickly became the fastest 
growing of the DAMP programs, enabling residents to manage their building for at least 
eleven months while paying rent to the city, after which they had the option to convert to 
a cooperative at a sale price of 250 dollars per unit. Tenants responded enthusiastically to 
the chance to eventually own their homes. Pearl and Ernest Knox, for instance, had lived 
for decades at 1 West 126th Street, a grand apartment building in the heart of Harlem that 
had housed Count Basie, Billy Eckstein, and Paul Robeson at times. When the owner 
abandoned the building, tenants found that the city did not maintain it to their 
satisfaction. So they pooled rents to pay for repairs themselves, and signed on to Tenant 
Interim Lease as soon as the program began. “I’ve seen apartments in all the newer and 
expensive buildings in Harlem,” Pearl Knox told the Times, “and those in this building 
are as beautiful as any I’ve seen.” UHAB provided training for tenants in such buildings, 
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as residents learned management skills with the hope that they would soon be able to take 
ownership.72  
By the new decade, then, tenant-led efforts to restore abandoned buildings to 
affordable housing had achieved a level of institutional support and a scale that far 
eclipsed the fledgling efforts of the mid-1970s. The dramatic increase of apartments in 
the city’s alternative management programs during this period testified to the gains that 
proponents had made, and the range of those programs demonstrated the innovations that 
had developed from early sweat equity rehabilitation. According to the Task Force on 
City-Owned Property, the number of occupied units in alternative management programs 
rose from 1,611 in July 1978 to 8,060 in July 1979, or 20 percent of the city’s occupied in 
rem units.73 By October 1980, the city claimed, DAMP encompassed 645 buildings with 
15,205 units. Twelve thousand of those units were occupied, representing over a third of 
city-owned occupied apartments. Community groups managed over 3,000 units in the 
Community Management Program; the Tenant Interim Lease program included 240 
buildings and 5,800 housing units across the city.74 A movement that had begun with the 
determined efforts of desperate tenants had moved into the political and physical 
mainstream. Would abandonment bring the radical dream of community control that 
Harlem activists had long imagined? 
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Thirteen Brownstones 
The city’s willingness to bring alternative approaches to in rem housing into its 
bureaucracy promised unprecedented influence for low-income homesteaders. Yet the 
momentum of the late 1970s would prove to be less a tipping point than a high water 
mark for activists. While Mayor Koch incorporated their strategies as the city became 
inundated with abandoned buildings, he would prove reluctant to make such approaches 
predominant as the city came out of fiscal crisis. The new decade brought conflicts over 
the future of Harlem, centered on the role of its abandoned buildings. On one side, 
activists saw city-owned buildings as the path to community control. On the other, 
officials placed their faith increasingly in middle-class settlement of the neighborhood’s 
city-owned buildings. As Harlemites and Koch clashed over the fate of the neighborhood, 
activists feared their opportunity for control was slipping away. 
While the auction moratorium in late 1978 had raised hopes that the city would 
cease returning abandoned buildings back to private owners, officials returned relatively 
quickly to their most controversial disposal strategies. Mayor Koch proposed the revival 
of auctions in the summer of 1979. Officials understandably wanted to get these 
thousands of properties off their hands. The city was not prepared to serve as landlord, 
and management and maintenance bore substantial costs. Auctions provided the fastest 
means to dispose of buildings en masse.75 Critics from the Task Force on City-Owned 
Property questioned Koch’s motives, however, noting the high risk of subsequent default 
and what that meant for tenants and the city, which would again find itself landlord of 
these buildings. “If the City runs its in rem buildings at a loss,” Task Force members 
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asked, “why will a profit-making individual be able to pay real estate taxes and make a 
profit?” Under such pressure, the city altered its auction requirements with the intention 
of reducing property speculation and ensuring more effective management. Reforms 
included requirements that new owners renovate properties to remove code violations, 
disclose their history as landlords, and live in or near buildings with four or fewer units 
for three years after purchase. But auction opponents remained unconvinced, arguing that 
landlords who had gamed the system before would do so once again, and that rent hikes 
permitted under the policy would displace tenants in occupied abandoned buildings.76 
In questioning the need for disposal back to profit-oriented landlords, advocates 
pointed to the tremendous success that buildings under the Division of Alternative 
Management Programs, or DAMP, had already achieved. The city had been initially 
skeptical of self-help strategies, the Task Force noted, arguing that “such programs would 
never contain more than a small percentage of city-owned buildings.” But the number of 
units in DAMP programs had grown rapidly as the city made bureaucratic space for 
them, and the remarkable rates of rent payment demonstrated the promise of alternative 
approaches. More than 90 percent of tenants in the Community Management Program 
paid their rent, the Task Force pointed out, and expressed high satisfaction with their 
community-based landlords. The city itself recognized the sensation it had in DAMP. 
City-owned buildings had typically yielded rent payment under 30 percent in the past. 
Yet tenants under DAMP paid a remarkable 83.8 percent of rent during the first year of 
the program, officials noted, and over 87 percent in Fiscal Year 1980. Just over 45 
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percent of tenants in in rem buildings under traditional city management paid their rent in 
the same year, an increase that officials were glad to note but which paled in comparison 
to tenants under DAMP.77  
Task Force members called for an expansion of community-based approaches to 
abandoned housing. Their benefits were manifold, advocates claimed—buildings could 
function at self-subsisting levels, tenants provided much maintenance and operation 
themselves, and rents remained affordable. Yet officials proceeded with plans to dispose 
of properties back to the private sector, restarting auctions in May 1980. Early sales 
avoided Harlem, instead focusing on the outer boroughs. The city hoped to sell around 
250 buildings in the first year, largely townhouses in Brooklyn and small buildings in 
Queens. Koch responded enthusiastically to financial projections for one of the first 
auctions in June 1980. “Keep it up. We need every million dollars you can find,” he told 
his Commissioner of General Services.78 Harlem’s reprieve proved only temporary, 
however. In late 1980, officials shifted their attention uptown, announcing plans to sell 
thirteen abandoned historic brownstones using a lottery instead of a traditional auction. 
Most were in the Mount Morris Park Historic District, near Fifth Avenue and 120th 
Street. One brownstone was located on 139th Street, in Harlem’s most famous
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residential blocks, called Strivers’ Row. Two were located further north, in the Hamilton 
Heights Historic District.79  
Despite the success of alternative management strategies, a success that even 
officials themselves acknowledged, why did Koch nonetheless decide to return city-
owned homes in Harlem to private owners? One answer could be found in the headlines 
that had increasingly marked New York papers in the last years of the 1970s. “Middle-
Class Blacks Return to Harlem,” the Times reported in 1976. “People Returning to 
Harlem,” wrote Harlem’s own New York Amsterdam News in 1979. That same year, 
Daily News columnist Earl Cardwell offered the lively title, “Harlem is Jumpin’ to a New 
Buy-Buy Blues Beat.” “It always was someplace else,” Caldwell wrote, chronicling the 
advance of the middle-class “pioneers” who had moved into New York’s neighborhoods. 
“It was Park Slope and Crown Heights in Brooklyn. It was downtown in SoHo and even 
in midtown, in the neighborhood that was once Hell’s Kitchen.” Harlem had remained 
the exception, but now it was Harlem’s turn. The neighborhood claimed streets of 
beautiful brownstones as ornate as any in New York, many now city property. “Once 
these were houses that nobody wanted,” Caldwell wrote. “They sat empty, windows 
broken, doors missing and, for the most part, they were shelter only for drug addicts.” 
But increasingly the problem was too much demand, not their vacancy.80 The city 
welcomed such interest. As wanting eyes looked to Harlem’s homes in the late 1970s, 
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officials realized the assets that had fallen into their hands. For Koch, the appeal was not 
simply the revenue that sales would bring, though officials did desire such revenue, but 
also a broader faith in middle-class resettlement as the key to neighborhood 
revitalization, a belief that he had maintained from the earliest days of his mayoralty.81  
Officials recognized the potential threat such a position represented in Harlem, 
where the community’s very identity as a majority African-American, largely low-
income community had become a source of power. One official with the city’s 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development acknowledged this in noting that 
Harlem residents maintained “understandable paranoia about losing out.” “Harlem is 
vulnerable to a takeover by whites,” he admitted. With high outside demand for Harlem 
brownstones, city officials took the unusual step of negotiating the terms of their 
disposition with the Harlem establishment – including elected officials and leaders of the 
Harlem Urban Development Corporation – as early as 1979. The choice of a lottery was 
intended to address interest in a limited resource while meeting Harlem leaders’ concerns 
that the city was seeding the gentrification of the neighborhood. While a freewheeling, 
wide-open auction could drive prices as high as bidders would take them, the lottery 
provided a fixed price between 5,000 and 42,000 dollars for each of the brownstones. 
Entrants applied to purchase a single building. Moreover, Koch administration housing 
officials agreed to build favoritism into the process based on an applicants’ current 
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residence, a concession that implicitly reflected concerns about racial transition. Harlem 
residents would receive three entries each, while non-residents would receive only one.82  
But Harlem observers at the grassroots level were not convinced that the terms 
negotiated by city officials and establishment leaders served their best interests. At issue 
was not simply the sale of these thirteen homes, a small percentage in a large 
neighborhood, but the fear that they were to serve as a gateway to the sale of everything 
else the city owned in Harlem. Residents filled planning board hearings in West and 
Central Harlem in the spring of 1981, making for “large and often raucous events” in 
which opponents voiced their concerns that the lottery marked the first step in the 
neighborhood’s takeover by outsiders. The respective community planning boards sided 
with resident demands that city-owned properties be sold to tenants through direct sales, 
not a lottery. Community Board 10, encompassing Central Harlem, voted unanimously 
against the plan.83 A group of residents opposed to the sale formed the Anti-Lottery 
Committee of Harlemites in early 1981. Their leader was Lois Penny, a self-described 
homesteader and 28-year-old activist with a home on West 138th Street. Committee 
members worried that if an auction was not immediately on the horizon, it soon would 
be. “If we do not voice our opposition, the City will sell over 700 City-Owned 
brownstones and apartment buildings in our community through this Lottery process and 
Auctions,” they promised in June. Their warning in July, on the eve of a crucial city 
Board of Estimate hearing on whether the plan could proceed, proved even more dire. 
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“The first step in the plan is the lottery sale of our brownstones,” wrote the Anti-Lottery 
Committee. “The auction sale of our apartment buildings will be next!!!”84  
If activists worried that the Board of Estimate hearing would seal their fate, their 
fears were in fact largely confirmed even before the meeting began. In an interview a 
couple days before the July 23rd hearing, the garrulous Koch explained the distaste he had 
for the lottery process and the concessions it reflected. “I’ve directed the housing agency 
henceforth to never have an operation that precludes people otherwise eligible from 
coming in and buying property in the City of New York,” he said. Koch, who maintained 
a career-long aversion to racial quotas, disliked the racialized nature of the plan. But he 
especially opposed the idea that disposal of city-owned property would proceed in a 
manner that restricted the middle-class settlement he saw as crucial to the city’s future. 
“They’re naturals for buying brownstones,” he said approvingly of members of the 
middle class, regardless of race. “That’s called gentrification.”85  
Koch and Harlem activists represented two different positions on what a 
neighborhood should be, and how it should get there. In articulating his opposition to 
lotteries, Koch described his beliefs as a product of racial liberalism. “I am an old 
fashioned liberal,” he said. “I still believe that it is in the best interest of the city, state, 
and country that we follow the principles of integration – meaning every citizen has the 
right to live in any community provided he or she is able to afford to live there.” But 
Koch’s objection to a strong public sector role in maintaining Harlem’s affordability and 
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its identity as a black capital, while upholding the city’s right to return property to the 
private sector to facilitate middle-class settlement, evinced the neoliberal approach that 
pervaded much of his policy, as did his premise that access came as a right to those with 
economic means. What Koch labeled as concern for the principle of open housing 
suggested his deep belief in the ameliorative role of economic upscaling through the free 
market. “The best thing that could happen to the Harlem community would be the 
strengthening of its middle class base,” the mayor said.86 In line with this belief, Koch 
maintained a laissez-faire approach to urban change and its consequences. Economic 
transition, he explained, was an inevitable occurrence that officials and residents could, 
and should, do little to stop. “My position is that some middle-class neighborhoods go 
down economically and some low-income neighborhoods go up and that is the nature of a 
changing city,” Koch told an aide in 1982. Consequent residential displacement, he 
argued, was just a fact of life.87  
Opponents of the lottery, on the other hand, maintained the radical view of 
community control that had shaped perceptions of space in Harlem since the late 1960s. 
Activists envisioned Harlem’s power residing in its predominantly African-American and 
low-income population. Abandonment had at last offered the opportunity for residents to 
claim the revolutionary spatial ideal they had long sought, to get out from under 
exploitive landlords and to own their land. “Blacks now have the opportunity to control a 
significant portion of Harlem Real Estate now that many whites have abandoned their 
property,” Rev. Calvin O. Butts, III of the Abyssinian Baptist Church wrote of the lottery. 
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“These plans are against the notions that persons who now live and do business in 
Harlem will have a chance to control real estate here.”88 Residents were not simply 
opposed to wealthier neighbors, or whiter neighbors, argued Lloyd Williams, chair of 
Community Board 10. At issue was the prospect that opening up Harlem’s abandoned 
buildings to any interested outsider would undermine residents’ ability to determine the 
future of their community. “It is our sense that Harlemites should have the major voice in 
determining that which is best for Harlem,” Williams said. “This is a right which other 
non Black and Hispanic communities simply take for granted.”89 In responding to the 
lottery, community control stalwart Preston Wilcox put the dilemma in typically more 
colorful terms: “If this is our community, then we have to find a way to control, upgrade 
our community. It’s like everybody knows that they have to ask permission to go into 
your refrig unless it has already been established that it’s ok for them to do so.”90 
In the collision of these visions, Harlemites feared, they would lose their hold on 
the neighborhood they had begun to rebuild over the previous decade by transforming 
aging buildings into affordable, cooperatively-owned homes. The lottery threatened to 
return the neighborhood to the outsiders who had long controlled its real estate. “When 
the whites came to Africa, they had the Bible. Now they are coming to Harlem with a 
new game—A Lottery,” Wilcox wrote. “They have not used the lottery to integrate white 
communities with us…Now they want us to participate in a lottery on our land to insure 
that we don’t keep them out!”91 Anti-Lottery Committee members argued that the three-
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to-one preference given to residents would not be enough to overcome the flood of 
entries from outside Harlem, and objected to rehabilitation requirements that effectively 
acted as income limits. City guidelines recommended a minimum annual salary of 18,000 
dollars for lottery entrants due to the costs of rehab, and suggested that salaries more than 
two and two-and-a-half times that would be preferable—far in excess of the average 
income in the neighborhood.92  
Lottery opponents argued that Harlemites’ persistence amidst abandonment 
deserved the reward of community control they had long sought. They proposed an 
alternative to the lottery that, not coincidentally, included many of the key tenets of the 
self-help movement in an effort to make acquisition and rehab affordable. Property 
should be sold through direct sales, not lotteries, Anti-Lottery Committee members 
argued, with preference given to community residents. Like properties in DAMP 
programs, the purchase price should be a modest 250 dollars. To keep costs of renovation 
down, opponents suggested, sweat equity should be permitted.93 Wilcox’s advice to his 
neighbors channeled both immediate concerns about the impending loss of “turf control” 
and the deeper symbolism underlying the drive to turn abandoned buildings into 
community assets. “Function collectively/selectively/correctively as psychological 
cooperative owners, and never as psychological tenants,” Wilcox urged.94  
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Their pleas gained concessions, but never the stay that lottery opponents had 
demanded. In the aftermath of the Board of Estimate hearing, in which members passed 
Koch’s lottery plan, the mayor backed down from his provocative statements. He would 
consider preferential lotteries in the future to dispose of abandoned buildings. But Koch 
had no intention of heeding the more radical suggestions of activists, and with the lottery 
in place, opponents were devastated.95 Daily News columnist Earl Caldwell, who just a 
couple years earlier had written with awe of the sudden speculative interest in Harlem, 
now worried what the future held. “[T]here are 7,000 other properties, by conservative 
count, and soon they too are going to be dumped on the market,” Caldwell wrote of city-
owned property in Harlem. “It has the makings of one of the biggest real estate deals in 
the history of the city, and it is going down now.” Sitting with Noreen Clark Smith, a 
member of Community Board 10, after the hearing, it seemed the bottom had fallen out. 
“The real estate developers have it now…They have just delivered Harlem to the real 
estate interests,” she told Caldwell.96  
Anthony Gliedman, the Commissioner of the Department of Housing Preservation 
and Development, announced more generous lottery terms in October. The city would 
adjust proportions to ensure that community residents had 50 percent of the entries in the 
final lottery, addressing concerns that outside entries would dominate.97 Still, as the 
February 1982 lottery loomed, opponents were sure that the end was near. Entries poured 
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in. The city had distributed 7,500 applications for the now twelve brownstones (the 
previous owner of one had paid the taxes he owed, unbeknownst to the city), and had 
already received 3,000 by the end of October.98 Lois Penny, leader of the Anti-Lottery 
Committee, remained defiant in the months before the lottery. “We’re not finished yet. 
We certainly are not lying down and playing dead,” she said. But as 250 spectators 
watched City College students pick winning entries in an auditorium on their campus in 
the Harlem neighborhood of Hamilton Heights, and as the crowd cheered Fred Samuel, 
Harlem’s councilman, as he told them he hoped “all the names of winners come from 
Boards 9 and 10,” no opponents were in the room to watch.99 The hopes that activists had 
carried for the abandoned buildings present in so much of Harlem had faded. The lottery, 
it seemed, marked a watershed moment in the neighborhood’s history, and the loss of a 
dream that community control proponents had carried for almost twenty years—that the 
neighborhood’s very poverty and segregation could provide the engine for neighborhood 
control. Abandonment had brought that promise near, but Koch’s vision appeared to have 
won out. 
 
Middle Road 
Activists were certain that the lottery of thirteen brownstones would spell the end 
of Harlem as they knew it. Yet if activists saw the sale as a rupture in the history of the 
neighborhood, in time the brownstone lottery, and the city’s plans that followed, proved 
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more of a hinge than an upheaval. Debates over the role of city-owned buildings had cast 
the alternatives in stark terms of good and evil. In the end, however, responses to the 
abandonment crisis signaled a middle road on the way to a more economically complex 
future for Harlem, an alternative to both the radical community control that activists 
sought and the total displacement that they feared.  
This reality became apparent as soon as the names of lottery winners emerged 
from the hopper in the City College auditorium. While activists had doubted that the 
city’s plan would provide a measured outcome, indeed the new owners disproportionately 
represented Harlem and its environs. One of the brownstone winners came from Long 
Island, one from Westchester County, one from Queens, and one from Brooklyn. Three, 
however, lived in nearby neighborhoods—Manhattan Valley to Harlem’s immediate 
south, Washington Heights to its immediate north, and East Harlem. And five were 
already Harlem residents. Blanche Brown lived on Frederick Douglass Boulevard (Eighth 
Avenue) near the Harlem River. Penny Sherrod also lived on Frederick Douglass 
Boulevard, just north of Central Park. Alvin and Dawn Martine resided on 147th Street, 
while Linda Gelpi’s home was located just south of City College. Amelia Samuda had 
lived her entire life in Harlem, most recently in historic buildings on 135th Street that St. 
Philip’s Church had owned since early in Harlem’s history as a black metropolis. Eleven 
of the twelve winners were non-white, and if the professions of three new owners were 
any indication, most were middle-class but decidedly not affluent—one worked as an 
administrative assistant, another as a systems analyst at New York Blood Center, and a 
third as an assistant manager at a variety store.100  
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In opposing the lottery, observers had argued that the sale would undermine the 
control that Harlemites had long sought. Yet for the lucky winners, their good fortune 
provided a feeling of autonomy much like that self-help advocates had claimed, though 
one increasingly expressed at the individual level, not as a communal ideal. “It really is a 
joy to have something of your own. It means you own a piece of the rock,” Amelia 
Samuda told a reporter. Priscilla Ashley, who had lived just north of Harlem’s unofficial 
borders, agreed. “I’m floating on air—completely,” she said. “It means I’m a 
homeowner, a property owner. It means that I have tangible assets to give my sons.”101 
And though more financially secure than neighbors who had scraped by in order to 
renovate nearby abandoned buildings, the winners likewise faced a thin line between 
rehabilitated homes and insolvency. When questions cropped up about whether state 
officials would require renovators to carefully restore the dilapidated but historic interiors 
of their new homes, for instance, many worried that substantial added costs – as much as 
30,000 dollars – would quickly exceed the limited financing the city provided through 
low-interest loans and grants. Like low-income homesteaders, lottery winners were 
focused on creating affordable, habitable spaces, not lush period interiors. “We’re not in 
the business of going in for gold faucets and crystal doorknobs…We’re trying to make a 
decent housing stock, not a luxurious housing stock,” said one frustrated city official.102  
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Though state officials eventually agreed to relax preservation requirements in 
order to keep rehab costs down, some lottery winners were ultimately unable to take 
ownership of the homes they had won, whether for financial or other reasons. Samuda 
was among the four lottery winners who never moved into their Harlem brownstones, but 
another Harlem resident obtained ownership of her home instead. Harlemites likewise 
became owners of two of the three homes never occupied by winners from East Harlem, 
Long Island and Brooklyn. By the time occupants signed deeds for eleven of the twelve 
brownstones in 1984, seven homeowners had moved from elsewhere in Harlem, and two 
more from neighboring blocks. Only two new homeowners came from elsewhere in the 
city. After renovation, residents lived in their homes far longer than the three years that 
the city required as a term of their ownership. Nine stayed in their homes beyond 2000. 
Rather than importing a crop of disruptive outsiders into Harlem or a group of speculators 
who sought to cash out after their required residency was up, the brownstone lottery 
ended up providing dream houses for a group of residents, most of whom had lived in the 
neighborhood during its most trying years and remained there long after.103  
The status of techniques pioneered by homesteaders in the mid-1970s similarly 
suggests the ambiguity of Harlem’s fate as the neighborhood began to witness new 
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investment. Officially sanctioned sweat equity programs largely diminished in the early 
1980s, limited in scale by many of the same factors that had brought abandonment in the 
first place. Homesteaders found wild inflation a paralyzing factor as they tried to 
construct their homes on a shoestring. In 1980, UHAB estimated that the cost of sweat 
equity had risen to 22,000 dollars per unit, half again as much as rehab just four years 
earlier. The patchwork nature of funding exacerbated difficulties, as onerous and 
complex bureaucratic requirements took labor time away from construction. Moreover, 
the rising fuel costs that made management costly for landlords likewise affected self-
builders. Minimum rents necessary to cover costs in 1980 had doubled from their level in 
1973, the year that the idea of self-help housing first caught fire. Public agencies offered 
loans but few subsidies, meaning that sweat equity increasingly became a pursuit that 
low-income tenants simply could not afford. “Everything has gone up, and basically our 
incomes are fixed,” rued Luqman Abdush-Shahid of the Mosque of the Islamic 
Brotherhood. “We find ourselves tightening a belt that has already been squeezed.” By 
early 1980, the Renigades had not paid taxes for months, unable to both keep 251 East 
119th Street running and pay the city’s bills.104  
Self-help proponents faced an array of impediments as they brought their work 
into the new decade. The very institutionalization and public support that had enabled 
progress through loans and funding for job training diminished the radicalism of a 
movement that had grown out of the dramatic act of squatting. As neighborhood groups 
gained more resources in the late 1970s and became larger operations with official 
mandates, participants took on less political roles. Community groups with management 
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responsibilities functioned essentially as landlords, finding themselves on the wrong side 
of tenants’ ire when things went poorly. In July 1982, for instance, tenants led a rent 
strike against the West Harlem Community Organization, in a building the group 
managed on West 117th Street. The property needed a new boiler and the city would not 
provide WHCO with the money necessary to replace it, so tenants denied the 
organization rent for six months.105 More problematic still, funding diminished 
substantially upon the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Officials 
removed restrictions that committed Community Development Block Grant funds to low-
income communities, and budget cutting slashed many of the programs that 
neighborhood developers relied upon, including the Comprehensive Employment and 
Training Act support that had paid many of the laborers on rehabilitation projects.106  
Despite strong countercurrents, however, neighborhood developers’ efforts were 
not insignificant, nor in vain. The city retained low-income homesteaders’ alternative 
development methods as one minor approach but generally cast their lot with the private 
real estate market that had long dominated New York City. But the Division of 
Alternative Management Programs nonetheless persisted into the new decade, and the 
city continued to boast of gains made under Tenant Interim Lease and the Community 
Management Program. Buildings under DAMP constituted around a third of occupied 
city-owned buildings in New York by late 1981. To be sure, those numbers remained 
small in the face of the still vast inventory that the city owned and the widespread 
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demand for affordable housing, but the city continued to sell buildings to low-income 
tenants at an accelerating pace. Between 1978 and 1982, officials claimed, the city sold 
112 buildings with 2,800 rehabilitated units to tenants through DAMP. Fifty-seven of 
those buildings, containing almost 1,100 units, were sold in the latter half of 1981. By the 
fall of 1982, the city had sold nineteen buildings with 426 apartments under Tenant 
Interim Lease, and eleven buildings with 149 apartments under the Community 
Management Program. Another 569 buildings throughout the city, with 13,600 housing 
units, remained under DAMP. Community Board 10, the planning district representing 
Central Harlem, claimed almost 1,500 units in alternative management programs by 
August 1982.107 Though representing a smaller portion of formerly abandoned buildings 
than activists had hoped for, the inventory nonetheless included enough units to house 
thousands of families.  
For every failure in the movement, a success story suggested the potential that 
advocates had imagined early on. Residents in early low-income cooperatives faced a 
slew of difficulties, including financial precariousness, a limited scale amidst widespread 
abandonment, and tenant participation that lagged behind expectations. But they 
expressed overwhelming approval for their living situation. In one 1983 survey, 91 
percent of residents preferred their low-income co-op to living in a building owned by a  
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Figure 4.9. Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood sweat equity project, exterior after 
rehabilitation, c. 1979. Laven, “Self-Help in Neighborhood Development.” Photograph 
by Beverly Hall. 
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private landlord, and 80 percent considered their buildings successful even if they were 
fiscally unsound. Cooperative members expressed feelings of autonomy and inclusion as 
a result of their housing, and, crucially, a sense of control.108 David Robinson walked 
away from United Harlem Growth in the early 1980s, frustrated by the enormity of the 
task and the lack of assistance he felt the group received on West 136th Street.109 But on 
St. Nicholas Avenue, members of the Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood moved into 
their new residential and spiritual home in 1979, occupying its fourteen newly 
refurbished apartments (Figure 4.9). Though members had incurred a 30,000 dollar cost 
overrun due to inflation during construction, they were up to date on their mortgage 
payments. Most tenants were employed, the director of UHAB reported, many in 
construction, others in the businesses the Mosque had built on site.110 Ironically, the city 
took possession of 251 East 119th Street, the Renigades’ tenement, in an in rem tax 
foreclosure action in 1985. But seventeen years later the city sold the building to the 
Youth Action Program, one of the many sweat equity rehab and job training programs 
that had flourished in the late 1970s in the Renigades’ wake, and which brought self-help 
to the national scale as the prominent non-profit YouthBuild USA.111 UHAB included 
more than a hundred Harlem buildings in a 1988 list of “self help housing” in 
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Manhattan.112 The legacy of self-help, whether in successful sweat equity projects such as 
that of the Mosque or through buildings that had passed under DAMP to become low-
income cooperatives, provided a core of tenant-controlled, affordable housing in Harlem 
that persisted long past its origin.  
Through debates over the fate of Harlem’s abandoned buildings, then, participants 
foreshadowed a pattern of settlement that would increasingly characterize the 
neighborhood over the next decade. In a period when it seemed that the city’s poorest 
neighborhoods might very well implode, competing visions of Harlem’s future had vied 
to determine the fate of thousands of shells, some occupied, some empty. Enterprising 
residents had envisioned a widespread movement of the poor that would turn forsaken 
houses back into homes and bring neighborhood control. City leaders had imagined the 
middle-class resettlement of Harlem, placing their faith in market forces that they could 
help stimulate. But Harlem instead took early steps on a middle path towards a vision that 
was neither radical nor conservative, but decidedly moderate politically, socially, and 
economically, with new affordable housing footholds in the community as well as 
increasing homeownership opportunities for members of the middle-class.  
Still, in the years immediately following the 1982 brownstone lottery, many 
longtime Harlemites remained unsettled as the city continued to return in rem properties 
to the private market. In 1985, officials proceeded with the large-scale auction of 
abandoned Harlem brownstones that activists had long feared, a 149-property sale that 
dwarfed the earlier lottery. Residents revived many of the concerns – and techniques – 
they had pioneered over the previous decade. Officials had agreed to sell 98 of the 149 
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brownstones to Harlem residents, but critics protested that the auction would nonetheless 
drive prices beyond what neighborhood winners could afford. Many called for sweat 
equity as an alternative, demanding direct sales to Harlem residents and tenant labor as an 
allowable financial contribution. Members of the National Reclamation Project, a Harlem 
group against the auction, echoed their predecessors in leading poor squatters in the 
takeover of some of the brownstones. But even such drastic measures were unable to 
prevent the sale. In his remarks to auction winners in September 1985, Mayor Koch 
reemphasized his position that New York was an “open city” without restrictions on 
neighborhood resettlement. Yet at the same time he demonstrated newfound restraint 
emblematic of the era’s emerging moderation, voicing his support for the auction’s 
concession to Harlemites. “The people who stayed,” he said, were to be “recognized for 
their courage.” But the people who stayed, even the winners, remained uncertain what lay 
ahead in their changing neighborhood.113  
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Chapter Five 
Managing Change 
 
In 1988, Preston Wilcox began a typically determined and ultimately unsuccessful 
campaign to gain federal, state, and local historic landmark designation for the full extent 
of Harlem. “Although Harlem is the best known Black community in the world and is 
irreversibly tied to the heritage, history and inheritance of African Americans, it seems 
that the racist practices in America continue to demand that we reassert our relationship 
with it or that we welcome outsiders into it as though they own it—and not us,” Wilcox 
told Orin Lehman, then commissioner of the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation, 
and Historic Preservation. “‘Harlem is our home’ is the way in which Harlem is 
discussed among Harlem-ites,” he continued. “It is the attitude that helped to nurture the 
Harlem Renaissance and is currently unfolding the second one. Only this time we hope to 
establish in unquestionable terms our claim to Harlem; our contributions consecrated it.”1  
While this crusade marked another stage in a life spent seeking recognition of 
Harlem’s special importance, Wilcox worked against a background in which such 
concerns had reached a new urgency. Harlem was facing two simultaneous threats by the 
late 1980s, seemingly paradoxical trends that both undermined the hopes that longtime 
community activists held for their neighborhood. On one hand, residents continued to 
fear the possibility that the gradual middle-class resettlement of Harlem would pick up 
steam, displacing residents and aspirations for neighborhood control. On the other, 
residents continued to suffer amidst widespread physical dilapidation and entrenched 
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poverty. “Harlem-ites have lived for years in fear of a master plan, gentrification, urban 
removal, the return of whites, etc.,” Wilcox wrote to city historic preservation officials 
four years later.2 Historic landmark designation, Wilcox hoped, would stem both forces 
by officially sanctioning Harlem’s identity as a place apart, a space whose cultural and 
physical properties merited self-determination. “If respected as being full members of this 
city and nation, then, our right to define ourselves, name ourselves and govern ourselves 
will be respected too,” Wilcox explained. “Such a designation may serve to increase the 
possibility that others will come to acknowledge and respect our legitimate claim to 
speak for, define and govern Harlem.”3 
Wilcox’s pursuit marked a particularly quixotic attempt to stabilize Harlem in a 
period of deep uncertainty. Harlem’s historic credentials were peerless. “I believe that a 
thematic nomination around the Harlem Renaissance is an important key to recognizing 
the crucial contribution of Harlem and its residents to the history of this country,” 
Lehman wrote Wilcox, encouraging his dream.4 But the possibility would remain only on 
paper. This scale of landmark recognition was unprecedented in its vastness, the effort 
simply too herculean. Wilcox hoped to truly define Harlem’s place as “a city within a 
city,” marking a district that included brownstones and tenements alike, but such an 
outcome was beyond even his determination.  
Wilcox’s attempt to unify Harlem’s hundreds of blocks as a single historic district 
nevertheless offered a symbolic last gasp of a radical spirit that had its origins in the late 
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1960s. Twenty years later, Wilcox still upheld a sweeping, utopian conception of Harlem 
that provided a dramatic counterpoint to the splintered reality of urbanism by the 1980s.5 
In an era of diminishing public resources, the revolutionary fervor that Wilcox had long 
maintained seemed increasingly quaint. Wilcox reminded his neighbors in 1989 “of our 
absolute obligation to become our own architects,” but the realities of the era demanded 
different expectations.6 While Harlemites increasingly evoked their past to promise an 
impending “Second Renaissance,” the scale of their dreams took on a decidedly moderate 
scope and tone in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Hopes for a large-scale transformation 
of Harlem by its poorest residents had dimmed, as had aspirations that Harlemites could 
collectively own and develop the land underneath their feet. Instead of seeking a 
revolutionary spatial ideal, a new wave of community-based organizations emerged in the 
1980s bearing the mantle of a new pragmatism. 
The austerity of this era brought new limitations upon New York’s citizens, but so 
too did it spawn grassroots efforts that transformed the city’s residential blocks. While 
federal cutbacks in the 1980s undermined the plans of early community development 
corporations (CDCs) like the Harlem Commonwealth Council, the same diminishing 
federal role catalyzed the emergence of a new wave of church-based CDCs in Harlem 
and across the nation. The Abyssinian Development Corporation, affiliated with 
Harlem’s famed Abyssinian Baptist Church, and the Harlem Churches for Community 
Improvement, a coalition of dozens of the neighborhood’s religious institutions, 
participated in crafting a new residential vision for Harlem that relied on outside funding 
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from new sources. In an era when Harlemites feared both impending takeover by 
outsiders and internal deterioration, these organizations managed the transformation of 
the neighborhood through the construction of modest-sized housing developments and 
targeted social services. Whether in rehabilitating Harlem’s existing buildings, tacking a 
path of political moderation to ensure access to resources, or assembling an array of 
funding from a combination of public and private sources, this new wave of CDCs 
evinced a decidedly practical approach to Harlem’s redevelopment.  
Fundamentally, these organizations followed an ascendant ideal of Harlem as a 
mixed-income community, a principle with roots in the new funding landscape in which 
CDCs worked as well as in a social belief that placed tremendous faith in the 
ameliorative power of an economically integrated community. In a period when 
Harlemites continued to fear the forces of gentrification at their door, community 
organizations themselves argued that more moderate- and middle-income residents could 
bring Harlem’s renaissance. While their work never neglected the community’s most 
impoverished residents, new community development corporations nonetheless 
constructed new rental and homeownership opportunities for economically diverse 
residents at a newly enlarged scale. Middle-class homeowners acting in the private 
housing market played a crucial role in altering Harlem’s demographic makeup in the 
1980s and 1990s, to be sure. But the work of not-for-profit community organizations 
likewise contributed to the neighborhood’s economic transformation to an extent that 
observers have largely overlooked. Their emphasis on diversification did not “gentrify” 
Harlem, per se, but marked a dramatic departure from the notion that had once formed 
the foundation of community development: that Harlem’s very strength lay in its 
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predominantly low-income, majority-minority existing population. Newly established 
community development corporations turned an increasingly moderate spatial vision into 
a moderate spatial reality in this era, as they produced hundreds of new homes, homes 
intended for Harlem’s low-income residents but also for the economically secure families 
they hoped to attract, in whom these institutions placed their faith. 
 
Harlem on the Brink 
 
Understanding the vision that community development corporations realized in 
Harlem first requires understanding the paradoxical place in which residents found 
themselves by the mid-1980s. Harlem teetered on the brink in this decade, with both 
internal and external threats confronting its longtime residents. Harlemites increasingly 
feared the consequences as new middle-class residents gradually began to move uptown. 
As the economic upscaling that observers called “gentrification” transformed many of the 
city’s neighborhoods in this period, longstanding residents wondered if their homes were 
next. Yet the neighborhood continued to represent one of New York City’s most 
impoverished communities and one of its most physically deteriorated. The multiple 
concerns that had stoked fears in the previous decade reached a new intensity in this one. 
Caught on the knife’s edge between potentially dangerous isolationism and the equal 
threat of unchecked outside speculation, Harlem’s lasting institutions, especially its 
churches, spawned new initiatives to manage the neighborhood’s transformation in a time 
of change.  
Those who chronicled Harlem’s changing landscape in this turbulent period 
typically began with a question. The exact nature of the query reflected the particular 
viewpoint of the observer, but their premise remained consistent: would Harlem survive 
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the 1980s? In surveying the blocks north of Central Park, for example, Elliott Lee, a 
journalist with Black Enterprise, situated himself amidst the community, wondering, 
“Will We Lose Harlem?” “Unlike any other black community in the world, Harlem 
exerts a profound influence on how we see ourselves,” Lee wrote, linking Harlem’s fate 
with the subjectivity of all African Americans.7 Peter Bailey, writing in Ebony, which 
largely appealed to a black middle-class audience, similarly framed the issue in terms 
suggesting the urgency of imminent loss. “Can Harlem Be Saved?” he asked. The 
necessity of trying to do so seemed self-evident to Bailey, though the answer remained 
undetermined. “Asking a true Harlemite whether Harlem can be saved is like asking the 
average Frenchman or Italian whether Paris or Rome can be saved,” he offered.8  
Even New York magazine, typically at the forefront of middle-class boosterism in 
New York’s gentrifying neighborhoods, adopted a more reverential tone in the case of 
Harlem. Its query, “Can Harlem Be Born Again?” suggested the presumption of loss as 
well as the necessity of revival—the patient had seemingly flat-lined, but salvation was 
on the author’s mind. Though the magazine’s Craig Unger adopted the language of real 
estate investment – Harlem was “underdeveloped,” he wrote – he assessed the costs of 
neighborhood change with evenhandedness. He offered the case of Wanda Kiely, a 
lifelong resident of Harlem, a single mother suffering from multiple sclerosis, and a 
realist who observed new middle-class residents warily. “The yuppies are coming! The 
yuppies are coming!” she told Unger. “They are not ostentatious. They try to fit in. I 
don’t blame them. I’d like to shop at Zabar’s myself.” But, Unger continued, as Kiely 
attempted to describe the reality of new neighbors, she grew upset. “Then her voice 
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rises,” he wrote, quoting Kiely. “‘But I’m shocked. I’m angry. I say, ‘How dare you. 
Your kind. You want to live here? How dare you?’” As Harlem began to transform 
economically, residents like Kiely, who had made the neighborhood their home over 
decades of disinvestment, feared they would be first to lose out. “[T]here have been 
predictions of a rebirth in Harlem for years, all of them premature,” Unger wrote. “If the 
current ones prove more accurate, just about everyone should be pleased. Everyone, that 
is, but the likes of Wanda Kiely.”9 
Concerns that had first materialized as the earliest middle-class investors found 
their way to Harlem in the late 1970s grew as their presence became more evident. If 
fears about the 1982 brownstone lottery as a tipping point had proven to be largely 
exaggerated, the reality of creeping gentrification remained nonetheless concerning from 
the viewpoint of Harlemites like Kiely. Accounts of early middle-class homeowners 
revealed the complicated demographic position most occupied—most were African 
American, and many were former Harlem residents. Unger included two such cases in his 
profile of Harlem, a lawyer who had been born in Harlem but grew up in New Jersey, and 
a photography technician who had grown up in the neighborhood and recently returned as 
a homeowner.10 Many of their new neighbors were also African American, if not 
originally from Harlem’s blocks. Craig Polite, a clinical psychologist with a home on 
West 146th Street, offered a particularly colorful portrait for a Washington Post profile of 
Harlem. As the reporter approached Polite’s sixteen-room mansion – purchased for 
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50,000 dollars in 1979 and still under renovation in 1984 – Beethoven blasted from his 
second floor windows. Polite’s neighbors were busy scraping paint from their mantles 
too. Four other African-American middle-class families had moved to the block, and a 
white teacher had also taken residence with renovation in mind.11 
Black middle-class investors provided something of a conundrum for observers of 
Harlem. Their presence could easily be justified on the basis of race. For example, 
Charles Rangel, Harlem’s longtime congressman, explained that many new residents 
were simply coming home to Harlem. “There are a lot of people out in the suburbs who 
are anxious to get back home,” he said. Among new African-American residents who did 
not actually claim Harlem as a birthplace, many nonetheless claimed it as a birthright, a 
symbolic home if not a literal one. A couple who purchased a townhouse in 1982 near the 
City College of New York had long dreamed of being homeowners in what they called 
the “capital of black America.” Craig Polite celebrated the history and heritage of Sugar 
Hill, the famed Harlem neighborhood he had made his home, and which, as he liked to 
point out, Duke Ellington also had once inhabited.12  
But these new residents ultimately evinced much of the same self-interest that 
motivated many who sought historic homes in impoverished neighborhoods throughout 
New York, no matter their race. While Polite expressed some regret about the possibility 
that the renovation of his block would bring residential displacement of poor neighbors, 
for example, he ultimately dismissed such concerns. “Those people will have to go 
somewhere else,” he explained, naturalizing their predicament. “You’ll have nice people 
                                                
11 Margot Hornblower, “Painful ‘Renaissance’ in Harlem,” Washington Post, 31 July 1984, A1. 
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go, but that’s the way of the world.” The couple that bought the townhouse near City 
College, whose acquisition had a direct impact on its longtime tenants, seemed surprised 
that their upstairs neighbors were not supportive of their renovation plans. “[O]ur dream 
house – like much of the rest of our community – seemed far from dreamlike when we 
took it over. It was then a down-at-the-heels rooming house with eight intransigent 
tenants, none of whom had a glimmer of an interest in our plans to convert the building 
into a perfect urban living space,” the owners said in 1984. Eviction took five months, 
during which the couple at least helped their former tenants find housing. Their tale of the 
early stages of rehabilitation emphasized the hopes such a home held for an ambitious 
family, but also the pecuniary potential a historic house represented as an asset. “Its 
market value has soared by 400 percent since we bought it,” they explained to Black 
Enterprise.13 
African Americans made equal claims on Harlem across income levels. Thus, 
while contemporary accounts suggested the direct social costs inherent in gentrification 
by white or African-American homeowners, observers of the process tended to downplay 
the problem of economic displacement in order to highlight the more volatile issue of 
racial displacement. The Baltimore Afro-American, for instance, offered the alarming 
headline, “Harlem ‘Renaissance’ May Push Out Long-Time Black Residents.”14 Ebony, 
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with its middle-class readership, shaded over potential class conflict in staging an intense 
racial drama, with Harlem lying vulnerable to its captors. “The external forces are 
organized around the menacing and ever-spreading specter of ‘gentrification,’ the take-
over of low-income neighborhoods by middle-class whites returning to the city,” the 
reporter explained. “The basis for this apprehension is the steady northward movement of 
whites to a position where their next logical move is into Harlem.” The “invaders” had 
been on the march north along the Upper West Side, turning its blocks “into havens of 
quiche-eating, boutique-shopping professionals.” Now, Harlem’s best assets could bring 
its own downfall. “Harlem, with its sturdy brownstones, strategic location and ready 
access to public transportation, sits there, like a black plum, ripe, some outsiders believe, 
for plucking.”15 “The Yuppies Are Coming,” Ebony blared in a different headline, 
“Young, Affluent Whites are Taking Over Urban Ghettos.”16 
If such observations revealed real fears that Harlem would lose its place as the 
symbolic heart of black America, they existed in large part only as threats in the mid-
1980s, not as present dangers. New York poked some fun at the media’s tendency to 
exaggerate the degree to which racial change was already underway. “Articles about 
young white professionals moving into Harlem almost all mention Jeffrey Roualt,” the 
owner of a beautifully restored brownstone near Marcus Garvey Park. “Indeed, since 
Roualt moved there five years ago, publications all over the world have reported an 
influx of young white lawyers to Harlem.” The roll was indeed long, encompassing 
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papers from New York, from Atlanta, from Arizona, even from England and France. 
“Yet the only white lawyer ever named is Jeffrey Roualt,” the reporter noted.17  
But Roualt was certainly not alone among new white Harlem residents, nor did 
their relatively minor share of the population mean that further change was not a real 
possibility. As a study on gentrification prepared for the Harlem Urban Development 
Corporation (HUDC) in 1982 explained, “it could happen here.” For the most part, 
neighborhood change remained most palpable on Harlem’s fringes – in the Upper West 
Side and near Columbia University, and in the northern end of the Upper East Side – or 
elsewhere in the city, in neighborhoods like SoHo.18 In Harlem, social scientists found 
unusual increases in income and rent alongside increased residential sales in only a few 
areas, south of Marcus Garvey Park, along the western edge of Central Harlem, and in the 
blocks immediately north of Central Park, and no notable racial change in the 
neighborhood.19 At mid-decade, gentrification remained a phenomenon that observers 
could trace in pockets throughout Harlem but one that had not yet dramatically changed 
the economic and racial composition of the neighborhood. Upheaval from outside 
Harlem’s borders remained ever-present in residents’ minds – a real and disruptive 
prospect that stoked fears – but not yet a full-fledged reality. 
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More immediately, Harlem faced severe social, economic, and physical 
challenges within its borders. Economic upscaling and neighborhood decline were not 
mutually exclusive phenomena; indeed, both could thrive side-by-side. Abandonment had 
provided the brownstones that the city distributed by lottery and auction, for instance, and 
contributed to the decline in property values that made acquisition possible for middle-
class buyers entering Harlem’s real estate market.20 In the mid-1980s, profound 
population loss created a more pressing dilemma than the possibility of rising property 
values. In the three community board districts that constituted Harlem, the city estimated 
a decline of almost a quarter of the area’s population between 1970 and 1980, including a 
loss of a third of the population in Community Board 10, the area that corresponded most 
closely to Central Harlem. The New York Times, employing a more expansive definition 
of Central Harlem, calculated population loss exceeding forty percent in the same 
period.21 The demographic characteristics within that loss suggested troubling trends as 
well. Forty-four percent of residents earning between 15,000 and 20,000 dollars departed 
the neighborhood. Almost 6,000 remaining families earned more than 20,000 dollars, but 
more than three times as many of Harlem’s households earned less than 5,000 dollars at a 
                                                
20 Peter Marcuse notes the linkages between gentrification and abandonment; while the two processes 
tended to occur simultaneously in different parts of a single city, gentrification also could follow 
abandonment, as occurred at times in Harlem. See Marcuse, “Abandonment, Gentrification, and 
Displacement: The Linkages in New York City,” in Gentrification of the City, eds. Neil Smith and Peter 
Williams (Winchester, MA: Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1986), 153-177. 
 
21 The city calculated the population of Community Board 10 as 159,300 in 1970 and 105,800 in 1980. See 
Memo to Herbert Sturz from Con Howe, et. al., 23 October 1984, Box 94, Folder 10, Departmental 
Correspondence-CPC, Edward I. Koch Mayoral Papers, New York City Municipal Archives (hereafter 
Koch Papers). The New York Times estimated Harlem’s 1980 population as 161,498, down from 275,100 in 
1970. See Sheila Rule, “Crossroads for Harlem,” New York Times, 21 November 1980, B3. 
 334 
time when the poverty line for four-person families exceeded 8,000 dollars. Harlem was 
growing substantially poorer .22 
Meanwhile, the housing abandonment that marked the 1970s continued apace in 
the new decade. By 1984, the city owned 1,669 buildings in Harlem, more than a 
thousand of them vacant. Eighteen percent of Harlem’s 57,000 housing units were vacant 
in 1980, one 1986 estimate suggested, and the city had sealed up an additional 20,000 
housing units in the first six years of the decade. While Central Harlem included only two 
percent of New York City’s housing stock, it encompassed one-fifth of the city’s 
abandoned residential buildings.23 In assessing the decline of the African-American 
population in the neighborhood, one reporter matter-of-factly noted the “virtual emptying 
of wide areas in central Harlem.” Historian David Levering Lewis, whose 1981 When 
Harlem Was in Vogue provided a captivating portrait of the neighborhood’s golden age 
during the Harlem Renaissance, offered a more poetic, and tragic, depiction of Harlem’s 
present state to readers of the Times. “History reserves a special paradox for great, dead 
cultures: They survive largely as resonant place names,” Lewis began. “That is Harlem’s 
apotheosis now.” Harlem had suffered a “slow, sleazy death in the late 1970’s,” he wrote. 
Now, in Lewis’s eyes, its greatest blocks were falling to pieces. “On once shimmering, 
ostentatious ‘Sugar Hill,’ the apartment buildings are fortified or empty, their canopies 
and doormen long gone, their lobby tapestries stolen and vases smashed.” Harlem had 
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suffered no single devastating battle in its streets, but many smaller ones had taken their 
toll. “Harlem today resembles nothing so much as France after the Great War,” Lewis 
suggested.24 
If for some observers the Great War had already shaken Harlem’s brick and stone 
facades by the early 1980s, they could never have foretold the tragedies that were still to 
come. The New York Amsterdam News plastered the arrival of one new danger across its 
front page in February 1986. “Crack, Super Drug Hits New York City Streets,” ran the 
headline, and readers soon learned that crack, a smokeable, fast-acting, and highly 
concentrated form of cocaine, had already become ubiquitous among Harlem’s dealers 
and users. Police reported that ninety percent of the cocaine they uncovered in West 
Harlem came in the form of crack. A few months earlier, Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents had busted a “crack factory” in Harlem, a busy operation that 
produced more than two pounds of crack a day, an amount with a street value of half a 
million dollars.25 The mix of abandoned buildings and a burgeoning crack industry 
produced a dystopian reality when the sun went down. On a stretch of 140th Street 
bounded by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. and Frederick Douglass Boulevards, the New York 
Times reported, “the once-grand brownstones are crumbling backdrops for crack selling. 
But they are far from vacant. As night draws near, the ‘vampires come out,’ as one 
resident puts it. In nearly every doorway, clusters of teen-age lookouts scrutinize 
customers,” the reporter described. “Inside virtually every building on the block are 
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young guards with guns. Their age and inexperience with the weapons are two reasons 
for the sharp increase in the shootings and other violence in those neighborhoods.”26 
Reporters connected the rise of crack usage to the other epidemic that was 
sweeping across New York, the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, or AIDS, crisis. 
Half of New York’s AIDS cases were linked to intravenous drug use by 1988, and crack 
offered a high for those who sought to avoid sharing needles. But plenty of users still 
passed IV needles filled with heroin in Harlem’s abandoned buildings, and sex became a 
well-known means of procuring crack cocaine. AIDS spread quickly. If the disease had 
been largely associated publicly with gay, white men downtown in its first years, by mid-
decade experts had begun to realize the speed with which it was moving through Harlem 
and other predominantly minority neighborhoods in New York. Under a thousand cases 
had been reported in Harlem by 1986, a number that likely undercounted actual victims. 
Within five years, health officials guessed, the number of reported cases would approach 
five thousand. Journalists recognized the disease as an epidemic in Harlem, but 
institutions were slow to respond in the neighborhood, whether due to denial, inadequate 
resources, or overtaxed services. Meanwhile, black men were getting the disease two and 
a half times more frequently than their white counterparts, and black women were 
contracting AIDS at a rate twelve and a half times that of white women. AIDS had 
become the leading killer among African-American and Latino men in New York 
between the ages of 25 and 44 by mid-1988. Twin scourges were ripping through the 
already struggling blocks uptown. As the Amsterdam News chillingly titled one report, 
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“Drugs, AIDS, Killing Off Harlem Youths.”27 The neighborhood seemed on the verge of 
implosion. 
Only a few Harlem institutions escaped the negative light in which David 
Levering Lewis painted much of contemporary Harlem. The Apollo Theater, in financial 
trouble in 1981, still stood on 125th Street. The famed Dunbar Apartments and the 
landmark townhouses of Strivers’ Row remained, former homes to many of Harlem’s 
most celebrated residents but now in diminished physical condition. And Harlem’s 
“venerable old churches” persisted, seemingly innocent of the transformations around 
them, “present[ing] proud facades to the public and declining attendance to their 
pastors.”28 Harlem was a city of churches. Literally dozens dotted its blocks, some in 
converted storefronts, others in neat brick buildings that lined up dutifully on their mid-
rise blocks, and still others in stone, with strong bell towers anchoring their corner lots.29 
Early in the 1980s, J. Max Bond, Jr., by this time a City Planning Commissioner and 
chair of Columbia University’s architecture department, wondered if Harlem’s churches 
were doing enough to face down the neighborhood’s crises. “Harlem needs to address the 
more immediate problems of economic deterioration, unemployment, and lack of decent 
housing,” Bond said. “We have a history of churches, fraternal organizations, and 
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building societies pooling resources, but less and less of that is happening. If we continue 
to let Harlem fall apart, then it will become a white middle-class community.”30  
But by mid-decade, Harlem’s churches could do little to avoid the neighborhood’s 
most vexing problems, for they had an often heartbreakingly close vantage point. Preston 
Washington, the pastor at Memorial Baptist Church on West 115th Street, for example, 
described the quotidian in a time of high inflation and high unemployment. “[T]hose of 
us who live and labor in the Harlems, Bedford Stuyvesants and South Bronx’s of this 
Metropolitan area know first hand that hungry bellies and frustrated lives represent the 
signs and symbols of our times,” he wrote soon after Thanksgiving Day in 1982. Next 
door to his church, Washington watched the stunning deterioration of the large apartment 
building at 100 St. Nicholas Avenue. “It was the twilight zone for 100,” Washington 
wrote. “Dope-addicted youth and drug-dispensing adults thrust the building and the 
neighborhood into chaos. The building itself suffered through all too many winters of 
despair, leaving busting pipes to flood entire apartments. Tenants were forced to light gas 
kitchen stoves in order to keep warm, thereby creating a dangerous possibility of 
exposing families to carbon monoxide poisoning.”31 Likewise, Abyssinian Baptist 
Church, Harlem’s best-known congregation, stood sturdily on West 138th Street between 
Lenox Avenue and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Boulevard, just a couple blocks from 
troubled 140th Street. But congregants saw the present reality of Harlem every time they 
left church. “I can look at 138th Street buildings that were completely filled and now have 
only 40 to 50 percent capacity,” Abyssinian’s executive minister, Rev. Calvin O. Butts, 
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III, told a reporter in 1985.32 Virtually the entire stretch of 138th Street facing the church, 
the block’s north side, was empty, city-owned, or both. Six facades hid city-owned 
vacant buildings, and three more vacant buildings remained in private ownership but 
behind in tax payments to the city. Only six out of twenty-two lots held any residents at 
all, and only two of those six buildings remained under private ownership. Seven vacant 
lots pitted the block, like missing teeth.33  
In this context, Harlem’s churches increased their commitment to physical 
redevelopment out of both physical and spiritual necessity. Preston Washington felt 
hemmed in. His neighbor, 100 St. Nicholas Avenue, was an accident away from a 
conflagration, and just on the other side of the west wall of his church. The building on 
the east side of the church, at 135 West 115th Street, contained fewer tenants, many with 
long-term residence, but the landlord had likewise left the apartments for dead. If 
Washington feared the physical consequences of letting the apartment buildings rot, he 
likewise saw their presence as marking “the mission field next door,” as he described it. 
Washington sought to gain control of 100 St. Nicholas Avenue, rehabilitate it, and put it 
under tenant ownership, and to enroll 135 West 115th Street in the Tenant Interim Lease 
program so tenants could eventually own their units. These strategies marked a means of 
bringing Memorial’s ministry into the broader Harlem community.34 The minister of 
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Abyssinian at this time, Dr. Samuel D. Proctor, likewise worried that the physical 
deterioration of Harlem immediately threatened the quality of life of Harlem-based 
congregants, many of whom were elderly. The church thus began to pursue an initial 
housing venture in the early 1980s, a 100-unit project that was to house these and other 
senior and disabled tenants. Abyssinian considered sites directly across from the church 
and a few blocks up Adam Clayton Powell Boulevard, before settling on a city-owned 
site on 131st Street between Fifth Avenue and Lenox Avenue, where the church 
eventually built the apartment building that came to be known as Abyssinian Towers.35  
These initial forays into housing development seeded broader efforts to confront 
Harlem’s troubled landscape. Preston Washington had been born in East Harlem, 
worshipped in a neighborhood storefront church, and left to attend Williams College 
before returning to pursue a doctorate in education at Columbia University. He had begun 
preaching at thirteen, seeking a self-described “practical theology” that he eventually was 
able to find at Memorial Baptist Church, which he joined as the pastor in 1976.36 While 
the church’s work with its immediate neighbors marked an engagement that matched the 
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scale of the moderate-sized church, Washington sought a broader involvement that could 
stem housing problems at a greater scale. In December 1986, he joined more than fifty 
other congregations to form Harlem Churches for Community Improvement (later called 
Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement), or HCCI, an ecumenical coalition 
that encompassed an array of predominantly – but not exclusively – African-American 
church leaders from congregations throughout Harlem, and which Washington led as 
president. HCCI’s first public act involved protests against a bus depot that the 
Metropolitan Transit Authority had planned for West Harlem, a project that Washington 
claimed would be a health nuisance as well as a misuse of resources. Washington called 
for the project budget to be redirected instead to new housing construction in the area, a 
concern that reflected the larger mission of HCCI to address the neighborhood’s 
simultaneous threats. “We…are very much concerned about the lack of affordable 
housing for the people of Harlem,” he wrote in a 1987 Amsterdam News editorial. “We 
are also determined to prevent the displacement of the members of our churches through 
the gentrification of our neighborhood.”37  
Abyssinian likewise expanded its work at Abyssinian Towers into a broader effort 
that sought to rebuild the surrounding neighborhood. The church had a long and 
illustrious history as an advocate for social change in Harlem and throughout New York 
City. Adam Clayton Powell, Sr. had moved the church to Harlem in the 1920s, using his 
powerful pulpit to advocate for civil rights. His son, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., pursued a 
more public role as pastor of Abyssinian, leader of campaigns against racially 
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discriminatory hiring on 125th Street, and longtime congressman from Harlem’s district. 
Samuel Proctor, the church’s senior minister since Powell’s death in 1972, and Calvin 
Butts, his executive minister, maintained a parallel contrast between gravitas and 
charisma, poise and bluster. Proctor encouraged congregants to engage with the 
dilemmas outside the church’s doors but skirted politics and confrontational protest. 
Butts, who took over the pastorate in 1989, sought political involvement and openly 
challenged Harlem and New York City leaders.38  
Abyssinian’s work in housing reflected the concern both leaders shared for 
Harlem’s broader community. While their public statements evinced fundamentally 
different outlooks on engagement, together they encompassed the range of issues 
confronting Harlem’s blocks. Proctor saw Abyssinian’s task as one of healing wounded 
souls. “We are going to take some of these homeless young women with children and try 
to see what love can do for them,” he explained to the Times. Butts, too, insisted on 
attention to individuals, not just their homes. “Where is the single mother with two kids 
going to go? Where is the senior citizen with a modest income going to go?” he asked. 
But he described the problem in political terms. “Gentrification will destroy a black 
political base. The poor people who are here deserve to remain.”39 With support from 
church leadership, volunteers already at work on the senior housing project formalized 
their housing development ministry in 1987, an effort that later became known as the 
Abyssinian Development Corporation (ADC). Karen Phillips, a member of the 
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congregation and landscape architect, served as the de facto leader, and later became 
executive director when the organization incorporated in 1989.40  
While these efforts developed from the experiences of individual congregations 
reacting to their immediate environments, over time they came to take responsibility for 
far broader stretches of territory in their respective communities. Abyssinian 
Development Corporation, for example, initially defined its range as extending from 
West 134th Street to West 141st Street, with an eastern border along Lenox Avenue and a 
western edge at Edgecombe Avenue. The presence of Abyssinian Towers staked the 
church’s claim on that stretch seven blocks south of the church as well.41 Harlem 
Churches for Community Improvement, with an array of members from across Harlem, 
claimed responsibility for the Bradhurst area, a Harlem neighborhood north of 
Abyssinian delineated by 138th Street, 155th Street, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. Boulevard 
and Bradhurst and Edgecombe Boulevards. Bradhurst marked an especially impoverished 
portion of Harlem. A later analysis of the 1990 U.S. Census noted that Bradhurst 
contained the poorest census tract in the entire city, a five-block stretch where almost 75 
percent of residents lived under the poverty level, and only 33 percent of adults had or 
were seeking jobs.42 HCCI joined with established Harlem organizations to propose the 
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redevelopment of the area, an effort that was to include HUDC, the Harlem Business 
Alliance, and others in an entity called the Consortium for Central Harlem Development 
(CCHD). Their November 1988 proposal marked an ambitious, 120-million-dollar vision 
for an area that the city had already designated for a much more modest effort. The power 
struggle that ensued stretched over the next twelve months, but eventually gained the 
Consortium the responsibility of overseeing one of New York’s largest redevelopment 
projects during the following decade.43 
HCCI and ADC marked the advent of a new form of community development 
corporation in Harlem, a nationwide shift effected in large measure by Reagan-era 
funding cuts to American cities. While early CDCs, like the Harlem Commonwealth 
Council, had grown rapidly in a period when they could count on generous federal 
support, they suffered profoundly with the elimination of key agencies like the 
Community Services Administration. Broad funding cuts undermined the means by 
which cities typically paid for such necessities as low-income housing construction, job 
training, and mass transit. The budget of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, for example, plummeted to 10.2 billion dollars in 1988, less than a third of 
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its 1980 budget, and housing-specific resources declined from almost 27 billion dollars in 
1980 to less than four billion at the end of Reagan’s second term. Aid to cities in general 
diminished by sixty percent, with cities over 300,000 in population seeing the federal 
share of their funding decline from 22 percent in 1980 to six percent in 1989.44  
Without dependable federal support for housing construction, but with an acute 
need for housing development in many American cities, CDCs paradoxically boomed in 
the 1980s. One 1987 estimate guessed that over a thousand new CDCs formed in the six 
preceding years. As non-profit institutions, CDCs provided a bridge between available 
public funding, now predominantly at the state and local level, and private sources that 
increasingly played a role in housing development (discussed in further detail below). 
With institutional bases in longstanding institutions such as the African-American 
church, such organizations claimed legitimacy as community representatives and 
maintained a persistent physical presence amidst deteriorating blocks. Churches had long 
played an essential role in development in New York, but such activities proliferated in 
the years preceding the formation of HCCI and ADC. For example, East Brooklyn 
Churches, South Bronx Churches, the Association of Brooklyn Clergy for Community 
Development, the Southeast Queens Clergy for Community Empowerment, and Bronx 
Shepherds Restoration Corporation, all coalitions of multiple churches, formed by the 
mid-1980s, and several churches throughout the five boroughs formed individual CDCs 
akin to Abyssinian’s effort. Programs like East Brooklyn Churches’ Nehemiah Homes 
project, a homeownership initiative that eventually produced 2,400 row houses, 
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established church-based CDCs as key actors in the redevelopment of vast stretches of 
New York City.45 
 While HCCI and ADC formed in response to the specific conditions of Harlem, 
then, they were also part of a much broader movement. By the 1990s, each had gained 
responsibility for the stewardship and development of a broad swath of Harlem. Between 
the two CDCs, their domain covered nearly half of Central Harlem north of 125th Street. 
Both organizations professed a comprehensive strategy for their respective efforts. 
“We’re talking about neighborhood revitalization, not simply housing renovation,” 
Preston Washington explained. Abyssinian similarly projected housing development 
alongside social services, economic development, drug rehabilitation, and care for 
teenage mothers. While neither CDC focused exclusively on housing development, 
however, the physical reconstruction of Harlem’s blocks would mark their most visible 
impact in a neighborhood undergoing dramatic change. “We’re talking about making the 
area beautiful,” Washington said.46 Their vision for who should fill those homes marked 
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an idealistic dream for Harlem’s future, one that differed dramatically from idealistic 
dreams long gone. 
 
The Promise of Economic Integration 
In a neighborhood confronted with both internal decline and the threat of external 
upheaval, community development corporations could take any of a number of paths. 
They could adopt a defensive stance, barring access to Harlem to prevent newcomers 
from disrupting existing residents. Or they could open the neighborhood’s gates wide, 
hoping that new investors would redevelop Harlem for multiple constituencies. In the late 
1980s, however, Harlem’s CDCs chose to occupy a middle ground, attempting to manage 
change in the neighborhood by accommodating both longtime Harlemites and the 
increasing number of middle-class families knocking on Harlem’s door. As Abyssinian 
identified early on in their goals for ADC, for example, their focus was on “balancing 
proposed development” while “preserving existing residents.”47 This approach marked a 
significant departure from the notion that the very roots of Harlem’s revival lay in its 
predominantly low-income population, a central idea that had motivated community 
development advocates in the 1960s and 1970s. The movement to a mixed-income ideal 
drew especially from developments in the social sciences in this period. With observers 
increasingly focused on the appearance of an “underclass” in Harlem and other poverty-
stricken neighborhoods, community organizations seized on economic integration as a 
panacea. Rather than viewing the middle-class as a looming threat, CDCs placed their 
faith in income diversification as a means of meeting Harlem’s socioeconomic crises. 
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Figure 5.1. Residential development plan for Bradhurst neighborhood, 1989. CCHD 
and HUDC, “Public Presentation on the Bradhurst Neighborhood Revitalization Plan,” 
23 June 1989, Box 2, Folder 5, Wilson Papers. 
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Mixed-income housing appeared in the plans of Harlem’s new CDCs from their 
earliest conception. In the case of Bradhurst, for example, the city’s Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development initially proposed a plan consisting of 1,200 units 
of housing, targeted to residents making no more than 25,000 dollars a year. The 
Consortium for Central Harlem Development, on the other hand, envisioned a 
community with 2,256 newly developed housing units for a range of residents, earning 
from 11,000 dollars to 35,000 dollars a year. The difference was subtle, but significant. 
While the city’s plan would accommodate incomes exceeding those of many who 
inhabited Bradhurst in the late 1980s, its vision encompassed a far narrower income band 
than that of the ministers, and included fewer housing options—the city intended to 
develop only rental units, while CCHD planned to offer rental housing as well as owner-
occupied units. Under the CCHD plan, 834 units were to be reserved for existing 
residents, and 364 units for the homeless. But almost as many homes were to house 
families with greater means. Four hundred and twelve units were to accommodate 
moderate-income families in rental or cooperatively owned units, and 646 of the 
neighborhood’s new units were to be middle-class condominiums. Subsequent plans 
expanded on this idea, with a mid-1989 proposal (Figure 5.1) encompassing 2,800 units, 
50 percent owned as cooperatives and condominiums, and the other half intended to 
begin as rental but convert to ownership units. In the vision that the ministers imagined 
for Bradhurst, the neighborhood would contain decent housing at several income levels. 
Almost 50 percent more residents earning more than 35,000 dollars would call Bradhurst 
home, as their 8.5 percent share in 1989 increased to a planned 12.4 percent.48  
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The Abyssinian Development Corporation proceeded without a comprehensive 
plan, but nonetheless pursued a vision of economic diversity in neighboring blocks that, 
like the Bradhurst project, encompassed both existing and new residents. Abyssinian’s 
first projects targeted the neighborhood’s most vulnerable residents. Soon after 
completing plans for the senior citizen housing at Abyssinian Towers, the church began 
renovations in a nearby building to create a 24-unit transitional apartment building for 
homeless families, called Abyssinian House. The volunteers who would become ADC 
also planned housing for at-risk young men and for teenage mothers, while beginning to 
explore options for constructing housing affordable to families earning both low and 
moderate incomes. On West 131st and West 138th Streets, the church initiated discussions 
in the late 1980s to build middle-income, owner-occupied housing. This endeavor 
became the church’s third housing development. West One Three One Plaza, as the 
project came to be known, began in 1989 and involved the creation of 34 one, two, and 
three bedroom homes across from Abyssinian Towers. The CDC sought to attract 
families earning between 24,000 and 54,000 (1990) dollars to the 131st Street block that 
ADC had begun to reconstruct.49  
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Such economically integrated plans marked a moderate vision of Harlem’s future, 
one consistent with the overall goals of HCCI and ADC to “balance” development that 
seemed inevitable by the late 1980s, and to turn it to the advantage of existing residents. 
In assessing the stock of abandoned buildings that remained in Harlem, for example, 
Abyssinian observed that they represented both a potential danger in the hands of 
speculators and an asset that the CDC itself could shape. “Many city owned structures in 
the Harlem community are being made available,” leaders wrote. “Institutions in this 
community like ours need to have mechanisms in place to participate in this and other 
programs in which developers are being invited into Harlem so that we can guide the 
redevelopment of this community.”50 Staff overseeing the Bradhurst project echoed 
ADC’s goal of “balancing proposed development” in advocating the use of economically 
diverse housing as a means of achieving “social and economic balance” in the 
neighborhood. In articulating the mix of homes that would fill Bradhurst’s blocks, 
planners explained their intention to diversify the neighborhood while retaining longtime 
residents. “The Bradhurst plan involves a variety of conceptual premises that need to be 
stated,” they explained at an early public meeting. “First is the need to develop an 
income-mixed community without displacing existing tenants.”51  
Economically diverse housing did not originate in the late 1980s, to be sure. 
Indeed, the emergence of economic integration as a planning goal paralleled racial 
integration, as a means of diversifying American neighborhoods that bore the mark of 
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social stratification. Even later proponents’ discussion of “balance” recalled discussions 
that had arisen at midcentury, when urban renewal remained ascendant. The “balanced 
neighborhood” emerged as an alternative to the architectural, economic, and racial 
segregation of large-scale redevelopment, a goal “with many meanings,” explained 
housing expert Elizabeth Wood in 1960, but one that remained constant: “it always 
means mixture or heterogeneity of population…[and] also signifies that this 
heterogeneity is desirable.” Heterogeneity offered a counterpoint to racial segregation, a 
“wrong both practically and morally,” and to economic segregation, “equally bad both 
practically and morally.”52  
Heterogeneity as an end in itself, as a concept imbued with intrinsic value, 
marked a through line in the post-urban renewal period, a vestige of racial liberalism that 
ran counter to the more radical ideals of the community control movement. The New 
York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), for instance, maintained economic 
integration as a stated goal in the projects it built across the state. UDC’s 70 percent 
moderate- or middle-income, 20 percent low-income, and 10 percent senior citizen 
balance in part grew from leaders’ sense that the failures of public housing arose from the 
economic segregation of residents. UDC maintained a similar income mix in its highly 
visible redevelopment of New York City’s Roosevelt Island and, in Harlem, at the twin 
towers that made up the Schomburg Plaza project at Fifth Avenue and 110th Street in the 
early 1970s.53 The Harlem Urban Development Corporation loosely maintained its parent 
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agency’s approach in the projects it sponsored throughout Harlem, which included low-
income housing, housing for senior citizens, single room occupancy housing, and, by the 
mid-1980s, condominium development targeted to middle-income buyers.54 Such trends 
towards middle-class homeownership in Harlem built upon a longer history that dated 
back as early as the 1910s, when New York’s African-American residents came to settle 
Harlem in large numbers and the neighborhood bore an economically diverse cast that 
had diminished in recent decades.55   
If the pursuit of such income diverse housing claimed roots in both the history of 
progressive housing policy and in the history of Harlem, it gained new prominence in the 
realm of community development in the late 1980s with the research of University of 
Chicago sociologist William Julius Wilson. Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged, 
published in October 1987, offered a complex analysis of the factors underlying the rise 
of a so-called underclass in American cities, a group that Wilson characterized as 
“individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment 
or are not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and 
other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-term spells of poverty 
and/or welfare dependency.” Wilson described the emergence of such a group “outside 
the mainstream of the American occupational system” as a consequence of broad 
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structural forces in predominantly African-American urban neighborhoods.56 While 
neighborhoods such as Harlem had always held a significant portion of residents living in 
poverty, Wilson contended, the concentration of that population grew substantially in the 
1960s due to shifts in the labor market from “goods-producing to service-producing 
industries,” greater wage polarization, and the movement of jobs out of city centers. 
Minority urban residents without extensive formal training increasingly found themselves 
without skills to obtain work in ascendant labor sectors, and available unskilled jobs 
moved increasingly out of geographic reach.57  
Alongside rising joblessness, the social composition of predominantly African-
American urban neighborhoods changed as a consequence of African-American middle-
class migration from the inner city. Wilson ascribed this phenomenon to both increasing 
movement of African Americans into “mainstream” occupations and the diminished 
residential barriers that had previously limited the housing choice of middle-class African 
Americans. Such families had provided a “social buffer,” Wilson argued, “that could 
deflect the full impact of the kind of prolonged and increased joblessness that plagued 
inner-city neighborhoods in the 1970s and early 1980s.” This “buffer” manifested itself 
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in institutions that could support residents in times of high unemployment and in “role 
models” who could emphasize the importance of education, employment, and “family 
stability.” Without middle-class residents in neighborhoods like Harlem, Wilson wrote, 
“a sudden and/or prolonged increase in joblessness…creates a ripple effect resulting in an 
exponential increase in related forms of social dislocation.”58 
Wilson’s argument in The Truly Disadvantaged hinged on a spatial conception of 
social phenomena, especially the presence or absence of integration along economic lines 
in the bounded space of a neighborhood. The “massive joblessness, flagrant and open 
lawlessness, and low-achieving schools” that Wilson observed in high poverty 
environments yielded greater disconnection between residents of such neighborhoods and 
those who resided elsewhere. The consequence, he argued, was “social isolation,” a term 
that Wilson offered as an alternative to the controversial notion of a “culture of poverty.” 
Whereas “culture of poverty” assumed destructive characteristics internalized by the 
urban poor, “social isolation” explained social problems as the outcome of structural 
forces. Social isolation worsened the problems already present in many inner-city 
neighborhoods, Wilson argued, such as unemployment, deficient education, low marriage 
rates, and crime. “Social isolation…not only implies that contact between groups of 
different class and/or racial backgrounds is either lacking or has become increasingly 
intermittent,” Wilson wrote, “but that the nature of this contact enhances the effects of 
living in a highly concentrated poverty area.” As Wilson explained, neighborhoods like 
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Harlem suffered “concentration effects,” the negative social outcomes of an increasingly 
poorer population within a defined space.59 
Wilson’s work quickly reached a high level of visibility, not only in public 
discourse at large but also in the kinds of communities he chronicled, including Harlem. 
The substantial initial impact of The Truly Disadvantaged arose in part because its mix of 
structural and cultural explanations challenged both liberal and conservative orthodoxy—
which tended to highlight the effects of racism in the case of the former, and behavioral 
explanations for poverty in the case of the latter. Wilson had already reached the 
prominence of a major public intellectual with his previous book, The Declining 
Significance of Race, in 1978. He received a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship, a so-
called “genius grant,” in 1987. Unsurprisingly, The Truly Disadvantaged garnered a 
front-page review in The New York Times Book Review and an interview in the Times in 
which Wilson articulated many of the book’s major arguments.60 In Harlem, leaders 
invited Wilson to present his recent research as the keynote speaker at a major March 
1988 conference organized by the Harlem Urban Development Corporation, entitled 
“Building Harlem for Harlem Through Unity: A Community-Wide Conference on 
Development.” Background materials distributed to participants highlighted Wilson’s 
work, including his recently published The Truly Disadvantaged. Sessions debated the 
neighborhood’s economic and social dilemmas as well as the potential that Harlem would 
undergo change. Many of the major figures in Harlem’s development during the previous 
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two decades participated, including Preston Wilcox, Alice Kornegay, and James Dowdy. 
The younger generation of community developers attended too. Abyssinian’s Calvin 
Butts and Preston Washington, of Memorial Baptist Church and HCCI, were among 
those who listened to Wilson’s keynote before sitting side-by-side on their own panel, 
entitled, “the role of religious organizations, businesses, and political leaders in the 
redevelopment of Harlem.”61 
If Wilson’s analysis served as a diagnosis of problems already underway in 
American cities, for many observers it also became a prescription. This proved true in 
Harlem as well as in urban policy at large. Wilson’s major argument – that joblessness 
and outward migration of the African-American middle-class had created unprecedented 
concentrations of poverty, and that those concentrations in turn worsened the effects of 
poverty – suggested a logical corollary. If the lack of middle-class residents in 
neighborhoods like Harlem had worsened the maladies of those communities, then the 
solution to such maladies, many assumed, lay in the pursuit of economic reintegration. 
While proponents had earlier backed income integration on moral grounds, in this period 
they increasingly cast it in socially ameliorative, even socially deterministic, terms. 
Indeed, several of the resolutions that participants adopted at “Building Harlem For 
Harlem Through Unity” involved the neighborhood’s housing, and such statements 
emphasized the effects attributed to economic diversification, using Wilsonian language 
as justification. “The Harlem community is in favor of mixed income housing,” one 
resolution read, “which will impact positively on the schools and education; eliminate 
isolation of the poor from the job network; and provide formal and informal social 
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controls.” A second resolution opposed any plans that would build housing only for the 
poor and homeless in Harlem. “The Harlem community is unalterably opposed to 
economically segregated housing,” it stated. “Sections and neighborhoods relegated to 
lowest income and homeless individuals reinforce underclass patterns of behavior, 
deterioration and flight of moderate and middle income individuals.”62 
CDCs looked to mixed-income housing out of a belief that returning middle-class 
families would provide a foundational base in the community, undoing the “concentration 
effects” that had arisen during an extended period of high poverty. As the first middle-
class homeownership project to be built by either HCCI or ADC in Harlem, ADC’s West 
One Three One Plaza especially exemplified this intention (Figure 5.2). “West One Three 
One Plaza…reinforces our concept of having a mixture of income levels in the housing 
units we provide,” Calvin Butts explained.63 Units were to remain affordable, with 
subsidies for those who qualified, but backers explicitly targeted economically secure, 
working families. Though four one-bedroom homes were available in the rehabilitated, 
formerly vacant and city-owned buildings, for instance, the majority of units provided 
more spacious quarters, including 30 larger units with two bedrooms and two duplex 
units with three bedrooms. Advertising materials promoted Central Harlem’s proximity 
to daycare, public and private schools, and buses and subways connecting uptown with  
                                                
62 “Building Harlem For Harlem Through Unity,” New York Amsterdam News, 26 March 1988, 29. Wilson 
notes this common interpretation of his work, especially in such later policies as the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s HOPE VI program, which replaced public housing with mixed-income 
developments. Wilson offered his own policy suggestions in The Truly Disadvantaged, which emphasized 
broad structural transformation through the universal expansion of economic opportunity. Such policies 
were to enable greater social and geographic mobility among the very poor. Wilson is careful to point out 
that he never called for the displacement of low-income residents as a means of reducing concentrations of 
poverty. See William Julius Wilson, “Reflections on Responses to The Truly Disadvantaged,” in The Truly 
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012); Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, 140-64. 
 
63 J. Zamgba Browne, “Abyssinian Project Ready for Tenancy,” New York Amsterdam News, 3 July 1993, 
40. 
 359 
 
Figure 5.2. West One Three One Plaza, West 131st Street. Completed 1993. 
Photograph by author. 
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downtown and “midtown Manhattan department stores.” Amenities attracted buyers who 
could afford to choose based on comfort and quality, not simply a need for shelter. Units 
featured “oak-strip flooring,” kitchens boasted oak cabinets and mica counters. Closets 
were “abundant and spacious,” bathrooms “elegant,” floor plans “unique,” and ceilings 
“high.” The duplexes included fireplace mantles, all homes had intercoms for security, 
and the buildings contained their own laundry facilities.  The units were not opulent or 
excessive, to be sure, but designed to be equivalent to what a middle-class family might 
seek elsewhere in the city.64 
In appealing to such families, ADC seemingly had in mind those who might 
already be considering a move to Harlem through the private real estate market, 
especially the enterprising African-Americans who made up the leading edge of 
gentrification in the neighborhood. Race remained decidedly – and necessarily – latent as 
CDCs pursued a mixed-income future for Harlem, but advertising materials subtly 
targeted the African-American middle class, the absence of which Wilson highlighted in 
his work. Though units were marketed for the amenities they shared with homes 
elsewhere in New York, Harlem itself remained a prominently advertised feature as 
developers sought to attract buyers. “Become a Harlem Homeowner!” promotional flyers 
encouraged, asking buyers to claim their place in the neighborhood. “Take stock in your 
community” marked an even more personal appeal, drawing on the sentimental 
associations many middle-class African Americans claimed upon moving to Harlem. 
Advertisements emphasized the nearby cultural institutions that recorded Harlem’s 
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history as an African-American community, including the Studio Museum, the Apollo 
Theater, the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, and the National Black 
Theater. One advertisement for West One Three One Plaza pictured a smiling young 
African-American couple, professionally dressed and in a domestic environment with 
pictures hanging on the wall—an image reflecting that of potential residents.65  
The condominium project signaled the role that community development 
corporations intended new middle-class migrants to play as they attempted to “balance” 
Harlem’s residential landscape. Advertisements appealed to homeowners’ independence, 
promising the ideal of individual control. “Be your own landlord!” they proclaimed, and 
“Stop Paying Rent!”66 But CDCs also asked potential residents to share in the collective 
project of improvement. Ads encouraged prospective buyers to “Take stock in Harlem.” 
Others detailed the buildings’ role – and thus, that of the homeowners – in the 
reconstruction of their surrounding neighborhood. The development was “part of 
Abyssinian Baptist Church’s development corporation’s initiative to restore the block,” 
advertisements explained. “Renovation is scheduled for 13 additional buildings on the 
block.”67 One early homeowner at West One Three One Plaza demonstrated the 
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commitment ADC hoped residents would make, echoing those who had purchased the 
twelve brownstones the city lotteried in the early 1980s (described in Chapter Four). “I 
fell in love with it the moment I saw it,” Hope McGarrity said of her new home. “I knew 
it had to be mine.” As McGarrity showed a reporter around, her enthusiasm suggested 
tremendous pride in the recently refurbished unit. “I like being able to throw back the 
blinds,” McGarrity said. “You should see it when the sunlight comes in in the 
morning.”68 
Planners remained realistic about the scope of problems Harlemites faced. For 
example, comprehensive social services formed a central part of the Bradhurst plan, one 
of the major goals that proponents prioritized alongside income diversity and 
homeownership. The Consortium for Central Harlem Development emphasized job 
training, educational programs, daycare, and health centers. Plans included a “community 
service center” that would serve as a hub for programming and service provision. 
Abyssinian Development Corporation likewise described a “comprehensive approach,” 
including social services for formerly homeless families that moved into its properties.69  
But alongside such individual-level approaches, proponents placed great hope in 
the belief that the growing middle-class population in developments like West One Three 
One Plaza would yield profound benefits, finding in income diversity the structural 
means by which the neighborhood’s social and economic problems would improve. 
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Explanations of the intended effects of mixed-income housing directly appropriated 
Wilson’s own language, imagining a future for Harlem with diminished “social 
dislocation.” Many such descriptions involved “stability,” portraying Harlem as an 
architectural frame with deficient supports, for example, a metaphor that suggested 
Wilson’s own argument that those in communities with high concentrations of poverty 
“seldom have sustained contact with friends or relatives in the more stable areas of the 
city or in the suburbs.”70 Planners wrote that the goal of the Bradhurst Plan was to 
“stabilize the neighborhood by creating an income-mixed community including working 
class, business and professional people with emphasis on home ownership.” Paraphrasing 
Karen Phillips of ADC, one reporter recorded the hopes contained in West One Three 
One Plaza: “The goal…was to get middle-income house-owners to the area because they 
would bring a stability that low-income housing could not.”71  
At their most aspirational, planners linked economically diverse housing to 
Harlem’s deepest socioeconomic challenges. New “working and middle income 
households…will expedite the stabilization of the area and pull the torn social fabric 
together,” Bradhurst participants explained, conceiving of Harlem as a damaged textile, 
largely intact but with ruptures that required mending. Bradhurst planners noted the 
“economic isolation that results in poverty and its accompanying social pathologies,” 
invoking the “social isolation” of The Truly Disadvantaged.72 Alluding to Wilson’s 
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argument that the loss of the middle-class in inner-city neighborhoods removed crucial 
role models as a “social buffer,” planners described the introduction of professionals and 
working people “as a means to foster acceptable social norms by reducing the 
proliferation of drugs, crime, and related social ills.”73  
Abyssinian Development Corporation later tied Harlem’s income diversity to its 
very possibility of persisting as a community. “A basic conviction guides ADC’s 
Housing Initiative,” staff wrote, “for a community to have viability it must have a 
housing stock that offers opportunities for the participation of diverse groups—low-
income, moderate-income, formerly homeless, renters and home owners.”74 Economic 
integration had emerged as the predominant approach to reconstructing both Harlem’s 
physical and social environments, a subtle refutation of past hopes that Harlem’s 
renaissance would grow from its majority low-income population. Instead of utopia, 
community development corporations in the late 1980s and early 1990s settled for a more 
modest approach to redevelopment that sought to turn the phenomenon of middle-class 
settlement to the existing community’s advantage. Instead of radical transformation, 
proponents settled for a new pragmatism as they brought their vision into physical form. 
 
New Pragmatism Uptown 
By the mid-1990s, as the earliest projects of ADC and HCCI took shape, the 
landscape around Abyssinian Baptist Church and in the Bradhurst neighborhood began to 
change, if slowly. Gradually both CDCs built a range of housing developments, some 
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targeted to low-income tenants and others to moderate- and middle-income families, 
some for owners and many for renters. Bradhurst’s first phase encompassed 290 units on 
145th Street and along Frederick Douglass Boulevard (Figure 5.3). One-hundred and 
fifteen units targeted moderate-income tenants, with two bedroom units for incomes 
ranging from 23,000 to 40,500 (1989) dollars; 112 units were for low-income families, 
with two-bedroom units targeting those earning 16,380 to 24,300 dollars; and 58 units 
were to house very low-income Harlemites in overcrowded conditions or otherwise 
needing relocation, with two-bedroom units for those earning up to 15,245 dollars.75 
HCCI’s Reverend Dr. John J. Sass Plaza project included 94 rental units, half for 
formerly homeless tenants, and half for low-income tenants. The organization’s 77-unit 
HCCI Plaza I (Figure 5.4) and 59-unit HCCI Plaza II likewise housed low-income 
tenants in Bradhurst, while the 281 units of Phase II of the Bradhurst project maintained 
the low- and moderate-income balance of the first phase.76  
Abyssinian Development Corporation, too, brought its mixed-income vision to 
reality, supporting low-income tenants in its 71-unit Hattie Dodson Houses, in the 42-unit 
George W. Lewis Houses, and in the 66-unit Lilian Upshur Houses, with thirty percent of 
units reserved for homeless families. In other projects, ADC housed moderate-income 
residents. For example, the Samuel D. Proctor Apartments, across from the church, 
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Figure 5.3. Bradhurst Phase I, Site 1B, 239-51 West 145th Street. Completed 1993. 
Photograph by author. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. HCCI Plaza I, 210 West 146th Street. Completed 1993. Photograph by 
author. 
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included 25 affordable rental units for a range of incomes. As mentioned above, West 
One Three One Plaza offered 34 homeownership units. ADC acted as the marketing 
partner for 24 rehabilitated brownstones on West 126th and West 127th Streets, intended 
for middle-income owner-occupants. And on Astor Row, the stretch of West 130th Street 
famed for its unique wooden porches, Abyssinian participated in the rehabilitation in the 
early 1990s of two vacant homes into eight limited-equity cooperatives for low- and 
moderate-income families.77 The completion of such projects marked more than a 
culmination of the work Harlem’s church-based CDCs had administered since 
confronting the reality of their neighborhoods in the mid-1980s. As they rebuilt adjacent 
blocks with economic integration in mind, building-by-building, the CDCs also made 
physical an approach to community development overwhelmingly characterized by its 
economic, political, and architectural pragmatism. The landscape they produced – 
increasingly fueled by hybridized funding sources that merged the public and the private, 
marked by an emphasis on political realism over idealism, and dependent on the 
continued reuse of existing buildings – signaled the moderation ascendant in this period. 
In rebuilding Harlem’s blocks, CDCs responded to the exigencies of housing 
development in a time of diminished federal aid. Their interest in mixed-income housing 
coincided with a funding context that increasingly emphasized – and accommodated – 
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such approaches. This was a distinct irony of the decline of the federal role in local 
housing development. Until the Reagan administration drastically reduced its 
contribution to housing in American cities, federal housing programs remained a vital, if 
declining, engine for the construction and renovation of low-income housing in New 
York. By 1980, for example, New Yorkers had built or rehabbed as many as 10,000 low-
income units in the city through Section 8, a program enacted under the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974. But Reagan officials eyed changes in the program 
from their first year in office, eventually replacing the program’s support for construction 
with a voucher-based approach that subsidized low-income rents in existing buildings 
and added no new housing to the existing stock.78 This was a major problem for 
municipal governments that had come to depend on federal aid to provide affordable 
housing. New York Mayor Ed Koch explained the issue in typically blunt terms. “You 
probably all know that the federal government used to have, and still has the 
responsibility of providing housing for those who can’t afford market rate housing,” 
Koch said in a 1988 speech. “But it has been abandoned by the Reagan administration.”79  
Without the federal government as a major player in new housing construction 
and renovation, but with an acute shortage of affordable housing in New York, city and 
state officials had little choice but to increase their role in housing provision. For Koch, 
this provided an opportunity to advance the economic integration he had long favored as 
his vision of New York City. Koch’s Ten Year Housing Plan, announced in 1986, 
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marked the grandest municipal housing program in the United States. He initially 
promised 4.2 billion dollars for the development of 252,000 affordable units, and 
expanded support to a staggering 5.1 billion dollars in 1988. Koch’s Ten Year Plan in 
part suggested the evolution of the city’s approach to the still-large stock of buildings it 
reluctantly owned. “The commitment of the Ten Year Plan is that every structurally 
sound vacant building in the city that we own – that’s 5,000 buildings in all – will be 
rehabilitated and turned into affordable housing for people making $32,000 a year or 
less,” Koch promised. The Ten Year Plan likewise funded the rehabilitation of city- and 
privately-owned occupied apartments and new construction of apartments and owned 
properties. Many ownership properties were intended for middle-income buyers, a 
demographic that made up a significant portion, though by no means a majority, of 
Koch’s plan—according to the city, 61 percent of units built under the Ten Year Plan 
were to house low-income New Yorkers, 26 percent were to house those of moderate 
income, and 13 percent were to house middle-income residents.80 
Economically eclectic inhabitants reflected the eclectic participants that helped 
make the Ten Year Plan a reality. While the city had been near the brink of economic 
bankruptcy by the mid-1970s, its recovery by the mid-1980s enabled officials to plan 
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boldly from the city’s capital budget, a source that the city combined with newly 
available state funding, including a Low Income Housing Trust Fund initiated by 
Governor Mario Cuomo and payments gained from the development of Battery Park 
City. If public funding sources provided the majority of the resources behind the plan, 
however, the multitude of programs under which officials developed housing depended 
on a range of private- and non-profit sector partners that arrived amidst federal 
austerity.81  
Entities commonly called “intermediaries” marked one such partner that emerged 
in the early 1980s and played a central role in the Ten Year Plan. The best-known 
intermediaries, the Local Initiatives Support Corporation – initiated by the Ford 
Foundation and six corporate partners – and the Enterprise Foundation, begun by 
developer James Rouse, channeled private funding to local development corporations for 
the purpose of affordable housing construction, while also providing technical assistance. 
Intermediaries convinced insurance companies, banks, and other corporations that low-
income housing could be a safe and profitable investment, attracting direct contributions 
or indirect funding through the federal Low Income Housing Tax Credit, which became 
available in 1986. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit incentivized private investment 
in affordable housing, providing a tax credit to corporations that invested in a general 
fund with close administrative ties to the intermediaries, who in turn lent to neighborhood 
organizations for housing construction. By 1989, estimated Mitchell Sviridoff, the first 
president of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, the organization had garnered 350 
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corporate investors and more than a hundred million dollars that it invested in 500 
projects nationwide.82  
While such financing required the construction of rental units, other partners, such 
as the New York City Housing Partnership, aided the city’s efforts to build ownership 
housing through the Ten Year Plan. Initiated by banker David Rockefeller in 1981 as an 
outgrowth of the New York City Partnership, a pro-development coalition of New York 
business interests, the Housing Partnership supported the construction of middle-income 
homes on city-owned land or in city-owned buildings. Major New York banks such as 
Chase, Chemical, and Citibank provided market-rate loans to fund such projects, which 
served the minimum income level that members deemed still profitable. Though the 
Partnership required a twenty-percent public subsidy to receive its assistance, the city 
eagerly sought such private aid towards its own ends. “[T]he work that organization does 
in conjunction with [the city] truly illustrates how fruitful a partnership between 
government and the private sector can be,” one city publication read. Housing Partnership 
developments often followed a suburban model of low-density and low-rise buildings in a 
dense urban context. In Harlem, however, the Housing Partnership’s largest move came 
at the northwest corner of Central Park, where it helped finance the 599-unit Towers in 
the Park, a predominantly middle-income project completed in 1988 that involved HUDC 
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and the design hand of Max Bond, who had been involved with planning for that site 
since 1970.83 
 In a sense, the approach to housing symbolized by the participants in the Ten 
Year Plan – which also included programs targeting private developers and private 
construction firms – marked the realization of the patchwork nature of low-income 
homesteading on a tremendously enlarged scale. This pragmatism characterized 
development in general in the 1980s, an era demanding innovation in the absence of 
conventional funding sources. “Explaining the Improbable,” one contemporary analyst 
titled a study of downtown development, writing, “[A]fter a long tenure as regulators and 
donors, cities became dealmakers and co-investors in private development projects.”84 
The same flexibility and creativity held true in the realm of affordable housing 
construction. City officials packaged intermediary funding with their own low-interest 
loans to support Ten Year Plan initiatives such as the rehabilitation of vacant buildings 
for low-income and homeless housing, for example, passed along groups of city-owned 
buildings to private developers who competed for the right to rehab them, and worked 
with a range of non-profit neighborhood organizations, including those in Harlem. One 
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1989 update on the Ten Year Plan listed fifteen ongoing housing development programs, 
including initiatives under the Division of Alternative Management Programs (see 
Chapter Four). The policies that Koch established during the last years of his mayoralty 
set in motion an effort that involved a wide array of partners in all sectors. While never 
exclusively subsidized by private funding, the means of housing production at this time 
marked a new scale of public-private partnership in residential development.85 
Community development corporations like the Abyssinian Development 
Corporation and the Harlem Churches for Community Improvement thus arrived into a 
context in which they faced new limitations as well as new opportunities. In many ways, 
it was the very fact that financing was so fragmented in this era that enabled the diverse 
approaches CDCs took. The funding landscape they inhabited shaped their work, but also 
coincided with their own vision for social amelioration through economic integration in 
Harlem. HCCI, for instance, found Koch an initially unwilling ally who needed 
considerable convincing that the partners of the Consortium for Central Harlem 
Development should take on the Bradhurst Plan. CCHD only gained that responsibility in 
the last month of Koch’s term. But like Koch, they aspired toward a mixed-income 
neighborhood makeup, and the policies that Koch launched in part underwrote the 
projects they constructed in succeeding years with greater funding assistance from 
Koch’s successor, Mayor David Dinkins. To an even greater extent, ADC – without the 
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state ties that HCCI claimed through its partnership with the Harlem Urban Development 
Corporation – relied on the elements of the Ten Year Plan.86  
The various programs that CDCs could tap facilitated the economic integration at 
the heart of their housing development ventures. A building for seniors might draw from 
one source, a building for the homeless from a different program, a low-income housing 
development from a funding intermediary, and middle-income housing from more direct 
private sources, providing a collage of both means and outcomes. Funding for buildings 
in the Bradhurst plan included resources from the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
procured through the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC); the Ten Year Plan’s 
Homeless Housing Program; and the New York State Low Income Housing Trust Fund. 
Near Memorial Baptist Church, HCCI developed low-income housing financed through 
LISC and senior citizen housing funded through the Section 202 program, one of the few 
resources still available at the federal level.87 ADC also leaned on Section 202 and the 
city’s Homeless Housing Program. The Hattie Dodson Houses and Lilian Upshur Houses 
provided low-income housing financed by LISC and the other major housing 
intermediary, the Enterprise Foundation, in conjunction with the city Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development. The Ten Year Plan’s Special Initiatives 
Program, which hired private contractors to rehab vacant buildings for a combination of 
homeless, low- and moderate-income families, funded ADC’s work on 129th and 137th 
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Streets and Fifth Avenue. The CDC financed other moderate-income housing through the 
city’s Vacant Buildings Program and with the help of the Enterprise Foundation and the 
Community Preservation Corporation, another coalition formed by commercial banks. 
West One Three One Plaza, the middle-income homeownership development on West 
131st Street, became possible through the assistance of the New York City Housing 
Partnership, with further support from the New York State Affordable Housing 
Corporation and mortgage financing from the Dime Savings Bank.88 The overall funding 
that both ADC and HCCI received through the 1990s suggests the centrality of the 
public-private hybrid that made their work possible. Each depended on banks and 
intermediaries for about a third of their support, on corporations and foundations for 
another ten percent, and on the local, state, and federal government for the remainder.89 
Instead of a single financing vehicle, each pragmatically followed any thread that would 
enable realization of a given project. 
The nature of housing finance at this time shaped the political approach of CDCs 
as well. In general, ADC and HCCI took an approach to political action as pragmatic as 
their approach to funding, and one similarly focused on practical outcomes rather than 
more abstract ideals, such as empowerment or broad structural change. This is not to say 
that the work of CDCs did not remain progressive in orientation. Besides affordable 
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housing construction – which even with a mixed-income goal remained heavily oriented 
towards those with low incomes – CDCs remained active in social causes. HCCI, for 
example, played a major role in raising awareness of AIDS as an issue meriting serious 
attention in the African-American church. The CDC educated member clergy, 
participated in a yearly Harlem Week of Prayer for the Healing of AIDS, provided 
housing to people with AIDS through a city program, and organized programming and 
supportive services for those residents suffering from the disease.90  
But CDCs evinced a decided professionalization in their work, an orientation in 
part shaped by the complexity of finance in this era as well as the many parties to whom 
they answered in developing property.91 As was the case with earlier generations of 
CDCs, dependence on outside funding influenced internal dynamics, and public-private 
partnerships in an era of tenuous support brought moderation to the outlook of CDCs. 
Funders looked to local organizations as both partners and brokers, who could funnel 
investment to projects while removing potentially disruptive political barriers. Outside 
organizations hoping to profit from their involvement in affordable housing finance 
expected local organizations to smooth the path. The New York City Housing 
Partnership, for example, in a memo retained by ADC, suggested their perceived 
essential role in crafting a new normal in Harlem in an age of federal austerity. 
“Obviously, the termination of federal housing programs is the single largest factor in the 
emergence of ‘affordable housing’ initiatives that depend on private involvement,” they 
explained. “The new funds committed by the City and State…cannot begin to provide the 
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dollars necessary to capitalize a volume housing production program serving the current 
residents of low income areas.” Plans for mixed-income development, they argued, 
depended on private support that would only come once local partners opened political 
channels. “Responsible members of the development/finance community often say they 
are prepared to assume economic risks, but not political ones,” the Housing Partnership 
wrote. “To the extent that Harlem seeks outside investment, local leadership will have to 
provide support in resolving the political issues (both community politics and 
government policies) that discourage responsible investment.”92 
If organizations like the New York City Housing Partnership called for such 
cooperation in part out of their own self-interest, however, CDCs voiced a similarly 
moderate pragmatism on their own. Preston Washington’s description of the 
responsibility of HCCI largely echoed the Housing Partnership’s stance. “Harlem 
leadership often perceives external redevelopment interests as domineering, patronizing, 
and selfishly motivated,” Washington wrote. “Regardless of one’s particular view, the 
tragic isolation of the Harlem community cannot be overcome while distrust remains the 
order of the day.” HCCI’s task, Washington argued, was to create an alliance that could 
serve to represent the interests of Harlem neighbors while opening the doors to outside 
interests. “HCCI apparently has succeeded in creating a coalition of concerned clergy and 
their congregants who can work constructively with lay groups and politicians to breach 
the development impasse in the area,” he wrote.93 Todd Jones, the executive director of 
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HCCI in 1991 and later the director of the broader Consortium for Central Harlem 
Development, struck one foundation representative “as a true politico,” who “will 
probably be quite effective in keeping potential antagonistic forces working 
cooperatively.”94 
Leaders were political in the sense that they managed their relations with funding 
partners carefully and staked a pragmatic middle ground. Their very ideological 
flexibility, openness to collaboration with all sectors, and professionalized approach 
defined the politics of their moderate spatial vision. Where earlier generations of 
community development leaders, especially those of the 1960s, had emerged as 
neighborhood activists who then became prominent at the helm of organizations they 
founded, by the 1980s CDCs claimed leadership with considerable formal training and 
close ties to the hybridized public-private landscape they inhabited. While not 
technocrats, the executives of HCCI and ADC maintained a high level of professional 
expertise and an emphasis on project execution. HCCI’s Todd Jones earned a masters 
degree in real estate development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
previously worked as a private consultant assisting the city with financing and 
construction of mixed-income housing. Both Karen Phillips, the chief executive of 
Abyssinian Development Corporation, and Kevin McGruder, the organization’s chief 
operating officer, had previously worked for the Local Initiatives Support Corporation. 
Phillips studied at the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and previously 
worked at the New York State Urban Development Corporation and the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey. She was thus deeply enmeshed in the means of development 
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in New York City by the time she joined Abyssinian’s community development effort in 
an official capacity.95  
CDC leaders praised their corporate partners, suggesting an alliance of interests, 
not a relationship of resentful dependence. ADC honored four private and non-profit 
sector partners – Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan Bank, J.P. Morgan, and the Local 
Initiatives Support Corporation – at its second annual fundraising event in 1996, for 
example. “Each of these institutions has been there for ADC since ‘day one,’” Phillips 
wrote.96 Funders in turn contributed to the professionalization of the community 
development corporations, encouraging their organizational sophistication. “The amount 
of housing development going under the HCCI banner, either as sponsor or developer, is 
indeed awesome,” read a 1993 Ford Foundation assessment. But HCCI needed greater 
financial rigor, the foundation argued, a more developed bureaucratic infrastructure—the 
kinds of administrative responsibilities that a corporation typically had, but community 
organizations often managed more casually. The Ford Foundation recommended that 
HCCI hire a chief financial officer, preferably a Certified Public Accountant with an 
MBA and experience working for a Big Six accounting company. They suggested that 
the CDC hire an executive recruiter to fill the position, and consult with partners such as 
Chemical Bank to vet candidates. Ford eventually funded the position for HCCI, as part 
of a larger grant that included money for a fundraising consultant, a role that Preston 
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Washington had often handled on his own but that the foundation also recommended 
formalizing.97 
 As affiliates of Harlem-based churches, the CDCs largely took their role as 
community representatives as a given. HCCI “seems to be on the verge of what no other 
recent organization has been able to do,” Preston Washington wrote, “to bring together 
diverse religious and lay community-based groups within Harlem to create a powerful 
constituency that insures local residents of a significant role in their neighborhoods.” Yet 
HCCI’s Board of Directors consisted wholly of leaders of member churches until 1993, 
when it expanded slightly to include a representative from a Harlem social service 
agency, more women, and greater representation from the neighborhood’s Muslim 
community, including the Imam of the Mosque of the Islamic Brotherhood. Similarly, 
through its first years ADC’s eighteen-member board was made up entirely of church 
congregants selected by the church’s pastor, Rev. Calvin Butts.98 Boards included 
stakeholders with deeply held interests in Harlem, to be sure, but remained within the 
orbit of their sponsoring churches. The persistent questions of representativeness, broad 
participation, and democratization of expertise that had once motivated community 
development largely faded in an era when leaders focused on assuring funding for their 
project-based work. 
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Indeed, the pragmatism of major community organizations brought a considerably 
diminished engagement with the sort of radical hopes that had supported neighborhood-
based efforts in past decades. ADC’s experience with community organizing symbolized 
the paradox the organization faced, as more aggressive approaches to improving the lives 
of nearby tenants ran up against the organization’s political middle ground. ADC hired a 
staff member to organize building tenants and block associations in the area around the 
church in late 1992, for example, but the organizer, Lowell Rodgers, found that ADC’s 
focus on projects often seemed to trump the interests of tenants within. Initially asked to 
organize tenants in several city-owned buildings, Rodgers instead learned that his actual 
task was to assess building condition and tenant “stability…so that ADC could determine 
whether or not these buildings would be worth pursuing for acquisition.” Was Rodgers’s 
duty to the tenants in dilapidated buildings, or to his employer’s acquisition plans? “If 
tenants in [city-owned] buildings are struggling with repair needs, should the organizer 
assist the tenants with…a rent strike or mediate the tenants’ demands with the property 
manager,” an outside assessment by activist Nellie Hester Bailey asked. “How does the 
organizer balance the needs of the tenants with the redevelopment goals of ADC?”99 
ADC’s involvement with the Task Force on City-Owned Property, the 
organization that had led resistance against city auction policies and called for low-
income housing in city-owned properties, cast this dilemma in stark relief. ADC formally 
belonged to the Task Force, but demonstrated considerable ambivalence to its work, 
which often directly confronted city officials. Rodgers pushed to include ADC’s name on 
a flyer for a 1994 housing rally, for instance, but CDC staff refused. “The organizer feels 
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that he was being asked to compromise his political integrity for the sake of political 
expediency,” Bailey noted. Such dilemmas grew out of ADC’s duty to its city funders, 
whom it did not wish to upset, but also its own political inclination. In a world of 
community development increasingly focused on implementation and 
professionalization, ambitious political advocacy found less and less room to flourish. 
The issue over the flyer was more than “poor communication,” Bailey wrote, but also 
marked an “ideological clash.” Rodgers sought greater involvement in the sweeping 
project of the Task Force, which remained focused on building a broad coalition of 
tenants in the many remaining city-owned buildings. The CDC preferred to skirt such 
potentially controversial action. “In discussions with Mr. Rodgers he suggested that ADC 
should assume a stronger advocacy role even taking political positions with respect to 
tenants’ rights,” Bailey wrote, summing up the larger dilemma. “On the other hand ADC 
has presented itself as moderately balancing its role with a low profile political agenda to 
meet its goals of a redevelopment program that will help to stabilize Harlem.”100 Where 
activism on behalf of radical political goals and the reconstruction of space had once 
coincided, community organizations now largely abandoned such idealism in order to 
define a path of least resistance for their development plans. 
This pragmatism could be read in the buildings that CDCs reconstructed as well. 
In 1988, Ghislaine Hermanuz, a former Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem staff 
member, architecture professor at City College of New York, and participant in planning 
for the Bradhurst Area, imagined a visionary transformation of Harlem’s landscape that 
combined rehabilitation of existing buildings and new construction to craft a “new 
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physical order” for the neighborhood. “The dilemma posed by rehabilitation in Harlem is 
not just the choice between rebuilding a past that was once ruled out as unfit for human 
needs or replacing it by a brand new housing type,” Hermanuz wrote. “More importantly, 
it implies a choice between reinforcing the expression of class structure in the physical 
environment, by relegating the poor once again to refurbished tenements, while the new 
housing is slated for the better-offs, or inventing a new physical order to represent a more 
equitable distribution of space according to needs rather than ability to consume.”101  
If Hermanuz saw growing physical reconstruction as a chance to redefine 
Harlem’s built environment as a representation of the equal value of Harlem’s residents 
no matter their class, however, CDCs were preoccupied with the more workaday task of 
providing housing as efficiently and practically as possible. CDCs proved egalitarian in 
the sense that they carried out their mixed-income vision regardless of building type. But 
with the city both the major state actor in housing production and the major landholder of 
available property in Harlem, rehabilitation of existing, city-owned buildings ruled the 
day. Indeed, with only a couple of exceptions, such as ADC’s Abyssinian Towers and a 
portion of HCCI’s Sass Plaza, all of the projects constructed by the CDCs in this period 
focused on the rehabilitation of existing buildings. West One Three One Plaza, for 
example, involved renovation of four vacant, city-owned old law tenements and two 
rowhouses. The eight rehabilitated buildings of ADC’s low-income Hattie Dodson 
Houses also had been vacant and city-owned before renovation, as were the three 
tenements of the Samuel D. Proctor Apartments and the two rehabilitated townhouses on 
Astor Row. The extensive rehabilitation of Bradhurst Phase I and Phase II likewise 
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involved the substantial reuse of existing, formerly city-owned vacant tenements along 
Frederick Douglass Boulevard, West 145th Street, and West 150th Street.102  
Like the low-income homesteaders of the 1970s, then – though without their 
revolutionary aspirations – CDCs participated in the preservation of Harlem by returning 
buildings to useful life (Figure 5.5). In large measure, their role in this form of historic 
preservation came incidentally. The city made tenements and townhouses available 
through the Ten Year Plan. CDCs eager to build housing capitalized on these 
opportunities, in the process making abandoned buildings viable once again. At times 
they embraced this task more explicitly. HCCI, for example, renovated five buildings 
west of Marcus Garvey Park, two of which they noted were designated historic 
landmarks. “Though many of HCCI’s other projects do not have this designation, HCCI 
maintains the architectural aesthetic of the buildings in their rehabilitation efforts,” staff 
wrote, explaining that the CDC tried to maintain historic integrity in its projects 
whenever possible.103 ADC served as the community partner in an effort to rehabilitate 
the landmark Astor Row (Figure 5.6), with the cooperation of the non-profit New York 
Landmarks Conservancy, the public New York Landmarks Commission, and the Vincent 
Astor Foundation. In addition to the two homes that ADC rehabbed, the project restored 
the facades and wooden porches that made the block unique not just in Harlem, but in 
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Figure 5.5. Bradhurst Phase I (231 West 145th Street). Completed 1995. Photograph 
by author. 
 386 
 
Figure 5.6. Astor Row (W. 130th Street between Fifth Avenue and Lenox Avenue), after 
restoration. Photograph by author. 
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New York City. The Landmarks Conservancy celebrated the attention to historic detail 
that the townhouse renovation entailed. “The entryways feature Victorian pocket doors, 
tiled hallways, and balustraded staircases. The parlor floors were transformed into two-
bedroom apartments, which boast new wood windows overlooking the front yards, oak 
floors, and original ceiling moldings and fireplace mantels,” they wrote.104 
Yet with preservation, too, CDCs remained concerned with pragmatism over 
idealism. Where Preston Wilcox had imagined landmarking all of Harlem to preserve the 
power and symbolism he identified with the neighborhood, ADC expressed a cautious 
approach to landmark designation, open to its possibility but determined to ensure that 
development goals would not be constrained by the requirements attached. As city 
preservation officials focused their attention uptown after years of largely overlooking  
Harlem’s building stock, Abyssinian attempted to shape the process to its advantage. The 
organization commissioned a study, intended to “formulate a strategy for how ADC and 
generic equivalents elsewhere can guide the landmarks process to minimize negative 
impact of landmark designation,” its consultants wrote. ADC feared that the task of 
financing its projects might grow only more difficult with widespread designation. 
“Landmarks designation and its potential for additional costs and procedures may 
inadvertently diminish the economic feasibility of important development or community 
services projects,” the report noted.105 Rev. Calvin Butts expressed similar sentiments 
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with regard to the designation of Abyssinian Baptist Church, suggesting not opposition to 
preservation per se, but insistence that preservation not restrict a living institution, one 
concerned with fulfilling practical needs. “[Landmarks Preservation Commission] needs 
to recognize that [Abyssinian Baptist Church] has a continuing mission of community 
and social service,” Butts wrote. “The evolving nature of this mission and the fact that 
this is a ‘living, working and breathing’ institution which will not remain static over time, 
should be referenced in the Designation documents.” Karen Phillips summarized the 
organization’s position rather succinctly in correspondence with the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission on the matter. “[C]ommunity development is preservation,” 
she said.106  
*   *   * 
By the mid-1990s, the particular form of community development that Phillips 
alluded to had ascended as the dominant mode in Harlem, and, indeed, throughout the 
work of community development corporations nationally. Focused on an ideal of urban 
neighborhoods as economically integrated spaces, this vision looked forward to a future 
in which residents of all incomes would fill Harlem’s blocks. With the new century fast 
approaching, proponents explained income diversification as an objective whose 
necessity was seemingly self-evident. “This has to be an economically integrated 
community,” Preston Washington said. Yet community leaders from an earlier generation 
– those who had helped craft the revolutionary spatial ideal that once guided the work of 
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community developers – watched cautiously. Margaret McNeil, longtime director of the 
West Harlem Community Organization, surveyed Harlem’s landscape of residential 
development. As new CDCs translated their moderate spatial vision into a moderate 
spatial reality and hopes for Harlem increasingly rested on the presence of the middle 
class, she wondered, would there still be room for the low-income residents for whom she 
had long worked? “We’re distressed that there isn’t a high enough percent of low-income 
housing for people who were displaced from the neighborhood,” McNeil said. “We just 
can’t do enough for those people.”107 
Indeed, in these years a new generation of CDCs succeeded in bringing the 
physical transformation that their predecessors had failed to accomplish. But their 
approach to Harlem’s reconstruction, if highly effective in providing new and decent 
housing for Harlemites, narrowed the horizon of possibilities to which community 
developers aspired. In confronting the vexing social, political, and economic dilemmas of 
the previous decade, these organizations embraced pragmatism as a strategy of building, 
a means of getting things done. Instead of seeking ownership models that strove toward 
the idealistic self-determination and self-reliance that had given rise to community 
development, they aligned their interests with the private and public sector funders that 
would increasingly fuel their work. Instead of building toward broad structural 
transformation, community development corporations simply built. While Harlem gained 
revived buildings on some of its most stricken blocks, it lost the sort of broad, utopian 
spatial and social imagination that Wilcox and McNeil had maintained. On the one hand, 
this was the price of progress: CDCs like the Abyssinian Development Corporation and 
Harlem Churches for Community Improvement had the expertise and versatility to 
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navigate an increasingly fractured political and financial landscape, and largely 
succeeded in their goals. On the other hand, their success in building raised its own 
questions about whether inclusion still stood as the central tenet of community 
development, and what would be the long-term implications of mixed-income housing in 
a community that felt constantly under threat. 
Margaret McNeil and Preston Washington offered their divergent perspectives on 
Harlem’s transformation in a 1990 article that posed a different question than bleak 
assessments from the previous decade. Observers had once asked, “Can Harlem Be 
Saved?” But now they wondered, “Harlem: A New Renaissance?”108 Despite the points 
raised by old hands like McNeil, leaders of community development corporations were 
sure it was on its way. “We can already see more evidence that the next Renaissance of 
Harlem is even closer,” Karen Phillips told attendees of ADC’s 1996 Harlem 
Renaissance Day of Commitment, the organization’s annual fundraiser.109 Indeed, even 
amidst concerns about the direction of community development, the moderate spatial 
reality had taken hold. Up in Bradhurst, the Consortium for Central Harlem Development 
completed apartments for moderate-income tenants on Frederick Douglass Boulevard, on 
West 147th Street, and on Macombs Place.110 Meanwhile, Abyssinian Development 
Corporation only bolstered its commitment to its vision of economic integration in 
Harlem. “Recently, ADC has begun to more aggressively pursue opportunities for 
developing housing for moderate income residents,” staff wrote in 1996. “While there has 
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been a significant commitment by local development corporations to building low-
income housing, no such commitment exists to meet the needs of moderate and middle-
income residents, who are essential for community stability.”111  
The pragmatic approach that enabled Harlem-based CDCs to expand and redouble 
their involvement in housing construction in the neighborhood would, by the end of the 
century, likewise enable them to become major players in urban development more 
broadly. As development moved increasingly toward a hybridized model of collaboration 
between the public and private sectors, these community-based organizations embraced 
the view that Harlem’s future rested not only on income integration within the 
neighborhood, but equally on integration into economic markets outside its borders. This 
vision would underlie their efforts to extend the moderate spatial reality from Harlem’s 
residential streets to its main boulevard and symbolic center, 125th Street, through 
commercial redevelopment.  
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Chapter Six 
Making Markets Uptown 
 
 In late October 1996, the board of the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone 
Development Corporation, the body responsible for administering the 300-million dollar 
cache of federal, state, and city funding that policymakers intended to stimulate private 
development uptown, announced their first round of funding recommendations. Through 
grants, loans, and equity investments, the Empowerment Zone proposed to spend a total 
of nearly 13 million dollars to expand a microloan program and establish a credit union in 
Washington Heights, to aid an after school program and a Latino cultural center in East 
Harlem, and to assist a variety of social service, training, and commercial projects in 
Central Harlem. To renovate a firehouse into a health center, the Empowerment Zone 
offered almost a quarter-of-a-million dollars. To fund a study on the feasibility of a 
neighborhood community court, the Empowerment Zone provided 110,000 dollars. To 
assist vendors at the outdoor market on 116th Street, the board offered a 300,000-dollar 
grant. The largest recommended allocation by far, a loan and equity investment in the 
amount of 11.2 million dollars, was to underwrite the construction of Harlem’s first 
shopping mall, called Harlem USA, which developers hoped to build on 125th Street, the 
neighborhood’s main street.1 
 Just a few days after their long-awaited announcement, the Empowerment Zone 
executives, Harlem congressional representative Charles Rangel, New York City mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani, New York governor George Pataki, and even President Bill Clinton 
received a blistering missive on the letterhead of the Harlem Unity Committee for Social 
                                                
1 “In the Zone: Who’s Empowered,” New York Times, 20 October 1996, CY8. 
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Justice. “The board of the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone is removed from the 
Harlem community,” Committee members wrote. “This can be seen in its first round of 
funding projects.” Signees included local activists with the Harlem Tenants Council and 
Harlem Fight Back, the longstanding advocacy group for minority construction workers. 
A staff member from the Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle signed too. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Preston Wilcox was also a member of the Unity Committee, and 
the vehemence of the letter’s prose suggested that he was very likely its author. 
Committee members claimed not just the Empowerment Zone board’s detachment from 
their concerns, but also a purposeful campaign to open Harlem to outsiders. “There is 
little that represents community economic development and most of the funds are going 
to outside interests,” they wrote. “Restaurants, night clubs, Harlem USA, a grant to the 
116th Street Vendors Market are not projects that encourage economic growth but 
tourism.” Committee members saw malevolence at play. “The economic racism of this 
City is second to none and inviting racist business people and investors from downtown 
or elsewhere to come into Harlem when they have done nothing in the past to address the 
exclusion of African people is not only self negating but stupid.”2  
Richard Parsons, the CEO of Time Warner and chairman of the Empowerment 
Zone, offered a brief rebuttal that suggested both his own impatience with such 
complaints and the new era in which Wilcox and his compatriots found themselves. “I 
would encourage you to ease up on the sixties rhetoric and, instead, share with us any 
specific proposals you may have for economic development initiatives in Upper 
Manhattan,” he wrote. Deborah Wright, the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone’s 
                                                
2 Letter to Richard Parsons from Harlem Unity Committee for Social Justice, 23 October 1996, Box 35, 
Folder 7, Preston Wilcox Papers, Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, New York Public 
Library (hereafter Wilcox Papers). 
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newly appointed president, offered a more thorough response, though the paradox of the 
commercial development of Harlem’s central spine in the last years of the millennium 
was bound up in her very first point. “First, your assertion that the initial round of 
Empowerment Zone projects are ‘outside interests’ is just plain wrong,” Wright wrote. 
“All but two projects are organized by local organizations or individuals and all will have 
significant community participation. For example, Harlem Commonwealth Council, a 
local non-profit, will not only be Harlem USA’s landlord, it will also be a significant 
equity participant.”3 
In the late 1990s, 125th Street increasingly bore the mark of the national retail 
chains whose stores were reshaping commercial centers throughout New York City. 
“Retailers Have Harlem On Their Mind,” read the title of one New York Times account of 
the neighborhood in 1996. Harlem had long been the province of big, unrealized plans, 
but now Harlem’s grand boulevard was showing new life. “[M]ajor retailers woke up to 
the fact that there was still a lot of pedestrian traffic on the street,” the article read. 
“Consumers, in other words.”4 By the beginning of the next decade, vast construction 
sites on 125th Street had become big projects—the neighborhood’s first supermarket, a 
Pathmark located between Lexington and Third Avenues; Harlem USA, between St. 
Nicholas and Eighth Avenues; and Harlem Center, a retail and office complex at the 
corner of Lenox Avenue and 125th Street, on the long vacant – and long contested – lot to 
the east of the Harlem State Office Building. If such projects bore comparisons to 
transformations elsewhere in the city, like that of 42nd Street, and, indeed, across 
                                                
3 Letter to Harlem Unity Committee for Social Justice from Parsons, 1 November 1996, Box 35, Folder 7, 
Wilcox Papers; Letter to Harlem Unity Committee for Social Justice from Deborah C. Wright, 28 October 
1996, Box 35, Folder 7, Wilcox Papers. 
 
4 David W. Dunlap, “Retailers Have Harlem on Their Mind,” New York Times, 10 November 1996, R1. 
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American cities that embraced the same stores, Wright’s admonition to Wilcox’s group 
raised a crucial point. The large commercial projects that took shape in Harlem were as 
much a realization of a specific community development ideal as they were a sign of new 
global and national economic trends in the late 1990s, and community development 
organizations stood at the center of such plans.5 
These projects marked the realization in physical form of the moderate spatial 
vision that the Harlem Commonwealth Council, Harlem Urban Development 
Corporation, and other community-based organizations had articulated for 125th Street 
beginning in the 1970s. In contrast to the vision of radicals who had imagined Harlem’s 
central spine as a vibrant center serving the needs of low-income Harlemites, such plans 
represented a narrower conception of 125th Street as a predominantly commercial district. 
However, those big plans had been relegated to drawing boards amidst the federal 
funding cuts of the early 1980s. Their realization in the 1990s, then, suggested a dramatic 
sea change, not just as a result of new funding sources that made large-scale commercial 
development viable again, but also as a result of demographic and intellectual shifts that 
created an environment in which supermarkets, malls, and offices could flourish. 
Commercial development went hand-in-hand with a vision of Harlem as a mixed-income 
space. The marked increase in income in Harlem at this time brought retailers to 
                                                
5 In his study of urban transformation in Brownsville (Chicago) and Harlem, sociologist Derek Hyra offers 
a theoretical framework emphasizing the importance of examining the interconnection of forces at the 
global, national, municipal, and community levels. My argument is consistent with his point that African-
American-led organizations played a larger role in development than scholars have often acknowledged, 
and that class plays an important part in determining the nature of their work, but he focuses on their 
impact on housing, only nodding to their role in commercial development. See Derek Hyra, The New 
Urban Renewal: The Economic Transformation of Harlem and Bronzeville (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), esp. 17-28, 129-150. For other treatments of Harlem in this decade, see Arlene 
Dávila, Barrio Dreams: Puerto Ricans, Latinos, and the Neoliberal City (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2004); John L. Jackson, Jr., Harlemworld: Doing Race and Class in Contemporary Black 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); David Maurrasse, Listening to Harlem: 
Gentrification, Community, and Business (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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Harlem’s door. At the same time, officials and moderate community development 
organizations came to share a new understanding of Harlem as an untapped market, and 
to see the community’s fate tied to their ability to integrate it into a broader economic 
“mainstream.” They agreed that the government’s role was to create the conditions for 
what they perceived as a free market in the neighborhood, a world in which national 
movie chains, retail stores, and supermarkets could flourish, but in which small 
businesses often lost out.6  
The consequences of such changes in Harlem’s landscape were decidedly 
complex, however, perhaps more so than the Harlem Unity Committee for Social Justice 
could ever have anticipated in 1996. If the reconstruction of Harlem marked the total 
eclipse of the revolutionary spatial ideal that the Architects’ Renewal Committee in 
Harlem, Preston Wilcox, and others had imagined of a prosperous Harlem built by and 
for its low-income residents, the entrance of Harlem into the American commercial 
mainstream held divergent meanings. For many Harlemites, middle-class and not, the 
arrival of national retailers, especially a Pathmark supermarket, was a welcome change in 
the neighborhood. The reconstruction of 125th Street did not meet radical hopes that the 
street would serve housing, cultural, and social service needs of the Harlem residents who 
stayed during the community’s most trying decades, but many nonetheless welcomed the 
predictability, access, and value that they associated with such commercial development. 
Likewise, if Wilcox saw Harlem USA and other big projects as exclusionary, even racist 
impositions, the centrality of community groups in their development suggested a 
                                                
6 Sharon Zukin also notes the role of the public sector in the project of “making markets” in Harlem in this 
period, though she does not emphasize the centrality of community-based organizations in this 
transformation. See Sharon Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. 77-87. 
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different conclusion: that by the end of the millennium, community-based organizations 
had achieved the prominence in development that they had long sought.  
No group achieved such centrality to an extent greater than the Abyssinian 
Development Corporation (ADC), the community development corporation (CDC) that 
had helped lead the way in crafting a mixed-income vision for Harlem through its 
pragmatic pursuit of diverse funding sources and its professionalized approach to the 
project of building. ADC rode its reputation to become a major player in Harlem’s 
redevelopment, but other community organizations did not benefit equally. The late 
1990s saw the construction in Harlem of a moderate spatial reality in steel, glass, and 
concrete, but also a sea change in the nature of power at the community level. If 
Abyssinian’s rise symbolized the ascent of community-based organizations that activists 
had demanded for forty years, so too did it raise new questions about power and 
democracy in the age of promised empowerment. 
 
“Mainstreaming” Harlem: The Mall Comes to 125th Street 
 The Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone (UMEZ) served as only the most 
visible symbol of a consensus that formed more broadly around urban development 
policy in the 1990s. Public officials, leaders in the private sector, and community-based 
organizations came to see neighborhoods like Harlem as potentially valuable markets, 
communities of undervalued economic resources that had existed outside the rules of 
capitalism and suffered for it. Policy in this era, then, was overwhelmingly characterized 
by a motivation to bring Harlem into the economic “mainstream.” While the federal 
government returned as a player in urban policy, it did so not primarily as a major 
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financial backer, but as a resource intending to stimulate private investment in high 
poverty neighborhoods. If this notion gained wide support, it was not without its critics. 
Leaders of the Empowerment Zone, federal, state, and city officials, and many 
community development organizations agreed that making Harlem look more like the 
rest of New York City through commercial development would revitalize the already 
changing neighborhood. But Wilcox and others objected that the economic mainstream 
would leave many Harlemites behind. The central role of Harlem’s first community 
development corporation in the development of Harlem USA, however – the very 
organization that Wilcox had cofounded on radical principles in 1967 – signaled the 
broad acceptance at the end of the century of the market approach to Harlem’s 
development, and of the position that the neighborhood was an overlooked resource 
ready to be tapped. 
 The federal legislation enacting Empowerment Zones, signed in the second year 
of Clinton’s first term, spoke to a broader tendency that characterized the new president’s 
approach to urban policy. Like his immediate predecessors, Clinton favored strategies 
based in the private sector, valuing housing vouchers over new low-income housing 
construction, for example, promoting increased opportunities for homeownership, and 
seeking means to expand private investment in predominantly low-income 
neighborhoods. Unlike the Reagan and Bush administrations, however, Clinton attempted 
to reestablish the federal role in urban policy. The Empowerment Zone program, 
established through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, marked Clinton’s 
first major gesture toward that end, authorizing over a billion dollars in flexible grants 
intended to stimulate development at the local level, and 2.5 billion dollars in tax 
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incentives likewise intended to attract projects to the areas designated under the program. 
Such resources were to be available in nine designated zones, six in cities and three in 
rural areas. In each, private and non-profit developers could apply for loans and grants, or 
benefit by hiring workers from within the zone. Employers received a tax credit for 20 
percent of the first 15,000 dollars in salary and training expenses paid to each area 
resident. They could likewise claim a larger tax write-off for business-related property 
than enterprises located outside the zone, and gain access to tax-exempt bonds to finance 
development.7 
 Such incentives were intended to create a climate attractive to private investors in 
areas that otherwise had largely lacked new business development. Through grants, loans, 
and tax credits, officials hoped, they could spur job growth in high unemployment areas. 
This policy marked a Clintonian twist on an innovation that had long been on the shelf, 
one that had transformed from a conservative pet idea to a moderate policy with support 
from both left and right. Originating in Britain in the late 1970s, the idea of 
geographically bounded areas with special provisions to attract investment, soon called 
“Enterprise Zones,” had moved from concept to reality in the early 1980s under Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher. Urban planner Peter Hall’s original formulation had 
proposed to radically scale back bureaucracy, immigration controls, and regulatory 
legislation in neighborhoods of declining growth. As passed in 1981, Britain’s Enterprise 
Zones offered a narrower prescription of tax amenities and reduced planning controls. 
                                                
7 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Public Law 103-66, 103rd Cong. [10 August 1993]; Michael B. Katz, 
The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State, Updated Edition (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 123-29; Roger Biles, The Fate of Cities: Urban America and the 
Federal Government, 1945-2000 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 324-26; Memo to 
Peter Powers from Alice Tetelman, Bill Daly, and Helen Mathis, 25 January 1994, Box 02/01/1/099, Folder 
291, Deputy Mayor Powers, Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani Papers, New York City Municipal Archives 
(hereafter Giuliani Papers). 
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The idea immigrated to the United States at the same time, appearing in unsuccessful 
bills offered at the state level in Illinois and at the federal level by Congressmen Jack 
Kemp, a Republican, and Robert Garcia, a Democrat. Though Reagan supported the idea 
– one of the few urban policies proposed by his administration – a series of bills 
emphasizing tax incentives and hiring credits failed throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, 
the vast majority of states passed Enterprise Zone laws in that decade. Kemp’s 
appointment as the secretary of Housing and Urban Development under George Bush 
kept wind in the sails of federal Enterprise Zone legislation. Both houses of Congress 
approved a bill in 1992, after civil disorder swept Los Angeles in the wake of the Rodney 
King verdict. President Bush vetoed that 1992 bill, but an incentive-based policy, with 
the added innovation of the grant and loan component, finally became law under Clinton. 
The major proponent of that bill in the House of Representatives was Harlem 
congressman Charles Rangel.8  
With Rangel’s involvement at the center of the Empowerment Zone legislation, 
Harlem’s designation in the first round of funding seemed a foregone conclusion. Indeed, 
Rangel and David Dinkins, New York City’s mayor until December 31, 1993, had 
worked to ensure that Harlem would have a favorable position against both national 
competition and any other New York neighborhoods that might vie for the city’s 
nomination. Rangel included a “special rule” in the law, a provision that modified 
stipulations requiring joint state-local government backing to also allow nomination to 
emanate directly from “an economic development corporation chartered by the State.” In 
                                                
8 Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, Updated Edition (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1996), 355-58; 
Katz, Price of Citizenship, 126; Biles, Fate of Cities, 325. For an excellent chronicle of the history of 
Enterprise Zone legislation at both the state and federal levels, see Karen Mossberger, The Politics of Ideas 
and the Spread of Enterprise Zones (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 54-94. 
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creating the possibility of an end-run around officials, Rangel had the Harlem Urban 
Development Corporation (HUDC) in mind, the entity that had emerged out of the battle 
over the State Office Building in the early 1970s and remained under Rangel’s control 
(see Chapter Three). Mayor Dinkins issued an executive order in his last days in office, 
naming HUDC as the leader of the nomination process in order to ensure Harlem’s 
priority. Mayor Giuliani pushed for a broader geographic scope upon his inauguration, 
resulting in a proposal including sections of Washington Heights – north of Harlem – and 
areas in the South Bronx that encompassed Yankee Stadium alongside extensive sections 
of East and Central Harlem (Figure 6.1). If Rangel failed to gain the precise geographic 
delineation he had in mind, he succeeded in gaining designation for New York’s entry, 
which the Clinton administration selected for the program in late 1994 alongside Atlanta, 
Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and, jointly, Philadelphia and Camden, New Jersey. Despite 
the extensive infighting between state, city, and Harlem leaders that preceded the 
nomination, HUDC’s proposal could claim the unique distinction of matching fund 
commitments from both New York State and New York City. Where the other urban 
Empowerment Zones drew from a 100-million dollar grant, New York’s zone claimed a 
pot three times as large.9 
 For the planners who charted Harlem’s role in the Empowerment Zone, the future 
direction of development tied directly to the demographic shifts that the neighborhood  
                                                
9 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993; Letter to Vice President Albert Gore from Mayor David Dinkins, 15 
December 1993, Box 02/11/007, Folder 218, Deputy Mayor Dyson, Giuliani Papers; Memo to Powers from 
Tetelman, Daly, and Mathis, 25 January 1994, Box 02/01/1/009, Folder 291, Deputy Mayor Powers, 
Giuliani Papers; Peter Marcuse, “Playing the Rangel Angle,” New York Newsday, 18 February 1994, 66; 
Memo to Jay A. Rosenberg from Len Wasserman, 11 March 1994, Box 02/11/007, Folder 218, Deputy 
Mayor Dyson, Giuliani Papers; Thomas J. Lueck, “3 Empowerment Areas Must Create a Wish List,” New 
York Times, 27 December 1994, B3. Seventy-four cities competed for designation as Empowerment Zones. 
The law also authorized the creation of 95 smaller “Enterprise Communities” that received fewer benefits; 
219 applicants competed for designation as Enterprise Communities. See Biles, Fate of Cities, 326. 
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Figure 6.1. Proposed New York City Empowerment Zone Boundaries (shown in black). 
New York City Empowerment Zone: Harlem, The South Bronx (New York, June 1994). 
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was experiencing. In part due to the efforts described in the previous chapter, Harlem’s 
residents increasingly claimed economic diversity that the neighborhood had not seen in 
decades. “The revitalization of the Harlem community is being led by housing 
development,” staff wrote in a briefing book on the Empowerment Zone nomination 
presented to U.S. Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown. “This activity has provided the 
opportunity to create a mixed income community with home ownership opportunities.” 
Population had increased only gradually by the 1990 census, HUDC reported, but there 
were ample signs that Harlem’s middle-class constituency was growing. Thirteen-
thousand more households earning incomes over 40,000 dollars had moved to Harlem in 
that decade, planners explained, and more than 34,000 fewer households earned less than 
20,000 dollars annually. College graduates in the neighborhood increased by nearly a 
third, to 62,019, an increase of 15,458 from the 1980 total. HUDC cited decreasing crime 
statistics too, reporting reduced burglary, robbery, and grand larceny between 1988 and 
1991.10  
With such changes underway, planners argued, Harlem was poised for a boom in 
commercial development. “Clearly, Harlem has become a place in which to conduct 
business,” HUDC staff explained. “The residential development activities have led to 
major changes in retail activities and interest of anchor tenants in locating in Harlem,” 
they wrote. A partnership between government, the community, and the private sector in 
the form of the Empowerment Zone would “capitalize on this new vision.”11 The 
widespread vacancy and property abandonment of earlier decades still left its mark on 
                                                
10 HUDC, “Briefing Information Presented to Ronald H. Brown, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Commerce,” 22 October 1993, Box 36, Folder 2, Wilcox Papers. 
 
11 HUDC, “Briefing Information Presented to Ronald H. Brown,” 22 October 1993, Box 36, Folder 2, 
Wilcox Papers. 
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Harlem, the official Empowerment Zone proposal explained. But even such physical 
vestiges of trying times portended a reversal. More than a million square feet of 
commercial space sat vacant in the neighborhood, planners wrote, property that awaited 
new development.12 
Indeed, proponents argued, Harlem was in a state of commercial immaturity. It 
was a community, in other words, whose streets were “under-retailed.” Between 110th 
and 153rd Streets, the Empowerment Zone proposal read, “there is approximately $3 
billion total personal income and an expenditure potential of $1.1 billion.” If Harlem’s 
residents earned less on average than those in other neighborhoods, their collective power 
on its dense streets added up. But residents were spending that income elsewhere. 
“Currently, Harlem residents shop in Queens, Westchester County, midtown Manhattan 
and New Jersey,” HUDC explained to Commerce Secretary Brown. “This exodus from 
the community can only be curtailed by the provision of a variety of community 
commercial services which will encourage residents to shop in the community.” Harlem 
required “major anchors” on its main streets, planners argued, on Third Avenue, 116th 
Street, and 125th Street, to attract Harlem dollars and to attract even more retail. “Biggest 
assets: 520,000 consumers north of 110 street,” UMEZ president Deborah Wright told 
city and state leaders. “Studies at Columbia say we’re underretailed by 30%. Pent-up 
spending power. Retail will be focus.” Proponents shared the hopes of the officials who 
backed the Empowerment Zone, who argued that retail would create an economic engine 
uptown. “Commercial development is vital to the well being of inner cities,” read a 
summary of the comments Vice President Albert Gore and Representative Rangel 
                                                
12 New York City Empowerment Zone: Harlem, The South Bronx (New York, June 1994), Section II, 24, 
Document #116, Harlem Development Archive, Archives and Special Collections Division, City College of 
New York, New York, NY (hereafter Harlem Development Archive). 
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delivered to Harlem business leaders in March 1995. “With it comes economic stability, 
jobs and growth.”13 
Proponents hoped that Harlem would thus join and contribute to what they 
perceived as the “economic mainstream.” They held that Harlem had been isolated from 
the free market, and that the neighborhood’s prosperity relied on its return to that market, 
especially by competing on a larger scale. “With its central location in Manhattan and its 
superior transportation services,” HUDC staff explained, “Harlem has the potential to 
become a regional shopping center.” Harlem’s turnaround would measure up to the city’s 
other commercial revivals, contended Wright and Richard Parsons, the UMEZ chairman, 
even the much vaunted reconstruction of 42nd Street and Times Square. “This is a unique 
moment of opportunity for Upper Manhattan and hence, the City,” Parsons and Wright 
told Giuliani administration officials in 1997. “We need your personal involvement and 
that of the Mayor in assisting us to mobilize this City’s vast private and public resources 
if we are to convert Upper Manhattan’s assets into the major economic contributor it is 
capable of being.” Wright’s goal, she wrote a year later, was “to bring our community 
into America’s economic mainstream.” This was “a tall order,” she acknowledged, but 
one with “ample precedent.”14 
                                                
13 “New York City Empowerment Zone: Harlem, The South Bronx,” 29 June 1994, Section II, 23, 
Document #116, Harlem Development Archive; HUDC, “Briefing Information Presented to Ronald H. 
Brown,” 22 October 1993, Box 36, Folder 2, Wilcox Papers; Memo to Distribution from Kimberly D. 
Hardy, 29 July 1997, Box 02/09/009, Folder 241, Deputy Mayor Washington, Giuliani Papers; “Welcome 
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14 HUDC, “Briefing Information Presented to Ronald H. Brown,” 22 October 1993, Box 36, Folder 2, 
Wilcox Papers; Letter to Rudy Washington and Randy Levine from Parsons and Wright, 20 November 
1997, Box 02/09/009, Folder 240, Deputy Mayor Washington, Giuliani Papers; Deborah C. Wright, “Upper 
Manhattan: The Future’s Looking Up!” EZ Works 2, no. 1 (Winter 1998), 2. 
 406 
Indeed, in expressing her vision for Harlem, Wright spoke to a broader tendency 
characteristic of community development at this time. In tying Harlem’s fate to its 
position as part of a broader market, Wright, HUDC, and their allies both anticipated and 
channeled an idea with growing currency in the mid-1990s. Increasingly, observers tied 
the socioeconomic failures of communities like Harlem to their perceived isolation from 
the larger economy. Harvard University professor and economist Michael Porter served 
as the most public evangelist of this idea. “The sad reality is that the efforts of the past 
few decades to revitalize the inner cities have failed,” Porter wrote in his landmark 
article, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” in 1995. Policymakers had 
typically offered remedies targeted to the social service needs of residents in high poverty 
neighborhoods, Porter argued, or focused on “piecemeal approaches” targeting economic 
development through subsidies or large public expenditures intended “to stimulate 
economic activity in tangential fields such as housing, real estate, and neighborhood 
development.” Such approaches failed, Porter claimed, because they misunderstood the 
nature of economic competitiveness. “Lacking an overall strategy, such programs have 
treated the inner city as an island isolated from the surrounding economy and subject to 
its own unique laws of competition,” Porter wrote. “They have encouraged and supported 
small, subscale businesses designed to serve the local community but ill equipped to 
attract the community’s own spending power, much less export outside it.”15   
Economic revival demanded “a radically different approach,” Porter contended, 
one that depended fundamentally and primarily on the private sector, and that relied on 
the rules that proponents associated with the free market. “A sustainable economic base 
                                                
15 Michael E. Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” Harvard Business Review, May-June 
1995, 55. Zukin, too, points to the influence of Porter in this period. See Zukin, Naked City, 78. 
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can be created in the inner city,” he wrote, “but only as it has been created elsewhere: 
through private, for-profit initiatives and investment based on economic self-interest and 
genuine competitive advantage—not through artificial inducements, charity, or 
government mandates.” Instead of starting with subsidies and hoping economic success 
would follow, Porter claimed, policymakers should follow the same rules that governed 
business development anywhere else. “[A]n economic model must begin with the 
premise that inner city businesses should be profitable on a regional, national, and even 
international scale,” he wrote, echoing Empowerment Zone leaders who had called for 
Harlem to compete on a vaster terrain. Economic development in high poverty 
neighborhoods should be guided by the same factors that motivated profit-making 
businesses in any other geographic context, Porter argued—that is, by the specific 
locational features that gave such businesses a competitive advantage. Despite its 
reputation, Porter explained, the inner city had fundamental competitive advantages: a 
central location, proximity to distinctive regional business clusters, an underemployed 
labor pool, and an underserved market. This last attribute, the feature that Harlem leaders 
had pushed forcefully in making a case for the Empowerment Zone, “represent[ed] the 
most immediate opportunity for inner-city-based entrepreneurs and businesses,” Porter 
wrote. “At a time when most other markets are saturated, inner city markets remain 
poorly served.”16 
In the pursuit of competitive advantage, Porter called for new roles for both the 
private and public sectors. The private sector, he explained, should not approach 
development in neighborhoods like Harlem with the intention of charity or with the goal 
of tapping “preference programs.” “The private sector will be most effective if it focuses 
                                                
16 Ibid., 55-6, 58. 
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on what it does best,” Porter wrote, “creating and supporting economically viable 
businesses built on true competitive advantage.” Such enterprises could take any form 
that capitalized on those advantages, Porter argued, but he highlighted several that he 
deemed especially apt. “In particular, retailers, franchisers, and financial services 
companies have immediate opportunities,” he wrote. Large chain retailers were “an 
especially attractive model for inner city entrepreneurship because they provide not only 
a business concept but also training and support,” he explained. The public sector would 
need to accept a new function, too. Porter, skeptical of any aid that he perceived as 
counter to the tendencies he identified with the free market, insisted that government 
would need to take a secondary role. “Government can assume a more effective role by 
supporting the private sector in new economic initiatives,” Porter wrote. “It must shift its 
focus from direct involvement and intervention to creating a favorable environment for 
business.” The public sector should not withdraw from the field of economic 
development, he argued, but maintain a policy of noninterference. “[S]ubsidies must be 
spent in ways that do not distort business incentives, focusing instead on providing the 
infrastructure to support genuinely profitable businesses,” he said.17  
Porter provided an intellectual justification for the growing predominance of the 
private sector in thinking on inner-city revitalization in general. As was also the case with 
housing development in this period, those involved with rebuilding 125th Street 
increasingly approached their work from a mindset honed in the world of business. 
Deborah Wright, the president of the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone, symbolized 
this approach. A graduate of Radcliffe College, Harvard Law School, and Harvard 
Business School, Wright had served as the city’s Commissioner of Housing, 
                                                
17 Ibid., 65, 67. 
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Preservation, and Development before joining the Empowerment Zone. Prior to that, she 
had worked at the New York City Housing Partnership, where she directed marketing for 
Towers on the Park, the Harlem condominium buildings that the David Rockefeller-
backed Partnership built with HUDC. After graduating from business school, Wright had 
joined the investment bank First Boston. As leader of UMEZ, she proudly maintained an 
approach informed by her work in finance. “Ms. Wright is not,” the Times paraphrased, 
“another traditional social reformer or a politician handing out favors to friends, but a 
financier who says she holds Harlem to the standards of Wall Street.”18 Similarly, while 
the UMEZ Board of Directors included an array of figures affiliated with non-profit 
institutions, local Harlem residents, and leaders of social service organizations, the 
appointment of chairman Richard Parsons – one of the city’s most prominent CEOs – tied 
the organization to the upper echelons of the private sector and spoke to the new 
prominence of the business world in community development.19  
If the designation of Empowerment Zones symbolized the national ascent of the 
market approach to urban development, however, not all Harlemites watched with 
enthusiasm. Perhaps no exchange symbolized both the wide acceptance of Porter’s 
theorization and the fear it brought forth quite like the 1996 correspondence between 
Wright and the Harlem Unity Committee for Social Justice, which transpired soon after 
the initial announcement of UMEZ funding. Wright offered a point-by-point refutation of 
the concerns voiced by Wilcox and his associates, beginning with her observation that 
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community organizations were at the center of the funded projects and ending with a 
reminder that Harlemites sat on the organization’s board. But she closed with a general 
statement that neatly echoed Porter’s arguments. “The very cornerstone of the 
Empowerment Zone’s approach to eradicating poverty is a belief that the private sector 
must be a prominent partner in this process,” she explained. “Countless failed 
government efforts have shown that sustainability dictates a nod to market forces. As 
difficult as this transition may be for all of us, the future of Harlem depends on reuniting 
it with the larger New York City and regional economies. This cannot take place in a 
climate of close mindedness and parochialism.”20 
Wright, like Porter, naturalized the free market, implying that Harlem’s failures 
over the previous decades had emanated from a neglect of the private sector and, 
consequently, that a reorientation towards the private sector would bring long-term 
prosperity. She explained this a year-and-a-half later in response to concerns that large-
scale retail would supplant local businesses. “It’s scary, frankly, because, as you know, 
one of the basic tenets of capitalism is that you can’t control it…Nor do I think we want 
to,” Wright said. “We want to prepare people to compete in a market-based economy 
because that is the only thing thus far that has been shown to be sustainable.”21  
Wilcox and the other members of the Harlem Unity Committee, however, 
doubted that market forces functioned “naturally,” arguing instead that the very 
unnaturalness of the market bore much of the blame for Harlem’s halting progress. 
“[T]he so called private sector that has excluded Harlem from participating in economic 
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growth and prosperity downtown is racist,” they wrote to Wright. “We are not close 
minded and parochial, but realistic.” Fundamentally unequal rules guided development, 
the Unity Committee members contended, and they remained deeply suspicious of the 
nature of the market that Wright hailed. They communicated their doubt by holding the 
terms in question between quotation marks. “What you call a ‘nod to market forces’ can 
and probably will be more devastating than ever if we observe what has happened with 
‘market forces’ around the world in so called underdeveloped areas, in Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East, Asia, Russia,” they wrote. “God save us from ‘market 
forces’!” Wright saw market ideology as the path to “sustainability,” but the Unity 
Committee saw the private sector paving the road to the neighborhood’s upheaval. “Thus, 
we are brought back to our beginning concern,” they concluded, “that continued and 
accelerated gentrification of Harlem through the seeming beneficence of UMEZ, with 
more power being asserted and carried forward by ‘market forces,’ where, once again, 
every one will be empowered but the people.”22 
That Harlem USA would rise as the neighborhood’s first large-scale commercial 
complex, then, and that the Harlem Commonwealth Council (HCC) – of which Wilcox 
had been a founding member – would play a central role in its development, marked a 
deep irony. The project claimed a long history in the work of HCC. The community 
development corporation, Harlem’s first, had moved increasingly toward profit-oriented, 
commercial development over the course of the 1970s, a story chronicled in detail in 
Chapter Three. The organization first offered plans for a shopping mall anchored by a 
large commercial tenant in 1976, on the land they had amassed on 125th Street between 
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St. Nicholas and Eighth Avenues, a project they further developed throughout the 1970s 
with the assistance of HUDC.23 These plans remained on paper, however, as the federal 
austerity of the Reagan era removed the economic support on which the leaders of HCC 
had built their vision. By the early 1990s, Wilcox had grown extremely frustrated with 
the organization, a corporation that had once aspired to facilitate the radical goal of 
collective ownership of Harlem’s land but which proved unable to build even the 
moderate spatial vision it came to adopt. “I am, frankly, terribly disappointed that HCC 
never became the economic pump-primer it was intended to become,” Wilcox told a 
reporter in 1991. Wilcox angrily cut ties with the CDC in the mid-1990s, by the time 
Harlem received designation as an Empowerment Zone.24  
The Empowerment Zone activated dormant plans, however, bringing HCC’s 
moderate spatial vision into physical reality and reifying the view of the private sector 
that Wright touted in response to Wilcox’s concerns. When the CDC’s controversial 
president, James Dowdy, resigned in 1991, the organization was left with a series of 
failed enterprises but also a substantial amount of land on 125th Street, just as private 
developers were beginning to express renewed interest in the street. Late that year, two 
such developers jointly proposed a mixed-use commercial project for a 125th Street site in 
East Harlem that was to become the Pathmark supermarket. The developers, Gotham 
Organization and Grid Properties, hoped to bring a commercial project to Harlem 
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including a movie theater, retail space, a food court, and a supermarket. Though the city 
declined to choose their proposal for that site, in part because of its speculative nature, 
the Grid/Gotham joint venture found an interested partner in HCC, which agreed to 
participate and lease the 125th Street property it had long intended for a shopping center. 
Sensing the optimism that surrounded Harlem’s designation as an Empowerment Zone 
and the new public support promised for private sector development, the partners 
announced their venture in early 1996, a “retail and entertainment complex” called 
“Harlem USA,” which the New York Amsterdam News touted as “the largest private 
commercial investment ever made in Central Harlem.” Soon after announcing UMEZ’s 
substantial financial commitment to Harlem USA in November of that year, Deborah 
Wright described her high expectations for the project’s impact on 125th Street. “[T]he 
thing that is going to push this strip over the top has not yet happened. It’s going to take 
something like Harlem USA to take the cover off.”25 
Indeed, Harlem USA’s backers espoused the broader celebration of the private 
sector that increasingly marked development on 125th Street, echoing the view that 
Harlemites were under-retailed and that the neighborhood thus offered a prime market for 
investors. “This complex will dramatically increase the availability of retail goods and 
services to the residents,” said Barbara Norris, HCC’s president, in announcing the 
project. “This will be a platform from which retailers and corporations can reach vastly 
underserved Harlem residents,” she continued. “Retailers are realizing they can sell more 
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products if they are located there,” explained Drew Greenwald, another of the project’s 
developers, “and banks know that there are deposits there and loans to be made.” In 
expressing their vision of commercial development, the project’s promoters had in mind 
the national chain retailers that had already reshaped midtown New York. “If they can get 
42nd Street under way, we can certainly get 125th Street under way,” Norris promised, 
comparing Harlem’s main street to Times Square. “Harlem USA will create 700 jobs and 
bring national retailers to 125th Street,” announced Richard Parsons. “Harlem USA is 
leading a resurgence in commercial and economic development in Upper Manhattan. Its 
high-profile tenants will increase the area’s visibility and enhance business activity in the 
community.”26 
On the day of Harlem USA’s groundbreaking in 1998, a large advertisement 
published in both the New York Times and Wall Street Journal proclaimed Harlem’s 
arrival into the mainstream that backers touted (Figure 6.2). “Today, breaking ground for 
Harlem USA opens the way to a $2.5 billion consumer market in Upper Manhattan,” bold 
text proclaimed. “Yes, Upper Manhattan.” The 65-million dollar project would 
“spearhead a new wave of private investment uptown,” the ad promised. “Proof positive 
that the upside of Manhattan is indeed above 96th Street.” The image of a still-clean 
shovel that dominated the page suggested that this was not just an announcement of the 
start of construction, but also an invitation to join the effort. “So whether your business is 
large or small, we invite you to get in on the ground floor of New York City’s next great 
destination.” An inset captured a rendering of the project that was on its way, all glass  
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Figure 6.2. Empowerment Zone Advertisement, July 1998. 
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and light with stores opening to the street, as spectacular as the luminaries who gathered 
for the first turning of soil: Charles Rangel, Governor George Pataki, Thomas Labrecque 
(the president of Chase Manhattan Bank, which provided the project’s financing), 
Richard Parsons, Deborah Wright, and Barbara Norris, and recording artists Dionne 
Warwick and Mary J. Blige, who paid tribute in song.27 The advertisement confirmed that 
proponents’ hopes that the mall would attract top national retailers had not gone 
unrequited. “Market-leaders” including Magic Johnson Theaters, HMV Record Stores, 
Old Navy clothing store, the Disney Store, Chase Manhattan Bank, sporting goods 
retailer Modell’s, and the New York Sports Club had signed on. “All eager to serve a 
customer base the size of Seattle,” the ad read.28  
The arrival of the Empowerment Zone, and the start of construction that would 
bring Harlem’s first shopping mall to life, story by story, marked the broad acceptance in 
the 1990s of the idea that socioeconomic and physical revitalization required a new 
openness to the private sector; in other words, that the road to urban transformation was 
paved with large-scale commerce. If Harlem USA made 125th Street look more like 
commercial corridors throughout Manhattan, that was precisely the point. Though the 
arrival of national retail chains obscured the diverse participants at the heart of such 
projects, the fact remained that community-based organizations, public officials, and 
private developers together pursued this moderate vision of Harlem with the aim of 
bringing the neighborhood into a perceived economic “mainstream.” As it turned out, the 
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costs and benefits of that strategy were as varied as the polychromatic signs that 
bedecked Harlem USA’s transparent façade (Figures 6.3, 6.4). 
 
The Costs and Benefits of Retail Transformation 
 When Harlem USA first opened its doors in early 2000, the enthusiastic response 
suggested a community longing for the new shopping options that the complex provided. 
Despite the frigid February weather on the day of Old Navy’s grand opening, residents 
lined up outside to await entry into the clothing store. Five thousand Harlemites attended 
the unveiling of the music store HMV a few months later, eager to meet the celebrities 
who attended but also to show their approval at the cash registers. The July unveiling of 
Harlem’s first multiplex cinema, the Magic Johnson Theaters, likewise found patrons 
excited to view the facility’s initial screening, Shaft. Harlemites offered generous praise. 
“It sends a message of upliftedness and a sense of pride and well-being,” the 
development director of the Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement said of 
the movie theater. “I don’t think you can encase it in a few words.” Others voiced their 
sentiments in terms more prosaic, but no less approving. An eager Old Navy shopper was 
“having a ball,” she told a Times reporter. “It’s convenient, so I don’t have to go 
downtown. It’s hard to travel with little kids. And I’m within walking distance, so I save 
money on carfare.”29  
Some, however, watched new development with concern. “We can’t compete 
with an international corporation like HMV,” the owner of a decade-old record store  
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Figure 6.3. Harlem USA, 125th Street Side, 2012. Photograph by author. 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Harlem USA, Corner of 125th Street and Frederick Douglass Boulevard 
(Eighth Avenue), 2012. Photograph by author. 
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explained. “Things are already tight. HMV will be detrimental to my business.” One 
critical commentator likened the Empowerment Zone to a Trojan horse. “When all the 
occupants of the hollow horse finally disembark, Harlem will have much more glitter, but 
Harlemites will have much less gold,” wrote Mamadou Chinyelu, a journalist who saw 
new commercial development as a means of economic exploitation. “Harlemites, for the 
most part, failed to ask, Who is going to be empowered by this initiative,” Chinyelu 
wrote. “Tragically, for those easily seduced by glitter, the question may never come to 
mind.” Likewise, Harlem-based activist Reverend Al Sharpton wondered aloud about the 
neighborhood’s increasing commercial development. “Harlem is on the rise, but who is 
riding the wave,” he asked. “Are the people of Harlem surfing or being drowned?” The 
answer proved decidedly ambiguous, dependent in large measure on whom one asked.30  
Perhaps no project symbolized both the tension and the promise that attended the 
arrival of large retail in Harlem quite like the Pathmark supermarket that rose on 125th 
Street, between Lexington and Third Avenues (Figure 6.5). Like Harlem USA, the 
supermarket had deep roots in the history of community development in Harlem. Already 
in the late 1960s, the leaders behind the effort to gain community control in the East 
Harlem Triangle began to discuss the possibility of bringing modern food shopping to the 
neighborhood. As detailed in Chapter One, East Harlem Triangle activists, led by Alice 
Kornegay, opposed city plans to demolish their neighborhood – east of Park Avenue and 
north of 125th Street – for industrial development. Members of the Community  
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Figure 6.5. Pathmark Supermarket, Corner of 125th Street and Lexington Avenue, 2012. 
Photograph by author. 
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Association of the East Harlem Triangle (CAEHT) gained official city approval of their 
own redevelopment plan, which prioritized affordable housing for the predominantly 
low-income residents of the small neighborhood. Leaders in the community found that 
above all, residents hoped for the addition of “a good supermarket” to the East Harlem 
Triangle. CAEHT identified this as a long-term goal, tied to the completion of new 
housing in the neighborhood and ideally to be cooperatively owned by residents. By the 
early 1970s, CAEHT had identified a site for the project and planned the start of 
construction. The project remained at this planning stage, however, likely due to the 1973 
federal housing moratorium that crippled the group’s efforts.31 
Kornegay remained faithful to this early dream over the succeeding decades, 
though the promise of new food retail remained only hypothetical for much of that time. 
In the early 1990s, however, the administration of New York City Mayor David Dinkins 
promoted the construction of supermarkets in neighborhoods with limited food retail and 
extensive housing construction under the city’s Ten Year Housing Plan. Both 
descriptions fit Harlem, which had no large-scale supermarket in its bounds. When the 
city requested development proposals for a long-vacant parking lot on the south side of 
125th Street in 1991, CAEHT submitted a bid in partnership with Pathmark, a 
supermarket chain that had already launched similar partnerships with community 
development corporations in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn and Newark, New Jersey. 
Their proposal gained the city’s approval, especially because of the central role reserved 
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for CAEHT. “The proposal…clearly demonstrates that local entities and minority 
individuals can be involved in the development process not merely as sub-contractors and 
consultants, but as full equity participants,” officials wrote.32  
Bringing the Pathmark to reality provided a symbolic bridge between the earliest 
generation of community developers, represented by the scrappy CAEHT, and the most 
recent generation, represented by the highly professionalized Abyssinian Development 
Corporation (ADC). While CAEHT’s plans gained praise from officials, problems 
obtaining financing brought the involvement of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(LISC), the funding intermediary that had helped to bankroll much of the community-
developed housing that organizations had built over the previous decade. LISC had begun 
to take greater interest in retail development, in part due to the financial difficulties that 
followed projects like this one. Through an effort called The Retail Initiative, LISC raised 
funds from institutional investors, such as large banks and insurance companies, to 
provide the equity needed to obtain construction loans. LISC, which had worked 
extensively with ADC and become familiar with the organization’s ability to complete 
projects, requested their addition to the development team “to strengthen [CAEHT’s] 
administrative capacity,” city officials explained. While CAEHT maintained many of the 
traits that characterized community organizations that originated in the 1960s – a 
charismatic leader, a self-reliant nature, and a homespun approach – ADC symbolized the 
sophistication and expertise that marked recent CDCs. The project proceeded as a joint 
venture of the two community organizations, old and new, with a funding structure as 
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complicated as in the housing developments on which ADC built its reputation. The 
federal government and Pathmark provided grants, the city Economic Development 
Corporation and private banks supplied loans, New York State and LISC provided both 
grants and loans, and The Retail Initiative funded the project’s equity. Though planning 
for the supermarket proceeded before the Empowerment Zone had begun operations, the 
effort shared the combination of public and private sector funding that was becoming 
ubiquitous in Harlem development.33  
Supermarkets may register at the more mundane end of commercial development, 
but for many in Harlem construction of the Pathmark project marked an extraordinary 
advance in a neighborhood that was, to put it mildly, poorly served by existing grocery 
retail. “The Poor Pay More…For Less,” the city titled their 1991 study of grocery 
availability in New York’s predominantly low-income neighborhoods. In communities 
like Harlem, officials in the city’s Department of Consumer Affairs explained, residents 
paid an average of almost nine percent more for groceries than in the city’s 
predominantly middle-class neighborhoods. Grocery stores in underserved areas were 
smaller, less sanitary, and had less competition for customers, many of whom lacked 
mobility and thus consumer choice. Smaller stores stocked fewer products and offered 
fewer services, the city wrote, such as automated teller machines. Convenience stores 
often filled demand in such neighborhoods, but offered a limited selection of fruits and 
vegetables and other fresh ingredients. More detailed studies confirmed that Harlemites 
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did, in fact, pay more. The city’s Human Resources Administration conducted market 
basket studies, comparing the largest available stores in Harlem – all served by two 
wholesalers – with the broader selection of retail available in New York’s Lower East 
Side, including a Pathmark. A September 1994 study found that the lowest priced sample 
basket cost more than 11 percent more in Harlem, and the highest priced basket over six 
percent more. A November survey found even starker disparities: residents paid over 27 
percent more for the lowest priced market basket in Harlem compared to the Lower East 
Side, and almost 17 percent more for the highest priced basket.34 
Unsurprisingly, then, Harlemites desired greater retail options in the community. 
HUDC conducted a survey of Harlem residents as part of the Empowerment Zone 
planning process. Only nine percent of respondents evaluated existing stores and 
supermarkets as “excellent.” Forty-four percent considered the availability of stores 
within walking distance to be “pretty good,” and 42 percent rated grocery stores with the 
same mark. Equally as many residents considered current stores to be “only fair” or 
“poor,” however. Forty-nine percent placed food retail in those bottom-most categories. 
When staff asked residents which new stores they would like to see in the neighborhood, 
clothing stores and supermarkets proved the leaders, with 22 percent requesting the 
former, and 19 percent selecting the latter. In 1998, Michael Porter’s Institute for a 
Competitive Inner City, a non-profit that he had founded to promote his ideas and for 
which Deborah Wright served as an advisory board member, collaborated with the 
Boston Consulting Group to investigate the potential of retail development in six urban 
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markets, including Harlem. The study emphasized the profitability of such investment. 
“For growth-oriented retailers seeking revenues and new opportunities in today’s global 
marketplace,” it promised, “the inner city is perhaps the last large domestic frontier.” Yet 
even as the authors made a “business case,” their analysis offered revealing glimpses of 
the human cost of limited shopping options in Harlem, a market that they estimated did 
not have retail supply to meet even half of resident demand. One Harlem focus group 
member suspected that retailers raised prices during the first two weeks of the month, 
after eligible residents received public assistance checks. “We do not want old, dated, 
second-rate stores, products, and services,” another focus group member said. 
“Sometimes six or eight of us share a van to New Jersey to go to BJ’s [Wholesale Club],” 
a third explained, suggesting the lengths residents were willing to go to obtain reasonably 
priced groceries. 35 
If many Harlemites looked upon news of improved neighborhood food retail with 
anticipation, however, others feared that a supermarket would expand not just grocery 
selection, but also inequality. As he often did, Preston Wilcox staked a position of deep 
skepticism at the 1997 construction groundbreaking for the Pathmark. “What we have 
here is a bunch of capitalists coming into our community, but not really showing us how 
capitalism works,” he said. “Harlem is looking more and more like a cash cow, but what 
needs to be done is for our people to invest in themselves.” Wilcox highlighted not the 
potential buying power of the neighborhood as a whole, but the financial potential of 
many of Harlem’s poorest residents. “These bankers and what have you should 
encourage the tenants who reside in some 22 housing projects and possess nearly $3 
                                                
35 HUDC, “The Harlem Survey,” c. 1994, 18-9, Box 36, Folder 2, Wilcox Papers; Boston Consulting 
Group and Initiative for a Competitive Inner City, “The Business Case for Pursuing Retail Opportunities in 
the Inner City” (Boston: Boston Consulting Group, June 1998), 1-2, 5, 8. 
 426 
million to use their money as an investment vehicle,” he told a reporter. Similarly, Lloyd 
Williams, the CEO of the Greater Harlem Chamber of Commerce, seemed to overlook 
the equity role of the community development organizations at the heart of the Pathmark 
in advocating for his member organizations. “You have a Pathmark coming here and we 
need it,” he said, “But it’s the Pathmarks that are benefiting from the tax credits, 
employees’ benefits and loans that are available, as opposed to the small mom-and-pop 
stores that really need to benefit from these zones.”36  
Indeed, the small retailers who had sold groceries for years in the absence of a 
large supermarket, and who now found themselves the subject of criticism, expressed 
these sentiments most publicly. The Retail Initiative’s support for supermarket 
development brought a hundred East Harlem storeowners to protest at the intermediary’s 
offices in late 1994. The merchants opposed the public and non-profit support allocated 
to the Pathmark project and they opposed the 50,000 square foot size of the combination 
grocery and pharmacy, a feature that they viewed as only bringing a new scale of 
competition to the neighborhood. “It will make the shopping strip of any commercial area 
like a ghost town,” one proprietor of small food markets explained. “The Pathmark gets 
everything.” A seemingly straightforward protest became complicated very quickly, 
however, as it continued over the next year. The lobbyist supporting the merchants most 
vociferously worked for one of the wholesalers that supplied many East Harlem markets, 
suggesting the multiple interests at play. The issue took on a racially charged edge as 
well, as the owners of bodegas and corner stores, mostly Latino, publicly resisted a 
project whose community backers were largely African Americans. Council members, 
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who would have to approve the land transfer to enable the project to go forward, 
consequently sorted along ethnic lines. Meanwhile, Mayor Giuliani, rarely shy in political 
battles, attempted to dodge this one as support for the project threatened to upset Latino 
voters he depended upon. Protest subsided only after Giuliani publicly stated his approval 
of the project, though his assent came with two concessions: a loan program for the 
smaller merchants administered by Chase, a lender to the Pathmark project, and a 
promised future 49 percent ownership share for a Latino group in the CAEHT/ADC joint 
venture, which seems never to have been allocated.37 
Though the Pathmark protest rapidly devolved into a battle cast along parochial 
lines, it nonetheless remained emblematic of a broader frustration among small business 
people in Harlem, who felt overlooked amidst the focus on large retail projects in the 
mid-90s. The response of longstanding record store owners to Harlem USA expressed 
such sentiment, as did the exasperation of those proprietors who felt neglected amidst 
discussion of “empowerment.” UMEZ funded a small-business lending program called 
the Business Resource and Investment Services Center, an effort that supported 
equipment purchases, working costs, and modest expansion with loans under 200,000 
dollars. The Empowerment Zone likewise supported an effort targeted at area restaurants 
and funded other modest lending programs throughout the area.38 Such aid proved helpful 
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to those who received it, but those who did not saw only official neglect and indifference 
to their efforts. One Harlemite who opened a small television studio with his own savings 
applied for a modest 50,000-dollar loan from UMEZ, but the program denied his 
application. “To get a loan they said you have to have a three-year track record of being 
in a business,” he told a reporter. “If I’m a new business, how could I have three years of 
bookkeeping and records?” Dorothy Pitman Hughes, who owned a small office supply 
store on 125th Street, wrote an entire book about her frustrations with the Empowerment 
Zone, which denied her funding request as well. “We African-American business owners 
now feel that we have been used,” Hughes wrote, “and that our efforts to empower the 
community may actually have resulted in accomplishing the gentrification of Harlem.”39 
Yet even as such views signified deeply held anxiety over changes that were 
readily apparent to any observer on 125th Street, many other Harlemites looked forward 
to such new development. Pathmark paid a market research firm to conduct a telephone 
survey of area residents amidst the controversy that surrounded the project. The survey, 
based on 300 random calls, found that 90 percent of respondents agreed that a 
supermarket was needed, a remarkably high number even for a commissioned study. The 
involvement of community-based organizations at the center of this and other large retail 
projects likewise complicated claims that these projects would bring the empowerment of 
outsiders and the downfall of residents. Abyssinian Development Corporation and the 
Community Association of the East Harlem Triangle jointly owned the land on which the 
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supermarket project stood. Pathmark paid them rent, funds that the non-profits used to 
support subsequent projects in the community.40  
Indeed, even the basic claim that new, large-scale competition would undermine 
smaller merchants remained less than certain. A Baruch College study that analyzed the 
impact of the Lower East Side Pathmark on nearby retail in the mid-1980s found that two 
of seven large food stores in the area closed in the three and a half years after the 
Pathmark opened, but the 66 nearby small specialty stores – which sold food, clothing, 
and other goods – were unharmed. The city’s own study of possible impact in East 
Harlem, conducted by a planning consultant in 1992 before any controversy had 
emerged, explained that the area had been underserved for so long that residents could 
support another 40,000 square feet of food retail and the same amount of pharmacy retail, 
far in excess of the size of this project. Soon after the Pathmark opened in April 1999, a 
New York Times reporter found nearby storeowners already improving their product 
selection, displays, and interior finishes, some with help from the aid program that had 
grown from their protests.41 
This new era of commercial development marked the physical realization of a 
moderate spatial vision of Harlem and the dwindling of the radical ideal of a community 
built by and cooperatively owned by its low-income residents. But as Harlemites 
responded to the arrival of the Pathmark with glee, it became clear that Harlem’s 
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community organizations had achieved at least a small portion of one of their early 
goals—that the neighborhood’s main street would serve the needs of its residents. If this 
objective had been attained on the narrower field of consumption, rather than as part of 
an expansive vision of 125th Street as a space of cultural, residential, social, educational, 
and economic self-determination, the achievement remained consequential. Residents in 
majority African-American neighborhoods had long depended on chain retail for 
predictable prices and quality goods. As exemplified by the response of Harlemites upon 
first passing through the automated glass doors of the Pathmark, this remained equally 
true at the close of the century. One visitor admired a head of broccoli, judging its quality 
worth its price. “We’ve been waiting a long time for a nice supermarket in Harlem,” she 
said, explaining that she would no longer need her daughter to bring back decent meat 
from outside Harlem. A mother of two young boys marveled at the simple fact that she 
could find everything she needed in one place. “I’m just going crazy in here,” she told a 
reporter. “Everything I need in a store is right here.”42  
One longtime Harlemite was not there to enjoy the fruits of her labors, however. 
Alice Kornegay passed away in May 1996, having lived long enough to see the long-
sought supermarket project come together but not to see it built and filled with customers 
(Figure 6.6). As one of the figures who had first insisted that residents demand 
community control of their built environment, her death signaled the closing of a chapter 
in the history of Harlem. Indeed, the transformation of 125th Street in the late 1990s  
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Figure 6.6. Memorial to Alice Kornegay in the 125th Street Pathmark Supermarket, 
2012. Photograph by author. 
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marked not just the arrival of new retail in the neighborhood, but also a changing of the 
guard among those who bore the mantle of community development at the close of the 
century.43 
 
Power Lost and Gained at the Corner of 125th and Lenox 
 The central block of 125th Street, on the north side of the street between Lenox 
Avenue and Adam Clayton Powell Boulevard, had witnessed every major phase of 
transition in the history of Harlem development in the last four decades of the twentieth 
century. It was here that the state decided to build a skyscraper office building, the last 
gasp of an urban renewal order that had reshaped the neighborhood in the 1960s. It was 
here that radical activists built a utopian settlement for three months in the summer of 
1969, hoping to stop the state’s project. It was also here, in the aftermath of that 
occupation, that the leaders of HUDC transformed the inclusive, eclectic ideal of activists 
and the Architects’ Renewal Committee in Harlem into a much narrower vision of a 
commercial future for 125th Street built on a foundation of large projects. This moderate 
vision had remained on drawing boards over the following two decades.  
In the mid-1990s, this site – home by this time to the State Office Building, a 
parking garage, and a row of small storefronts – witnessed yet one more transition, from 
the older generation of liberal moderate leaders represented by HUDC, to the younger 
generation of pragmatic centrists represented by Rev. Calvin O. Butts, III, the leader of 
the Abyssinian Baptist Church, and the church’s Abyssinian Development Corporation. 
Abyssinian’s addition to the Pathmark project suggested the prominence the organization 
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had achieved through its successful housing efforts. “[T]he developer, Abyssinian Baptist 
Church, is one of the most powerful forces in black Harlem,” the New York Daily News 
explained. “But it is also one of the most respected institutions in the city, with a proven 
track record.”44 Indeed, Abyssinian’s increasing involvement in Harlem’s commercial 
transformation over the last years of the decade symbolized the arrival of community-
based organizations not merely as participants, but as major players in both urban 
development and, consequently, the city and state’s political scene.  
The strands of the 40-year history explored here come together at the corner of 
125th Street and Lenox Avenue: the longstanding hope that community-based 
organizations could shape the neighborhood’s physical form, the ascendant moderate 
vision of commercial development in Harlem’s core, and the new pragmatism 
exemplified by the generation of church-based CDCs that emerged in the 1980s. At the 
end of the century, ADC at last transformed the block that had been the canvas for 
generations of visions of the neighborhood’s future. While ADC’s ascent signaled the 
central role of community development organizations in determining the neighborhood’s 
form in the new millennium, however, so too did it raise new questions about the nature 
and distribution of power at Harlem’s grassroots. 
If the low-slung Pathmark marked the still-growing influence of ADC in the mid-
1990s in a correspondingly understated fashion, the commanding office tower and retail 
complex of Harlem Center provided apt signification of the status the organization had 
achieved by the early 2000s, when the shopping center opened its doors (Figure 6.7). 
Harlem Center, like the nearby Harlem USA, added additional national retailers to the 
neighborhood’s major spine, including the clothing stores Marshall’s and H&M, a CVS  
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Figure 6.7. Harlem Center, Corner of 125th Street and Lenox Avenue, with State Office 
Building in Background, 2012. Photograph by author. 
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pharmacy, office supply store Staples, Washington Mutual Bank, and Dunkin Donuts. 
Officials explained the approximately 80-million dollar project as the latest in the series 
of large-scale commercial complexes that were transforming the blocks of 125th Street. 
“Harlem Center is another tremendous project that will create jobs, investment and 
confidence in one of New York’s most storied neighborhoods,” announced Governor 
George Pataki in publicly launching the project in 2000. “Harlem Center will continue 
the economic renewal that this community is experiencing with projects such as 125th 
Street Pathmark, East River Plaza [a commercial development on the former Washburn 
Wire site in East Harlem] and Harlem USA.” Like its predecessors on Harlem’s main 
street, Harlem Center grew from a partnership between a supportive public sector 
partner—in this case, the state of New York, a private sector developer—here, Forest 
City Ratner, and a longstanding Harlem community development organization, ADC.45 
Harlem Center mirrored the collaborative approach and commercial development 
orientation of its new neighbors, but its origin story proved considerably more 
complicated. Indeed, Abyssinian’s role at the center of the project indicated not simply 
the organization’s emergence as Harlem’s go-to CDC, but the broader transformation of 
the landscape of community development in the last years of the twentieth century. For 
nearly two decades, the land that became Harlem Center, located to the east of the State 
Office Building, had instead fueled dreams of the Harlem International Trade Center, the 
project that was intended to instantiate HUDC’s own vision of large-scale, publicly-
funded, commercially-oriented development as the basis of Harlem’s transformation. As 
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described in Chapter Three, the Harlem International Trade Center marked the eclipse in 
the 1970s of the eclectic, inclusive vision that activists had once hoped would rise on this 
site. Instead of a community-planned, mixed-use center of culture, housing, education, 
and commerce, HUDC’s moderate board members pushed a hotel, convention center, 
trade institute, and international bazaar for this land. Backers hoped that the mega-project 
would both spur development in Harlem and become a hub of commerce between 
America and what proponents described as “Third World” countries abroad.46  
Yet while the trade center received enthusiastic promotion from Representative 
Charles Rangel, the steadfast supporter of HUDC who made this his pet project, and 
gained prominent backers in succeeding years, the development inched along only slowly 
amidst alternating advances and setbacks. Diplomats and world leaders fueled hopes, for 
example, visiting the neighborhood and HUDC’s Harlem Third World Trade Institute to 
express their interest. Tanzania’s president Julius Nyerere, Nigeria’s president Shehu 
Shagari, and Zimbabwe’s prime minister, Robert Mugabe, were some of the many 
statesmen to pose for photographs in the late 1970s and early 1980s with architectural 
models, HUDC’s executives, or Rangel. Reagan’s election undermined the federal 
support President Carter had offered to the project, but Rangel’s own growing influence 
in Congress and the election of Democrat Mario Cuomo as governor of New York in 
1983 kept hope alive that a skyscraper would nonetheless rise on the fateful 125th Street 
site. A 1986 request for proposals failed to secure a developer, but by 1988, Rangel had 
procured a commitment from the federal government to lease one-third of the office 
space in the project, and Cuomo dedicated 50 million dollars to the project from the Port 
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Authority of New York and New Jersey. In 1989, the state at last announced the selection 
of a developer for the project, a public-private collaboration that foreshadowed the later 
structure of Harlem Center, pairing private entities with community partners, including 
the Harlem Churches for Community Improvement, the CDC that at that time was also 
actively involved in housing construction. The groundbreaking was finally just over the 
horizon, backers claimed. “Next year,” Rangel promised in late 1990.47 
But the long-delayed project continued to stand in suspended animation as the 
new decade began, and soon it outlasted the state officials who provided essential 
support. Despite visits from twenty different foreign leaders, none had yet signed on as 
tenants in the still speculative complex. Meanwhile, the project’s private sector backers 
took three years to agree on development terms with the state. By late 1993, the site still 
remained untouched and the International Trade Center languished. While backers 
scrambled to secure assurances from potential lessees, the political winds shifted among 
the leaders who supported the project.48 George Pataki’s election as governor in 
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November 1994 came as something of a surprise, ending both the three-term rule of 
Mario Cuomo and the two-decade tenure of the Democratic Party in the governor’s 
office. Pataki, at the time a one-term state senator, benefited from the steadfast support of 
Senator Alfonse D’Amato, general dissatisfaction with the Clinton Administration, and 
weariness toward Cuomo, who had responded to the ongoing recession with budget cuts 
and new taxes. Pataki attracted disenchanted suburban and upstate voters with promises 
of tax cuts and the reinstatement of the death penalty, riding a broader conservative 
political tide that ushered Republicans into office throughout the nation.49 
Pataki’s election owed little to New York City. New York City Mayor Rudolph 
Giuliani, though a Republican, had endorsed Cuomo in the gubernatorial race, a wager 
based on his sense that Cuomo would win and on his bitter, longstanding rivalry with 
D’Amato. Indeed, Pataki gained from Giuliani’s seeming betrayal of his party, painting it 
as a cynical “deal” that would benefit residents of New York City at the expense of other 
New Yorkers.50 Unsurprisingly, then, soon after his January 1995 inauguration, Pataki 
looked to eliminate state expenditures that especially benefited New York City’s urban 
residents. His first budget proposed deep cuts to social services spending, moved funding 
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for urban public transportation to upstate projects, and slashed funding to public 
education and Medicaid.51  
Likewise, Harlem did not escape the new governor’s notice. Pataki promised the 
end of the Harlem Urban Development Corporation, proposing to merge the autonomous 
but state-funded organization into the state’s Urban Development Corporation, soon 
renamed the Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC). Charles Gargano, Pataki’s 
appointee to head the ESDC, cited HUDC as an inefficiency in the new state 
development structure and an expenditure – of 3.5 million dollars each year – that the 
state could not afford. Upon HUDC’s closure in August 1995, Gargano chided the 
“uncontested reign” of the organization, describing what he perceived as their “failure to 
stimulate economic growth despite an investment of $109 million in state funds over the 
years.” Pataki created a new organization, the Harlem Community Development 
Corporation, in its stead, an entity that would receive substantially less funding from the 
state and whose board of directors the governor would largely control. Rangel, who had 
backed the creation of HUDC from its inception and supported the faction of Harlem 
establishment moderates who had maintained power over the organization, seemed to 
recognize the broader transformation that the end of HUDC foreshadowed. “This seems 
like the end of development in Harlem as we have known it,” he told a reporter.52 
The closure of HUDC surely derived from a changing political context in the 
state. Pataki’s rapid move to dismantle the agency despite its relatively modest budget 
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spoke to his interest in undermining an organization that had been the stronghold of 
Democratic political leaders like Rangel. Yet the Pataki administration’s criticisms of 
HUDC as an entity that had dreamed up big projects but built few, and that had often 
seemed to spend freely in its own self-interest, were apparently not without foundation. 
The state performed a comprehensive audit of HUDC in the aftermath of its closure, 
citing repeated instances of overpayments and payments for services not rendered that 
appeared to contradict the agency’s mission to spur development in Harlem. As a result 
of its autonomy from state oversight, the state’s investigation reported, “HUDC spent 
untold unnecessary amounts of taxpayer funds, failed to properly account for loans and 
advances to HUDC directors and employees, and pumped millions of dollars into New 
York’s underground economy through ‘off-the-books’ payments to construction workers, 
security guards, consultants, and independent contractors.” Despite warning signs 
throughout the organization’s twenty-five year history, these issues persisted, the report 
claimed.53 
HUDC’s backers brushed off such criticisms as partisan attacks, but the state’s 
findings were consistent with the conflicts of interest and self-interest that had appeared 
in the organization’s operations from its very first years, sometimes even involving the 
same people. “I have no idea what the findings are based on,” Rangel claimed. “You have 
a bunch of Republicans going through the files of a defunct organization run by 
Democrats.” Yet many of the excesses that the state cited were plainly egregious, if not 
malicious. HUDC skirted state hiring restrictions by classifying many employees as 
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“consultants,” for example, and did not withhold taxes on their salaries. HUDC often paid 
excessively for services. For instance, the agency paid a computer consultant a six-figure 
salary to perform what the state categorized as “routine accounting functions,” though the 
agency had its own accounting staff. HUDC similarly overpaid a consultant to manage 
the parking garage on the future Harlem International Trade Center site, yet failed to pay 
the city the rent it owed for operating the garage. The Temporary Commission of 
Investigation frequently cited HUDC’s failure to maintain standard financial records as 
an impediment in determining if the agency’s expenditures were appropriate.54  
The case of attorney Jeff Greenup offered one of the most symbolic examples of 
the endemic conflicts of interest and misspent funds that marked the organization. 
Greenup had sat as the general counsel on HUDC’s board of directors throughout the 
history of the agency, yet he served at the same time as a paid legal consultant to 
HUDC’s staff, an arrangement that went unquestioned within the agency. In the last 
three-and-a-half years of HUDC’s history alone, Greenup billed for more than 600,000 
dollars, yet his invoices detailed none of the services rendered nor the members of his 
firm who had worked on assignments. HUDC had been alerted to such discrepancies as 
early as the 1980s, the state explained, but leaders had never acted to rectify them. The 
state claimed that Greenup had billed – and received – three times the amount allowed 
under his contract in 1995 alone. Greenup’s implication in the investigation suggested the 
persistence over decades of the kinds of excesses that had emerged in HUDC even in its 
first years. Indeed, as described in Chapter Three, it was Greenup himself who, in the 
early 1970s, had attempted to bid on the project intended for the corner of 125th Street 
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and Lenox Avenue despite his official involvement with HUDC’s board, and to change 
the agency’s by-laws to allow HUDC board members to profit from the development 
activities of the purportedly community-oriented agency. Now, Greenup refused to 
respond to the state’s inquiries and provided only cursory documents when officials went 
through the courts to compel participation. Greenup’s case, reported in the New York 
Times alongside several other provocative anecdotes, undermined the agency’s protests 
that it had been a necessary agent in Harlem’s built environment and distracted from the 
successes that the agency had accomplished, especially in the realm of housing.55 
Unsurprisingly, the end of HUDC reverberated on the Harlem block that its 
backers had hoped would hold the skyscraper tower of the Harlem International Trade 
Center. The death of the project spelled the end of the strategy of Harlem development 
that Rangel had backed, consisting of large projects funded through public support often 
arranged by the congressman. Like federal leaders and those in the local Empowerment 
Zone, Pataki, too, subscribed to the notion that development efforts should arise primarily 
through the involvement of the private sector. Soon after taking office, Charles Gargano, 
the head of the ESDC, expressed his distaste for big, publicly funded projects, including 
the Harlem International Trade Center. When Gargano instituted a December 1995 
deadline on the longstanding but so far unrealized project, Rangel protested that its 
backers needed more time. “The Trade Center is the linchpin for economic growth and 
business development for Harlem and upper Manhattan,” he told Pataki. Yet the 
administration disagreed, favoring the emerging view that Harlem’s economic health 
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rested on the use of public funds to attract private investment, with the goal of bringing 
the neighborhood into a perceived economic mainstream through commercial 
development. When the state withdrew its support for the International Trade Center in 
late 1995, explaining that “the money can be better spent,” Gargano expressed his desire 
to instead develop the site for retail.56 
HUDC’s end brought with it the demise of a particular approach to community 
development, but not all Harlemites stood to lose from the increasing focus on making 
markets uptown. Harlem International Trade Center supporters claimed that the project’s 
termination would harm Harlem. “This is economic racism,” stated Percy Sutton, the 
chairman of the Harlem International Trade Center Corporation. But the younger 
generation of community-based organizations, like Abyssinian Development 
Corporation, which embraced the market-oriented approach to Harlem’s redevelopment, 
gained by HUDC’s loss. Political change created an untenable situation for the 
Democrat-backed old guard of Harlem community developers, but the political free 
agency that had long marked ADC’s approach – emphasizing the task of building over a 
rigid political dogma – proved remarkably valuable in this new era. While Rangel and 
others complained about the seemingly political moves that undermined the International 
Trade Center, Rev. Calvin Butts and ADC seized the opportunity provided with the 
election of Pataki.57 
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This sea change, and the consequent prominence accorded ADC, were bound up 
in the figure of Calvin Butts, the prominent leader of Abyssinian Baptist Church. Butts, 
who had called from the pulpit for the community engagement that brought the founding 
of ADC, served as the very symbol of the political pragmatism that suffused its work and 
the spiritual guidepost of its agenda. Butts had cut an unconventional political figure in 
the usually predictable political landscape of Harlem since his initial ascent as 
Abyssinian’s pastor. Born in 1949, Butts had participated in the Civil Rights Movement 
as a teenager growing up in New York City and taken part in the civil disorder that 
followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Butts continued to associate his 
work closely with the legacy of leaders like King and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., his 
predecessor at Abyssinian. Yet Butts eschewed the typical alliances that African-
American leaders in New York often followed. In the late 1980s, Butts criticized old 
guard African-American political leaders like David Dinkins, who would become New 
York’s first African-American mayor, as “overly cautious.” In the 1992 presidential 
election, Butts endorsed third party candidate Ross Perot, even serving as the co-chair of 
Perot’s New York campaign committee. Butts staged bombastic campaigns against 
tobacco and alcohol advertising in Harlem, leading ministers in painting over billboards 
in the neighborhood, and crusaded against rap music lyrics. In 1993, he supported the 
mayoral candidacy of Republican Rudolph Giuliani. The next year, he endorsed Rangel’s 
congressional reelection from his pulpit, especially citing the Democrat’s support for 
ADC and new prominence on the House Committee on Ways and Means, but also took 
the highly unusual step of inviting Pataki, then the Republican gubernatorial candidate, to 
speak to the members of the church during Sunday services.58  
                                                
58 Calvin O. Butts, interview by Julian Bond, c. 2008, Explorations in Black Leadership, University of 
 445 
The New York Times described “the political dance of Calvin Butts,” emphasizing 
the minister’s flexibility and shifting alliances in pursuit of needed resources. Butts 
sought diverse political partners not out of cynicism, but because he recognized allies in 
places where many local leaders had not looked. Republicans claimed political power in 
the mid-1990s that Butts and his organization could benefit from, to be sure. But Butts 
also saw alignment between the strategy of ADC, which emphasized improvement 
through building, and leaders like Pataki, who favored opening neighborhoods like 
Harlem to development. “I think the Republicans are in an excellent position to make the 
argument and demonstrate that you can do as much through economic development as 
you can through social welfare programs—in fact more,” Butts explained.59  
At the same time, leaders like Pataki were eager to embrace figures like Butts, 
who offered a platform to a community that had rarely formed part of the Republican 
political coalition. For his invitation to speak at Abyssinian and his refusal to endorse 
either candidate in the election that Pataki won, the new governor rewarded Butts with a 
seat on his transition team and, more crucially, membership on the board of the Empire 
State Development Corporation, the newly reorganized statewide development entity. 
Pataki also appointed Butts to the board of the Harlem Community Development 
Corporation, the successor to HUDC, whose vote determined the fate of the Harlem 
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International Trade Center. Rangel blamed the appointment of Butts for the trade center’s 
demise. One New York paper claimed that Butts had even introduced the resolution to 
end the project. Regardless of whether that was actually the case, he reportedly voted 
with the majority, electing termination.60 
With the official end of the Harlem International Trade Center, the Pataki 
administration wasted no time in pursuing the retail project that Gargano had indicated 
was destined for the corner of 125th Street and Lenox Avenue. In early 1996, officials 
requested proposals for the “Harlem Center Mall,” a complex that touted the same 
market-oriented economic logic as the other large-scale commercial projects that would 
be built on 125th Street during the latter half of the decade. “[T]he absence of major 
national retailers, as well as the lack of varied mid-priced retailers, causes many of 
Harlem’s residents to make their purchases outside of the area,” the request for proposals 
explained. Likewise, the population between ages 45 and 54, the “peak earning year 
group” within Harlem, was expected to grow, meaning hundreds of millions of potential 
spending dollars. “While many retailers have shown an appreciation of Harlem’s 
favorable demographics and a largely untapped market,” state officials wrote, “there has 
not been first class retail space for them to lease.” Harlem Center Mall was to provide 
that retail space for Harlemites. To build it, the state sought development teams with 
experience on similarly large-scale projects and involvement from Harlem non-profits or 
entrepreneurs. ADC, already engaged with commercial development through the 
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Pathmark project, invited one of New York’s largest commercial developers, Forest City 
Ratner, to submit a joint bid for the complex.61 
If the state did not design the project specifically for such a proposal by ADC, the 
political capital that Butts had built up through his support of Pataki nevertheless 
continued to pay dividends as the selection process unfolded. In mid-1997, when the 
state’s Empire State Development Corporation selected ADC and Forest City Ratner to 
develop the project, some eyebrows were raised but few wondered why that outcome had 
come to pass. “The designation is yet another example of the ascension of Rev. Calvin O. 
Butts 3d…under the administration of Gov. George E. Pataki,” the Times wrote. Rangel 
explained the selection as an obvious result of Butts’s loyalty to the governor. “You 
support somebody and they in turn support you,” he said, “and I think Reverend Butts 
understands that.” Butts, for his part, waved off such insinuations, even if their speakers 
delivered them without malice. The reverend, eager to ensure that his project was not 
tainted with the air of impropriety that had stained HUDC’s reputation, explained that 
though he served on the board that made the selection, he did not take part in the 
decision. “I am first and foremost a clergyperson,” he said. “Charles Gargano has been 
extremely fair. He hasn’t doled out any favors I’m aware of.” Later, he attempted to 
distance himself from the success of the church’s development corporation, though their 
fates – and their ascents – were entwined. “I don’t think I’ve been extended any privilege 
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as a member of the ESDC board,” he said. “The Abyssinian Development Corporation is 
a separate corporation with separate boards.”62 
Yet Butts and ADC’s growing influence in the landscape of Harlem development 
had become undeniable. Butts’s close connection to Randy Daniels, the African-
American senior vice president of ESDC, provided one example. Daniels largely handled 
the state’s affairs in Harlem. He was a longtime resident of Harlem, a member of 
Abyssinian Baptist Church, and a friend to Butts. Daniels also administered the 
Metropolitan Economic Revitalization Fund (MERF), a revolving state loan fund that 
seeded largely privately financed development projects. MERF had grown from the ashes 
of the Harlem International Trade Center. The state divided up the millions of dollars it 
had committed to the trade center upon its termination, assigning a portion to the 
Empowerment Zone and 25 million dollars to MERF, which provided essential funding 
to ADC and Forest City Ratner’s Harlem Center project. Harlem Center did not tap direct 
grant or loan support from the Empowerment Zone – though the state touted the project’s 
eligibility for the Zone’s incentives in seeking developers – but Pataki did call upon Butts 
as he weighed whether to maintain Cuomo’s 100 million dollar commitment to the effort. 
Pataki’s reluctance in part accounted for the long delay before the Empowerment Zone 
began distributing funds in late 1996. Butts shaped the governor’s eventual decision to 
honor his predecessor’s pledge. “When the Empowerment Zone was being set up, the 
governor called me and asked me if I thought the state should really participate,” Butts 
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recalled. “I never will forget that…I said that I appreciated him asking for my advice, and 
to move forward.”63 
The construction of Harlem Center recorded ADC’s prominence in the real, 
physical space of Harlem’s built environment, at one of the neighborhood’s major 
intersections. No longer occupied only with housing development, the CDC had begun to 
reshape the neighborhood’s landscape in vast strokes (Figure 6.8). Likewise, the growing 
power of Butts in Harlem’s physical space served as an index of his influence in the 
political space of Harlem and beyond. Butts, long rumored to be eyeing a run for public 
office, kept such rumors alive into the late 1990s. “[I]t looks more and more like I would 
do it,” he told a reporter in 1998. That year, the reverend appeared on the cover of New 
York magazine, with Al Sharpton in the background. The headline posed a provocative 
question: “Which would you choose, Dr. King?” Butts mused about being mayor of New 
York, his hometown. The reporter considered whether challenging the long serving 
Rangel was a more likely possibility. No African-American political leader had stepped 
up since the generation of Dinkins and Rangel, the reporter noted, and Butts’s political 
pragmatism, a departure from the approach of his predecessors, could serve as both a 
liability and an asset on a broader stage.64  
Though Butts fed such speculation, he played a more prominent political role 
behind the scenes. He stepped into the political rivalry between Giuliani and Pataki in 
1998, for instance, labeling the mayor as a racist for his administration’s approach to  
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Figure 6.8. Harlem Center, View from 125th Street, 2012. Photograph by author. 
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policing and cuts to services that benefited the poor. A few months later he officially 
endorsed Pataki’s bid for a second term, a move that angered both African-American 
leaders frustrated with Pataki’s own budget cuts and Giuliani, who called for the 
governor to reject the endorsement. “I can have someone I disagree with, but who helps 
me a great deal with projects that are important for our community,” Butts announced in 
endorsing the governor. Pataki, rather than rejecting Butts’s support, embraced it. “We 
are unequivocally thrilled to have Reverend Butts’s endorsement,” Pataki’s spokesman 
said. Though Butts eventually declined to run for either Rangel’s seat or Giuliani’s, his 
steadfast support for the governor did help gain one new leadership role at the state level. 
In August 1999, the 16-member governing board of the State University of New York at 
Old Westbury, 15 of whom were appointed by Pataki, nominated Butts as the university’s 
new president. Randy Daniels, the state official who funded Harlem Center and served as 
a State University of New York trustee, had pushed Butts’s candidacy. Despite charges 
that the decision was politically motivated, a claim that Pataki denied, Butts received 
approval. He took his new post alongside his position as leader of Harlem’s most 
prominent church, and his growing reputation as one of Harlem’s most successful 
builders.65 
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“Real Players”—But at What Cost? 
Early in the new century, the New York Amsterdam News stepped back to survey 
the church-based community development corporations that had been reshaping the city’s 
predominantly African-American neighborhoods for nearly two decades. “More than 20 
years later,” the author wrote, “these religious institutions are real players in helping to 
reshape some of the city’s working class neighborhoods, propelling development in 
places that were once ignored.” Exhibit A was Harlem Center, and the reporter turned to 
Calvin Butts. “We think things are going well,” Butts explained. “We are involved in 
total community development, from residential to commercial to educational and 
cultural.” The Abyssinian Development Corporation had achieved influence that backers 
never dreamed of when they launched as a modest, informal venture intended to build 
stable housing for the church’s elderly parishioners. Now, as leaders like Butts gained 
greater power, Harlem took on an increasingly economically diverse cast, and insiders 
and outsiders both demonstrated a new openness to the private market as the means of 
Harlem’s development – and to retail markets as the ends that development would pursue 
– organizations like ADC were, indeed, “real players.”66 
Yet if ADC’s prominence derived in large measure from its pragmatism in an era 
of change, serious questions remained about whether all community developers gained 
equally from the new order of development. On this issue, ADC’s experience with 
Harlem Center proved once again instructive. When Abyssinian gained designation for 
the project to which it had deep political ties, other longstanding CDCs cried foul. 
Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement, the CDC that had arisen alongside 
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ADC in the late 1980s (as Harlem Churches for Community Improvement), had 
submitted a proposal for the project as well. The organization’s director, Preston 
Washington, objected that ADC had gained favorable treatment through its relationship 
with Pataki. “I think this was done to position Calvin [Butts] to run for Congress,” he 
explained. “Sixty congregations are going to be overlooked so the project can go to one 
church, with one preacher.” Harlem Commonwealth Council, which was participating in 
the development of Harlem USA and unsuccessfully sought involvement with this project 
as well, drew parallels between ADC’s success and the just-released state audit of 
HUDC. “This is more of the same, only now it’s colored Republican,” Joseph Searles of 
HCC claimed. Such complaints surely arose in part from envy, but also from the reality 
that the changing nature of development would reward some organizations while leaving 
others behind. In an increasingly competitive climate, as leaders sought to spur 
investment in Harlem, the public and private sectors would look to organizations like 
ADC that built their reputations on ideological flexibility and the ability to get things 
done.67 
Yet if ADC had achieved the long hoped-for centrality of community-based 
organizations in Harlem’s development, the question also remained whether such 
influence included the high ideals that had inspired demands for community development 
in the first place. Indeed, political pragmatism came at a cost. When neighborhood 
activists protested against Butts’s embrace of Pataki, they did so not merely out of 
parochial turf battles or personal rivalries, but because they believed such an endorsement 
had real and problematic consequences in Harlem. Many pointed to the cuts Pataki had 
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instituted in tuition assistance for students attending the state and city university systems. 
Others wondered how Butts could endorse a leader who had reintroduced the death 
penalty in the state, expanded the state’s investment in prisons, and slashed social service 
spending. Those on the front lines of such protests included many of Harlem’s graying 
activists, survivors from an earlier era who brought their dissent to the transforming 
landscape of 125th Street. Several gathered in front of the State Office Building in late 
1998, on the plaza whose pavement covered the earth that had once supported the tents 
that designated Reclamation Site #1. “Butts’s political opportunism must be challenged 
by the members of his church and the Harlem community who have provided the base for 
his emergence as a prominent spokesperson for Harlem,” said Jim Haughton, who for 
decades had fought discrimination in the construction industry. Preston Wilcox, as ever, 
was among them, and, as ever, spared no mercy in challenging the position of an 
opponent. “He has put himself in the position of a slave catcher to help Pataki take over 
Harlem,” Wilcox exclaimed.68  
Yet if Wilcox saw the new development on Harlem’s main street as the 
foreboding sign of a neighborhood that would no longer be a city within a city, Butts 
viewed the commercial redevelopment of 125th Street as the most concrete sign that 
longstanding goals had finally been accomplished. Questioned on his endorsement of 
Pataki, Butts pointed to one of the projects that his organization had been able to build. 
“We can…say that the developers of the Pathmark supermarket are Black people. In 
other words, we won the building and the land.”69 If both sides evinced certainty that 
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their view of Harlem was the right one, in fact their inability to agree suggested the 
complexity at play in the neighborhood by the late 1990s. Making markets in Harlem, 
both abstract and literal, brought mixed meanings for the neighborhood’s residents. Many 
welcomed Harlem’s entrance into a promised economic mainstream, while others feared 
that open doors would bring new threats. At the center stood Harlem’s community 
developers, who also had much to gain and much to lose in Harlem’s continuing 
transformation, and who would surely continue to offer new visions of community 
development in a new century. 
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Conclusion 
“Between the Two Harlems” 
 
 In November 2001, architect J. Max Bond, Jr. joined former Upper Manhattan 
Empowerment Zone president Deborah Wright, Abyssinian Development Corporation 
executive Darren Walker, and other architects, developers, and business people at an 
Urban Land Institute event on development in Harlem. The program outlined a boosterish 
agenda consistent with the orientation of the Urban Land Institute, a real estate interest 
group. “The purpose of the program is to present a current view of development 
opportunities in this increasingly vibrant Manhattan community,” an announcement 
explained. “Speakers will address the salient issues driving the current revitalization 
efforts in Harlem and discuss why these efforts are timely, profitable, and beneficial for 
New York, Harlem, and the development community.” If the Urban Land Institute 
promised discussions consistent with the view of Harlem as a market yet to be fully 
tapped, however, Bond took the opportunity to raise a series of critical questions about 
who gained and who lost in Harlem’s accelerating transformation. “Who will benefit?” 
he asked. “Who will profit from growth and change?” Will all Harlemites have access to 
newly created jobs, Bond wondered, and would the neighborhood’s “existing social and 
cultural institutions” gain too? “There are many other such questions that need to be 
addressed,” Bond told the audience members, “but for me as an architect and urbanist the 
overarching question is: in what image will Harlem be recreated?”1 
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Indeed, the story of Harlem in the late twentieth century was fundamentally a 
story about images—about social, political, and architectural visions of the future city 
and the struggle over which would prevail. Frustration with large-scale, state-led urban 
redevelopment in the mid- to late-1960s had prompted often-radical demands for 
community control over the built environment. Bond had helped to articulate the 
revolutionary spatial ideal that grew out of these demands, a utopian, yet seemingly 
attainable hope that Harlem could be a place built by and for its predominantly low-
income residents. These goals gave rise to community-based organizations promising to 
achieve this radical image. In time, however, they abandoned such aspirations for a 
variety of reasons, including their continued dependence on the financial support of the 
state, the intransigence of community control radicals themselves, the preferences and 
political orientations of strong leaders, changing sociological understandings of poverty, 
and the simple fact that profound transformation often required herculean efforts by local 
activists facing long odds.  
By the end of the century community developers had in many ways achieved the 
highest aspirations of the late 1960s, that they could gain a major role in the reshaping of 
their neighborhood, but the moderate spatial vision they carried forth – of economic 
integration and commercial redevelopment – differed dramatically from the ideals that 
had seeded signal events like the occupation of Reclamation Site #1 and the activism of 
urban homesteaders. This was a central irony of these decades: Harlem community 
organizations with radical roots came to espouse a moderate, often pragmatic approach to 
social, political, and spatial transformation. Community development, which had once 
stood for a communitarian, collectivist ideal of the future city, instead came to exemplify 
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an image of Harlem as a place whose revitalization would proceed from the attraction of 
the middle-class and from the neighborhood’s entrance into what backers characterized 
as the economic mainstream.  
This view predominated by the end of the twentieth century, as public-private 
development partnerships and income diversification became the watchwords of 
community developers not only in Harlem, but nationwide. Indeed, in articulating his 
own response to the question he had posed, even Bond blended the radical aspirations 
that he had voiced in 1968 and 1969 with the moderate vision that had since become 
pervasive in Harlem. “I believe that we should develop images of what I call the Working 
City, a city that serves the needs and reflects the imaginations and visions of all its 
people,” Bond explained at the Urban Land Institute event. “If only Harlem could 
become an area that retained its rich heritage while providing jobs, good housing, good 
schools, even better libraries, reliable and efficient municipal services, better parks, and 
playgrounds.” Bond feared Harlem’s transformation into a “bourgeois vision of urban 
paradise, sanitized, full of shops, beautiful people, clean entertainment, museums; but 
devoid of risk.” Yet so too did he acknowledge – and welcome – the new reality in which 
he found himself, where middle-class settlement had become typical as both an event and 
an objective. “Such a community should accommodate people of various incomes. Its 
population should be diverse,” said Bond.2 
At the helm of the Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone (UMEZ), too, 
leadership changes symbolized the broader transformation that unfolded in Harlem in 
these forty years, the ubiquity of the moderate spatial vision for Harlem’s blocks, and the 
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tensions that attended that vision. In early 2003, Kenneth Knuckles became the third 
president of the Empowerment Zone, taking his place in the organization’s Lenox 
Avenue office, just a few doors from where the Architects’ Renewal Committee in 
Harlem (ARCH) had once set up shop and across the street from Harlem Center. 
Knuckles had sat on the board at UMEZ since September 2001 and had made a career as 
an increasingly prominent official in New York’s public and non-profit sectors. He had 
served as an assistant city housing commissioner, as deputy borough president in the 
Bronx, as Commissioner of the New York City Department of General Services, and as a 
vice president in the administration of Columbia University. In 2000, he joined the City 
Planning Commission. In 2002, Mayor Michael Bloomberg elevated him as vice chair of 
the commission.  
As UMEZ’s new leader, Knuckles pursued an agenda consistent with that of his 
predecessors, focused on the organization’s role in stimulating private development as a 
means of social and economic transformation. Chain stores, Knuckles argued, served 
both resident needs and provided employment for a population that he hoped, as did 
many of his peers, would exhibit increasing income diversity. “Harlem needed economic 
integration,” Knuckles explained. “I think it is a good thing that whites, middle-class 
Blacks, are moving back to Harlem.” In tempering this call with hopes that his 
organization could better engage Harlem’s small businesses and residents in the future, 
however, he perhaps revealed the path he had travelled in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. Knuckles, African-American and trained as an architect and lawyer, 
had come to Harlem 35 years earlier as a high school dropout, to enroll in the first class 
of “Architecture in the Neighborhoods,” the program that ARCH had begun in 1968 as 
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part of its broader effort to create direct pathways for African-Americans to gain control 
over their built environment. Architecture in the Neighborhoods introduced Knuckles to 
the professions of architecture and planning, and served as the first step in his emergence 
as one of Harlem’s leading development officials. Knuckles’s ascent to the top of the 
Empowerment Zone and the City Planning Commission, the body that ARCH had once 
targeted with protests at City Hall for its lack of diversity, exemplified all the promise 
and paradoxes intrinsic to the project of community development. At once, he embodied 
both the considerable legacy and success of radical demands for community control, and 
the remarkably different image of the city that had emerged as the major objective of 
community developers.3  
In the first years of the new century, the pursuit of this image would continue at 
an accelerated pace and greater scale. New commercial developments would rise on 
Harlem’s major streets, and new middle-class residents would find their way to Harlem. 
Community-based organizations often stood at the center of such projects, but not 
always. Private developers and private citizens increasingly joined their efforts to build 
new large-scale retail centers and renovate homes for middle-class residents. In 
Bradhurst, for example, the Harlem Congregations for Community Improvement broke 
ground on a building containing Harlem’s second Pathmark supermarket and more than a 
hundred middle-income cooperative apartments in 2002. UMEZ helped fund an auto mall 
in 2003, bringing new car and truck sales within the bounds of the East Harlem Triangle. 
Touring Harlem, a New York Amsterdam News reporter found “on practically every 
block…a plethora of construction activity.” A speculative office building and new 
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commercial center joined the other developments that had recently emerged on 125th 
Street. A New York Times reporter described “A New Harlem Gentry in Search of Its 
Latte,” as he chronicled the travails of middle-class, African-American residents in the 
streets around Lenox Avenue, for whom it was ever easier to find a salon, a gift shop, or 
a bistro in a neighborhood where they had once had difficulty meeting even their morning 
beverage needs.4  
Likewise, longstanding concerns about the direction of Harlem’s development 
would persist at an increased pace and scale in the early 2000s. Organizations like the 
Abyssinian Development Corporation (ADC) continued to tiptoe the line between the 
responsibility they claimed to existing low-income Harlemites and the middle-income 
residents they sought to attract. On one hand, the CDC proved its commitment to 
Harlemites with its continued provision of housing and services for the homeless, its 
Head Start program, and its development of the first public school to open in Harlem in 
decades. On the other hand, ADC continued to attract scrutiny from those same residents 
in response to its often-pragmatic approach to the neighborhood’s built fabric and its 
increased focus on middle-class homeownership. The organization’s redevelopment of 
the Renaissance Ballroom, a neighborhood icon around the corner from Abyssinian 
Baptist Church, offered one example. Abyssinian leaders opposed official landmark 
designation of the structure, arguing that doing so would restrict their plans. The CDC 
intended to demolish much of the site in order to build a 19-story building with nearly 
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120 condominiums, four-fifths to be sold at market rate. Leaders pointed to their 
normative ideal of a mixed-income community with greater homeownership to justify the 
increasing scale of their ambition. But with the prospect of a new, predominantly middle-
income structure towering over a rapidly gentrifying Frederick Douglass Boulevard and 
other plans for moderate- and middle-income housing on nearby streets, ADC 
unsurprisingly faced continued questions about its role and responsibility in an already 
changing neighborhood. “If you want to branch out into business and moderate-income 
housing, that’s cool,” said one Harlem tenant advocate. “But don’t forget about the 
people.”5 
Indeed, if middle-class residents had once been scarce in Harlem – notable for the 
Beethoven they blasted from their windows as they restored woodwork or their interest in 
period furniture in a neighborhood confronting the rise of crack cocaine – their presence 
was not so strange anymore. One newly arrived 125th Street tenant suggested the degree 
to which Harlem had regained continuity with the rest of Manhattan in the minds of many 
New Yorkers. In 2001, after leaving office as president of the United States, Bill Clinton 
rented the penthouse in one of Harlem’s tallest buildings for his post-presidential office 
and for the offices of his foundation. Community leaders and real estate brokers hoped 
Clinton’s arrival would accelerate the transformation of 125th Street already underway.6  
                                                
5 Alan Feuer, “Stress of Harlem’s Rebirth Shows in School’s Move to a New Building,” New York Times, 2 
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The street’s ongoing changes brought mixed emotions, however. While some 
continued to look with optimism upon the arrival of retail they had lacked, other longtime 
Harlemites watched and worried as new amenities displaced the businesses they had 
depended upon, if not themselves. “The majority of the stores, the 99-cent stores, they’re 
gone,” one resident explained. “The Laundromat on the corner is gone. The bodegas are 
gone. There’s large delis now. What had been two for $1 is now one for $3…The foods 
being sold—feta cheese instead of sharp Cheddar cheese. That’s a whole other world.” 
Preston Wilcox joined other 125th Street institutions forced to decamp. In early 2005, he 
received an eviction notice for the office he had occupied for twelve years, a decision 
motivated by the landlord’s desire to gain “fair market value” for the space Wilcox had 
rented at a rate that now seemed unusually low on the changing boulevard. Wilcox 
moved on from Harlem’s main street.7 
Wilcox passed away the following year, in August, at age 82. “Preston Wilcox 
was born on Harlem Street in Youngstown, Ohio,” read an obituary by the journalist 
Herb Boyd, “and died last week at his apartment in the village of Harlem.” Wilcox had 
made a life “between the two Harlems,” Boyd continued.8 Though he was referring to the 
symmetry of Wilcox’s place of birth and place of death, and the seeming inevitability of 
his finding his way to the most famous neighborhood in America, the metaphor could be 
read differently, too. Wilcox’s death marked the end of an era in Harlem, the end of the 
period chronicled in this study, a period in which Harlem changed dramatically. In the 
1960s, Harlem served as a national emblem of the “urban crisis” wracking predominantly 
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African-American communities across America. By the late 1990s, the neighborhood 
represented the leading edge of the “Second Renaissance” that touched many such 
neighborhoods. This renaissance took place amidst transformative forces at the local, 
national, and global level, including the transnational spread of ideas and economies, the 
political shift away from a dominant welfare state, and the fall and rise of New York’s 
financial and real estate sectors, but came about in large part through the work of 
community-level actors like Wilcox who struggled to imagine and rebuild the 
neighborhood they called home.  
Wilcox offered a creative, often critical voice as such struggles unfolded, a 
constant who never missed an opportunity to remind Harlemites of the highest ideals that 
had inspired demands for community control. “He was a challenger, a multifaceted 
person whom I liked very much,” said Harlem politician and businessman Percy Sutton at 
Wilcox’s memorial service. “I didn’t know him in his athletic days, but I knew him in his 
angry days. I will always remember his bringing me clippings, clippings, and more 
clippings.”9 The movements that Wilcox had inspired built a neighborhood very different 
from the one he had helped to imagine on blocks like Reclamation Site #1. In his refusal 
to give up that radical vision as things changed around him, Wilcox could seem quite 
utopian, even quaint, in a neighborhood whose fate community leaders increasingly tied 
to the goal of economic integration. Yet in an era in which such a view of urban 
revitalization became so common as to go largely unquestioned – ubiquitous not only in 
the work of community development corporations but also enshrined in national policy 
through programs like HOPE-VI, which replaced public housing with mixed-income 
developments – Wilcox’s dependable advocacy on behalf of Harlem’s low-income 
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residents offered a vital counterpoint. Activists’ revolutionary spatial ideal offered the 
possibility that low-income residents in communities like Harlem could be the very roots 
of a city whose branches would bring benefits to all of its citizens. This view held that 
longtime Harlemites could provide the foundation for revitalization—that they 
represented not the problem of cities, but a potential solution.  
The most ardent evangelist for this idea no longer could voice it on Harlem’s 
streets, but Wilcox’s call remained equally urgent, if not more so, in the era to which 
these decades served as a prelude. The pace of transformation became ever quicker in the 
first decade of the 21st century in Harlem. Community-based organizations had once 
wondered about the feasibility of attracting middle-income residents to the neighborhood, 
but now a more pressing question was whether they would be able to manage the rapid 
change underway and, indeed, maintain the influence they had obtained. Harlems 
nationwide found themselves facing similar questions. U Street in Washington, DC, for 
instance, whose past and future mirrored that of 125th Street, would likewise become a 
center of debate over neighborhood change, as would Over-the-Rhine in Cincinnati, 
Bronzeville in Chicago, and even neighborhoods just across the East River in Brooklyn. 
In Harlem, where the neighborhood’s fame always gave it the added responsibility of a 
standard bearer and where its Manhattan location meant development pressures came at 
full volume, residents felt the stress particularly acutely. Columbia University advanced a 
plan for a 17-acre expansion in 2007, for example, to transform the Manhattanville 
neighborhood of West Harlem from Broadway to the Hudson River. The following year, 
the City Planning Commission proposed to rezone 125th Street to enable a greatly 
expanded scale of development, including skyscrapers up to 29 stories tall. Each revived 
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old ghosts from battles long past, eliciting resident protests and turbulent public hearings. 
Kenneth Knuckles voted for both plans. Karen Phillips, the former president of 
Abyssinian Development Corporation, who also served on the City Planning 
Commission, voted against them. Nevertheless, each passed.10 
If the latter half of the twentieth century in Harlem brought debates over the class 
makeup of a neighborhood that remained predominantly African-American despite its 
changing landscape, the new pressures in the years following this transformation were – 
and will be – marked increasingly by debates centered on the issue of race. Race adds an 
unpredictable ingredient to the alchemy of change in what had long been, in the words of 
James Weldon Johnson, “a city within a city.” “In the make-up of New York, Harlem is 
not merely a Negro colony or community,” wrote the great writer amidst the Harlem 
Renaissance, “it is a city within a city, the greatest Negro city in the world…There is 
nothing just like it in any other city in the country, for there is no preparation for it; no 
change in the character of the houses and streets; no change, indeed, in the appearance of 
the people, except their color.” Looking out from 1925, Johnson wondered about this 
place he had come to call home, and wondered about its future. “The question naturally 
arises, ‘Are the Negroes going to be able to hold Harlem?’” Johnson continued, “When 
colored people do leave Harlem, their homes, their churches, their investments and their 
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businesses, it will be because the land has become so valuable they can no longer afford 
to live on it.”11  
This moment would not come soon, Johnson predicted. “[T]he date of another 
move northward is very far in the future,” he wrote. By and large, he was correct. As 
Harlemites debated the future of their neighborhood and their role in rebuilding it in the 
decades chronicled in this study, their assumptions proceeded from the power and 
identity they claimed as a predominantly African-American place. Whether in the form of 
a revolutionary spatial ideal or a moderate spatial vision, community members had 
largely agreed that the neighborhood they revived would remain a majority black 
neighborhood, indeed, America’s greatest majority black neighborhood. This belief 
remained in the background as Harlemites continuously reinvented the space they called 
home. As the pace of change has quickened in recent years as a consequence of that 
reinvention, however, this belief has come into question. Observers have been quick to 
declare that the end of African-American Harlem is near. “No Longer Majority Black, 
Harlem is in Transition,” one reporter titled a much-circulated piece in 2010, a claim that 
depended in large measure on where one drew the boundaries. But if Central Harlem 
retains its African-American majority today, only one certainty remains about the 
future—it is uncertain. As James Weldon Johnson wrote almost ninety years ago, “What 
will Harlem be and become in the meantime?”12 
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